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С каким наслажденьем 
  жандармской кастой 
я был бы исхлестан и распят 
за то, 
 что в руках у меня 
   молоткастый, 
серпастый 




  я – 
   гражданин 
Советского Союза. 
 
В. В. Маяковский, Стихи о советском паспорте (1929) 
 
 
With what pleasure 
  I would be flogged and crucified 
by the gendarme cast 
because 
 I have in my hands 
   a hammered, 
sickled 
 Soviet passport... 
 
Read it, 
 envy me, 
  I am 
   a citizen 
of the Soviet Union. 
 





























 Whenever I arrived in an archive with my letter of introduction, archivists received my 
letter either with practiced indifference or with concern about the scope of my project. One well-
meaning archivist even suggested I ask my advisor for a better, more specific topic. Alongside 
my appreciation that this is not how American academia works, I have been especially grateful 
for all the support and advice from my advisor, Douglas Northrop, who has always encouraged 
me to think big while holding me responsible for the smaller details (and for keeping Central 
Asia in focus!). Throughout the Ph.D. process, Doug has been an untiring source of wisdom and 
advice. It is impossible to imagine this dissertation without his support. 
 The rest of my committee has also been instrumental in shaping my scholarship. Ron 
Suny has been an invaluable interlocutor on Soviet history, and I am particularly thankful for his 
enthusiasm for my work. A seminar with Mrinalini Sinha in my first year at Michigan changed 
my approach to writing, and I am forever grateful for her insights into empire and citizenship and 
her outside perspective as a historian of the British Empire. Krisztina Fehérváry and Serhy 
Yekelchyk were late additions to the committee who joined with gusto. I am grateful for their 
perspective and generous feedback, which will shape the project in the years to come.  
 Beyond my committee, Kathleen Canning encouraged me to think about citizenship in an 
excellent seminar in my first year; Valerie Kivelson shaped my thinking about early modern and 
imperial Russia; and Jeff Veidlinger has been a source of insight and encouragement. Amir 
Weiner’s seminar at Stanford introduced me properly to Soviet historiography. My thanks go to 
Rachel Applebaum, Sam Hirst, Mayhill Fowler, Alissa Klots, Jo Laycock, Jeff Sahadeo, 





thoughtful comments at various points of the writing process. 
 Research was supported by numerous grants, including Title VIII funding through 
American Councils; Title VI funding through the University of Michigan and Stanford; the UM 
International Institute; the Weiser Center for Europe and Eurasia; the Weiser Center for 
Emerging Democracies; the UM History Department; and the Rackham Graduate School. 
 Research and writing took place across three continents and in cities across the former 
Soviet Union. From Ann Arbor to Dushanbe, Moscow to New York City, and everywhere in 
between, I have been fortunate to be surrounded by fellow researchers and scholars who have 
made the process of researching and writing this dissertation not only more effective and 
productive but also more fun. Aaron Hale-Dorrell and Benjamin Sawyer provided me a crash 
course in using archives during my first research trip to Moscow, a favor I’ve paid forward since. 
 In Dushanbe, Nona and Umed Majidi provided helpful insight into life in Tajikistan in 
general and to the archives specifically. Artemy Kalinovsky and James Pickett helped me 
navigate the archives from afar. Additional thanks to Vadim Abanin and Irna Hofman. On a prior 
trip, Grace Zhou was the best Uzbek-language classmate I could have asked for; it’s been 
wonderful keeping up over the years! Yoqubjon, Saltanat, Faridun, Dilnura, Nargiz, and host 
families helped me with Uzbek and Tajik and taught me much about Tajikistan in the process. In 
Almaty, I saw Marysia Blackwood almost daily both in the archives and outside them, and she 
graciously hosted me on more than one occasion in Moscow. Michelle Chan Brown, Margaret 
Hansen, Madi Mambetov, Rebekah Ramsay, Kimberly Powers, and Erden Zikibay made time in 
Almaty memorable. Saule Satayeva and Kundyz Kozhanova were wonderful hosts and friends. 
Raushan deserves particular mention not only for her Kazakh-language instruction but also for 
her openness and warmth. Natalia kept me caffeinated at Nedelka between Kazakh lessons and 
long days in the archives. In Moscow, I was joined by a rotating cast of researchers. Ben 
Bamberger, Betty Banks, Alan Barenberg, Natalie Belsky, Abigail Bratcher, Aaron Hale-Dorrell, 





and Mirjam Voerkelius made my longest stint there more enjoyable. Tamara Polyakova hosted 
me in Petrozavodsk. In Ukraine, Nazar and Olena Rybiy hosted on many occasions, and it’s been 
lovely to watch Khrystynka and Tereza grow up through the years. Jen Carroll was not only a 
tireless organizer, but she also introduced me to many along the way. Orysia Kulick has been a 
thoughtful reader, a careful editor, and a great friend. Across all research sites, archivists have 
always been professional and helpful. 
 I did most of my writing in Toronto and New York City. In Toronto, Lynne Viola 
welcomed me as a full-fledged member of her monthly workshops. Simone Bellezza, Marilyn 
Campeau, Susie Colbourn, Simon Miles, Yuliya Nikolova, Maris Rowe-McCullough, and Yvon 
Wang made the time in Toronto especially memorable. In New York City, the Jordan Center for 
the Advanced Study of Russia at New York University offered me an academic home away from 
Michigan as I finished up. There, Betty Banks, Heather Janson Messina, Brigid O’Keeffe, and 
Brandon Schechter made me feel especially welcome and included. Charles Shaw and Tanya 
Mazyar offered their home in Budapest when I needed a place to sit and write in August 2016.  
 Along the way, fellow graduate students improved my experience while providing 
invaluable insight from their own research. Particular thanks to Ian Campbell, Eli Feiman, 
Johanna Folland, Sarah Garibova, Krista Goff, Jeremy Johnson, Deborah Jones, Sarah Mass, 
Erin Null, David Spreen, Ronit Stahl, Katie Wroblewski, and Jessica Zychowicz. Jeremy 
Johnson and Levani Papashvili, Hanna Folland and David Spreen, Sarah Garibova, and Katie 
Wroblewski and Chad Weeks deserve special mention for hosting me in Ann Arbor. 
 My writing has been immeasurably improved by writing groups, who plodded through 
rough drafts and loose ends. For the feedback, accountability, and camaraderie, special thanks to 
Marysia Blackwood, Susie Colbourn, Brady G’sell, Emma Park, Rebekah Ramsay, Maris Rowe-
McCullough, Maria Taylor, Katie Wroblewski, and Kate Younger. Kate deserves particular 
mention for not only reading multiple versions of most chapters but also for reading the entire 





How far we’ve come since we were assigned to be roommates our freshman year of college, 
when you first taught me to read the Cyrillic alphabet. How many adventures we’ve had since! 
 Friends have been there along the way; many made considerable effort to visit and host 
me. Thanks to Marysia Blackwood, Susie Colbourn and Simon Miles, Caroline Corbitt, Eli 
Feiman, Marina Fisher, Rachel and Phil Hartwell, Alli Germain, Dennis and Adisa Keen, Roy 
Kimmey, Maria Mammina, Alana Mendelsohn, Ivo and Jessy Mijnssen, Brittney Moraski, 
Adrian Oryshkevych, Calvin Seward, Eliot and Aneesha Sherman, Mirjam and Felix Schiller, 
Alex Usher and David Hartmann, Kate and Neil Younger, and Grace Zhou and Igor Rubinov. 
 The biggest debt, of course, is to my family. My parents, Robert Whittington and Martha 
von Hillebrandt, have supported me in immeasurable ways, and they even managed to visit me in 
the field, together with my in-laws, Jurij and Olenka Dobczansky. My siblings have been a 
source of endless support and encouragement: Daniel and Lila Whittington (along with Hector), 
Lydia Whittington and Kevin Davies, Ruth Whittington, and Thomas Whittington—I can’t 
imagine life without you! Even Rocky kept me company as I wrote the introduction—you’re 
missed, bud! Thanks also to Roman Dobczansky, Adrianna and Taras Hankewycz, and Daria 
Melnyk and Roman Hewryk for additional support and conversation through the years. 
 Markian Dobczansky has accompanied me throughout this project. He not only read the 
full dissertation, but he graciously traveled to most of my research sites and to countless places 
in between. Throughout, he’s always been my biggest cheerleader, my favorite conversation 
partner, and the best co-adventurer. My dissertation is certainly better for his feedback, and my 
thinking is much clearer for years of conversation and argument. I’m still glad I said hi at that 
Stanford holiday party back in 2010. Now with two dissertations behind us, life has certainly 





NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION 
 
  
 Research for this dissertation was drawn primarily from Russian-language sources, with 
additional sources in Ukrainian, Uzbek, Kazakh, and other languages. Wherever possible, I have 
sought to consult materials in original languages. All translations into English are my own unless 
otherwise noted. 
 I cite all archival documents from the former Soviet Union according to the Russian 
terms for each level of organization: fond (collection), opis (inventory), delo (file), and list 
(page). Although these have equivalent terms in other languages, I have used the Russian for the 
sake of simplicity and to reflect the uniformity of Soviet archival organization. 
 Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian terms, names, and materials are transliterated 
according to a simplified Library of Congress transliteration system, with diacritics removed, 
except where names or terms have standard transliterations that are familiar (for example, 
Yeltsin not Eltsin). For Uzbek, Kazakh, and other Turkic languages, written in Cyrillic beginning 
in the late 1930s and early 1940s, I transliterate according to current standard Latin variants, 
including special characters. For Uzbek, this is straightforward, as a standardized Latin alphabet 
was approved in 1995. For Kazakh, this has been more complicated due to the ongoing process 
of Latinization. Kazakh-language sources and terms are transliterated according to the version 
approved in February 2018. Names of individuals in Latin-based languages (such as Estonian, 
Latvian, and Lithuanian) are left in the original spelling, including special characters. 
 I have attempted in the text to render names according to the spelling of their language of 
origin (thus, Jambyl rather than Dzhambul), particularly for cases in which non-Russian 
languages or identities were self-evidently relevant to individuals. For cases in which Russian-
language versions are more common or also relevant, I provide Russian equivalents in 
parentheses. In footnotes and the bibliography, names and titles are transliterated according to 
the language of the materials. Thus, a poem by Jambyl translated into or written in Russian will 
appear under the name “Dzhambul” in notes. Whenever I was unable to determine spelling in the 
original language, for example with obscure republic-level politicians, I have transliterated from 
Russian. Place names are generally rendered according to names in use at the time, as rendered 
in the local language except where cities have standard English-language variants (thus, Almaty 
and not Alma-Ata, Kyiv not Kiev, and Leningrad not St. Petersburg, but Moscow not Moskva, 
and Tashkent not Toshkent). 
 The question of language use and spelling is never a precise science. However, in light of 
the fact that the Soviet state placed considerable weight on the promotion of non-Russian 
languages and cultures, and in recognition of the independent status of former union republics, 
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 This dissertation explores patriotism, citizenship, and identity in the Soviet Union, 
arguing that leaders increasingly promoted a notion of civic identity that emphasized citizens’ 
active participation. People embraced this vision of citizenship across a wide geographical and 
cultural spectrum, as many identified as citizens of the Soviet Union. Based on a diverse array of 
citizen letters, educational curricula, civic rituals, oral history interviews, newspaper discourse, 
and legal documents collected during 27 months of fieldwork in Russia, Eastern Europe, and 
Central Asia, this dissertation considers the complexities of citizenship in a multiethnic, 
multilingual environment. 
 A wide variety of discourses and practices contributed to a growing sense of community 
within the Soviet Union. This dissertation emphasizes the evolving discourse of the “Soviet 
people” (sovetskii narod). When the concept was first invoked in the 1930s under Joseph Stalin, 
it was closely associated with participatory patriotism, which called upon citizens to sacrifice and 
contribute to economic and political life. This emphasis encouraged people from a variety of 
ethnic, linguistic, and social backgrounds to consider themselves first and foremost citizens of 
the Soviet Union. This identity did not preclude ethnic affiliations but rather saw these as part 
and parcel of civic identity. In wartime, the stakes of participation increased, as citizens 
experienced the country as a coherent whole that was engaged in an existential struggle. This 
experience paved the way for more expansive notions of civic identity under Stalin’s successors, 





between state and society, founded on a recognition of the Soviet people as an existing 
community. 
 Citizens experienced, participated in, and developed Soviet identity through a variety of 
practices and encounters. Most obviously, citizens encountered on a daily basis the omnipresent 
discourse of the Soviet people in newspapers, political speeches, and rhetoric. A growing sense 
of identity could also emerge in interactions with the state and fellow citizens, encounters that 
became normalized as Soviet culture, customs, and civic life became entrenched in everyday life. 
Citizens, however, did not simply receive and recite messages of identity. They drew on personal 
observations and experiences to articulate their own understanding of Soviet identity in ways that 
reinforced and challenged the official discourses. This engagement ensured that dynamic 
understandings of Soviet identity shaped civic life across the country. 
 Returning the focus to Soviet identity challenges a widespread belief, most evident in 
scholarship written outside the Soviet Union and Russian Federation, that the Soviet Union failed 
to cultivate a distinct sense of civic identity. A powerful recent scholarly focus on the promotion 
of ethnic identities has driven an underappreciation of the discourses, institutions, and practices 
that drew citizens closer to one another and that imbued the state with a sense of permanence and 
even genuine popularity. Tracing the origins of, reception of, and engagement with Soviet 
identity offers insight into a powerful institution that influenced identity formation across a wide 
geographic space. This focus expands the empirical basis for the wider global scholarship on 
citizenship, which typically locates the origins of modern, participatory citizenship in the process 
of claiming civil rights, most often within democratic contexts. The present study suggests that 
similar notions of civic identity and citizenship could in non-democratic contexts—not simply as 








 In a 1976 letter addressed to the commission convened to prepare a new Soviet 
constitution, Anatolii L., a young party member and scientific researcher at the Kaliningrad 
observatory, petitioned the state to eliminate the entry for ethnicity in Soviet internal passports. 
He believed such a change would better reflect his own identity: “I was born in our marvelous 
multiethnic country and identify only as an equal rights-bearing citizen of the Soviet Union.” 
Born in Northern Kazakhstan to Ukrainian and Polish parents in 1946, Anatolii spoke only 
Russian and felt little attachment to either of his parents’ ethnicities. In his own passport, he had 
fluctuated between Ukrainian and Polish identities, but found neither to “correspond to the 
Marxist-Leninist understanding of belonging to a nation (natsiia).” Only Soviet identity, he 
declared, could appropriately describe him and others like him.1 
From the introduction of the Soviet internal passport regime in the 1930s, ethnicity 
(natsional’nost’) was recorded in citizens’ identification documents and used in applications for 
schools and jobs, and even when receiving medical care.2 Anatolii was one of many citizens who 
openly opposed this system in letters to the constitutional commission in the 1960s and 70s. 
                                                            
1 State Archive of the Russian Federation (hereafter GARF), f. 7523, o. 131, d. 367, l. 190–190ob. Anatolii gives his 
full name and address, but since he and other letter writers cited in the dissertation were not public figures, I omit 
full names to preserve privacy for individuals and their families. For greater anonymity, I use first names when 
available. We will return to Anatolii L. and other letter writers with similar requests in Chapter 3. 
2 Victor Zaslavsky and Yuri Luryi, “The Passport System in the USSR and Changes in Soviet Society,” The Soviet 
and Post-Soviet Review 6, no. 1 (1979): 137–53; A. K. Baiburin, Sovetskii pasport: istoriia, struktura, praktiki 
(Saint Petersburg: Evropeiskii universitet v Sankt-Peterburge, 2017). Natsional’nost’ can alternatively be translated 
as the cognate “nationality,” but I prefer “ethnicity” for two reasons: first, it has a more specific meaning in English 
that avoids confusion with questions of citizenship and belonging to the “nation.” Second, ethnicity better reflects 
Soviet usage: the term referred to both small and large ethnic groups, regardless of claims to political autonomy, and 






Many expressed deep dissatisfaction with what they saw as an unfair, unnecessary, or simply 
outdated institution. Ascribed passport ethnicity, letter-writers argued, poorly represented their 
lived realities and ideological leanings. Many believed replacing ethnicity with “citizen of the 
Soviet Union” would more accurately reflect how they identified themselves. 
This dissertation considers how and why people of diverse social, ethnic, and geographic 
backgrounds came to identify primarily as citizens of the Soviet Union. In contrast to recent 
scholarship in Soviet history, it shifts the focus away from the promotion of ethnic identities 
towards the cultivation of a distinctly Soviet identity, one that was seen, at least theoretically, to 
be compatible with (and even informed by) national affiliations. The internal passport itself 
symbolically testified to this understanding: while serving as citizens’ primary record of 
identification as Soviet citizens, the infamous and unpopular fifth line documented their ethnic 
affiliation according to the ethnicity of either parent. It was this item that Anatolii criticized in 
his 1976 letter, preferring to be identified only as a Soviet citizen. His and similar statements of 
attachment to the state, this dissertation demonstrates, should be seen in light of the state’s 
deliberate agenda to cultivate Soviet identity. Through an exploration of Soviet patriotism, 
citizenship, and identity, I argue that leaders promoted a civic identity that emphasized active 
participation in public life. People across a wide geographical and cultural spectrum embraced 
this vision of citizenship, even as ethnic, gender, and linguistic differences created disparities in 
citizens’ claims to and participation in this citizenship. 
This dissertation traces the development of Soviet identity in the lead-up to World War II 
and its evolution in subsequent decades. Based on a wide range of sources collected over 27 
months of fieldwork in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, I consider the complexities of 






embraced a civic identity that was buttressed by ethnic identities, but that this relationship was 
often fraught with tensions between theory and practice. My dissertation offers a more 
positive interpretation of Soviet citizenship than is typically presented by historians, shedding 
light not only on how citizenship as an institution was established, cultivated, and practiced, but 
also on how it contributed to the longevity of the Soviet state. 
A wide variety of discourses and practices contributed to a growing sense of community 
within the Soviet Union. This dissertation emphasizes the evolving discourse of the “Soviet 
people” (sovetskii narod). When the concept was first invoked in the 1930s under Joseph Stalin, 
it was closely associated with notions of participatory patriotism, which called upon citizens to 
make sacrifices and take part in economic and political life. This emphasis on Soviet identity 
encouraged people from a variety of ethnic, linguistic, and social backgrounds to consider 
themselves first and foremost citizens of the Soviet Union. This identity did not preclude ethnic 
affiliations but rather saw these as part and parcel of a broader civic identity. In wartime, the 
stakes of participation increased, as citizens experienced the country as a coherent whole that 
was engaged in an existential struggle. This wartime experience paved the way for more 
expansive notions of civic identity under Stalin’s successors, Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid 
Brezhnev, who envisioned a more cooperative relationship between state and society that was 
founded on a recognition of the Soviet people as an existing, meaningful community of citizens. 
Citizens experienced, participated in, and developed Soviet identity through a variety of 
practices and encounters. Most obviously, citizens encountered on a daily basis the omnipresent 
discourse of the Soviet people in newspapers, political speeches, and rhetoric. A growing sense 
of identity could also emerge in everyday interactions with both the state and fellow citizens, 






in everyday life. Citizens, however, did not simply receive and recite messages of identity. They 
also drew on personal observations and experiences to articulate their own understanding of 
Soviet identity in ways that reinforced and challenged the public discourses. This engagement 
ensured that dynamic understandings of Soviet identity shaped civic life across the country. 
Returning the focus to Soviet identity challenges a widespread belief, most evident in 
scholarship written outside the Soviet Union and Russian Federation, that the Soviet Union failed 
to cultivate a distinct sense of civic identity. A powerful recent scholarly focus on the promotion 
of ethnic identities, for all of its contributions, has also driven an underappreciation of the 
discourses, institutions, and practices that drew citizens closer to one another and that imbued the 
state with a sense of permanence and even genuine popularity. Tracing the origins of, reception 
of, and engagement with Soviet identity offers new insight into a powerful institution that 
influenced identity formation across a wide geographic space. This focus also expands the 
empirical basis for the wider global scholarship on citizenship, which typically locates the 
origins of modern, participatory citizenship in the process of claiming civil rights, most often 
within democratic contexts. The present study suggests that similar notions of civic identity and 
citizenship also emerged in non-democratic contexts—not simply as a state-driven institution but 
as one navigated and negotiated by citizens themselves. 
 
Nationalities Policy and Soviet Identity 
My focus on Soviet identity and citizenship contrasts with much existing scholarship. 
Recent historical work on identity in the Soviet Union has generally explored Soviet identities: 
especially the countless ‘national’ identities that proliferated among a wide variety of ethno-






all term for the party-state’s broad agenda to manage its diverse population—challenged the 
classic Cold War view of the Soviet Union as a “prison-house of nations.”3 Historians of 
nationalities policy have shown how the state promoted ethno-linguistic minorities as part of a 
wide-ranging program of “affirmative action” that promoted national elites through favorable 
quotas in higher education, guaranteed representation in government, and extensive cultural 
programs.4 As Terry Martin argues, leaders sought to circumvent potential nationalist uprisings 
by establishing and controlling forms of nationhood, a “strategy designed to avoid the perception 
of empire.”5 Martin traces the rise of affirmative action policies in the 1920s and early ‘30s, 
before analyzing their slow demise, culminating with what he terms the “return of the Russians” 
and the rise of the concept of the “friendship of the peoples” on the eve of World War II. 
Francine Hirsch interprets this shift differently, arguing instead that nationalities policy 
should be instead understood as “state-sponsored evolutionism,” which would transform citizens 
                                                            
3 “Prison-house of nations” borrows from Marx’s description of the tsarist empire. In the Cold War, scholars and 
government officials in the west emphasized state oppression of linguistic, religious, and ethnic minorities, 
epitomized in the 1958 Library of Congress report The Soviet Empire: Prison House of Nations and Races; A Study 
in Genocide, Discrimination, and Abuse of Power (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1958). Many Cold War-
era scholars pointed to hotspots of restive nationalism as potential sources of instability, see Hélène Carrère 
d’Encausse, Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979); 
Alexander J. Motyl, Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity, and Stability in the USSR (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1987); Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities 
Problem in the USSR (New York: Free Press, 1990).  
4 Richard Pipes’s The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1954) was one of the first historians to address the Soviet Union’s cultivation of ethnic 
identity. In his view, the Soviet Union did so instrumentally, to trick minorities into working with the state, before 
ultimately undermining and destroying national cultures. Nationalities policy came into renewed focus in the 1980s 
with Gerhard Simon’s pioneering Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik in der Sowjetunion: von der totalitären 
Diktatur zur nachstalinschen Gesellschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1986). His sweeping study of the entire Soviet 
period (to 1986) traced the evolution of nationalities policy from its early blossoming in the 1920s and ‘30s, a 
retreat, and an eventual return in the 1960s. The collapse brought newfound attention to the nationalities question, as 
scholars offered more generous interpretations of the Soviet cultivation of ethnicity, including Ronald Grigor Suny, 
The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993); Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted 
Ethnic Particularism,” Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (1994): 414–52. In subsequent years, the field has expanded 
dramatically, see especially Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet 
Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca: Cornell, 2001); Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the 
Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). Both Martin and Hirsch focus primarily on the 
first decades of Soviet rule; Jeremy Smith offers a comprehensive study of the entire Soviet period in Red Nations: 
The Nationalities Experience in and After the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 






into a higher stage of Marxist-Leninist historical development. Rather than seeing change in the 
1930s as a shift in policy, Hirsch convincingly demonstrates that the nascent state pursued a 
program of “double assimilation,” by which individuals were first fused into nations, which were 
in turn integrated into state and society, in two distinct but overlapping processes.6 What Martin 
describes as a reversal, Hirsch alternatively describes as a shift in emphasis from the first phase 
to the second. Although Martin’s policy reversal and Hirsch’s distinct but overlapping phases 
share much in common, Hirsch draws more attention to role of ethnic minorities and local actors, 
in part reflecting her focus on the work of early Soviet anthropologists and ethnographers. 
The work of local actors has come into sharper relief in the proliferating literature on 
regional aspects of nationalities policy. In suggesting how central initiatives were translated, 
altered, negotiated, and even initiated at the periphery, these studies enrich and challenge 
arguments put forward by Martin, Hirsch, and others. Matthew Pauly’s study of language 
education in Ukraine, for example, reveals considerable resistance to Ukrainization not evident 
from Martin’s more sweeping perspective, while Peter Blitstein highlights the dialectical 
relationship between Russian and native-language education.7 Scholars of early Soviet Central 
Asia emphasize a focus on women, as manifested through unveiling campaigns and public health 
and educational initiatives.8 Others suggest the specific ways the nascent state forged changes in 
                                                            
6 Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 8. 
7 Matthew D. Pauly, Breaking the Tongue: Language, Education, and Power in Soviet Ukraine, 1923–1934 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014); Peter Blitstein, “Nation-Building or Russification? Obligatory 
Russian Instruction in the Soviet Non-Russian School, 1938–1953,” in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-
Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 253–74. 
8 E.g. Gregory J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet 
Central Asia, 1919–1929 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Paula A. Michaels, Curative Powers: 
Medicine and Empire in Stalin’s Central Asia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003); Douglas Northrop, 
Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Marianne 
Kamp, The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling Under Communism (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2006); Adrienne Lynn Edgar, Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006); Ali F. İğmen, Speaking Soviet with an Accent: Culture and Power in Kyrgyzstan 






industry and agriculture, often to tragic effect, while others, not speaking on nationalities policy 
per se, have focused on religious dimensions of these policies.9 These and other studies have 
called attention to the interplay between center and periphery, shedding light on the implied and 
explicit hierarchies that shaped Soviet ethnic relations.10 
Not coincidentally, scholars of nationalities policy have overwhelmingly focused on the 
1920s and 1930s, when policies of minority promotion were most pronounced. Relatively few 
have considered the fate of nationalities policy after World War II and Stalin’s death in 1953, 
although Gerhard Simon, Jeremy Smith, and Krista Goff are notable exceptions. Gerhard 
Simon’s Nationalismus und Nationalitätenpolitik in der Sowjetunion (1986; English translation 
in 1990) analyzed shifts in nationalities policy from the founding of the Soviet Union to the 
Brezhnev era. More recently, Jeremy Smith’s Red Nations (2013) provides an updated analysis 
that also considers the fate and role of nationalities policy in the collapse of the Soviet Union.11 
Both offer schematic, general overviews of policies over time. Krista Goff’s recent work on non-
titular minorities (those not associated with a given republic) draws attention to the fate of 
nationalities policy after Stalin, with attention to how minorities understood and expressed ethnic 
and civic identities.12  
Although all of these scholars have done much to illuminate the Soviet Union’s unique 
approach to managing diversity, scholars, particularly in the West, have paid surprisingly little 
                                                            
9 Matthew J. Payne, Stalin’s Railroad: Turksib and the Building of Socialism (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2001); Sarah I. Cameron, The Hungry Steppe: Famine, Violence, and the Making of Soviet Kazakhstan 
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attention to the related phenomenon of all-union Soviet identity. To the extent that Soviet 
identity has been discussed, it has often been in studies of the post-revolutionary discourse of the 
“new Soviet person” (novyi sovetskii chelovek), a figure widely understood to be the product of 
the new revolutionary era.13 Yet there has been little focus on the emphasis on the collective 
sense of Soviet identity that really began on the eve of World War II, when elites first spoke of 
the emergence of a Soviet people. In subsequent decades and especially in the 1970s and ‘80s, 
however, a number of Soviet academics and theoreticians, including Iulian Bromlei, Mykhailo 
(Mikhail) Kulichenko, Maksim Kim, and others, focused on the flourishing (rastsvet), coming 
together (sblizhenie), and fusing (sliianie) of peoples. These processes were widely considered to 
contribute to the forging of a united Soviet people, a community that progressively assumed 
nation-like qualities.14 
Western scholars have generally been quite skeptical of these claims. Indeed, the 
existence of Soviet identity has not so much been ignored as explicitly dismissed. Terry Martin 
rejects the concept entirely: “No attempt was ever made to create a Soviet nationality… The 
Soviet people were primarily a figure of speech, used most frequently as shorthand for the 
passionate patriotism [of the Soviet peoples].”15 Yuri Slezkine similarly remarks, “no one ever 
suggested there existed a ‘Soviet nation’ (natsiia, that is, as opposed to the ethnically non-
specific narod).”16 The widespread undervaluing of Soviet identity has only intensified since the 
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Soviet collapse, which many scholars have analyzed in light of rising nationalist pressure, 
foremost in the Baltic republics and the Caucasus.17 
These post-Soviet views differ from those of the Soviet Union’s contemporary critics, 
who acknowledged the existence of Soviet identity but interpreted it as evidence of linguistic and 
cultural Russification that stamped out all semblances of national particularity. Within the Soviet 
Union, the Ukrainian literary critic Ivan Dziuba panned discourses of internationalism as a ruse 
for Russification and called for a return to Leninist policies of ethno-cultural promotion.18 In the 
West, critics pointed to Russian-language use and the discourse of the Soviet people as evidence 
of ethnic repression and cultural imperialism.19 Other contemporary critics interpreted national 
mobilization in Central Asia and Ukraine as resistance to Russo-Soviet cultural integration and a 
major threat to state stability.20 Although these fears ultimately proved unfounded as the biggest 
nationalist pressures within the USSR came from the Caucasus and the Baltic states, the idea that 
ethnic and Soviet identities were incompatible continues to be commonplace. In a less overtly 
critical mode, Kate Brown has observed a rising sense of Soviet identity among deported Poles 
and Germans on the emptied Kazakh steppe. There, Brown notes, individuals slowly lost their 
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sense of national affiliation and “began gradually to fuse into Soviet identities as they assimilated 
into Russian-Soviet culture.”21 Yet even for Brown, Soviet identity simply appeared in the 
absence of alternatives and when ethnic identity no longer had meaning, rather than something 
that was distinctly cultivated, either by individuals or the state. 
A few scholars have written against the grain of these dominant, negative understandings 
of Soviet identity. Bruce Grant reveals the emergence of a distinct Soviet culture and identity 
within the Nivkhi community on Sakhalin Island in the Soviet Far East.22 Focusing almost 
entirely on the post-Soviet period, David Laitin also acknowledges the existence of the Soviet 
people, at least among Russian speakers in Central Asia and the Baltics, but he does not explore 
how these identities formed.23 Turning back to history, Şener Aktürk and Zbigniew Wojnowski 
have each explicitly explored the postwar discourses surrounding the Soviet people.24 Aktürk 
concluded that leaders sought to forge a nation-like understanding among citizens, although he 
limited his analysis to ideological discussions under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Wojnowski 
vaguely suggests that the Soviet people was offered as a unifying concept for the country’s 
diverse citizenry. In other writings, the historian Ronald Suny reminds us of the emotional pull 
of Soviet identity, which formed, in his words, an “affective community” that transcended ethnic 
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divisions.25 Taking a more cultural approach, Adrienne Edgar also suggests the existence of 
Soviet identity in her study of interethnic marriage in late Soviet Central Asia. Elites and citizens 
alike interpreted such marriages as evidence of the ongoing creation of the Soviet people.26 
Lastly, and more recently, Krista Goff demonstrates that non-titular minorities in the Caucasus 
invoked citizenship to demand national rights and language use.27 
This dissertation builds on this work by considering the origins and sources of Soviet 
identity, not only arising from party-state elites but from citizens as well. I challenge the 
widespread notion that ethnic and civic identities were inherently at odds and instead 
demonstrate how the state conceived these two loci of identity as mutually constitutive. Leaders 
and citizens alike increasingly understood Soviet identity to have the same sort of affective 
charge and motivational pull that is typically associated with the nation. Indeed, under 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev, leaders and citizens frequently acknowledged, or at least implied, 
that the Soviet people functioned essentially like a nation.28 By focusing on this long-term, 
ongoing, and evolving project of forging Soviet identity, this dissertation also has implications 
for understanding the cultivation of quasi-national civic identities and the practice of citizenship, 
both in the Soviet Union and more broadly around the world. 
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Identity and Citizenship Between Nation and Empire 
 The concept of “identity” itself has recently been at the center of considerable scholarly 
debate. As Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper put it in a 2002 essay, use of the term has 
proliferated to such an extent as to render it in their view nearly meaningless. For greater clarity, 
they propose less ambiguous terms, including identification, categorization, self-understanding, 
and others.29 Although their critique of overuse is fair, the usefulness of the term is determined 
not despite but because of its depth of meaning. As Charles Tilly noted, “The concept ‘identity’ 
has remained blurred but indispensable in political analysis and social history for three obvious 
reasons: first, the phenomenon of identity is not private and individual but public and relational; 
second, it spans the whole range from category to organization; third, any actor deploys multiple 
identities, at least one per category, tie, role, network, group and organization to which the actor 
is attached.”30 Responding to Brubaker and Cooper in 2002, Tilly returned to the concept: 
“people regularly negotiate and deploy socially based answers to the questions ‘Who are you?’ 
‘Who are we?’ and ‘Who are they?’ These are identity questions. Their answers are identities—
always assertions, always contingent, always negotiable, but also always consequential.”31 
 Following Tilly, I use the term not only because of its flexible range of meanings but also 
because it best describes what citizens themselves believed they were doing when they reflected 
on their allegiance to the state—and what the state hoped to accomplish when cultivating these 
discourses. Identity is not taken as innate or fixed but is rather specifically negotiated within the 
realm of available discourses and institutional arrangements. Here, Soviet identity functions as 
shorthand for a general sense of how citizens understood who they were, particularly vis-à-vis 
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the state. I locate the origins of this identity at the intersection of state discourses and citizens’ 
own experiences, practices, and articulations. Here I am influenced by historical scholarship on 
national and civic identities and citizenship. 
 Theorists of nations and nationalism have pointed to these entities’ constructed nature, 
challenging previously dominant notions (foremost among nationalists themselves) of the 
immutability of national identity. Karl Deutsch, Ernest Gellner, and Benedict Anderson 
emphasized the role of modernization in the conceptualization and formation of national 
communities, pointing to new means of communication, print capitalism, urbanization, and 
industrialization as factors in the theoretical (or “imagined”) construction of nations.32 Historians 
have developed and challenged these views in a host of studies that suggest how nations were 
conceptualized and came into being as the result of policies of centralization and increased 
cultural ties. Eugen Weber’s Peasants into Frenchmen and Linda Colley’s Britons, for example, 
drew attention to concurrent nation and state-building processes in Western Europe, revealing 
how even relatively homogeneous national identities came together only as the result of concrete 
policies that unified previously more heterogeneous, multilingual, and multicultural societies.33 
 In Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, these processes looked quite different: 
national movements emerged not as the result of state policies but out of growing ethnic and 
cultural consciousness among imperial minorities in the Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman 
Empires. Here, scholars point to the formation of national consciousness among groups that 
faced varying levels of historic oppression or cultural underdevelopment, processes that started 
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with elites and gradually spread across the populace.34 In the Soviet case, the state itself was 
heavily involved in this process of forging ethnic consciousness.35 Scholars of “national 
indifference,” including Tara Zahra, Pieter Judson, Jeremy King, and others, argue that the 
uptick in national activity in the late 19th century often reflected resistance or indifference to 
nationalism, rather than a widespread embrace of it. Their work urges us to redirect attention to 
the longevity of more hybrid, regional, religious, and even civic identities.36  
 In a corrective to this widespread focus on national identity, other historians have 
suggested that civic identity could form a similar locus of affective belonging. Scholars have 
identified the military and state bureaucracies as key institutions for forging civic identity among 
political, military, and social elites in the Habsburg Empire.37 Similar attempts occurred in the 
late Russian Empire, though most scholars concur that these were quite limited and largely 
unsuccessful.38 In the Ottoman Empire, Islamic identity and discourses of modernity bridged 
                                                            
34 Miroslav Hroch offered a theoretical overview of these processes in Social Preconditions of National Revival in 
Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European 
Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). For historical views on the formation of national 
consciousness in Central and Eastern Europe, see Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and 
National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848–1918 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950); Brian 
Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth Century Poland (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000); Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, 
Belarus, 1569–1999 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Faith Hillis, Children of Rus’: Right-Bank Ukraine 
and the Invention of a Russian Nation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
35 E.g. Suny, Revenge of the Past; Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire; Hirsch, Empire of Nations. 
36 E.g. Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848–1948 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language 
Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Tara Zahra, Kidnapped Souls: National 
Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–1948 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2008); James Bjork, Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European 
Borderland (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009); Tara Zahra, “Imagined Noncommunities: National 
Indifference as a Category of Analysis,” Slavic Review 69, no. 1 (2010): 93–119. 
37 István Deák, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Laurence Cole, Military Culture and Popular Patriotism in Late 
Imperial Austria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); John Deák, Forging a Multinational State: State Making 
in Imperial Austria from the Enlightenment to the First World War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015). 
38 On the ultimate failure, see Ronald Grigor Suny, “The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, ‘National’ Identity, 
and Theories of Empire,” in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. 
Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 23–66. On multiethnic state loyalty 






ethnic divides, at least among middle-class and intellectual elites.39 So, too, has there been 
considerable attention to discourses of civic identity among colonial subjects in the British and 
French Empires.40 Scholarly focus has been generally on elites or otherwise more unusual cases 
(migrants, for example), rather than on more popular notions of civic identity. Pieter Judson goes 
further in his recent history of the Habsburg Empire, demonstrating how notions of state loyalty 
and institutional practices like elections forged a sense of civic belonging not only among 
imperial elites but across the empire.41 These discussions of civic belonging have also 
contributed to a broader conversation about the historical development, understanding, and 
practice of citizenship. 
 Contemporary scholarship has connected modern notions of citizenship temporally to the 
rise of civil society and the public sphere in Western Europe and the U.S. in the 18th century.42 
Scholars generally take one of two major approaches to defining citizenship. The first defines 
citizenship as membership status within a governing state. Since citizens are endowed with 
certain rights and obligations, as Rogers Brubaker described in his study of citizenship in France 
and Germany, states must develop ways to delineate who belongs. Citizenship serves as both “an 
instrument and an object of closure” that connects individuals to the state.43 Mrinalini Sinha 
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offers a more nuanced, rights-based approach in her study of the Child Marriage Restraint Act in 
India (1929), which granted protections to all Indian women irrespective of religion, enabled 
Indians to envision individual rather than communal rights, creating a fleeting sense of rights-
based citizenship.44 Within this state-focused paradigm, others focus on documenting citizenship. 
Here, the emphasis is on the rights ascribed to citizens and non-citizens, the determination of 
citizenship status, and the crossing of the citizenship boundary through immigration and 
naturalization (as well as emigration and denaturalization).45 Others look specifically at the 
passport and identity documents as means to establish and monitor status in order to include and 
exclude citizens from the rights of citizenship.46 Although individuals interact with citizenship 
regimes, the status is achieved rather than navigated in perpetuity. 
Working from T.H. Marshall’s classic essay, a second approach to citizenship shifts the 
emphasis away from the question of status and instead focuses on exercising rights.47 As 
Frederick Cooper notes, “Citizenship, in most contemporary formulations, is a relationship 
between a state and individuals,” one forged by countless interactions.48 In this view, citizenship 
is perpetually negotiated, as citizens practice, navigate, and perform rights and obligations, or 
demand rights where they may not currently exist. These studies have concentrated almost 
exclusively on citizenship in (nominal) democracies, citing participatory citizenship as a catalyst 
for increasingly democratic and equal polities, with a focus on claims-making and participation. 
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Citizenship is a category of performance, contestation, and mediation.49 Intrinsic to this approach 
is the role of individuals in shaping citizenship. Exemplifying this emphasis on individual 
agency, Sukanya Banerjee’s work on the late Victorian British Empire highlights the role of four 
Indian actors in challenging their subject status by demanding individual rights to participate in 
public life. In this sense, they “became” citizens through claiming and practicing their rights.50 
Shifting the attention away from democratic practices, Jan Palmowski argues that citizenship in 
the German Democratic Republic was predicated on citizens’ active civic participation.51 
Although neither vision of citizenship has been central in scholarship on the Russian 
Empire or the Soviet Union, echoes of both approaches have had some prominence. Some deny 
the possibility of participatory citizenship in Russia and the USSR and suggest a rights-based 
approach to citizenship is impossible. Instead, they focus on Russian and Soviet deviation from 
European norms, emphasizing the arbitrariness of imperial and Soviet law.52 Others emphasize 
the Soviet focus on collective over individual rights.53 In his study of Russian citizenship, Eric 
Lohr argues that Russian and Soviet citizenship can only be defined in terms of membership 
status. He justifies his choice by noting the “relatively rightless” status of Russian (then Soviet) 
subjects, building on a trope that sees citizens as oppressed objects of Russian and Soviet state 
policies.54 His work looks almost exclusively on immigration and naturalization, building on a 
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longer tradition that has focused on the legal boundaries of citizenship.55 
More recently, scholars have begun to take the category of participatory citizenship more 
seriously. Valerie Kivelson demonstrates that the early modern Muscovite system met a minimal 
set of requirements typically associated with citizenship: people in Muscovy recognized 
themselves as members of a polity, membership within which was universal and associated with 
specific rights and obligations. There were even mechanisms for making successful legal claims 
on the state. Still, Kivelson concludes that the absence of a “self-conscious claim to freedom as a 
citizen’s right” ultimately divides subject from citizen, thereby suggesting that citizenship as a 
participatory, rights-based category cannot apply to Muscovy.56 Scholars have been more 
optimistic about the usefulness of the concept in the Russian Empire, citing court activity, civic 
rituals, peasant legal structures, and tax codes.57 For many, this was tied to a rising sense of 
ethnic Russian identity in the 19th century.58 Work on Soviet citizenship has been more limited, 
and many deny that Soviet subjects could be considered rights-bearing citizens at all, particularly 
in light of Stalinist repression. 
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A few scholars, though, have provocatively suggested at least a limited possibility of 
Soviet subjects as active, participatory citizens, either explicitly or implicitly. Perhaps the best 
formal treatment of citizenship can be found in Golfo Alexopoulos’ work, which explores the 
“legal and cultural boundary” of citizenship under early Stalinist rule as experienced by those 
who traversed this boundary. Hers is primarily a study of repression and the deprivation of 
rights, analyzing only the period that ended with adoption of the 1936 Constitution, which 
formalized equal citizenship for all subjects. She extends this work to the constitution itself in a 
subsequent article, yet she describes citizenship primarily as a state-sponsored institution. 
Tantalizingly suggesting that the state under Stalin established a blueprint for active citizenship, 
she offers little sense of how people actually responded to or interacted with this institution.59 
Sheila Fitzpatrick implicitly hints at the possibility of active, participatory citizenship 
both in Stalin’s Peasants and Everyday Stalinism, which focus on everyday life in Soviet Russia. 
Fitzpatrick draws on a range of sources, including petitions, interactions with authorities, the 
culture of rumors, as well as evidence of civic organization and voluntary association. Rather 
than reading these as forms of active citizenship, Fitzpatrick reads into her sources a culture of 
resistance to a repressive regime, suggesting how citizens learned to “mouth slogans” in support 
of the regime.60 Emphasizing repression and the limited rights of citizens, her work exemplifies 
the generally negative vision of Soviet citizenship that permeates scholarship. 
Moving away from categories of resistance and accommodation, Stephen Kotkin offers a 
slightly more optimistic vision in Magnetic Mountain. Kotkin acknowledges that many citizens 
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adopted the language of the state and learned to “speak Bolshevik” in constructing their own 
identities. He focuses on acculturation into the Soviet system through participation. As Kotkin 
notes, “It was not necessary to believe. It was necessary, however, to participate as if one 
believed—a stricture that appears to have been well understood, since what could be construed 
as direct, openly disloyal behavior became rare.”61 Following Kotkin, scholars have suggested 
that citizens individually made meaning of Soviet identities and ideology but with little attention 
to the collective nature of Soviet identity.62 Moving into the late Soviet period, Alexei Yurchak 
explains citizens’ illusive sense of stability through the changing nature of ideology as 
understood by the generation who came of age under Brezhnev. Yurchak argues that language 
and ideology underwent a “progressive normalization” after Stalin’s death, as political speeches 
became increasingly rote and repetitive. For Yurchak, the pervasive authoritative language 
contributed to a sense that ideology was stable, concealing how inflexible and brittle it had 
become. Implicit in his work is the sense that ideology ceased to be meaningful, as citizens 
recited ideology rather than navigating it on a personal level. 63 
Perhaps the most exciting statements of active, participatory citizenship can be seen in 
recent work that analyzes how citizens actively took part in society. As Serhy Yekelchyk argues, 
“the Stalinist state understood citizenship as practice, with participation in a set of political 
rituals and public display of certain ‘civic emotions’ serving as the marker of a person’s 
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inclusion in the political world.”64 The state constantly monitored political allegiance, which was 
measured through the expression of emotions, including love for the motherland, gratefulness to 
Stalin, and hatred towards enemies. In his work on the Khrushchev era, Denis Kozlov argues that 
critical reflections on and understandings of the past, including of citizens’ own participation in 
mass terror, produced “a more reflective, open-minded understanding of social membership.” 
Kozlov suggests this sense of membership did not necessarily entail uncritical allegiance to the 
state.65 Krista Goff suggests that non-titular minorities invoked ideology and citizenship to claim 
minority rights.66 Together, this new work is starting to reshape our understanding of how Soviet 
citizens participated in civic life and made claims on the state, even while lacking robust 
guarantees of their rights. 
 I extend this work by placing civic participation into the context of notions of Soviet 
identity as articulated by both elites and citizens. State discourses of identity called on citizens to 
participate in society through contributing to economic and civic life, serving in the military, 
interacting with their compatriots, and taking part in public discourse. In interactions with others 
and the state, citizens engaged with ideologies and discourses of Soviet identity not simply as 
something they memorized and repeated but as something they negotiated and wrestled with. 
This approach challenges widespread views that support for the state was only superficial. 
Citizens were not simply “mouthing slogans” (Fitzpatrick), “speaking Bolshevik” (Kotkin), or 
memorizing and performing ideology (Yurchak). Rather, they engaged with ideology in a deep 
way, often adopting the language of citizenship to express commitment to the state and its 
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projects, all while understanding their membership in the Soviet body politic.67 As people 
themselves made clear, this helped to forge an affective community, wherein citizens felt a 
genuine sense of deep patriotic, political, and emotional belonging to the Soviet people, as they 
personally identified as citizens of the Soviet Union. 
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
 The dissertation focuses on sources of Soviet identity, both as expressed by political 
elites and individuals. The first three chapters take a largely chronological approach and consider 
the origins and development of discourses of Soviet identity from Stalin to Brezhnev. Although 
there are some forays into citizens’ experiences, the focus in these chapters is largely on party-
state discourses, particularly the concept of the Soviet people, which was first articulated in the 
1930s. The final two chapters look at two related sources of identity: the creation of explicitly 
Soviet holidays and rituals and the use of the Russian language, which served as the primary 
means of communication between citizens. Because Soviet identity was a complex institution 
that emerged from many sources, this study is in no way exhaustive; still, it places sustained 
attention on several key aspects of identity formation in the Soviet Union. 
 Chapter 1 traces the first articulations of the concept of the Soviet people (sovetskii 
narod) on the eve of World War II. The looming war, I demonstrate, was a foundational moment 
for an emergent sense of Soviet identity. Working primarily with central newspapers, I 
demonstrate that the Soviet people served as a conceptual basis for a coherent notion of civic 
identity. This identity was rhetorically connected with three interrelated discourses: a sense of 
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heroism and exceptionalism that distinguished the Soviet Union and its citizens from their peers 
in other countries (and from their own histories in the Russian Empire); a dialectic of unity and 
diversity; and the identification of enemies that delineated the limits of the body politic. In 
letters, citizens frequently adopted the language of citizenship, suggesting the state’s nascent 
successes in cultivating Soviet identity. 
 If Chapter 1 focuses on the theoretical foundation of Soviet identity through a study of 
prewar ideological discourse, Chapter 2 considers World War II and its aftermath as critical 
moments when citizens started to experience the Soviet Union as an integrated whole. War was a 
transitional moment, as the nascent sense of community loosely formulated in the 1930s took on 
new manifestations. The first half the chapter looks at wartime discourses of unity, which 
extended and challenged prewar notions of civic identity. The chapter also considers how 
citizens experienced these discourses, focusing on interethnic relations in the military and 
increased interaction on the home front. The final section considers the postwar trajectories of 
these experiences, demonstrating that the state continued to cultivate interpersonal interactions in 
peacetime, as memories of the war became entrenched in postwar notions of Soviet identity. 
 In the wake of Stalin’s death in 1953, the state continued to foster discussions of Soviet 
identity. Chapter 3 considers its evolution under his successors, Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid 
Brezhnev. Here I demonstrate how notions of participatory, active patriotism focused more on 
the party and the people than on Stalin. In contrast to the Stalin era, when the idea of the Soviet 
people functioned primarily as a tool for popular mobilization, the concept expanded into 
ideological discussions, suggesting new confidence among elites about the existence of the 
Soviet people, manifested in the term’s explicit appearance in the 1961 Party Program and the 






dovetailed with and reflected a more collaborative understanding of the relationship between 
state and society. The final part of this chapter considers citizens’ letters to the constitutional 
commission in the 1960s and ‘70s. Letter writing offered opportunities to both engage with and 
challenge official ideology, as citizens expressed a deep sense of civic belonging. 
 The fourth chapter turns to Soviet holidays and rituals, which were formulated as an 
explicit counterweight to and replacement for religious rituals. In the first part, I consider new 
revolutionary holidays as a source of civic identity that promoted popular participation. I also 
look at the creation of non-religious civic rituals, tracing their evolution from the radical 
experimentation of the 1920s to more institutionalized forms under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. 
Using republic-level archives, I demonstrate that civic rituals (and thereby Soviet identity) were 
envisioned as compatible with ethnic identity but explicitly irreconcilable with religious practice.  
The final chapter analyzes the role of the Russian language, which I see as something of a 
microcosm of the state’s overall approach to Soviet identity. Across all periods, I demonstrate 
that Russian functioned as tool of hierarchical and lateral integration, binding citizens both to the 
state and to one another. Leaders did not see Russian exclusively—or even primarily—as the 
language of the Russian people. Rather, they emphasized the language’s utility and commonality 
across the entire populace and attempted to make Russian more ethnically neutral. Use of 
Russian was incentivized through its associations with the state, culture, progress, and interethnic 
communication, and Russian proficiency was deeply connected with Soviet identity. At the same 
time, Russian’s dominance suggested persistent inequalities, as the expectation of near-native 
proficiency systematically disadvantaged non-Russians. 
 The dissertation’s epilogue considers the fate of the “Soviet people,” suggesting that 






Soviet Union. This shift coincided with citizens’ vocal concerns about worsening interethnic 
relations that starkly contrasted with the rhetoric of prior decades. Citizens’ letters and oral 
history testimonies from this era give insight into growing unrest, both experienced and 
anticipated, and suggest increasing signs of instability and disunity. Although these 
circumstances do not explain the Soviet collapse, they suggest declining social cohesion as 
citizens spoke more freely about the problems they observed. The state was increasingly aware 
of these tensions, as evidenced by sociological data it collected about the political and social 
orientations of young people and its interest in alternative means of managing interethnic 
relations. The dissertation concludes by ruminating on the legacies of Soviet identity, which did 
not disappear simply because the Soviet Union ceased to exist. 
 
Sources and Approach 
 To understand the discourses and experience of Soviet identity, this dissertation draws on 
a diverse array of newspaper articles, citizen letters, educational curricula, civic rituals, oral 
history interviews, and legal documents collected from across the former Soviet Union. This 
dissertation seeks not to understand “Soviet identity” as a monolithic, stable institution, but 
rather, to understand the wide range of available sources and discourses that shaped citizens’ 
understanding and expression of themselves and their lives. How a person identifies, of course, 
depends on a range of factors, including the social context and circumstances under which 
identity is questioned. Identity is not taken as a fixed, unchangeable category; rather I understand 
the creation, assumption, and navigation of identity to be a process that citizens constantly 
negotiated, often in response to specific and changing circumstances. 






and party-state elites. This approach places considerable weight on propagandistic discourse and 
citizens’ own descriptions of themselves and their identification. I see state-sponsored discourses 
around Soviet identity, including the concept of the Soviet people, as language that citizens could 
adapt to talk about their own lives. Although it does not follow that these words should 
necessarily be taken at face value or as objective descriptions, neither should they be dismissed 
simply because they were produced under problematic circumstances. Here, I am less concerned 
with whether things were “truly” meant or believed (not least because questions of authenticity 
rarely have satisfying answers), although I generally contend that people meant what they said 
more often than not. Rather, by analyzing the specific language used and considering the 
particular circumstances under which texts and letters were produced, we better understand how 
citizens constructed and talked about their own identities and interpreted state discourses. 
 A more literal word on language: the vast majority of sources throughout this dissertation 
were written in Russian, reflecting the state of archives and publishing in the (former) Soviet 
Union. In some cases, this reflected both explicit and implicit policies and state preferences. In 
Kazakhstan, people who spoke at state and party meetings in Kazakh were often encouraged to 
summarize remarks in Russian, since meetings often lacked qualified staff to record Kazakh-
language statements. Other than an observation that they presented in Kazakh, sometimes 
nothing was recorded if they did not comply. Non-Russians frequently addressed the state in 
Russian, reflecting an internalized belief that complaints and suggestions would be better heard if 
offered in Russian. In Kazakhstan, the paucity of Kazakh-language materials in the archives is 
striking, often limited to discussions of Kazakh-language curricula and cultural matters, if even 
then. In other republics where I researched, including Ukraine and Lithuania, archives contained 






development of those languages. To the greatest of my linguistic abilities (and sometimes thanks 
to helpful archive staff, foremost in Lithuania), I have tried to consult non-Russian sources 
wherever possible as a view onto the ways of being Soviet. Non-Russian sources often suggest 
the ways in which identity in the Soviet Union was conceived as nested, wherein sub-state 
identities, particularly ethnic and linguistic ones, were seen to inform and strengthen attachment 
to the state as a whole. This was especially true during World War II, when ethnic identity was 
cultivated as an integral part of wartime patriotism, in part through non-Russian propaganda. 
 To understand the field of discourses surrounding Soviet identity, I also draw heavily 
from the country’s two premier central newspapers, Pravda and Izvestiia, organs of the 
communist party and the state, respectively. As Jan Plamper notes, Pravda set the tone for public 
discourse: “Pravda was much more than the first socialist state’s prestigious newspaper: it was 
both a mirror of the Soviet political, social, and cultural landscape and an invaluable compass 
used to navigate through this rugged terrain.”68 I supplement newspapers with archival and 
published party-state materials, which suggest how citizens and elites conceived and interacted 
with ideology through propaganda campaigns, school curricula, civic rituals, letter writing, and 
media, as well as through other institutions and practices of citizenship. 
 Reflecting the biases of archival and published records, primary attention is on state 
discourses, but citizens’ own voices also frequently emerge through a range of archival and non-
archival sources, including citizen letters, memoirs, and oral histories. Letters to the state from 
individuals, particularly in connection with the 1977 Constitution, offer insight into how citizens 
voiced their own understandings of their identities. Although oral histories are a limited part of 
the formal source base, informal conversations over more than a decade of travel, work, and 
research across the former Soviet Union, including nearly every republic and across the Russian 
                                                            






Federation, have shaped my understanding of how people talk about and remember their lives. 
 Formal on-site archival research for this dissertation was conducted in Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Lithuania, as well as the Hoover Institution in Stanford, California. 
This strategy was designed to reveal and exploit specific circumstances concerning post-Soviet 
archives, as well as to understand the country’s geographical diversity. As a result of the 
country’s collapse, archival records are now managed by fifteen independent states, each with its 
own rules governing access. In general terms, republic-level research reveals specific local 
variants and initiatives often invisible from Moscow’s view. Many educational and cultural 
policies were quite decentralized, contributing to the need for regional research. This 
geographical reach also enables access to otherwise unavailable files. Although Russian archives 
have declassified the vast majority of documents, many files, including most related to state 
security, remain off-limits to foreign researchers. Government decisions in Ukraine and 
Lithuania to make the files of the Committee on State Security (KGB) available to researchers 
provide insight into how this secretive institution monitored and interpreted citizens’ words and 
behaviors. Kazakhstan, too, has notably provided quite complete access to Soviet-era files with 
relatively few exceptions. Archival work outside Moscow thus enables observations and 
conclusions that would be hard to gauge from work in Russia alone. 
 This approach was partially inspired by my own observations during my earliest travels 
across the former Soviet Union, where, despite obvious differences in language, culture, and 
physical geography, I encountered deep similarities and shared history. Changes wrought by the 
advent of Soviet power were often most visible at the periphery. There at the edge of empire, 
everyday life underwent notable and obvious changes that had a significant impact on the lives 






result of educational campaigns transformed what early Soviet leaders saw as a backwater, 
“backwards” periphery into an integral and integrated part of the Soviet Union. The rise in 
Russian-language proficiency, too, was especially pronounced and noteworthy in non-Russian 
regions, where implicit and explicit ethnic hierarchies were also rendered most visible. Those 
who experienced structural inequalities were more likely to comment on it than those who 
benefited from institutionalized and informal privileges. Efforts to integrate parts of Western 
Ukraine and the Baltic republics after World War II further shed light on larger processes of 
cultural inclusion and social change. Because these developments can be most easily observed in 
“peripheries,” research in Central Asia and Eastern Europe made me more sensitive to analogous 
processes that unfolded across the country in less dramatic ways. 
 Multi-sited research is here understood as synoptic: rather than as a means of comparing 
and contrasting life in one republic or another or between center and periphery, the multiplicity 
of research sites sheds light on how the Soviet Union operated as an integrated whole. This 
approach has two primary advantages. Most obviously, this approach reflects the fact that the 
Soviet Union was a single, unified country. Citizens—political and cultural elites in particular—
circulated and moved across Soviet space relatively freely and interacted with one another across 
geographic, ethnic, and linguistic lines, binding citizens together in a common cultural 
experience. Citizens, whether in a village in Ukraine or an urban center in Kazakhstan, had 
access to parallel institutions and had similar recourse to appeal to local, republic-level, and all-
union institutions. Upward mobility often entailed movement across spatial hierarches, from 
villages to cities to republic capitals, all the way to Moscow. Citizens—especially students, 
political leaders, and cultural elites—frequently traversed these lines for work, study, and even 






distinctly Soviet cultural life, as they interacted with state institutions and fellow citizens. 
 Secondly, this multi-sited research challenges and nuances our understanding of the 
relationship between center and periphery across the Soviet Union. Republic archives often 
demonstrate how central policies were adapted, translated, and implemented on the ground, often 
modified to meet the needs of specific republics, regions, and localities. This relationship, 
however, was never unidirectional. My approach also illuminates the ways supposed peripheries 
shaped policy and became central sites for the formation of Soviet identity. This was especially 
evident during World War II, when borderland battlefields and far-flung hinterlands became key 
sites for forging Soviet identity among combatants and civilians. Educational curricula, including 
the study of Russian, were also surprisingly decentralized, creating space for republic leaders to 
negotiate and adapt to local circumstances. Republic activists also helped cultivate civil rituals 
that took into account local cultural heritage and traditions, providing a way for Soviet identity to 
be forged in specific, ethnically inflected ways at the periphery. Here, the periphery is not seen 
as a deviation from the center but as an integral and ordinary part of the Soviet Union. 
 In addition to its wide geographical expanse, this dissertation also has a wide temporal 
reach, beginning in the 1930s, with the initial discussion of Soviet people, and ending in the 
country’s final days, with thematic forays into the 1920s and earlier. This coverage has been 
made possible by technological changes as well as extended research across the former Soviet 
Union. The digitization, online availability, and optical character recognition (OCR) of central 
newspapers has enabled generalizations about trends in word-usage over time, revealing patterns 
that would have been nearly impossible to identify even a decade ago. Advances to archival 
search terms in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) have similarly made it far 






notwithstanding, these technological advances enable a more wide-ranging, integrative approach. 
 This long temporal span challenges the typical tactic in Soviet history to study shorter 
timeframes. As already noted, scholars of nationalities policy have focused almost exclusively on 
the 1920s and ‘30s, when the state was most engaged in promoting ethnic identities. This in turn 
has driven an almost singular attention to policies of minority promotion. This focus also reflects 
a more general post-Soviet obsession with understanding Stalinism more concretely through 
carefully combing the archives. Although things have certainly improved since a 2003 critique of 
“1930s studies,” the 1920s and ‘30s have remained prominent in historiography.69 Moving away 
from the tight focus on the 1920s and ‘30s, others offer nuanced portraits of later generations, 
providing key insight into how citizens navigated the circumstances of subsequent decades.70 
This more temporally limited approach enables a deeper, more complex understanding of 
specific eras but has contributed to a tendency to understand Soviet history episodically. 
 The temporal and geographic reach of this dissertation enables sustained attention not 
only to the formation of a distinctly Soviet identity in the 1930s but to its evolution in subsequent 
decades across the country. Only this wide temporal approach can reveal how discourses of 
Soviet identity expanded from the realm of patriotism to more all-encompassing notions of 
participatory citizenship. The geographic reach similarly suggests how ideas of Soviet identity 
were adapted, altered, and understood by citizens across a wide cultural and linguistic space. 
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Together, political elites, scholars, and ordinary citizens engaged in a broad-ranging conversation 
about the nature of Soviet identity that unfolded over decades. For many citizens, this identity 
was not just theoretical but observable in their everyday lives and the world around them. 
Indeed, some would say it continues on, diminished but unbroken. As we will see in Chapter 1, 
discourses about the emergence of a new Soviet person surfaced in the immediate aftermath of 
revolution, but the idea of Soviet identity took on new life in the mid-1930s, when elites first 
articulated the notion of the Soviet people in the looming shadow of World War II. This 
discursive formulation served as a baseline for conversations in subsequent decades, as elites and 
citizens pointed to existence of the Soviet people as a coherent, affective community, the sum 








“The Heroic Soviet People”: 
Heroes, Enemies, and the Making of a United Body Politic 
 
 
 In 1935, Nikolai Bukharin, a top-ranking Bolshevik leader, published an article in 
Izvestiia celebrating the emergence of a unified Soviet people. He emphasized that, in the face of 
a menacing fascist threat abroad, the country was unifying across both class and ethnic lines. 
Together, Bukharin argued, “the unity of goals, unity of leadership, the unity of a planned 
economy, the colossal growth of actual connections—economic and cultural—all of this leads to 
the unusual consolidation of peoples… In this manner, a new reality is being raised up—the 
heroic Soviet people.”1 The accompanying page layout (Figure 1) underscored the emphasis on 
diversity. Along the left side of the page, under the headline, “People of our country,” a series of 
portraits featured people in national dress representing a wide range of economic sectors. A 
photo of Samarkand’s Shah-i Zinda mausoleum and works by the Ukrainian poet Maksym 
Ryl’s’kyi and the Russian-Jewish poet Iosif Utkin reminded readers of the country’s diverse 
geography. An essay by the academician I.P. Pavlov declared the Soviet Union to be a homeland 
for all citizens. 
There can be little doubt about intentionality: the layout clearly celebrated both the unity 
and diversity of the Soviet Union. The motifs are familiar to anyone versed in Soviet ideological 
writing, but Bukharin’s essay was one of the earliest elaborations of the concept of the Soviet 
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people (sovetskii narod). It represented a new articulation of the ever-changing relationship 
between nation and empire, a subject much discussed by scholars of Russian and Soviet history.2 
On one hand, the concept of the Soviet people stood at the heart of a civic, nation-like identity 
borne of rhetoric of equality and commonality. On the other hand, the repeated emphasis on 
diversity unintentionally testified to the Soviet Union’s imperial character, particularly in light of 
persistent inequalities between citizens. The civic identity embedded in the new concept of the 
Soviet people simultaneously recognized individuals’ ethnicities and affirmed their belonging to 
a unified Soviet collective. Leaders sought to harmonize national and civic forms of belonging as 
the threat of war necessitated social cohesion. 
The term itself was likely chosen carefully. “Narod,” a collective noun of Slavic origin 
with a meaning roughly equivalent to the German Volk (“the people”), distinguished itself from 
both the plural liudi (people, individuals) and the Latin-derived natsiia (nation). Bolshevik 
thinkers understood the latter as a temporary phenomenon that would disappear after worldwide 
revolution. The word narod had both ethnic and non-ethnic uses. Most commonly, the term 
referred to the Soviet Union’s more developed ethnicities—the Russian people, the Ukrainian 
people, etc. The term was also used in at least one context with a non-ethnic, quasi-class 
meaning: the “working people” (trudovoi or trudiashchiisia narod). Narod itself derives from 
rod, a word that conveys family, kinship, and birth, which was disconnected from the ideological 
baggage, bourgeois connotations, and academic jargon of “nation,” even though these meanings 
somewhat overlapped. The phrase sovetskii narod suggested a vague, untainted vision of society 
as a unified collective, united by a sense of imagined kinship and common origin. 
Although the term would later become a banal part of state ideology, the Soviet people 
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had been almost completely absent from the press during the 1920s and into the 1930s. Its 
emergence on the ideological scene in the mid-1930s was thus unprecedented, and the nearly 
identical pattern of its use in both Pravda and Izvestiia suggests intention rather than 
coincidence, with a notable surge in usage preceding World War II (Figure 2).3 Yet when the 
term began to appear in 1934 and 1935, it rarely appeared with any explanation of its meaning. 
Bukharin’s article was one of the first to grapple with the concept in any depth. In the years that 
followed, the phrase “Soviet people” appeared regularly and became a hallmark of ideological 
discourse under Stalin and after. 
This chapter looks at the earliest invocations of the Soviet people from the mid-1930s 
until the outbreak of war in 1941, drawing primarily on central newspapers, journals, and 
published state documents. This was a turning point in public understandings of Soviet identity, 
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as leaders stressed the emergence of a distinctly Soviet body politic. I focus on three interrelated 
discourses that crystalized around the concept of the Soviet people in the 1930s: heroism and 
Soviet exceptionalism; the coexisting unity, equality, and diversity of the populace; and the use 
of enemies to define the limits of the Soviet people. Each of these discourses served a mobilizing 
purpose that promoted a participatory, patriotic citizenship that called all citizens to take an 
active part in economic, political, and cultural life. Newspapers, journals, and other party-state 
sources, of course, provide a subjective lens through which to view events and discourses of the 
1930s, but close analysis of these sources uncovers the state-sponsored discourses that citizens 
encountered and negotiated on a daily basis. Though problematic, official rhetoric provides key 
insight into the discursive world of Soviet life. 
This discourse was not merely theoretical: throughout the late 1930s, the state cultivated 
new modes of civic engagement that became closely associated with citizenship. In the first three 
sections that follow, my analysis is tightly focused on public discourses around Soviet identity 
and the Soviet people in the central press. In the final section, I turn towards popular responses, 
focusing on letter writing in connection with the 1936 Constitution. Using both archival and 
published letters, I demonstrate that participation and active patriotism were hallmarks of Stalin-
era citizenship that created a space for people to engage with their own identities. In letters, 
many citizens adopted the language of citizenship to describe their own emotional attachment to 
the Soviet state, hinting at the state’s early successes in forging civic identity. These discourses 
around Soviet identity and the modes of participation that were first cultivated under Stalin 
created a blueprint for his successors to adapt in subsequent decades. 
 
Making Heroes, Soviet-Style 






power had fostered a distinctly Soviet type of heroism. With the proletariat and collectivized 
peasantry at its helm, the Soviet people constituted a “heroic people”: “not slaves, not serfs, not 
hired slaves of capital. They are ‘young masters of the country,’ creators, organizers, people who 
fight with the elements, with enemies—[they are] stubborn and persistent, used to breaking down 
all barriers, courageous, extraordinarily energetic, and [people] who know how to bear scars and 
who know how to win.”4 In both his title and his analysis, Bukharin described heroism as a 
uniquely Soviet trait, one that could be readily observed in the population at large. 
In identifying a specifically Soviet heroism, Bukharin contributed to an ongoing 
conversation about the exceptionalism of the state and its citizens. This conversation, one that 
began shortly after 1917, highlighted how revolution contributed to the formation of a new type 
of person, a “new Soviet person” (novyi sovetskii chelovek), who would be a core building block 
of a new society.5 Alongside the idea of the new Soviet person, notions of “Soviet people” 
(sovetskie liudi), which also circulated prominently throughout the 1930s, placed more emphasis 
on individual membership in the more collective Soviet people (narod). 
Over the first decade of rule, leaders embarked on an ambitious agenda to remake society 
and people from the ground up. Through explicitly Soviet political structures; new experimental 
culture in literature, the arts, and the theatre; education and literacy campaigns; new approaches 
to labor and work; and an ambitious agenda of minority promotion, the state sought to forge a 
new society that differed from its predecessors and its contemporary rivals in every way 
possible. The concept of the Soviet people built on this discourse but placed new emphasis on 
the collective heroism that bound citizens together in a single community, with a shared way of 
life, communal traits, and a common future under communism. 
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The New Soviet Person: Forging a Soviet Way of Life in the 1920s 
 After seizing power in the October Revolution and winning the subsequent civil war, 
Soviet leaders in the 1920s embraced the idea that they had made a radical break to establish a 
new economic order, a new political system, and a new society. The canonical History of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (“The Short Course”) argued that the revolution had 
“created the conditions for the development of Socialist construction” and “thereby ushered a 
new era in the history of mankind.”6 Revolution had paved the way for the creation of the “new 
Soviet person,” a class-conscious, hard-working individual forged by revolution. Historical 
scholarship has emphasized this emergence of a new person. Igal Halfin, for instance, explores 
how Soviet ideology resembled a secular religion, arguing that Marxism offered an 
eschatological, messianic worldview that promised salvation through revolutionary 
consciousness. The new person, according to Halfin, was to be “totally emancipated from the 
servile capitalist system,” transformed by revolution to face a bright future in communism.7 
Jochen Hellbeck’s study of diary writing has likewise demonstrated that individuals personalized 
revolutionary rhetoric and explored their own place within a new, socialist society. Far from 
being simply objects of state policies, individuals actively negotiated official ideology.8 
Across the Soviet Union, the creation of this new person took on common characteristics, 
with a focus on labor, education, and other aspects of a modern, Soviet way of life, all of which 
intensified after Stalin’s rise to power. Educational policies aimed at opening schools, teaching 
basic native-language literacy, and developing curricula that imparted Marxist and Soviet values 
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and principles.9 Theater, film, and the arts were mobilized for closely related purposes.10 Atheist 
activists worked tirelessly to reduce religious influence on everyday life.11 Local leaders adopted 
various campaigns and policies to bring this new way of life into being. In rural areas, leaders 
focused on the collectivization of agriculture and the recruitment of peasants to work on 
collective farms.12 The opening of factories and industrial worksites helped to create a proletariat 
that included previously marginalized groups, like women, peasants, and ethnic minorities.13 In 
Central Asia, leaders focused on women’s dress and other habits associated with a feudal past.14 
These efforts, taken as a whole, pointed to a distinctly Soviet way of life that was itself helping 
to forge a new society, guided by a distinct set of morals and principles. 
 Together, policies that rebuilt society according to socialist principles contributed to a 
sense of Soviet exceptionalism. Indeed, one early invocation of the Soviet people appeared in a 
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1930 article by Karl Radek, who stressed the unique relationship between state and society: 
Bourgeois journalists and writers, trying objectively to talk about the great achievements 
(podvigi) of the Soviet state and the Soviet people, sink into a sea of falsehood and 
slander. And, despite this, the alluring power of the USSR grows. For the fact cannot be 
hidden from the masses of the world that we have overcome the devastation of war, that 
we are moving forward and are industrializing our country by our own strengths, despite 
the Finnish boycott from the side of the entire bourgeois world. It is impossible to hide 
from the masses that we have undertaken the unprecedented task of socialist restructuring 
of agriculture and that we have destroyed unemployment at the same time that it is raging 
across the entire world.15 
 
Even without directly theorizing the Soviet people, Radek’s contrast between Soviet successes in 
agriculture and full employment and the rampant unemployment across the capitalist world 
pointed to the country’s unique triumph in paving an alternative, allegedly superior path to that 
forged by its crumbling, capitalist neighbors. Bukharin advanced this idea, declaring that the 
emergent collective represented a new historical phenomenon, a “new reality” (real’nost’) that 
was exceptional in its revolutionary approach to class and power. Here, he built on past 
discourses of the new Soviet person but emphasized its collective nature. He suggested that 
heroism both defined and distinguished citizens and contributed to Soviet exceptionalism. 
Nowhere could the exceptional nature of the Soviet state be seen more clearly than in the new 
heroes that emerged from its population in the mid-1930s. 
 
Explorers, Adventurers, and the Making of Soviet Heroes 
The connection between the Soviet people and heroic accomplishments was perhaps most 
evident in the glorification of individual heroes, who were celebrated simultaneously for their 
extraordinary accomplishments and their ordinary background. The identification of new heroes 
departed from practices of the 1920s, when leaders remained skeptical of glorifying individual 
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accomplishments in a society that prided itself on collectivism. As David Brandenberger 
observes, the focus on individual heroes reflected a larger shift towards “popular revisionism.” 
When the more theoretical and class-based discourses largely failed to convert the masses to 
Bolshevism, an emphasis on individuals cultivated popular understandings of revolutionary 
transformation and would lead to popular mobilization.16 Soviet writer Maksim Gorky 
spearheaded this shift. Beginning in the late 1920s, his popular biographical works demonstrated 
the transformation of individuals within the new system. Individual memoirs of the revolution 
and its impact were popular and widely read.17 The accomplishments of ordinary workers also 
became a focal point of the 16th Party Congress, held in Moscow in 1930. There, writers and 
journalists devoted new attention towards celebrating citizens’ everyday heroism.18 These 
discourses emphasized revolution’s transformative effect on individuals and fostered the idea 
that citizens had undergone a process of deep, personal change. 
By the mid-1930s, discourses of heroism became more formalized, as the popular press 
transformed heroism into a trait of the entire Soviet people. One of the most publicized early 
episodes in the celebration of a distinctly Soviet heroism was the events surrounding the fate of 
the S.S. Cheliuskin, a ship commissioned in 1933 for an Arctic expedition around the northern 
coast from Murmansk to Vladivostok. By the fall of 1933, it became clear that the retrofitted 
steamship, stuck in the icy waters of the Chukchi Sea, could not complete the journey. The crew 
settled in for the winter. By February, the ship had been crushed by ice, and a dramatic rescue 
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was launched to save the crew by plane. Upon their return, the state inaugurated the award of 
“Hero of the Soviet Union” to recognize the seven pilots who participated in the mission.19 
That June, massive celebrations of the returned heroes on Red Square showcased the 
state’s emphasis on participatory patriotism. Pravda’s third-page description of the large public 
rally connected the feats of individual heroes with the entire populace: 
On June 19, 1934, on Red Square in Moscow, the Soviet people gave the highest 
recognition to the human race (chelovecheskaia priroda), to people of the Stalinist tribe 
(plemia). The demonstration of Moscow proletarians went on many hours, celebrating the 
greatest victory in world history in the silent icy realms of the Arctic. There they stand 
before us, the sons of the great Motherland, hundreds of S.S. Cheliuskin’s hardened crew, 
pilots, and flight engineers. Look into their weatherworn faces. They are our heroes, who 
emerged from the depths of the people (iz nedr naroda).20 
 
Though the Soviet people featured only once in this editorial, and then only as spectators, the 
editorialist directly linked the masses and their heroes. Although the heroes themselves were 
individuals, fellow citizens celebrated their accomplishments as a collective. The editorial 
emphasized not only that the masses had gathered to celebrate the great accomplishments, but 
that these heroes, the “sons of the Motherland,” had arisen from “depths of the people,” from the 
ranks of the very workers who had come to celebrate their extraordinary compatriots. 
 The following year, in 1935, a manned high-altitude research mission offered another 
occasion to extend the same ideas into scientific accomplishments. After the balloon successfully 
reached a height of 16,000 meters and researchers completed their research mission, technical 
problems forced two of the three researchers to parachute back to Earth. The third successfully 
landed the balloon with all its scientific equipment in a village outside Tula. The article lauded 
the scientific results, which were “massive and incomparable with any previous flights” at home 
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and abroad, signifying a major step towards the “study and mastery of the stratosphere.” This 
success, a front-page editorial remarked, was made possible by the “atmosphere of greatest 
attention and manifold support from the side of the entire Soviet people.”21 Several days later, 
after the scientists received the Order of Lenin, Pravda noted: “Our parachutists are a wonderful 
example of the great power of the Soviet people. And this is far from coincidental, since 
parachuting is audacity (smelost’), and where there is audacity, there is also our Soviet youth.”22 
 Both articles directly linked the achievements of the “heroic trio” to the success of the 
Soviet people, cultivating the sense of common accomplishments and community and deepening 
the discursive connection between the Soviet people and heroism.23 The earlier article portrayed 
the people’s support as crucial to the mission’s success. The second placed the mission into a 
longer list of accomplishments: “Our people, having demonstrated audacity (smelost’) in the 
greatest of revolutions and having covered itself in the glory of unfading heroism in the battles of 
the civil war and in the great victories of the two Five Year Plans, goes at the head of all 
progressive humanity. And how couldn’t [the people] have heroes and daredevils among its 
ranks, prepared for everything in the interests of their motherland?”24 The extension of audacity 
to the entire population connected the feats of the research crew to the people. 
 In describing the public response, the press suggested a shared emotional experience that 
united citizens around the accomplishments of its heroes, illustrating Ron Suny’s assertion that 
“nations are as much ‘affective communities’ as they are ‘imagined communities.’”25 Although 
the descriptions of the “feelings” and pride of demonstrators that dominated reporting on the 
                                                            
21 “Pobeda muzhestva i samoobladaniia,” Pravda, 27 June 1935, 1.  
22 “Nagrada za otvagu i samoobladanie,” Pravda, 30 June 1935, 1. 
23 The term “heroic trio” appeared in a Dem’ian Bednyi poem, a greeting to “our new, glorious trio of heroes of the 
motherland,” also published in Pravda, 27 June 1935, 1.  
24 “Nagrada za otvagu i samoobladanie,” Pravda, 30 June 1935, 1. 






feats of Soviet heroes may or may not have corresponded to the actual lived reality of 
participants, the repeated emphasis on the shared emotions relayed to citizens the state’s message 
about collective emotions. This language sought to bind citizens together into a more closely-
knit, affective community and popularized a sense of collective belonging that, as we will see in 
the final section of the chapter, self-evidently shaped citizens’ own emotional connection to the 
Soviet state. One article on the success of the high altitude balloon mission commented on the 
“enthusiasm” of the crowds as they rushed to greet the returning heroes upon landing.26 A 1937 
article on a North Pole research station noted a similar display of emotion: “The reception more 
than anything showed what kind of feelings guide our people (liudi), what kind of deep love 
workers foster for their motherland and its heroes… Moscow met its polar heroes with flowers, 
joyful greetings, cheerful songs. The streets were overcrowded with the people, and the day of 
the reception became a public festival.”27 This demonstration, or at least assertion, of what Serhy 
Yekelchyk has termed “civic emotions” suggested an affective connection that ordinary citizens 
allegedly shared with both their compatriots and heroes.28 
 This alleged public display of emotion and the growth of affective ties, moreover, was 
seen to have practical implications, suggesting the participatory nature of patriotism. In 
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discussing the affection for stratospheric researchers, one article noted that patriotic pride had led 
to voluntary contributions of more than 50 million rubles to replace the Maksim Gorky, a large 
aircraft that had crashed earlier in 1935. This outpouring of resources was seen to be the “natural 
expression of such ardent feelings that Soviet people foster towards its aviation as an 
impenetrable guardian of its revolutionary achievements!”29 Beyond the obvious benefits of 
financial support, emotional support from crowds was said to motivate ever greater 
accomplishments from celebrated heroes: “Covered in glory, they return to their native places, to 
an atmosphere of warm concern and attention from the masses, so that when the party and the 
motherland calls them to accomplish new feats for [the party and motherland’s] glory, they will 
again master new successes.”30 
More generally, articles linked the celebration of heroes to a shared sense of pride and 
patriotism that bound citizens together. As one editorial noted, “Love for the motherland, ardent 
and boundless, love for their party, for their state, for their Red Army, for their vozhd’ (leader) 
Stalin—this is what drives Soviet people (liudi), this is what binds them into a strong and 
powerful collective and makes this collective victorious.”31 The invocation here and elsewhere of 
the plural liudi (people, individuals) further emphasized the agency of individuals as members of 
the collective Soviet people. A 1940 editorial explored the emotional connection between 
citizens and the physical territory of the Soviet Union. Reporting on the return of researchers 
after 27 months aboard a floating Arctic research station, the article imagined the researchers’ 
response upon their return Soviet soil: “An immeasurable happiness fills the hearts of the 15 
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Soviet patriots who have victoriously finished their heroic journey. For the glory of the 
motherland they completed their amazing feat. And there it is—the motherland, there it is—
Soviet land, and there it is—the people, enveloping the heroes in a brotherly embrace.”32 
This emotional connection was not exclusively reserved for returning heroes. The article 
described similar emotions among ordinary citizens: “With their feelings and thoughts, the entire 
multimillion Soviet people is directed there, to the far-off yet near and dear (rodnoi) coast of the 
Kola Peninsula… Motherland! How much is contained in this word for each of us, citizens of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics!” The editorial highlighted the great power of patriotic love, 
which purportedly filled people with happiness and courage, inspired them to heroic feats, and 
enabled them to fight against their enemies. As described by the press, love for the Soviet Union 
inspired both extraordinary heroes and ordinary citizens, unified by a willingness to sacrifice for 
the good of their country: “The Motherland for every Soviet patriot is more valuable than 
everything, more valuable than life itself.”33 In addition to inspiring popular interest in Soviet 
accomplishments, the impact of this patriotism also carried over into the economy. 
 
Stakhanovism and Heroism in Labor 
 Aviation and exotic exploration formed just a fraction of the inspiring stories featured in 
newspapers. More often, heroism was of a much more prosaic variety: that of workers in mines, 
in factories, and on the fields of collective farms, seen as exemplary and definitional to the 
Soviet people. Aleksei Stakhanov, a Donbas miner who became a celebrity for his record output 
in a single day, represented perhaps the most famous example. After his feats became publicly 
known, his name became synonymous with a movement of shock workers and Stakhanovites 
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who symbolized the raw power of the working class. This was true in industry and in agriculture, 
where heroes of labor could inspire ordinary citizens to similar feats. 
Leaders—even Stalin himself—routinely feted Stakhanovite heroes at the Kremlin palace 
and held them up as an inspiration for fellow citizens. Press features about Stakhanovites 
abounded with references to the Soviet people and emphasized the distinctly Soviet nature of the 
movement.34 An article on the first Conference of Stakhanovite Workers in Industry and 
Transport emphasized the meeting’s historic importance and highlighted how the famous 
laborers had been plucked out of obscurity: “Two or three months ago, their lives were known 
only in their workshops, workplace, mine. Today the entire country knows these names: 
Stakhanov, Busygin, Krivovoe, Smetanin, Diukanov, Artiukhov, Vinogradova, Iusin. Their 
deeds have become the banner of the broadest movement of the entire Soviet people.”35 The 
successes of these exceptional workers, the article emphasized, were inseparable from the 
country’s economic development. 
Public discussions and celebrations of Stakhanovism repeatedly connected labor and 
heroism, seeing them as intrinsically connected to a distinctly Soviet way of life. “Labor in our 
country,” one editorial proclaimed, “has become a matter of heroism, a matter of valor and 
heroism. Soviet people (liudi) know that as they work for themselves, they are working for the 
good of the people (narod).” The author further emphasized that because people understood that 
their labor was for their own benefit and was prized by society, they were more willing to 
contribute. This, the article claimed, “is why the ranks of heroes of socialist labor, who work 
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with enthusiasm, passion, and high creative output, multiply with each year.”36 
 Accordingly, the press accentuated the ordinariness of labor heroes in all industries and 
economic sectors to inspire fellow citizens. Workers themselves emphasized their humble origins 
and a sense of shock about their unexpected celebrity and upward mobility. In both agriculture 
and industry, the Stakhanovite movement emerged as a strategy to boost productivity and 
agricultural output to limited effect.37 Scholars have debated the economic success of the 
initiative, but there can be little doubt that the movement sought to harness the economic 
capacity of workers in industry and agriculture and to mobilize popular participation in the 
economy.38 A 1934 Pravda editorial confirmed this goal: “The Stakhanovite movement is not a 
goal unto itself but a means—a means for the faster growth of production, the faster completion 
of the program of the second Five Year Plan.”39 The celebration of heroes was seen to inspire 
other citizens’ economic productivity, suggesting the broader accessibility of heroism. 
 
“Among Us Anyone Can Be a Hero” 
 The repeated emphasis that heroes had emerged from the ranks of ordinary citizens 
allegedly filled people with the sense that they, too, could achieve the same successes. The press 
celebrated these heroes as examples of the boundless creative and productive power of the Soviet 
people. Public discussions centered on heroes—in the economy and in science, technology, and 
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the military—as emblematic of a distinctly Soviet way of life and as an example for all citizens: 
The names of Heroes of the Soviet Union, the names of commanders and Red Army 
soldiers, Stakhanovites and famous collective farmers are used in our country with great 
popularity and love, because people see a living example of work and struggle, the most 
complete combination of the qualities inherent to the Soviet people. The clarity of 
purpose, the perseverance in achieving this purpose, the strength of character to break 
any and all obstacles—here is the strength of Soviet people (liudi), here is a guarantee of 
new, even more glorious victories.40 
 
This vision of Soviet people as uniquely equipped for achievement implied that all citizens 
contributed to the country’s expanding glory and economic success. In doing so, ideologists, 
leaders, and citizens emphasized that everyone might be capable of the same achievements, since 
the state promoted the very conditions that made such grandiose feats possible. 
That these heroes had once been ordinary people suggested the accessibility of heroism, 
epitomized in the words of a popular song, “Among us anyone can become a hero.” Invoking 
this lyric, a long editorial noted how truthful these words had become: “Once they fell into 
conditions that demanded audacity and resourcefulness, completely insignificant, modest people 
have turned into miracles of valor and bravery.” The article reflected on how the Soviet Union 
had created “incomparable heroes out of ordinary Soviet people (liudi) who were no different 
from their comrades.” Citing the unprecedented success of the great construction projects in the 
first and second Five Year Plans and the “grandiose” third Five Year Plan, the unmatched 
heroism in flight, and various expeditions, the editorial posited that society was moving full 
speed ahead toward new victories. The Soviet people, the author suggested, could only move 
forward: “The Soviet people knows that success and victory are in its very own hands, the Soviet 
people finally recognizes itself as the all-powerful master of his own fate.”41 
Scientific discoveries, military achievements, and economic success were heralded as 
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signs of a Soviet heroism that distinguished citizens from their peers abroad. Journalists who 
invoked the concept of the Soviet people identified the distinctive relationship between the state 
and the populace as the wellspring of strength, often pointing specifically to the state’s concern 
for ordinary workers, women, and minorities. A 1935 editorial suggested that plans for continued 
industrial construction demonstrated the “motherly concern for our great, heroic Soviet 
people.”42 A 1938 editorial celebrated the state’s emphasis on women’s inclusion in society and 
the economy: “Soviet women, arm in arm with their husbands, fathers, brothers, are fighting for 
communism. This doubles the powers of socialist formation. It gives the Soviet people a power 
that human society has never had and could not have [in the past].”43 Soviet agriculture, industry, 
and science, newspapers frequently noted, were more productive, successful, and innovative than 
those in the capitalist West.44 Stalin, too, was praised for his ability to cultivate and inspire the 
masses to unprecedented feats.45 
 The Soviet people was associated with a new brand of heroism that people outside the 
country could only envy, a heroism that newspaper editors praised as widespread and universal. 
As one front-page Pravda article emphasized in 1935: 
Our Soviet people is now the most abundant with gifted people and natural talents: all 
those who were once crushed, trampled, mutilated and destroyed by capitalism are now 
rising up to a full-blooded creative life and are burning with a desire to lay their brick 
into the magnificent edifice of socialism being constructed. This is why so quickly and on 
such an unprecedented mass scale heroic record-holders appear on the all-union stage of 
competition. They are the masters of their craft, the authentic talents of the Soviet people, 
and they are enveloped with popular esteem. And there will be more of them with each 
passing day. Because the new competition for greater mastery is only just beginning. And 
because the concern for every worker of our country, written on the banner of the 
established socialist order and implemented by the party and our vozhd’ (leader) Comrade 
Stalin with Bolshevik precision, opens new, previously unseen springs of vital energy.46 
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By emphasizing “concern for every worker” alongside a shared experience of past oppression 
and current glory, the editorialist underscored the collective accomplishments of all citizens and 
articulated a deeper sense of what bound them together. 
 
Privilege and Preference in Making Soviet Heroes 
For all the celebration of the ordinariness of extraordinary heroes, the selection did not 
reflect all members of society in equal measure. Although articles repeatedly suggested that any 
citizen could become a hero, examples usually drew from select, privileged groups, complicating 
the vision of complete participation. First, there were gender discrepancies. Women dominated 
among agricultural heroes, but few were associated with the more dramatic, exciting exploits of 
explorers, scientists, and military heroes.47 Although there was certainly no lack of women in 
technical fields, their prominence (and the relative dearth of men) in rural Stakhanovism 
suggested a deep association between women and agriculture.48 
More significantly, the most-celebrated heroes almost always came of a Russo-Slavic-
European heritage. Non-Slavic, non-European minorities constituted a significant segment of the 
populace, but they rarely featured among the country’s most decorated citizens. A 1938 
propaganda poster (Figure 3) designed by Lazar and Sof’ia Lisitskii illustrated this fact.49 Under 
the banner “Who is glorified and famous in the country of socialism,” the poster featured 
photographs a selection of prominent heroes (right to left): miner Alexei Stakhanov, textile 
worker Elena Vinogradova, pilot Valery Chkalov, Moscow metro worker Tatiana Fedorovna, 
machine builder Ivan Gudov, and tractor driver Praskov’ia Kovardak. Below the portraits, a 
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quotation from Stalin suggested that “neither property ownership, ethnic origin, gender, nor 
social position but the personal labor of each citizen determines his position in society.” Yet the 
images themselves revealed familiar tropes. The only pilot is male; the only agricultural hero is 
female. Although the poster presented male and female heroes in equal measure and showcased 
technical, agricultural, and military fields, not a single figure came from a non-Slavic minority. 
All were almost certainly ethnic Russians (or at least Slavic) and perceived as such by readers.  
The press, too, devoted increasing attention to the Russian people, reversing the trends of 
the 1920s and early 1930s, when ethnic Russians had taken backseat during the heyday of 
affirmative action policies. By the late 1930s, ethnic Russians were restored to prominence, as 
they returned as the dominant figures of society. This return was suggested in a 1937 Pravda 






editorial. The piece opened with a celebration of ordinary citizens, noting how the Soviet people 
had “defended and strengthened their country” in order to enjoy the many benefits of their own 
liberation from capitalism.50 The rhetoric subsequently shifted. Speaking of the three pilots 
involved in a recent transarctic flight mission, the editorial remarked, “The echo of the 
Chkalovite and Gromovite pilots, the echo of the heroic deeds that reverberate from one end of 
the country to another, gives birth to new, modest, and noble heroes, the sons of the great 
Russian people…They take on their wings the national pride of the great Russian people, the 
resplendent glory of the country.”51 Another editorial likewise switched between the “heroic 
(bogatyrskii) power of the Soviet people” and the “glorious traditions of the Russian people.”52 
In crediting the Russian people, the editorials hinted at an emergent hierarchy among the various 
Soviet peoples in official rhetoric.53 
 These inequalities in representation dovetailed with a new emphasis on Russian history 
and language in educational curriculum, what Terry Martin has termed the “reemergence of the 
Russians.”54 The study of Russian became mandatory in all schools beginning in 1938. Most 
non-Slavic languages were gradually switched from modified Latin to modified Cyrillic 
alphabets between 1939 and 1941, a change that was justified as a means to make it easier for 
non-Russians to learn Russian.55 Russian war heroes, previously condemned in official ideology 
for their connections to Russian imperialism, were resurrected as Soviet heroes. Brandenberger 
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describes this shift as a quest for a “usable past” that could rally citizens together as the country 
moved inevitably towards war.56 Together, these policies underscored the de facto hierarchies 
that governed interethnic relations. 
 Although there was some room for heroes who represented ethnic minorities, most 
prominently in local newspapers or in republic-level school curriculum, ethnic Russians 
maintained a position of prominence that suggested their implicit (and occasionally, explicit) 
superiority over their non-Russian compatriots. Russians almost exclusively stood in for an 
ethnically neutral citizen and played the role of senior partner and “older brother” to their non-
Russian counterparts, tropes that grew more pronounced in subsequent decades.57 
 Despite disparities in representation, there can be little doubt that the everyday heroes as 
celebrated by Bukharin and others in newspapers and in political speeches were meant to be 
universally accessible. Everyone was called to participate in the public celebration of Soviet 
heroes and to emulate their examples through contributions to the economy and political life. 
The rhetorical presence of the Russian people complicated but did not contradict the celebration 
of heroic deeds as a focal point for an affective, patriotic sentiment that drew citizens together 
into a unified Soviet people. This simultaneous unity and diversity formed another cornerstone of 
Soviet identity. 
 
Soviet People, Soviet Peoples: Unity, Equality, and Diversity on the Eve of World War II 
 Alongside the emphasis on universal heroism, Bukharin’s seminal discussion of the 
Soviet people devoted considerable attention to the themes of unity and diversity, which were 
fundamental to emergent notions of Soviet identity. He argued that the state’s unique approach to 
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power had eliminated the class and ethnic divides that had once separated subjects in the Russian 
Empire, bringing together a multiethnic population into a single political and economic project. 
The unity that Bukharin described did not deny ethnic and class differences. Rather, he 
emphasized the polity’s multiethnic character: this “new reality” was a “heroic Soviet people, 
multiethnic, uniting the powers of the proletariat, the collective farm peasantry, and the Soviet 
intelligentsia, with its proletariat part at its ‘head’, transforming everyone in its image and 
likeness.”58 
 This dual emphasis on both unity and diversity formed another key aspect of early 
articulations of the Soviet people. These two seemingly contradictory concepts were connected 
in practice through a concurrent emphasis on equality. Within the press and in other ideological 
rhetoric aimed at the public, the state’s guaranteed equality for all citizens was seen as a 
precursor to multiethnic participation in and contribution to economic, political, and social life. 
Not coincidentally, the rhetorical rise of the Soviet people complemented significant legal and 
ideological changes, including the adoption of the 1936 Constitution, which theoretically granted 
all citizens the same rights and responsibilities. Although this much-celebrated equality was 
often contradicted in practice, it formed the foundation for a diverse, united citizenry. 
 
Imperial and Early Soviet Antecedents 
Despite Bolshevik leaders’ explicit attempts to disassociate the Soviet present from 
Russia’s imperial past, the vision of a multiethnic and unified state that emerged in the 1930s 
was not without historical precedent. The Russian Empire, itself led by a predominantly Russian 
but nevertheless multiethnic nobility, offered limited opportunities for non-Russians to 
participate in governance and civic life while retaining distinct linguistic, cultural, and religious 
                                                            






identities. The military represented a cogent source of civic identity and provided opportunities 
for the (partial) integration of non-Russian male subjects. This intensified after the 1874 decree 
mandating “universal” conscription, though many citizens were excluded from eligibility.59 
Although the full extent of this mandate was realized only during World War I, and even then 
with severe inequalities, compulsory military service was a powerful source of civic identity.60 
More often, the imperial regime attempted to foster multiethnic loyalty by extending 
privileges towards favored groups (often at the expense of others), a practice Kivelson and Suny 
call “a trademark of empire.”61 Privileges took many forms across time and space. In the 18th 
century, Don Cossacks and Bashkirs were granted limited cultural and political autonomy in 
exchange for loyalty as a means of pacification. To hedge against Swedish influence in the 
Grand Duchy of Finland, Alexander II granted special status to the Finnish language in 1863. 
Selective religious pluralism represented another source of integration.62 Individuals also 
benefited from special privileges, especially at times of imperial expansion. As Ian Campbell 
notes, state weakness especially in the 19th century created opportunities for (Kazakh) 
intermediaries to enter imperial bureaucracies as purveyors of local knowledge.63 
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 While some groups found favor and upward mobility, others found themselves excluded 
from political, social, and religious life, and inequalities abounded in many places and among 
many groups. Bolshevik leaders sought to capitalize on this weakness.64 Indeed, early Soviet 
leaders explicitly used nationalities policy to reverse some of the more pernicious elements of 
tsarist policy, which they criticized as oppressive of ethnic minorities. Scholars of nationalities 
policy have demonstrated how the fledgling state promoted minorities through representation in 
government, native language education, and culture. This was intended to foster state loyalty and 
a better understanding of Marxism-Leninism, which was the core of the state’s ideology.65 
 Despite the centripetal force of Marxism-Leninism, initial policies emphasized class and 
ethnic differences rather than unity. Early nationalities policy may have aimed to win the hearts 
and minds of ethnic minorities, but specific policies and practices tended to encourage division. 
By relying on ethnic quotas in personnel matters and encouraging the development of each 
ethnic group separately, the state generally promoted thinking along ethnic lines rather than 
across them. The theoretical unifying force of ideology was often less meaningful than practical 
policies of minority promotion. The height of affirmative action policies in the early 1930s also 
coincided with brutal class warfare. From dispossessing and nationalizing land holdings to 
                                                            
64 Studies of this type of exclusion have tended to be specific, but John Slocum provides an excellent overview in 
“Who, and When, Were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the Category of ‘Aliens’ in Imperial Russia,” Russian 
Review 57, no. 2 (April 1, 1998): 173–90. Some groups that faced specific exclusion at various points included 
Jews, Old Believers, Poles, and Central Asians, though this list is in no way exhaustive. See Eugene M. Avrutin, 
Jews and the Imperial State: Identification Politics in Tsarist Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010); Irena 
Paert, Old Believers: Religious Dissent and Gender in Russia, 1760–1850 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2003); Theodore R. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the 
Western Frontier, 1863–1914 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996); Paul W. Werth, At the Margins of 
Orthodoxy: Mission, Governance, and Confessional Politics in Russia’s Volga-Kama Region, 1827–1905 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2002). 
65 Suny, Revenge of the Past; Slezkine, “The USSR as Communal Apartment”; Martin, The Affirmative Action 






suppressing religious elites, this set of policies ruptured tsarist-era social structures.66 The post-
revolutionary state distinguished between full citizens and those whose social origin excluded 
them from many rights, including the ability to vote. This created strict gradations in citizenship 
that relegated many to second-class status.67 Collectivization and the harsh repression of accused 
“kulaks” (wealthy peasants, a subjective category) intensified these processes. Accordingly, on 
both ethnic and class levels, the early state was more attuned to difference than to unity, setting 
the stage for the interventions of the 1930s. 
 
Laying the Legal Groundwork for Equality 
In light of the politics of ethnic and class difference that dominated the post-revolutionary 
period, Bukharin’s 1935 article reflected a shift towards establishing a collective identity that 
would bridge the ethnic and class divides of the past. In ethnic terms, this emerged as the state 
retreated from active promotion of minorities.68 Discourses surrounding the idea of class and its 
role in society also underwent major revision and reconsideration in the mid-1930s. The 
discussion of common economic goals reflected broader trends in ideological discourse that 
tended to see the class issue as largely resolved. This confirms Benjamin Tromly’s assertion that 
the concept of the Soviet people shifted attention away from divisive class conflict.69 At the 17th 
Party Congress, held in early 1934, Stalin declared the country was “approaching the creation of 
a classless society” largely as a result of industrialization under the first Five Year Plan. His 
speech touted the major economic and cultural changes that were creating a more uniform and 
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The Stalin Constitution, adopted in 1936 to replace the 1924 version, further established 
equality regardless of class or ethnicity, at least theoretically, even as purges, mass imprisonment 
in the Gulag system, and questionable democratic norms suggested the many limitations of this 
equality in practice. The constitution officially eliminated gradations in citizenship, granting 
universal suffrage and full rights to all citizens.71 In its official history, the party touted universal 
suffrage and equality as major accomplishments: the constitution established the equality all 
citizens, “irrespective of their nationality or race” as “an indefeasible law.”72 Neither the 1936 
Constitution nor the 1938 Short Course spoke of the Soviet people as such, but these works 
spoke of the citizenry as a “Socialist society” unified by its loyalty to the “Socialist fatherland.”73 
This was declared to be a “new stage of development,” marked by the “completion of the 
building of a Socialist society and the gradual transition to Communist society, where the 
guiding principle of social life will be the communist principle: ‘From each according to his 
abilities, to each according to his needs.’”74 Bukharin’s shift towards emphasizing unity across 
ethnic and class lines thus reflected broader legal changes, which had profound implications for 
participatory citizenship. 
 
Friends and Family: The Metaphors of Multiethnic Unity 
 Embedded in the discourse of the Soviet people, as we have already seen, was a dual 
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emphasis on both the unity and diversity of the Soviet populace. These aspects of identity were 
developed and complemented by metaphors of friendship and family, which contributed to 
discourses of unity, equality, and diversity. Metaphors of friendship often complemented and 
extended notions of equality between Soviet peoples, emphasizing lateral connections between 
citizens of different ethnicities. In contrast, family metaphors, not only of the “brotherhood” or 
“family of peoples” and of Russians as older brothers, but also of Stalin as a “father of the 
peoples,” usually deepened hierarchical relationships among ethnic minorities and towards the 
state. Both sets of rhetoric suggested new ways to think of the body politic as a unified whole. 
 Like the Soviet people, the concept of the friendship of the peoples (druzhba narodov) 
emerged in the mid-1930s seemingly out of nowhere. Prior to mid-1936, the phrase had only 
been used in the context of international relations—concerning the friendship between people(s) 
of the Soviet Union and of foreign countries.75 By mid-1935, the central press popularized the 
idea of the friendship of (Soviet) peoples on a timeline that roughly coincided with the rise of the 
Soviet people (Figure 4).76 
 The first invocations of the term in the central press concerned events that celebrated 
diversity and brought together citizens of different ethnicities. A July 1935 article, for instance, 
described a meeting between representatives of the Belarusian, Ukrainian, and Transcaucasian 
Federative Republics in Minsk. The delegation traveled together to the border for a mass 
demonstration in an ethnically Polish region on the Polish border, a region that was described as 
a “wonderful example of the triumph (torzhestvo) of Leninist-Stalinist nationalities policy, of the 
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friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union.”77 
 A widely publicized horse race from Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, to Moscow was employed 
for similar propagandistic purposes. Thirty riders, collective farmers from across Turkmenistan, 
covered some 4300 kilometers over 83 days before arriving in the nation’s capital, demonstrating 
their superior skills in managing and handling their horses. Upon arrival in Moscow, the 
horsemen in national costume were greeted as heroes by Head of State Mikhail Kalinin, Head of 
Government Viacheslav Molotov, and Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov and celebrated 
as an example of the international friendship of the peoples of the USSR. In a speech addressing 
the delegation, Voroshilov declared their heroic race from Ashgabat to be “not only proof of the 
fraternal friendship of peoples of the USSR but also a formidable admonition (groznoe 
predosterezhenie) to its enemies.”78 In subsequent months, the concept was widely invoked in 
celebrations of leading collective farmers across the country, as well as in the context of a series 
of 10-day festivals (dekady) to celebrate the arts and culture of specific republics, discussed in 
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 The motif of friendship generally offered an equitable vision of mutual relations that 
connected citizens across ethnic lines and emphasized linkages and mutual relations not only 
mediated through Moscow but also between peripheries directly. This weakened historic 
hierarchies and enabled citizens to develop and grow together. As one 1935 editorial noted, 
reflecting on a joint gathering of Tajik and Turkmen collective farmers at the Kremlin, “The 
Soviet Union, a socialist cooperation of peoples, is flourishing.” The article ended with Stalin’s 
remarks at the meeting: “the friendship between peoples of the USSR is a great and serious 
conquest. For as long as this friendship exists, peoples of our country will be free and invincible. 
No one, neither external or internal enemies, can scare us as long as this friendship lives and 
thrives.”80 The emphasis on mutual relations and inherent equality was most evident in general 
discussions of the friendship of the peoples and when discussing relations among non-Russian 
peoples. Some elements of hierarchy returned in discussions of bilateral friendship between the 
Russian people and its fraternal counterparts, which were often couched in paternalistic language 
of what Russians had done for their “younger brothers.” 
 While the motif of friendship emphasized lateral ties and equality, family metaphors 
offered a more hierarchical vision of society. Invocations of the Soviet Union as a family or 
brotherhood of peoples had something of a longer history. As Joshua Sanborn notes, the 
metaphor of brotherhood had been prominent in the military at least since the late tsarist period, 
as the state sought to forge a sense of social cohesion in a multiethnic institution: “The family 
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metaphor was used not only to build affinitive bonds between conationals but between soldiers 
as well. The nation was like a family, as was the army, as indeed was the primary battle group to 
which the soldier belonged. The attempt to utilize kinship bonds as a model for new social 
relations was intentional and was part of the military’s repertoire throughout the twentieth 
century.”81 Family metaphors, both in the post-revolutionary period that Sanborn analyzes and in 
subsequent decades, deepened notions of imagined kinship that connected citizens across ethnic 
lines. Throughout the 1930s, the press consistently described the populace as a “family” or 
“brotherhood of peoples.”82 
 In the early 1930s and mid-1930s, the family metaphor tended to be more equitable. A 
front-page article in Izvestiia ahead of the Seventh All-Union Congress of Soviets, for example, 
interpreted the upcoming congress as demonstrative of the “historical victory of the fraternally 
consolidated family of peoples.” The article specifically highlighted the fact that “there are no 
longer backwards and unequal [peoples] in this family of peoples” as proof that greater equality 
had been achieved.83 By the late 1930s, the metaphor of brotherhood returned with an emphasis 
on Russians’ prominence, reflecting the new weight being placed on ethnic Russians. The 
discourse of equality among all peoples was complemented by the new tendency to see Russians 
as the “first among equals,” and, significantly here, as the “older brother” to fellow citizens. By 
the late 1930s, it became increasingly customary for non-Russians to express gratitude to their 
older brother, the Russian people, for sacrificial assistance during the revolution and since. These 
metaphors dominated ideological language for the remainder of the Soviet Union’s existence, but 
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they were most prominent under Stalin.84 
 Rounding out the family metaphors, Stalin himself was routinely cast in a paternal mode, 
as a veritable father of the peoples. As Jan Plamper observes, Stalin was frequently pictured with 
children, including with ethnic minorities—with a Buriat girl, a blond boy, or young Uzbek 
women—even as Stalin’s identity was often Russified.85 In a famous encounter in December 
1935, the Tajik Pioneer Mamlakat Nakhangova gave a Tajik translation of Questions of Leninism 
to Stalin, who signed a portrait for her in return. Pravda ran a front-page photo of Stalin with 
Nakhangova and the Turkmen collective farmer Ene Gel’dyeva. The accompanying article 
described the encounter and the concurrent joint gathering of Tajik and Turkmen collective 
farmers. The article described the joyous cries of the audience, “Hooray for Stalin! Long live our 
teacher, our father, our leader Stalin! Long live our dear, favorite Stalin!”86 As with family 
metaphors more generally, Stalin’s central position suggested hierarchical integration into a 
family of peoples, with Stalin himself at the top as the ultimate father-figure of authority, to 
whom citizens were expected to express constant gratitude and loyalty.87 His presence offered 
one point of unity that encouraged citizens to see themselves as part of a diverse family of 
peoples, as they collectively contributed to and participated in civic life. 
 
Multiethnic Participation and Representation 
 Scholars have pointed to participation as a hallmark of Soviet citizenship, especially 
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under Stalin.88 Participation in a wide-range of practices and institutions, from voting in elections 
to writing letters, from marching in parades to serving in the military, demonstrated not only 
people’s status as citizens but also the broad base of multiethnic support that the state received 
from the populace. Citizens’ own reflections will be discussed below; here I show how the state 
presented and interpreted participation as evidence of the unity, equality, and diversity of its 
people, even as actual practices often belied the state’s ideological message. 
The adoption of the 1936 Constitution provided an opportunity for leaders to celebrate 
the cohesion of the populace, as the document itself was celebrated for the radical equality it 
supposedly guaranteed. Even without directly invoking the Soviet people, the constitution was 
rhetorically connected with the citizenry, in part through the process of creating the document. 
Discussions of the draft version, clearly intended as propaganda, drew deep associations between 
the constitution and the citizenry. On the eve of the special All-Union Congress of Soviets, 
which gathered to approve the constitution, an Izvestiia editorial noted that the Congress was 
convened to accumulate and implement in its decisions the aspirations, hopes, and 
expectations of 170 million people (narod), citizens of the country of victorious 
socialism. It is summoned to say all that has occupied the minds of the entire country for 
almost half a year, that inspires the Soviet people to a new scope of heroic, Stakhanovite 
labor, which gives the forward movement of socialism new speed and new energies. The 
Congress of Soviets is summoned to discuss everything that millions of Soviet citizens 
have said about the draft constitution, having studied it in their workshops and clubs, in 
mines and in the fields, in shepherds’ huts and nomad camps, in camp tents and at 
earthworks. With enthusiasm, with pride, with consciousness of its own glory and might, 
the Soviet people discussed the Stalin Constitution.89 
 
Here, the author emphasized diversity both by repeatedly stressing the millions of citizens who 
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had come together to discuss the constitution and by pointing to citizens’ varied living and 
working conditions. The mention of nomadic camps (very few of which continued to operate) 
and earthworks referenced exotic scenes unfamiliar to many readers. Together, the Soviet people 
rallied around the creation of the constitution, “with millions of hands, as the great charter of 
socialism, the victorious banner of new times, of the new history of humanity. Our people stands 
together, cohesive and powerful.”90 
In subsequent years, the constitution was celebrated for its radical equality. Study of the 
document was mandated in all schools beginning in 1937, furthering its discursive connection to 
the Soviet people and its universal claims.91 On the second anniversary of its adoption, one 
Pravda editorial noted great “enthusiasm” with which citizens received the document and 
exercised their civil rights through voting, a demonstration of their “moral-political unity.”92 
Further underscoring the multiethnic community, the editorial ran alongside a poem by Kazakh 
poet Jambyl Jabaev, who called the constitution the “law of happiness” for his “favorite 
people.”93 The poem, complete with a smattering of Kazakh words (and annotated Russian 
translations), furthered the notion that the constitution was property of all citizens, including 
ethnic minorities, as well as the object of significant emotional attachment. 
 Elections provided an opportunity for journalists and leaders to talk about unity and 
diversity. This was most true during the 1937 elections to the Supreme Soviet, the highest 
legislative body, the first held under the conditions of the total equality and universal suffrage 
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allegedly guaranteed by the constitution. Directly ahead of the elections, Izvestiia proclaimed 
that election day “should be a great holiday of unity of workers of all peoples of the USSR under 
the victorious banner of Lenin and Stalin,” citing an address from the communist party.94 The 
text featured reporting from various municipalities and republics and speeches from prominent 
politicians, all showcasing the country’s diversity. Many speeches referenced the Soviet people, 
pointing specifically to the 1936 Constitution as a marker of unity.95 
The reporting of the results placed the Soviet people at the heart of what was hailed as a 
successful campaign. Both Pravda and Izvestiia devoted full-page spreads to discussing the 
election results, which were universally interpreted as a sign of the unity. Under the headlines 
“The Soviet people fervently greets its electors” and “The Soviet people is united (splochen) as 
never before,” Pravda reported on a massive demonstration in Kyiv of 300,000 voters to 
celebrate the election and presented various reports and telegrams from various corners of the 
country, including Engels (on the Volga), Kursk (on the Black Sea), Tashkent (Uzbekistan), and 
even reports of voters participating in elections on skis and by reindeer in far northern 
settlements. In all their geographic and cultural diversity citizens collectively and unanimously 
voted for representatives of the communist party.96 
Reports from Almaty (Kazakhstan), Rostov-on-Don (Southern Russia), Yerevan 
(Armenia), and elsewhere made similar proclamations, relayed under the heading, “In the world 
there is no government whose policies were approved by such a great number of votes as in the 
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Soviet Union.”97 In a meeting with voters, the Stakhanovite Solov’ev addressed the Secretary of 
the Central Committee of Kazakhstan, Levon Mirzoian: “The election of Comrade Stalin as a 
deputy of the Supreme Soviet is an expression of the will not only of the voters of the Stalin 
district of Moscow but of the many millions of people (narod). Together with all workers, we 
share this joy: the results of the election in our country, the likes of which have never been heard 
in history, have shown the entire world the strength, power, unity and cohesion of the Soviet 
people.”98 As in Pravda, attention to representing the various peoples and geography of the 
Soviet Union gave self-evident proof of the country’s diversity. 
 An overview of the electoral process, published in a historical journal that same month 
drew analogous conclusions: 
In these truly free, truly democratic elections, victorious is the Stalinist bloc of 
communists and non-party members, victorious is the agenda promoted by the Bolshevik 
party and their non-party allies, victorious is the moral and political unity of the Soviet 
people, a symbol and banner of which is manifested in the great leader (vozhd’), teacher 
and friend of the peoples, Comrade Stalin… The Soviet people has voted for the 
unconquerable Stalinist blocs of communists and non-party members, for the power of 
the soviets, for the Bolshevik party, for the great leader of peoples Comrade Stalin.99 
 
Drawing comparisons to the United States and France, where “democratic” victories were won 
with barely more than 50 percent of the voters and with comparatively low voter turnout, the 
article proposed that the very enthusiasm and unanimity of the population’s support was 
evidence of their moral-political unity. The article concluded by noting the apparent enthusiasm 
with which everyone had voted for their leader and government, affirming the policies of the 
Bolshevik party and its allies.100 
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 The same discourse pervaded reporting on the actual assembly of the Supreme Soviet the 
following January, as a diverse array of elected representatives convened for legislative activity. 
The head of the mandate commission, Sadyk Nurpeisov of Kazakhstan, emphasized the 
unprecedented representation of ethnic minorities, including not only Russians, Ukrainians, 
Azerbaijanis, Georgians, and other major ethnicities, but also representatives of small minorities 
like Bashkirs, Yakuts, Karakalpaks, and Karelians. Electoral results were again heralded as 
“proof of the moral and political unity of the Soviet people, its cohesion around the party of 
Lenin-Stalin.”101 Newspapers published various speeches from the first session of the Supreme 
Soviet in subsequent days, and the January 20 issue of Izvestiia even included a sizable picture of 
the Belarusian delegation in national dress behind a Belarusian-language banner.102 As reflected 
in reporting on elections and elected assemblies, political institutions and the communist party 
supposedly represented cogent sources of unity. 
 Holidays, anniversaries, and celebrations of various accomplishments also became 
moments to demonstrate unity and a sense of civic belonging. By the mid-1930s, invocations of 
the unity of the Soviet people became standard for holidays, as citizens gathered en masse to 
demonstrate their support and love for their country. A 1936 article about the preparations for 
May 1 emphasized the holiday’s importance: “Never before in all our history has the entire 
Soviet people been this unified together, from the small to the great. Ever more indestructible 
becomes the friendship of the peoples who are triumphantly building socialism.” The conclusion 
further noted the importance of the holiday for citizens and allies around the world.103 Analogous 
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language surrounded the holiday in subsequent years, as the holiday became part of the shared 
legacy of all citizens.104 Anniversaries, especially annual celebrations of the October Revolution 
on November 7, functioned the same way.105 Institutional anniversaries were invoked for the 
same purposes, evidenced in the spate of twenty-year anniversaries in the late 1930s and early 
‘40s. Discussions in the central press of the twentieth anniversaries of the Red Army and Navy 
(February 1938), the Komsomol (October 1938), and of other political and cultural institutions 
offered a chance to celebrate citizens’ unity.106 
 The military held particular significance. A 1938 Pravda article referred to the Red Army 
as the “powerful army of the Soviet people,” a connection strengthened by the fact that the army 
was literally derived from the people: “The Red Army and Navy have countless reserves—the 
entire 170-million-strong, powerful people (narod), inspired by the ideas of communism, 
monolithically fused together around the party of Lenin-Stalin, its Stalinist Central Committee 
and the Soviet government.”107 The editorial closed by arguing that all citizens were obligated to 
serve in the military and aid the Red Army in any way they could. A January 1939 article in 
Istoricheskii zhurnal stressed this point, while also hinting at diversity: “The political and moral 
unity of peoples (narody) of our great country is especially reflected in the Red Army. The 
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Soviet people and its army are a single whole, unified by a single aspiration towards building 
communism, towards defending hard-won socialism. The Soviet people knows no higher duty 
than to protect the socialist fatherland (otechestvo).”108 Reporting on the new military oath and 
protocol for being sworn into the military, the article noted the deeply felt connection between 
the new recruit and his homeland. Taken individually, the new “oath of loyalty to one’s own 
motherland (rodina), to one’s own people (narod), further increases and strengthens the 
connection of the Red Army to the Soviet people, further increases the political consciousness of 
its soldiers, who deeply know for what they fight and what they defend.”109 
 Articles also stressed the public’s emotional bond to the military. As the same article 
noted, “The Red Army is made strong by both the revolutionary enthusiasm of its soldiers, who 
are inspired with love for the motherland and by ideas of proletarian internationalism, and it is 
made strong by the fervent love of the entire Soviet people.”110 A 1938 Pravda editorial made 
analogous claims: “The heroic army of the Soviet people is full of patriotic feelings. Youth 
entering the ranks of the Red Army know that they are called to defend the interests of the 
people. Soldiers and commanders of the Red Army know that the Soviet people, with enormous 
attention, follows how its dear army grows and strengthens” as it mastered modern technologies 
of war and prepared to defend the homeland.111 
A 1937 article in Pravda, published ahead of the 20th anniversary of the founding of the 
Red Army noted, “Soviet Union relies upon the invincible Red Army, surrounded by the love 
and support of the entire Soviet people.”112 This love, as suggested in an Istoricheskii zhurnal 
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article by G. Fadeev, was driven by a deep consciousness of what the army and state provided 
citizens: “Over the course of a number of years, Soviet power has been able to ensure that our 
Motherland now has at its disposal tested punitive organs and a well-equipped Red Army, as 
well as a consistently enacted political agenda of peace in the field of foreign relations.” The 
relative peace of the last 16 years was seen as a testament to the army’s role as a guarantor of a 
Soviet way of life, enabling citizens to work peacefully and productively.113 
 
The Soviet People Expands: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
The motif of unity, discussed abstractly in the 1930s, became critical as the Soviet Union 
expanded westwards after the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. As the population swelled to 
include millions of new citizens, the state utilized state and party institutions to ensure the 
political and social integration of these new territories. As part of this process, the western Soviet 
Union underwent significant administrative changes. Both the Ukrainian and Belarusian SSRs 
expanded with the acquisitions of new territories from interwar Poland in 1939. The Baltic 
States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—were annexed in 1939 and became union republics the 
following year. The Winter War with Finland culminated in the addition of parts of Finland to 
the Karelian ASSR, which was accordingly reorganized as the Karelo-Finnish SSR. Finally, the 
invasion of Romanian territories in 1940 led to the formation of the Moldovan SSR and the 
addition of Northern Bukovina to the Ukrainian SSR.114 
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As the Soviet Union incorporated territories, the press emphasized the unity of all Soviet 
citizens, including those who had recently joined. Elections became a focal point as the press 
hailed nearly unanimous votes for the communist party and for formal accession to the Soviet 
Union as demonstrations of the people’s will. In February 1940, Pravda discussed the upcoming 
party elections in Western Ukraine and Belarus and noted the inclusion of a more than a million 
new members and high levels of voter participation. Reports from Western Ukraine and Belarus 
celebrated the liberation from “bourgeois (panskaia) Poland,” the appearance of Marxist-
Leninist classics, and the availability of various lectures and courses, all signs of the region’s 
seamless incorporation.115 
The following month, after elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and to the 
Supreme Soviets of the Ukrainian and Belarusian SSRs, Izvestiia devoted nearly an entire front 
page to the electoral triumph, as headlines celebrated the glorious day and the “great enthusiasm” 
of agitators and voters alike. “Love for the motherland, Soviet patriotism,” the front-page 
editorial declared, “brightly blaze in the hearts of workers of the western oblasts, as well as in the 
hearts of our entire people.”116 Photos depicted joyful voters in Lviv and Białystok submitting 
ballots. The press also described the alleged joy with which voters in Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia went to the polls the following summer to vote for new pro-Soviet parliaments: “How 
much sincere joy and deep gratitude can be seen in the faces of laborers, white-collar workers, 
soldiers in their meetings with Red Army soldiers… On billboards and posters carried by 
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workers, you most frequently see the inscription, ‘we will strengthen the friendship with the 
great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.’”117 A week later, Pravda heralded the decision of the 
three elected assemblies to join the Soviet Union as the embodiment of citizens’ will, declaring 
that “the boundaries of the brotherly family of socialist peoples have been broadened.”118 
Family metaphors abounded in reporting on newly acquired territories. This served a dual 
purpose of justifying the incorporation of new people and territories into the USSR and asserting 
the common bonds and imagined kinship between all citizens. Pravda highlighted connections 
between residents of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and their now-fellow Soviet citizens: “In the 
soldiers of the valiant Red Army, workers, peasants, the working intelligentsia saw not only 
representatives of the great, friendly Soviet people, but also the bearers of a higher, socialist 
culture, their own brothers, the couriers of the people’s happiness.”119 A front-page spread in 
Izvestiia on the acquisition of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from Romania highlighted a 
profound sense of countrywide unity: “Millions of workers of the USSR send ardent greetings to 
their blood brothers who are entering the happy Soviet family.”120 The following month, Izvestiia 
published photos of representatives of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina in national dress and of 
the joyous crowds that greeted the delegation sent to Moscow to celebrate unification.121 The 
same edition detailed official visits of Estonians in Leningrad and of Lithuanians in Minsk and 
Moscow to celebrate unification. 
Here and elsewhere, the press offered a sanitized description of the peaceful, celebratory 
advent of Soviet power, glossing over the darker aspects, including the brutal suppression of 
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“anti-Soviet elements” and deportations of unreliable populations. Reports within the People’s 
Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) tell a very different story of the incorporation of these 
territories between 1939 and 1941. The NKVD carefully prepared for and monitored elections to 
ensure they were held in an organized and appropriate manner without interference from “anti-
Soviet elements.”122 Holidays, celebrated as symbols of unity, were also carefully monitored, 
most ruthlessly on the Soviet holidays of May 1 (Labor Day) and November 7 (Day of the 
October Revolution). The NKVD also surveyed the mood and atmosphere and suppressed any 
potentially anti-Soviet activities.123 This undercurrent, not seen in the published newspaper 
record, hints at a third motif that ran through official discourse about the Soviet people: the idea 
that the body politic was also defined by exclusion and suppression. 
 
Forging Enemies, Abroad and at Home 
In the previous two sections, I focused on how the discourse of the Soviet people offered 
a sense of what bound citizens together. Not surprisingly, however, another powerful source for 
uniting citizens was a growing articulation of who did not belong. The emphasis on enemies, to 
be sure, was not unique to the mid-1930s. From the very origins of the state, Soviet leaders had 
expressed considerable concern about capitalist encirclement and foreign intervention, which fed 
concerns about class enemies within the country.124 This anxiety took on new urgency in the mid-
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1930s as threats of war became less theoretical. Following the Nazi rise to power in Germany 
and escalating conflicts in Europe and Asia, ideas about the “enemies of the Soviet people” took 
on new life, suggesting that the term was intrinsically connected to the threat of war and a new 
awareness of enemies, both beyond and within Soviet borders. 
 
Foreign Fascism and the Soviet People 
The specter of war featured prominently in Bukharin’s 1935 piece, which used a contrast 
between the Soviet people and its external enemies as a device to sharpen the articulation of civic 
identity. Nearly half of the article was a discussion of the enemy’s “malicious, frenzied 
campaign” against the Soviet people. Fascists, Bukharin warned, could easily manipulate and 
utilize this slander to discredit the Soviet Union. He emphasized the menace of German fascism, 
which, he argued, justified its “world-historical mission” in ways that were antithetical to Soviet 
citizens. It depended on a racial ideology that saw one people (narod) and race (rasa) as 
intrinsically capable of ruling over remaining peoples. Fascists, he continued, envisioned a small 
class of those destined to be rulers (vozhdia), a class that “always corresponded to the major 
factory owners, the financial sharks, banking wolfhounds, artillery merchant princes, illustrious 
and titled landholders, and Wilhemine generals.”125 As Bukharin described, the Soviet people 
detested this worldview because it made the proletariat a perpetually oppressed underclass. 
Soviet society contrasted with fascist society through its radical equality, achieved through 
eliminating capitalists, landholders, and private property. Fascism thus stood as a symbolic foil 
to the Soviet people. 
German fascism was far from the only menace covered in the press. Newspapers reported 
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frequently on the threats to the Soviet Union both on land and at sea, which only grew with 
Soviet support for republican forces during the Spanish Civil War. Italian ships sunk at least 
three Soviet ships in the Mediterranean—the Komsomol in 1936, and the Timiriazev and the 
Blagoev the following year. Izvestiia discussed the attacks under the headline “Do away with 
fascist banditism on the high seas!” The newspaper highlighted the protests and responses of 
citizens across the country with a photograph of a protest, various excerpts from resolutions and 
meetings, a political cartoon, and a poem. These were featured under a sub-headline that read, 
“The multimillion Soviet people demands a severe retaliation against the presumptuous pirates 
who sunk the Timiriazev and Blagoev.”126 
Commenters and resolutions described the “fascist barbarians” in no uncertain terms as 
provocateurs of war and demonstrated citizens’ readiness to defend their country. The most 
prominent resolution, prepared by employees at a Moscow factory, promised a pushback against 
“any enemy.” Another, from a factory in Kuibyshev, noted, “The Soviet people has sufficient 
strength and is ready at any moment to deal the death blow to the enemy, in order to dispel his 
hunger for infringing on the interests of USSR.” Along the bottom of the page, a short piece by 
poet Vasilii Lebedev-Kumach mentioned the fates of both the Komsomol and the Timiriazev. He 
implored the Soviet people not to forget the aggressive banditism of “fascist pirates.”127 The 
entire spread, covering most of the page, raised alarm about the risk of war. 
As entanglements continued in Europe, borders in the east provided another point of 
escalating conflict. Skirmishes on the Soviet-Japanese border followed the establishment of 
Manchukuo, the puppet-state founded after the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Tensions 
escalated in the summer of 1938 over the territory around Lake Khasan, today on the border of 
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North Korea, China, and Russia. Fitting for the tenor of the day, the press decried the incursions 
of Japanese fascists, and the ensuing battle, which lasted two weeks in August 1938, offered an 
opportunity to emphasize citizens’ willingness to defend the country and its borders. On August 
3, a full second-page spread in Pravda reported on countrywide responses to the battle under the 
headline, “The Soviet people and its heroic Red Army, unified around the party of Lenin-Stalin 
and the government, are ready to deal a crushing blow to the provocateurs of war.”128 
Throughout the two-week conflict, both Pravda and Izvestiia published a steady stream 
of resolutions from various groups of workers, institutions, and citizens across the country, all of 
which condemned the actions of “Japanese fascists.”129 The overwhelming message, as stated in 
a resolution from a Moscow oblast factory, was to make “Japanese interventionists understand 
that in the dreadful hour of military danger, the entire Soviet people will rise up in defense of the 
borders of its motherland and defeat the enemy on his very own territory.”130 Public resolutions 
portrayed the Soviet Union and its populace as reluctant to enter war but prepared to defend the 
country. An August 7 Pravda headline declared that the “Soviet people is ready at any minute to 
stand up in defense of its motherland,” while the accompanying resolutions continued to promise 
no mercy to the “Japanese fascists.”131 
The routine publication of these resolutions underscored the supposed unity of citizens 
behind their government, a unity that had become self-evident in light of this violation of what 
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one resolution called the “holy borders of the Soviet state.”132 Journalists emphasized that the 
entire population supported the government’s decisions and actions in this military conflict. As 
Pravda declared, “The entire Soviet people unanimously approves the hardline agenda of the 
Soviet government.”133 On August 10, nearly two weeks after the conflict began, a special 
session of the Supreme Soviet assembled to condemn the attack, rule on emergency conditions, 
and finance the war effort. A front-page Pravda editorial hailed this meeting as a symbol of the 
unity of the Soviet people.134 
The Red Army ultimately won a decisive victory at the cost of nearly 800 soldiers killed 
or missing and another 3000 injured.135 The press heralded the costly victory as a joint 
accomplishment of the Red Army and Soviet people: 
The Japanese militarists, attempting to drag Japan into war with the Soviet Union 
managed to be quickly convinced of the might of the Red Army. The provocative attacks 
of Japanese samurais on Soviet territory aroused the terrible wrath of the entire multi-
million people (narod). From place to place across our immense motherland, the Soviet 
people declared its readiness at any minute to stand up in defense of the socialist 
fatherland at thousands of meetings and rallies.136 
 
Recalling the battle the following year, another article declared: “The events at Lake Khasan 
demonstratively showed how capable our soldiers, commanders, and political workers are. The 
cruel lesson that the impudent Japanese samurais learned will long stay in the memories of those 
who sought ill-gotten gains.” The editorialist concluded that the love allegedly felt by the Soviet 
people for their army was borne of a deep knowledge that the army was “capable of defeating 
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any enemies of socialism, wherever they might appear.”137 
 
From Enemies Abroad to Enemies at Home 
More often than not, reporting on fascism as the ideological opponent of the Soviet 
people remained rather vague, as suggested by the fact that enemies within the Soviet Union 
were accused of collaborating with fascists abroad. As James Harris observes in his study of the 
Great Terror, using the threat of war to justify repressive measures and drive internal cohesion 
was a well-established practice.138 Fears of collaboration with enemies abroad became clearly 
pronounced in reporting on Moscow show trials between 1936 and 1938, symbolic of the Great 
Purges more broadly. In the first of these trials, against the so-called Zinoviev-Kamenev bloc in 
August 1936, 16 defendants were convicted and executed for various crimes against the state. On 
August 21, 1936, in the middle of the proceedings, a front-page Izvestiia editorial directed 
readers on the proper interpretation of the ongoing trial. Under the headline “fascist degenerates 
(vyrodki),” the article described the defendants as Trotsky’s disciples and active participants in a 
dangerous terrorist center. 
The article contrasted the accused with the Soviet people in its introduction: “every hour, 
before the Soviet people and to the entire world, more clearly revealed are the crimes committed 
and prepared by people who, according to Kamenev’s confession, distinctly imagine that they 
are going against the government that is building socialism, against socialism.” Calling for the 
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conviction and execution of the accused, the editorial accused the defendants of fascist 
tendencies, citing Zinoviev’s own recorded words from the trial as proof: “Trotskyism plus 
terrorism is fascism.” The defendants stood accused of betraying the state, meriting clear hatred 
from all citizens: “All these names of malicious enemies, agents of Trotsky and fascism are 
hateful to workers of the USSR. Their hands are stained with the blood of the remarkable person, 
the talented leader of workers, the great son of our motherland S.M. Kirov.”139 
During the 1936 trial, the connections with fascism remained relatively vague. A more 
explicit connection was made several months later during the next major show trial in January 
1937, in which 17 high-ranking officials (most prominently Karl Radek and Mikhail Piatakov), 
were tried for Trotskyism and various plots against the state. A front-page Izvestiia editorial 
decried the defendants as “allies and accessories of fascist aggressors.” Going through several of 
the defendants individually, the article accused them of Trotskyist schemes, spying for Germany 
and Japan, and aiding Japanese spies in a plan for an attack with biological weapons. Above all, 
the article repeated their deep affiliation with fascism and fascists at home and abroad.140 
The trial provided an opportunity to display the emerging consensus about enemies of the 
people. The editorial concluded that the trial provided an opportunity for citizens to unite: 
Thousands, tens of thousands of meetings day and night are taking place during factory 
shifts, in mines, on collective farms. Our entire land has risen up again, clenching its fists, 
harsh and filled with wrath, full of hatred towards the Trotskyist band of fascist agents, 
towards their cursed schemes and monstrous, bloody deeds. As one, our entire people 
(narod) has awakened to complete decisiveness, demanding ruthless punishment for 
evildoers, the restorers of capitalism, the basest traitors of the motherland. The entire 
Soviet people and with it all honest people of the world, burning with contempt towards 
Judas-Trotsky and his henchmen (oprichniki), are mobilizing all of their energies for the 
struggle with fascism and are demanding the remnants of the counterrevolution, the 
servant of fascism, the criminal anti-Soviet Trotskyist band be trampled into the ground 
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and annihilated completely.141 
 
A journal article on Bukharin and Rykov’s expulsion from the party in April of the same year 
made an even simpler pronouncement about the so-called “rightists”: much like Trotskyists 
before them, they “ceased to be a political movement and turned into a band of the worst 
enemies of the Soviet people, traitors and betrayers of the socialist motherland.”142 Enemies were 
defined by their opposition to the state, a fate many were unable to escape. Even Bukharin 
himself fell victim to the very people whose rhetorical existence he had helped to forge: he and 
20 others were convicted in another show trial in March 1938 and executed shortly thereafter. 
The concept of the Soviet people was inextricably linked to this more nefarious context. 
As the term became popularized during the mid-to-late-1930s, the language used to describe 
enemies underwent a concurrent shift, as can be seen in the trajectories of terms “class enemy” 
(klassovoi vrag) and “enemy of the people” (vrag naroda). Both terms originated in the post-
revolutionary period, but “class enemy” was the preferred term throughout the 1920s and early 
1930s.143 Although many of the accusations of so-called “class enemies” had little basis in reality 
and the term often served instrumentally as an accusation that could be leveled against anyone, it 
marked people whose class interests and background were believed to be hostile to the interests 
of the populace, the state, and Marxist ideology.  
In the mid-1930s, however, the preferred terminology began to change, as leaders shifted 
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towards using “enemy of the people,” as evidenced by their relative trends in Pravda and 
Izvestiia (Figure 5).144 The concurrent decline of “class enemy” and meteoric rise of “enemy of 
the people” reflected two ongoing processes. First, the rhetorical consensus that the country had 
built a classless society made it more difficult to claim the continued existence of class enemies. 
Second, more importantly, the sense that there existed a distinct Soviet people also made it easier 
to talk about enemies of this people as a unit. As society coalesced around its state and 
institutions, the idea that its enemies stood against the body politic writ large easier to claim.  
The rhetorical connection between the Soviet people and the concept of “enemies of the 
people” was further suggested by the Soviet people’s prominence in reporting on internal 
security. On December 20, 1937, the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD)—
formerly the Cheka and precursor to the KGB—celebrated its 20th anniversary, and the press 
emphasized the organization’s deep connection to the people: 
                                                            
144 Data from EastView, compiled in November 2016. Each line represents the total number of pages on which each 
term appeared in Pravda and Izvestiia; multiple instances of a single word on the same page are counted once. Each 
search term covers each term in singular and plural forms, in all grammatical cases. On rhetoric of terror both in the 
1930s and earlier, see Igal Halfin, Terror in My Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003); Igal Halfin, Intimate Enemies: Demonizing the Bolshevik Opposition, 1918–1928 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007); Wendy Z. Goldman, Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin: 
The Social Dynamics of Repression (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Wendy Z. Goldman, Inventing 
the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin’s Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 






In the hearts of the Soviet people lives an inextinguishable hatred towards all sworn 
enemies of socialism. The Soviet people surrounds the fighters of Soviet intelligence with 
deep attention and concern, helping them in their difficult battle. The Soviet people 
knows that its unremitting watchman—the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs will 
mercilessly destroy all enemies of the people, all base traitors of the motherland. Soviet 
intelligence, constantly improving its technology and methods of work, should quickly 
unmask and immediately and decisively suppress every political agenda of the enemy to 
encroach upon our motherland, upon our great, free people. Soviet intelligence officials 
should live up to the exclusive trust that is shown to them by the Soviet people, the party, 
and Stalin!145 
 
Izvestiia’s official press release called the NKVD “the punishing arm of the Soviet people” and 
praised employees for “honestly and selflessly fulfilling its duty before the Soviet people in the 
battle with [foreign] espionage, sabotage, and subversive activity.”146 Beneath the statement, an 
editorial repeated the sentiments while warning of “remnants of exploited classes within the 
country” and “reactionary fascist forces of capitalist countries beyond the bounds of the Soviet 
Union.” Their possible union, the paper warned, endangered the entire country.147 
 The following day, Pravda described the various celebrations for the organization’s 20th 
anniversary and proclaimed, “Soviet intelligence is made strong by the support of the people.” 
Making little distinction between internal and external threats, the article emphasized the 
importance of the secret police organs in defending the Soviet Union as fascists threatened war. 
These conditions, the article continued, obligated “the entire Soviet people to greater vigilance.” 
The article quoted L. Sharov, a factory worker, who extended his good wishes to NKVD head 
Nikolai Yezhov: “May Comrade Yezhov know that the Chekisty [secret police] of the NKVD 
are not only those who work in the punishing organs, but also millions of workers who have 
learned Bolshevik vigilance, who have learned to unmask enemies of the people, and who 
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comprise the reserves of the NKVD.”148 This statement stressed that participation in and 
cooperation with intelligence was a patriotic duty, as citizens united to identify and punish 
enemies. Such calls to action played on citizens’ fears to deepen the affective claims of Soviet 
identity and called upon citizens to participate in the struggle with its enemies.149 
The focus on so-called enemies of the people belied the perpetual assertion that citizens 
shared equal rights. Already we have seen how the “revised nationalities policy” described by 
Martin led to the re-centering and reemergence of Russian and Russians. As the press placed 
more weight on the Russian people, leaders also regarded some citizens as exceptionally 
dangerous. In the early 1930s, a series of national repressions included brutal famines in Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan; purges of national party elites; and growing apprehension over “enemy nations” 
within the Soviet Union.150 Deportations removed suspicious ethnic minorities from border 
regions and forced settlement in internal regions of Central Asia and Siberia beginning in the 
mid-1930s, replacing them with citizens the state deemed trustworthy. These deportations 
included forced resettlements of Germans, Poles, and Finns from the western borders, Koreans 
from the eastern borders, and various non-titular minorities in the Caucasus.151 This process 
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intensified during the Great Terror, which included a series of sweeping party purges alongside 
selective targeting of specific national minorities.152 
Campaigns against internal enemies took on new dimensions after the 1939 Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, which allied the German and Soviet states and set the framework for the Soviet 
annexation of new territories. Between the signing of the pact and the German invasion in 1941, 
the terms “fascist” and “fascism” disappeared almost entirely from the country’s central 
newspapers, leaving internal enemies as the primary targets of repressive propaganda 
campaigns.153 The state devoted special attention to newly annexed territories. Across Western 
Ukraine and Belarus, the Baltic States, and Moldova, local authorities targeted assorted “anti-
Soviet elements,” a flexible category that broadly included nationalists, the religiously observant, 
comparatively well-off peasants, non-communist political activists, and anyone else local or 
Soviet authorities deemed to present a threat to the new Soviet order. Those targeted were 
subject to mass deportations, imprisonment, and execution.154 
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 The campaigns directed against national minorities in the decade before World War II 
exposed the de facto inequalities that governed interethnic relations within the Soviet Union, 
particularly when seen alongside the concurrent reemphasis on ethnic Russians. Although these 
two discourses were not directly connected, their coincidence suggests a hierarchical approach to 
managing the ethnicities that comprised the Soviet people. The celebration of some groups and 
the repression of others belied repeated assertions of the equality, suggesting a distinct limitation 
on who could participate in civic life and by what means. At the same time, as long as citizens 
avoided being labeled enemies of the people, they were called to participate in civic life. 
 
Letter Writing and Participatory Citizenship 
 As we have seen, the concept of the Soviet people was from the start tightly associated 
with notions of participatory patriotism. From celebrating heroes to contributing to the economy, 
from voting in elections to identifying enemies, party and state leaders called citizens to 
participate in civic life in myriad ways. Public discourse tightly connected these various forms of 
popular participation and contribution with invocations of the Soviet people, confirming, as 
Yekelchyk argues, that “Stalinist citizenship” was “an active form of participation.”155 The 
central press celebrated active participation as a key element of citizenship, often placing more 
emphasis on the act of participation than on the content. Yet the content of participatory 
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patriotism was not inconsequential. For example, as we will see in Chapter 4, the state carefully 
developed the content of holiday festivities at both the center and across the country, infusing 
celebrations with visual representations of the ideological messages it sought to impart.  
 Under Stalin’s centralized rule, ideological messages emanated primarily from the center, 
as the state and party determined both the content and rhetoric of Soviet identity. Regardless of 
the party-state’s clear primacy, this was never exclusively a one-way process. Paralleling and 
complementing messages from the state and party at the center, citizens across the country also 
had opportunities to communicate their own opinions and interpretations. Public letter writing 
became an important medium for citizens to address grievances, petition for help, comment on 
ongoing matters of political and social significance, and even reflect on and communicate details 
of their own lives.156 The content of letters themselves, many of which were saved and archived 
by state organs, offers insight into how citizens made sense of ideological messages. Here, 
alongside the significant scholarship on Stalin-era letter writing, I focus on one campaign—
letters written in connection with the 1936 Constitution—as a window into the state’s early 
success in cultivating the practices of Soviet identity. 
 
 
                                                            
156 Following Sheila Fitzpatrick, I distinguish between “public” letter writing to the state, party, newspapers, and 
other public institutions, from private letter writing, to family, friends, and loved ones. As Fitzpatrick notes, the 
“public” aspect should not be overstated, and indeed, letters were only ever “partially public.” In letters, citizens 
often drew broadly from details of their private lives, providing a glimpse into their life circumstances and their own 
reflections on many aspects of life in the Soviet Union. Newspaper boards occasionally reported publically on the 
content of the letters received by editorial staff, but more often, letters were read, archived, and described in internal 
reports. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in Soviet Russia in the 1930s,” 
Slavic Review 55, no. 1 (1996): 79–80. For relevant discussions of early Soviet letter writing and popular opinion, 
see J. Arch Getty, “State and Society Under Stalin: Constitutions and Elections in the 1930s,” Slavic Review 50, no. 
1 (1991): 18–35; Fitzpatrick, “Supplicants and Citizens”; Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Signals from Below: Soviet Letters of 
Denunciation of the 1930s,” The Journal of Modern History 68, no. 4 (1996): 831–66; Sarah Davies, Popular 
Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934–1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997); Matthew E. Lenoe, “Letter-Writing and the State: Reader Correspondence with Newspapers as a Source for 
Early Soviet History,” Cahiers du monde russe 40, no. 1/2 (1999): 139–69; Lewis H. Siegelbaum et al., eds., 






Reading Letters Along and Against the Grain 
 Given the repressive conditions of the Stalinist Soviet Union, citizens’ letters raise 
obvious interpretive and methodological questions. High levels of surveillance and the 
unchecked power of the state security apparatus limited and affected the scope of what some 
citizens might have been willing to write, particularly when signing their names to letters, as 
most did. Yet even keeping all of these obvious and important caveats in mind, what is most 
striking about citizens’ letters, whether in connection with the 1936 Constitution, to newspapers, 
or to other institutions, is the unexpectedly wide range of materials and opinions covered. As 
Lewis Siegelbaum suggests in his co-edited volume of civilian voices, the sheer quantity of 
letters received by political elites and newspapers is almost unfathomable. Thousands of letters 
poured into the offices of Bolshevik elites and newspapers daily. Letters themselves served an 
array of purposes that visibly ran the gamut from complaints to denunciations to expressions of 
praise and gratitude to the state and its leaders. The state—from party representatives to 
newspaper offices—devoted significant resources and people to handling letters and their 
contents, from archiving them to summarizing the range of content in reports. This testified to 
the state’s commitment to understanding and engaging with popular opinion, as well as the letter 
writers’ own investment in civic life.157 
 With respect to the 1936 Constitution, the state solicited letters from citizens as part of a 
formalized all-union discussion of the draft, meaning citizens wrote with reference to a pre-
circulated document. Judging by the minimal edits actually incorporated into the final version 
adopted in December 1936, the content of citizens’ letters was not significant to the editing 
process. Still, the discussion played a symbolic role in signifying mass participation. The sheer 
                                                            
157 Siegelbaum et al., Stalinism as a Way of Life, 1–27, especially 6–9. On the organization of the process, see also 
Getty, “State and Society Under Stalin,” 23–24; Lomb, Stalin’s Constitution, 62–83; Velikanova, Mass Political 






numbers of apparent participants in the discussion are staggering. The state reported the 
participation of some 36.5 million citizens, more than twenty percent of the population.158 
Although the state’s highest priority was participation itself, it was not entirely indifferent to the 
content. The state made efforts to showcase letters that praised the draft constitution and could 
serve as demonstrations of public support both at home and abroad. 
Just ahead of releasing the final approved version of the constitution, the state published a 
collection of letters and responses as a “living testimony to the joy with which the Soviet people 
discusses the Stalin Constitution.”159 The editors praised citizens’ familiarity with the document: 
“There is no corner of our country where the fiery words of the Stalin Constitution have not 
reached. There is not a single citizen who would not be familiar with this most wonderful 
document. The utmost simple words of the basic law of the USSR have inspired millions of 
people.”160 Letters selected for publication offered a rosy view of citizens’ responses, but original 
letters, filed away in the State Archive of the Russian Federation, generally revealed similar 
themes and viewpoints. 
 
Self-Identification and Citizenship in Public Letters 
 In letters to the commission convened for the countrywide discussion of the draft for the 
1936 Constitution, citizens addressed a wide range of topics. Although the general tone of letters 
tended towards laudatory, many citizens did not hesitate to criticize the circulated text. Of all the 
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topics covered in the constitution, participants in the all-union discussion focused most heavily 
on matters relating to citizenship, revealing, as Samantha Lomb observes, “strongly developed 
opinions on the role of the state.”161  
 Letters themselves require attention to their specific limitations and potential advantages. 
Since letters were the work of individuals, it is impossible to judge to what extent citizens were 
forthcoming or honest about their observations and opinions, not least because of rampant 
repression and surveillance in the 1930s. The people most motivated to write often held extreme 
views at all ends of the political spectrum, including those most satisfied and dissatisfied with 
their specific life circumstances. Accordingly, it is impossible to determine to what extent fellow 
citizens, particularly those who did not write letters, shared the opinions of those that did. Letters 
are more revealing of how citizens described themselves in relation to the state and interpreted 
their life circumstances. Thus, although letters should not be read as necessarily descriptive or 
reflective of an objective reality, they offer insight into people’s subjective interpretations. 
Moving away from the question of whether people “really” thought or believed what they wrote, 
letters suggest how people adapted the language of state in composing their identities, a process 
Stephen Kotkin calls learning to “speak Bolshevik.”162 Here, I am most interested in the degree 
to which people adopted the language of citizenship in writing to the state. 
 According to party reports compiled several decades later, more than half of letters made 
suggestions and comments concerning Chapter 10 of the constitution, which outlined the “basic 
rights and duties of citizens.”163 These included the right to work, rest, medical care, education, 
and to equal rights before the law, regardless of gender or ethnicity. The chapter also outlined 
basic civil rights, including freedom of conscience, speech, press, and assembly, and promised 
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the separation of church and state. In perhaps the greatest contrast between the law and reality, 
citizens were guaranteed the inviolability of both their persons and property, with arrests and 
seizures permitted only in accordance with the law. The chapter also outlined a long list of 
obligations, including serving in the military, contributing to the economy and civic life, and 
defending the country. Although, as already noted, the concept of the Soviet people did not 
feature in the constitution, the document formally declared anyone who committed crimes 
against public property to be “enemies of the people,” hinting at the atmosphere of repression.164 
 That people responded to matters relating to their rights and duties as citizens suggests a 
deep engagement from citizens themselves about their own status vis-à-vis the state. Many 
criticized the poor guarantees of their rights. One of the most common complaints came from 
collective farmers, who wanted less ambiguity about their status. Many objected to the fact that 
Article 119 as drafted (and approved) outlined all citizens’ right to rest but guaranteed access to 
sanatoria, houses of rest, and clubs only to workers (trudiashchikhsia). Some feared that the 
ambiguous phrasing could be interpreted so as to exclude collective farmers. As I. Ianutin, a 
collective farmer in Bashkiria, noted, “we are neither workers nor white collar workers ([but 
rather] collective farmers); does that mean that we do not have rest?” He requested that the 
constitution more explicitly extend the right to rest and care in old age to farmers.165 Iakov Oguz, 
a self-identified Jewish factory worker from Moscow, likewise called upon the state to ensure 
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equal opportunities for all citizens by offering more robust protections against anti-Semitism.166 
 Letter writers adopted the language of citizenship to express pride in their country. Many 
specifically citied their own experiences of upward mobility as a driving factor in their feelings 
of loyalty and dedication to the state, contrasting the opportunities they had received since the 
revolution with their experiences in the tsarist empire. Factory worker Petr Latyshev noted in a 
speech at his workplace, “I have four sons, and I would not have been able to educate them 
before the revolution. The most a worker could have done for his children would have been to 
send them to an elementary school and then as soon as they grew up, they would go to the 
factory like their fathers to work for pieces of bread. Work was difficult.” Now, in contrast, he 
worked by choice and was thankful for the state’s provision in retirement, as outlined in the 
constitution. “I am a master (khoziain) of my own country,” he proudly declared, to the applause 
of coworkers.167 Another letter writer, M. Chinsov, who wrote to recommend that the right to 
education be limited to citizens who were 40 and younger, similarly noted, “We are actually 
masters of the earth.” He declared his willingness to defend the country from fascists and others 
who would slander life in the Soviet Union, as he reflected on the unprecedented opportunities 
the state offered its citizens.168 
 Women, peasants, ethnic minorities, and factory workers often credited the state for 
offering them unprecedented opportunities relative to their limited horizons in tsarist Russia. One 
50-year-old letter writer from Ivanovo noted that his children had first received education after 
the revolution, and he reveled in the fact that one of his sons had become an engineer and 
another was finishing up his training as a military pilot.169 Another noted how his own 
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educational opportunities had allowed him, a former shepherd from the Omsk region, to study in 
Moscow and return as an agronomist, for which he had been recognized with awards.170 A 
woman from eastern Siberia described her trajectory from barely literate peasant to award-
winning dairy farmer and proudly declared herself to be a citizen with equal rights.171 Many letter 
writers took pride in a sense of ownership in the state. 
 Although published excerpts were carefully chosen to showcase happiness and gratitude 
and clearly served propagandistic purposes, we should not dismiss them out of hand. Indeed, 
stories of upward mobility testified to the real opportunities the state provided citizens. Even 
without robust guarantees of rights and privileges (and often, alongside the reality of repression), 
many experienced significant improvement to their status. For many, the opportunities for 
educational and professional advancement were unthinkable a generation earlier.  
 Many specifically interpreted the opportunity to participate in the discussion of the 
constitution as a clear example of the unprecedented and innovative ways that the state solicited 
the participation and cooperation of its citizens. This was exemplified in the words of Iakov 
Oguz, the Jewish factory technician cited earlier: 
There can be no question about the fact that I, as a citizen of the world’s first socialist 
state, am happy at the mere thought that I am participating in the discussion of the draft 
of the Great Stalin Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. My joy—it is 
the joy of all of us millions of creators of socialism, with a bright, happy life and future. 
My pride—it is the fact that I am taking part (I, a mere mortal!) in the discussion of the 
greatest historical document of the revolutionary epoch, every word of which was drafted 
by Stalin. I take pride in the fact that our constitution—it is the first constitution to 
stipulate the rights of workers of humanity; the most democratic, the most revolutionary, 
the most brilliant… Finally, it is the first constitution that a government has released for a 
broad discussion by the people.172 
 
Even as he declared his hopes for better protection of his rights as a Jew, he expressed both pride 
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as a citizen and his confidence that the state would continue to provide for him and others. 
 Under Stalin, this formalized countrywide discussion was mostly ornamental, at least if 
measured by how much the comments influenced the constitution’s actual written content. 
Although citizens were encouraged to offer suggestions and corrections, few changes were made 
after Stalin had approved the constitution in April.173 Even though letter writers’ suggestions 
were not used to produce the constitution, leaders nevertheless saw the process of discussion as 
an important avenue for citizens to take part in civic life. The letters offered the state a glimpse 
into some of the ways citizens made sense of the materials and of their lives more generally. The 
content of letters, even when critical of the constitution, the state, and life in the Soviet Union, 
suggested some success in the party-state’s efforts to cultivate affective attachments, as people 
took their status as citizens seriously. 
 
Conclusion: Unity through Hierarchy 
 As war loomed as an almost inevitable threat to the country, leaders rallied around the 
concept of the Soviet people as the center of a new vision of Soviet identity that called citizens to 
participate actively in civic life and defend the country’s borders. Here, the focus has been 
almost exclusively on how the state developed a patriotic rhetoric that encouraged participation 
and sacrifice in order to strengthen affective bonds to the state when war loomed on horizon, but 
brief forays into citizens’ own writings suggest some noteworthy success already in the 1930s in 
cultivating new affective attachments to the state. The state featured prominently in discourses 
about Soviet identity: the state was credited with promoting conditions for a new society, served 
as the common point of unity for all citizens, and demanded the participation of the populace in 
securing its defense. All these factors expressed a vision of a participatory patriotism that was 
                                                            






deeply tied to the new ideological concept of the Soviet people. 
 Embedded in the idea of the Soviet people, and indeed the very phrase, was a vision of a 
populace unified by an imagined sense of kinship derived from a common commitment to the 
Soviet state. Across the press and in public speeches, leaders emphasized the diversity, unity, and 
equality of citizens. Actual practices, however, betrayed the inequalities that defined and shaped 
Soviet life in explicit and subtle ways, particularly with respect to ethnicity. Through both a 
stronger emphasis on Russian people, culture, language and history, and a scaling back of the 
policies that had promoted ethnic minorities in the 1920s, state policies reinforced and 
formalized the very ethnic hierarchies that leaders had criticized so prominently in the 1920s and 
early 1930s. With the rising threat of war creating a need for internal cohesion, ethnic hierarchies 
became an organizing principle and a strategy to manage the country’s diverse population.  
 Even while deepening existing inequalities, more strongly defined hierarchies contributed 
to a more centralized, unified state, one that not only encouraged but demanded participation 
from all citizens. This participation both demonstrated and contributed to citizens’ affective 
attachments, especially as the international tensions escalated. The threat of war, while certainly 
contributing urgency and necessity to unity, was only one aspect of a broad project of cultivating 
a state-sponsored Soviet identity. Indeed, as much as war overshadowed public life in the 1930s, 
the speed with which leaders turned their attention to the common traits and linkages that united 
a staggeringly diverse citizenry is striking. The concept of the Soviet people offered an effective 
metaphor of unity that sought to harness the creative and productive powers of the entire 









Making a Home for the Soviet People: 
Soviet Identity in the Great Patriotic War and Its Aftermath 
 
 
In October 1942, Uzbek soldiers on the front received warm greetings, encouragement, 
and a call to action in a letter from their fellow Uzbeks, published in full in Pravda. Following 
then-established practice, the letter drew upon history, family metaphors, and ideological 
statements to implore soldiers to remember the examples of their heroic forbears, who fought 
valiantly against enemy invaders. The text reframed the war as a specific threat to Uzbeks: 
The enemy is insidious. Today, using tricks, fear, and panic, he intends to spread dissent 
among the members of the great family of Soviet peoples, to shatter our determination to 
achieve victory. Tomorrow he will become the master of our homeland (yurt). He intends 
to give our collective farms and Soviet farms to German barons and landholders and our 
enterprises to German capitalists as private property. Developing slave markets, they 
want to sell free Uzbeks like cattle. He will turn the canals we built with love into rivers 
of blood. He will return to the era of the Mang’it Amirs of Bukhara, even worse than the 
era of the bloodthirsty khans of Khokand and Khiva. Destroying the Samarkand of Uzbek 
poet Navoi and Uzbek astronomer Ulug’bek, the Fergana of Uzbek poet Muqimiy, the 
Bukhara where the hero Tarobiy struggled against Mongol invaders, he will carry off the 
treasures of this land to Germany. They want to turn our schools into prisons, our theatres 
into brothels. Hitler intends to steal our literature and our books, our ghazals [a type of 
poem], our songs and our dutors [a two-stringed instrument], our cozy homes and our 
bekasam robes [a type of cloth], the beauty of our wives, the clean and calm lives of our 
elderly, and the peaceful slumber of our children. 
 
Alongside appeals to ethnic pride and history, the letter reminded soldiers that they were children 
of a single, multiethnic homeland, and that they worked and lived alongside their fellow citizens 
to build a “big home” and common culture. Together they were called to defend their homeland.1 
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However, in a departure from standard practice, this letter was published in both Russian 
and Uzbek. The two versions filled nearly two pages of Pravda, one printed in a language 
completely unfamiliar to nearly all of the paper’s readers.2 The letter, in both of its versions, 
exemplified the Soviet Union’s wartime efforts to develop an inclusive vision of patriotic 
citizenship that brought together its diverse citizenry. Here was a quintessential example of what 
I term nested patriotism, the harnessing of sub-state loyalties—here, ethnic affiliation—to the 
wider interests of Soviet state patriotism.3 In this case, appeals to soldiers’ ethnic pride, devotion 
to their Uzbek and Soviet homelands, and desire to protect their families functioned as tools to 
encourage sacrificial service at the front. 
Although Soviet leaders had spent most of the 1930s ideologically (and materially) 
preparing citizens for war, Nazi Germany’s sudden invasion in June 1941 came as a shock to 
leaders and populace alike.4 In subsequent days, the Soviet press called upon citizens to join a 
patriotic effort to defeat the enemy in what would ultimately become a nearly four-year struggle 
for the Soviet Union’s very existence. By the time of the German surrender in May 1945, war 
had claimed the lives of some 25 million Soviet citizens, inflicting a deep, almost unimaginable 
toll on the state, its territory, and its people. Despite vast suffering, the Soviet Union ultimately 
emerged from World War II intact, even expanding its territory, a victory that leaders would 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
different knowledge about cultural reference points. The Russian version also makes explicit reference to Uzbeks as 
“equal rights bearing members” of the Soviet family, while the Uzbek letter simply implies this by noting that the 
Uzbek people was a child (farzand) of the Soviet family, like other Soviet peoples. The letter would have circulated 
in frontline publications, ensuring wide availability. See especially Brandon Schechter, “‘The People’s Instructions’: 
Indigenizing The Great Patriotic War Among ‘Non-Russians,’” Ab Imperio 2012, no. 3 (2012): 109–33. 
2 The use of Ukrainian and Belarusian, often without Russian translation, was somewhat more common during the 
war. These Slavic languages were more or less intelligible to Russian-speaking readers, unlike Turkic tongues such 
as Uzbek.  
3 Scholars have long noted that identity is often nested or layered, but to my knowledge this idea has not previously 
been applied to patriotism. 
4 The extent of Soviet knowledge about Operation Barbarossa has remained a topic of historical debate and dispute, 
though there is no doubt the invasion caught the general public by surprise. On Soviet intelligence, see David E. 
Murphy, What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). See also 
Jonathan Haslam, “Soviet‐German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out,” The 






credit to the combined efforts of the entire country. 
Whether writing about military effectiveness, propaganda, or economic planning, 
scholars of World War II in the Soviet Union have often been preoccupied with the question of 
how the country overcame sharp economic, military, and political disadvantages to win the war.5 
Others have sought to understand how specific groups or the population at large participated (or 
did not participate) in the war effort.6 Some have focused on the human costs of war, including 
especially the Holocaust.7 Yet others have seen World War II as a focal point of Soviet identity 
primarily in retrospect, as a moment enshrined in collective memory.8 The present study has a 
different goal: to understand how the war itself shaped and altered the understandings of the 
Soviet identity that had circulated in the previous decade. 
What follows in this chapter is primarily a study of wartime propaganda, focusing on the 
discourses surrounding Soviet identity. In the first half, I consider how wartime propaganda both 
described and created a united population, focusing on how the propaganda apparatus—
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especially the central press, leaders’ public speeches, and popular literature—built on prewar 
discourses of heroism, multiethnic unity, and common enemies to deepen the affective ties that 
bound citizens to one another. The Nazi invasion placed the Soviet Union in the unique position 
of managing a defensive war on its own contiguous territory while simultaneously managing a 
multiethnic, multilingual, and multi-confessional population.9 The sheer scale of military 
calamity necessitated complete mobilization, as the country of necessity relied on the combined 
efforts of soldiers and civilians to guarantee final victory. To promote the widest possible 
participation, wartime propaganda described a unity that simultaneously built upon and 
renegotiated ideas of the Soviet people, confirming and challenging ideas of the 1930s. This 
discourse specifically used forms of nested patriotism, including appeals to ethnic, familial, 
local/geographic, and even religious sentiment, to focus and deepen loyalty to the state. 
This unified vision was not merely theoretical. Although this chapter primarily considers 
propagandistic discourses that circulated in the central press, forays into the wartime experiences 
of soldiers and civilians in the second half of the chapter offer insight into the practical 
application of propaganda.10 As demonstrated in archival documents from both the central party 
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apparatus in Moscow and in republic archives in Kazakhstan, wartime conditions placed people 
into increased contact with other fellow citizens both on the front and in the rear, implicitly 
promoting a sense of common community and belonging that extended beyond class, ethnic, and 
geographic lines. As a result, World War II complicated the geographic and ethnic structure of 
the Soviet Union, as the country itself began to operate more as a unified, nation-like whole in 
both theory and practice. As soldiers and citizens interacted across geographic and ethnic lines, a 
more powerful understanding emerged of what it meant to be Soviet. At the same time, even as 
war bound citizens together through common goals and an imagined victory, these interactions 
also exposed persistent ethnic difference and hierarchies. 
The chapter concludes by considering the postwar trajectories of these trends, as the state 
reasserted its power and ideology while undergoing an extensive campaign of reconstruction in 
Stalin’s final decade. As is evident from archival documents from the center and from the Soviet 
Union’s western republics, this took particular forms in the territories that were newly 
incorporated into the Soviet Union, which required not only the process of reconstruction but 
also political, economic, cultural, and social integration. As in wartime, the postwar period was 
fraught with the same tensions between theoretical visions of equality and institutionalized and 
informal inequalities. Still, in the aftermath of victory, the war itself was nearly universally 
understood to have been a foundational moment for the Soviet people and for this broader Soviet 
identity. 
 
The ‘Soviet People’ at War: Ideological Mobilization and Wartime Propaganda 
 Hours after the German invasion, Viacheslav Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Occupation Policies (London: Macmillan, 1981). More recent studies include Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair; Lower, 






People’s Commissars and the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, addressed Soviet citizens by radio. 
He described the surprise Nazi attack in terms that accentuated its inhumanity, calling it “without 
precedent in the history of civilized peoples.” The attack, he emphasized, broke treaty 
agreements between Germany and the Soviet Union, leaving leaders no choice but to declare 
war. Alluding to Napoleon’s ultimately unsuccessful invasion of Russia in 1812, he pledged total 
defeat to the invading Germans: “The Red Army and our entire people (narod) will once again 
carry out a victorious patriotic war for the motherland (rodina), for honor, for freedom.”11 
 Echoing discourses from the late 1930s, Molotov suggested a connection between the 
state, its military, and its people: “The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its unshakable 
conviction that our valiant army and navy and the brave falcons of Soviet aviation will fulfill 
their duty with honor before the motherland, before the Soviet people, and will deal a crushing 
blow to the aggressor.” Calling upon “true Soviet patriots” to provide for all needs of the state 
and military, he expressed his confidence that the Soviet Union would triumph: “Our cause is 
righteous (pravoe). The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours.”12 Molotov’s speech was 
printed in Pravda the next day, accompanied by a quarter-page photograph of Stalin and 
declarations from ministries and military institutions, illustrating the centralized, unified state 
and diverting attention away from Stalin’s curious retreat from the public eye. 
When Stalin finally addressed the country directly by radio on July 3, he also asserted the 
inevitability of victory. Like Molotov, he described the German invasion as a cruel, unjustified, 
and illegal provocation and an assault on the Soviet way of life. It endangered hard-won 
economic, cultural, and political achievements and threatened a return to tsarist-era oppression 
and inequality: “The matter thus concerns the life and death of the Soviet state, the life and death 
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of the peoples of the USSR, of whether the peoples of the Soviet Union will be free or if they 
will fall into servitude.”13 He called upon citizens to present a unified front to repel the attack, 
stressing the importance of both military and economic strength. Only the combination of well-
trained forces, ruthless partisans, and an organized, focused home front could defeat the enemy. 
Recalling this speech, Mukhamet Shayakhmetov, then a Kazakh enlistee, remembered, “After 
hearing these words, I felt even more confident about us winning a speedy victory. Most of my 
compatriots felt the same. Our faith in the genius of our leader and the indomitable might of the 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was enormous.” A surge of patriotism followed.14 
In the first days of the war, Pravda and Izvestiia painted an image of a population unified 
to crush the invading fascist enemy. The historian and Central Committee member Emelian 
Iaroslavskii, in a June 23 Pravda editorial, described the country’s principal strength as the 
unique “moral-political unity of Soviet society,” as citizens joined together in a spirit of 
patriotism, hatred for the enemy, and willingness to sacrifice for the defense of the country. This 
war, he stated unequivocally, would be a “battle of the entire Soviet people,” as citizens united 
under Stalin to defend the motherland. Invoking prewar motifs, Yaroslavskii declared, “Today 
the day has come when the feelings and energy of Soviet patriots are embodied in a current that 
breaks all barriers, when war will beget in every step the mass heroism of Soviet people (liudi) to 
make any sacrifices, to surmount any barriers, in order to defend the native country (rodnaia 
strana), to give it the possibility to grow and grow...”15 
Editorials and declarations from citizens further underscored this atmosphere of unity. 
Members of the intelligentsia declared their allegiance to the state, their conviction of final 
                                                            
13 “Vystuplenie po radio Predsedatelia Gosudarstvennogo Komiteta Oborony I.V. Stalina, 3 iulia 1941 goda,” 
Izvestiia and Pravda, 3 July 1941, 1. 
14 Mukhamet Shayakhmetov, The Silent Steppe: The Story of a Kazakh Nomad under Stalin, ed. Anthony Gardner, 
trans. Jan Butler (London: Stacey International, 2006), 259. 






victory, and their willingness to fight the enemy.16 Poetry exhibited the commitment of the 
creative intelligentsia, as poems sought to drum up affective support from readers.17 Pravda and 
Izvestiia ran numerous full-page spreads of declarations from work collectives, local soviets, and 
other rank-and-file citizens, attesting to this unified response. Collective farmers, workers in all 
industries, and attendees at public rallies in every corner of the country declared their intent to 
fight, in Molotov’s words, “for the motherland, for honor, for freedom.” Photos depicted large 
crowds gathering to listen to speeches and soldiers preparing for battle. Headlines like “The 
Soviet people demonstrates its tight cohesion around the great party of Lenin-Stalin and the 
Soviet Government” and “The entire Soviet people is unified (splochen) and united as never 
before” borrowed from prewar discourses.18 Even as the language echoed the past, newspapers, 
leaders, and citizens portrayed the war as an unprecedented challenge, but one in which ultimate 
victory was assured.  
 
Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Heroism and Sacrifice on the Front and Home Front 
 Leaders and news agencies emphasized the extreme circumstances of war. As Stalin 
noted in his July 3, 1941 radio address, “The war with fascist Germany cannot be considered an 
ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies. It is at the same time a great war of the 
                                                            
16 See declarations by Leonid Sobolev, Academic P.L. Kapitsa, poet and academic Pavlo Tychyna, academic V.A. 
Obruchev, Hero of the Soviet Union G. Baidukov, and Academic I. Bardin, all published under the headline “Golos 
sovetskoi intelligentsii,” Pravda, 23 June 1941, 4. 
17 For selected poems, see Aleksei Surkov, “Prisiagaem pobedoi,” Pravda, 23 June 1941, 2; Nik. Aseev, “Pobeda 
budet za nami!” Pravda, 23 June 1941, 3; Aleksandr Prokof’ev, “V pokhod,” Izvestiia, 24 June 1941, 3; Pavlo 
Tychyna, “My idemo na bii,” Pravda, 24 June 1941, 3; Iakub Kolas, “Shalionaga psa—na lantsug!” Pravda, 24 June 
1941, 4; Vas. Lebedev-Kumach, “Pokonchim s fashizmom,” Izvestiia, 25 June 1941, 2; Suleiman Rustam, trans. A. 
Adalis, “Nesokrushimaia krepost’,” Izvestiia, 26 June 1941, 2. 
18 “Ves’ sovetskii narod splochen i edin, kak nikogda,” Pravda, 24 June 1941, 3; “Nashe delo pravoe. Vrag budet 
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Lenina-Stalina i sovetskogo pravitel’stva,” Pravda, 23 June 1941, 3. A perusal of Pravda and Izvestiia in the days 
following the Nazi invasion would reveal similar headlines. For prewar antecedents as discussed in Chapter 1, see 
especially “Sovetskii narod splochen kak nikogda, Pravda, 16 December 1937, 3; “Velikii sovetskii narod 






entire Soviet people against German-fascist troops.”19 Although allusions to the last successful 
“patriotic war” on Russian territory in 1812 were common, Stalin emphasized the unprecedented 
severity and intensity of the German campaign. As he noted in his second wartime address, 
delivered at the November 1941 meeting of the Moscow soviet, the lack of a second European 
front enabled Germans to attack with unparalleled ferocity, intensified by the element of 
surprise. These circumstances contributed to “temporary setbacks” (vremennye neudachi) as 
German troops pushed deep into Soviet territory, inflicting serious casualties.20 Later, Stalin and 
others pointed to the sheer number of German troops as evidence of unprecedented suffering.21 
Commenters frequently saw the war as a test or trial (ispytanie) of the strength and will of 
the Soviet people. In the words of war correspondent Il’ia Bachelis in a 1942 Izvestiia article, 
“The Soviet people is undergoing a difficult test. War tests all of us, Soviet people (liudi), our 
country, our state. We are not the only ones who are undergoing the test: the hour of verification 
has come for all peoples and states. The state system and social structure, economic system, 
political ideals, and moral qualities—everything boils and bubbles in the fiery furnace of war.”22 
Comparing it to rigorous scientific testing to ensure the quality and strength of materials, 
Bachelis saw war as “a difficult and serious test—perhaps the most serious of all those that 
humanity has experienced” and a chance to prove mettle and resolve.23 
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 Descriptions of wartime hardship inspired and intensified opportunities for heroism and 
sacrifice from civilians and soldiers. From the outset, the total impact was undeniable: as leaders 
repeatedly emphasized, success in war would require the absolute focus not only of all military 
personnel but also of a meticulously organized rear. As the writer Konstantin Trenev noted in 
Pravda several days after the invasion, “Each of us is ready for any sacrifice. In this hour, our 
great, heroic people demands heroism from each of us. And each of us is ready for the great 
historic feat, the feat of struggle for our sacred homeland.”24 As in the 1930s, heroism was seen 
as an intrinsic quality of the Soviet people, which was unified in patriotic devotion. 
 Central newspapers abounded with stories of soldiers’ heroism. The “heroic army of the 
Soviet people,” as described in one editorial, provided training and opportunities for citizens to 
distinguish themselves: “Every day and every hour of the patriotic war bring ever new examples 
of the greatest heroism and steadfastness of our soldiers.”25 The state formally recognized its 
most valiant citizens through awards and titles, including the most prestigious Hero of the Soviet 
Union, first used for the polar expeditions of the 1930s. The number of recognized heroes 
skyrocketed during war, as the title was bestowed liberally upon the country’s defenders. As 
before the war, the recognition of heroes served as an example to compatriots. A profile of 
Gennadii Gabaidulin, a Tatar awarded Hero of the Soviet Union in 1942, highlighted his 
willingness to go to war, mastery of weaponry, and refusal to surrender, even once injured. Then 
convalescing from injuries but ready to return to war as soon as possible, Gabaidulin was seen as 
an inspiration to both fellow Tatars and all citizens.26 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
December 1944, 1. 
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 In many cases, heroism was collective, as entire units banded together to defend the 
motherland. As Izvestiia declared in a 1942 front-page editorial, “The heroic defenders of 
Moscow and Tula, Odessa and Sevastopol, Leningrad and Stalingrad have shown the entire 
world examples of high military art. Cadres of the Red Army increased in serious strength, they 
have withstood an onslaught of the enemy of the sort no other army, no other country could 
withstand.”27 On the eve of victory, Stalin noted the heroism not only of soldiers but of entire 
cities, singling out Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, and Odessa as “hero cities.”28 
Stories and legends of heroes did not need to be strictly true to be effective and inspiring. 
Perhaps most (in)famously, the 28 guardsmen of the Panfilov Division were praised for their 
heroic, sacrificial defense of Moscow in November 1941. According to official reports, the entire 
division, a multiethnic unit made up primarily of residents of the Kazakh SSR, perished 
heroically, taking with them some 70 enemy soldiers and 20 enemy tanks. In reality, several 
soldiers survived the battle, one of whom was later convicted of treason. Such inconvenient 
details were stricken from the official record, making room for an embellished account of the 
unit’s accomplishments and heroism. The legend of the Panfilovtsy grew, memorialized in 
articles, poetry, and a postwar memorial in Almaty.29 The soldiers were posthumously named 
Heroes of the Soviet Union, and leaders and citizens took pride in their accomplishments. As 
Kazakhstan’s First Secretary, Nikolai Skvortsov wrote in a 1942 Pravda article, “Of the 28 
Guardsmen-Panfilovtsy, famous in the entire world for their heroism and unreserved loyalty to 
the motherland in the struggle with German occupants, twenty of the heroes are Kazakhstanis 
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(kazakhstantsy).”30 The use of the term Kazakhstani (i.e. of Kazakhstan) rather than (ethnic) 
Kazakh suggested that nested patriotism could also be defined in civic terms, as a statement of 
loyalty to both the Kazakh SSR and the Soviet Union as a whole. 
 Heroism was not limited to the front. Deep in the rear, citizens also contributed to the war 
effort through industrial and agricultural output. Again invoking a civic form of belonging, 
Skvortsov emphasized that this work could be equally heroic: “In labor valor (trudovaia 
doblest’) and heroism, Kazakhstanis will not lag behind their glorious countrymen (zemliaki), the 
guardsmen-Panfilovtsy.”31 Yo’ldash Oxunboboyev, chairman of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, 
likewise noted, “The defense of our motherland—the defense of our happiness, our law, our 
accomplishments—is the sacred duty of citizens of the USSR. These lofty goals give birth to 
heroes and heroines of the front and labor.”32 Because victory depended on the ability of the 
home front to support the troops, labor became a critical arena for heroism and dedication. 
Citizens also supported the war effort financially, a practice encouraged through bond 
and lottery programs designed to fill war coffers. As Kristy Ironside notes, citizens donated 
generously and with enthusiasm, often pledging life savings (sometimes ill-gained through 
wartime speculation) to the war effort. The most generous were singled out as public examples 
of patriotism and commitment.33 Many contributed to funds designated for specific purposes, 
including commissioning individual airplanes and tanks. Newspapers also detailed generous gifts 
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of warm clothing, food, and other necessities collected in various localities, many of which never 
reached the front.34 Donations suggested the ongoing theme of individual sacrifice for the greater 
good, whether risking life and limb in the physical defense of the country, sending loved ones to 
the front, laboring tirelessly in the rear, or donating hard-earned salaries or valued goods. Such 
sacrifice and heroism presented an image of a united populace willing to do anything to defend 
its beloved homeland against a hated and dangerous enemy. 
 
Hatred and Love: The Civic Emotions of War 
Wartime propaganda capitalized on what Serhy Yekelchyk has termed “civic emotions” 
to bind citizens into a tightly knit, affective community.35 As an attendee at a March 1944 
meeting of the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation noted, the use of emotion in 
propaganda—in his case, in higher education—was critical to ensuring effectiveness: “It is 
necessary to ensure that the teacher combines propaganda and agitation, so that he acts 
emotionally on the student, not only on the mind, but so that he acts also on the soul, so that he 
infects (zarazhal) and convinces. Unfortunately this is not done enough.”36 During war, hatred 
towards the enemy—this time an invading fascist one—was perhaps the most important rallying 
point for emotional unity, and not without precedent. As seen in Chapter 1, a specifically fascist 
enemy had been a key to the original theoretical formulation of the Soviet people, although this 
earlier approach had lost ground to a focus on “internal enemies” after the signing of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The return of the fascist enemy, once Nazi Germany had broken that 
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treaty, refocused Soviet efforts on internal cohesion against an external foe.37 
During the war, the press regularly highlighted German atrocities against “peaceful 
Soviet citizens” to capitalize on citizens’ outrage and hatred. In his initial address, Molotov 
emphasized the unjustness of the invasion, highlighting civilian casualties across invaded 
territory.38 Between November 1941 and April 1942, Molotov also sent a series of diplomatic 
notes to all Soviet embassies for publication abroad concerning various German atrocities on 
Soviet territory. Although the notes were ostensibly directed towards a foreign audience, each 
was published in full in Pravda and Izvestiia, suggesting their domestic importance. The first, 
published on November 26, described “outrageous atrocities” committed against Soviet prisoners 
of war, including torture, violent murders, and systematic starvation, including of the wounded 
and sick. Molotov decried German treatment of Soviet POWs as a violation of the Hague 
Convention and called for the German government to be held responsible for its military’s cruel 
and inhumane actions.39 
The following two notes, dated January 6 and April 27, 1942, deepened these accusations 
and focused on Nazi atrocities against civilians. The first, “On the widespread robberies, 
devastation of the population, and monstrous atrocities of German authorities on occupied Soviet 
territories,” declared that the Soviet Union was actively tracking all German crimes in 
accordance with the demands of the Soviet people. Both described German policies of systematic 
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torture, murder, rape, and looting of the “defenseless civilian population,” including women, 
children, and the elderly.40 The third report devoted an entire section to forced labor and 
categorizing non-combatants as prisoners of war, as cities, villages, and collective farms fell to 
Nazi invaders.41 
In addition to violent crimes against individuals, the second and third reports interpreted 
German actions as deliberate attempts to stamp out national cultures and reverse all progress: 
The German occupiers stop at nothing in the occupied territories of the Soviet republics 
to insult in every way the national feelings of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, 
Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Moldovans, as well as those individuals of other 
ethnicities residing in the USSR. When meeting [Soviet citizens] on their bloody path, 
[Germans] inflicted the very same outrages and violence on Jews, Georgians, Armenians, 
Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis, Tajiks and other representatives of the Soviet peoples, unified 
amongst themselves by a feeling of fraternal friendship and cooperation in the Soviet 
Union.42 
 
The third note, although more limited in scope, leveled analogous accusations. It interpreted Nazi 
crimes as an attempt to stamp out Russian culture, even as it also discussed the destruction of 
cultural institutions, cities, and villages across occupied territory in the Ukrainian, Belarusian, 
and the Baltic republics. By listing a diverse group of ethnicities, the note downplayed the 
primacy of Jewish suffering to emphasize that all Soviet citizens suffered under Nazi rule, 
thereby cementing the war as a universal Soviet experience. This simultaneous equating but also 
privileging of some citizens’ experience over that of others reflected persistent ethnic hierarchies 
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embedded in Soviet ideology. 
Together, Molotov’s notes exhorted citizens to avenge the violence inflicted on their 
compatriots. As the second report concluded, “Our entire multimillion people (narod) is filled 
with a fiery vengeance for the blood and ruined lives of Soviet citizens. Soviet people (liudi) will 
never forget and never forgive the atrocities, violence, destruction, and humiliations incurred and 
being incurred by the peaceful population of our country by the bestial bands of German 
occupiers.”43 The third report declared that past atrocities of Genghis Khan, Batu Khan, Mamai 
Khan and those experienced under the “Tatar-Mongol yoke” paled in comparison to Nazi 
behavior. These allusions, more familiar to the domestic than the foreign reader, secured 
collective anger and resentment and called upon the international community to hold Germany 
responsible for its crimes.44 Editorials further heightened the emotional response to German 
atrocities, as citizens were called to avenge German crimes and offer no mercy to perpetrators.45 
 To regularize the process of reporting on Nazi atrocities, the Soviet Union established the 
Extraordinary State Commission in November 1942. The commission investigated, collected, 
and published evidence of German wrongdoing in the Soviet Union. Reports on German crimes 
were regularly published in the central press to keep citizens informed—and angry—about 
ongoing crimes and cruelties.46 The reports, stripped of specific references to Nazi crimes against 
Jewish citizens, interpreted German atrocities as perpetrated against Soviet citizens generally. 
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Some reports contained outright fabrications designed to heighten their emotional impact.47 
German soldiers were commonly described in unforgiving, dehumanizing terms, a 
strategy that further increased the level of anger against them.48 Words like vermin (gadina), 
plague (chuma), monsters (izvergi), degenerates (vyrodki), beasts (zveri), hordes (ordy, 
polchishcha), evil spirits (nechist’), bastards (svolochi), scoundrels (merzavtsy), cutthroats 
(golovorezy), and cannibals (liudoedy) left little doubt about the appropriate response.49 Even the 
less extreme characterizations—describing Germans as “bandits” (bandity, razboiniki), invaders 
(zakhvatchiki), and “robbers” (grabiteli)—suggested the grave danger German soldiers posed to 
Soviet citizens and territory. With their “dirty paws,” “beastly instincts,” and “misanthropic, 
crazy idea of the ‘superior race,’” German soldiers needed to be “cleansed from Soviet land.”50 
This language justified a severe response. As one 1941 headline bluntly put it, “These are not 
people.” The accompanying article closed in the harshest of terms: “With this critter (tvar’), only 
one conversation is possible: a bullet, a bayonet, a shell, death. The beast (zver’) must be 
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na vostoke SSSR,” Pravda, 15 May 1942, 3.  
50 “Krepnet sila nashikh udarov po vragu,” Izvestiia, 24 November 1942, 1; L. Kuz’min, “Edinaia volia sovetskogo 






destroyed.”51 The Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskii described the war in stark terms in 
1942: “There is an unprecedented battle in the history of mankind for peaceful hearths, for the 
right to a happy life for people who have built a new, socialist society with their own hands, who 
are now defending this society in bloody battles with treacherous robbers and bandits with the 
morality of cannibals and the instincts and psychology of a bloodthirsty beast.”52 
Civic emotions, as Yekelchyk notes, were not limited to hatred towards the enemy. Love, 
too, could unite citizens.53 Indeed, as suggested in a front-page Pravda editorial, hatred for the 
enemy and love of country often went hand-in-hand: “The Soviet people and its valiant Red 
Army are carrying out a merciless battle against Hitlerite bandits. The burning, holy hatred 
towards the base enemy is borne of warm, wholehearted (bezzavetnyi) love for the Soviet 
motherland, one’s own land, one’s own people, one’s own close family members. Our country is 
full of this hatred.”54 Mikhail Sholokhov’s short story, “The Science of Hatred,” published in 
Pravda on the first anniversary of the German invasion, outlined the duality of love for the 
motherland and hatred for the enemy. His fictional Lieutenant Gerasimov observed: 
And they [soldiers] really learned how to fight and to hate and to love. On such a 
grindstone as war, all feelings become perfectly sharpened. It would seem as if love and 
hatred would be impossible to place side-by-side. As they say, “you cannot harness a 
horse and a trembling doe to the same cart,” but among us they are harnessed and are 
pulling hard. I arduously hate the Germans for everything they have inflicted on my 
motherland and on me personally, and at the same time, with my whole heart I love my 
people and do not want it to suffer under the German yoke. Precisely this compels me—
and indeed, all of us—to fight tooth and nail: precisely these two feelings embodied into 
action, and they will lead to us victory. And if love for the motherland is preserved in our 
hearts for as long as they beat, then hatred we always carry on the tips of our bayonets.55 
 
The central press celebrated the positive role of love—for the motherland, the state and 
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party, fellow citizens, the military, and Stalin—in binding citizens together. Patriotism was seen 
to bring together the best of Soviet qualities: “It has become especially clear now that all the 
most wonderful traits of the Soviet person—selfless devotion, dedication, loyalty, love for fellow 
citizens—have amalgamated into one all-encompassing trait: patriotism.”56 As Pravda noted in a 
New Year’s editorial in 1942, war “has shown all the effective power of Soviet patriotism, the 
mighty, driving force of our society. In the years of peaceful construction, love for the 
motherland moved Soviet people (liudi) to exploits of labor heroism; in war years, love for the 
motherland gives rise to military feats of unparalleled courage and bravery.”57 The “boundless 
love of the Soviet people” for the military, another article noted, inspired support for the front.58 
Contrasting the subhuman descriptions of German soldiers, propaganda often relied on 
religiously inflected vocabulary to describe Soviet values, territory, and wartime activity, a 
practice that went back at least to the 1930s. In describing the German invasion as a violation of 
the “sacred (sviashchennye) borders,” newspaper columnists emphasized the importance of 
defending “sacred Soviet land” from a base, evil enemy.59 A 1942 editorial described the war 
effort in similar terms: “Soviet people (liudi) meet the new year, 1942, with fierce hatred towards 
the enemy, with an unshakable faith in the triumph of our righteous (pravoe) cause, with steely 
determination to bring to a victorious end our sacred struggle for life, for the honor and freedom 
of our great fatherland.”60 Feelings of hatred towards the enemy and obligation to the state were 
also elevated to “sacred” and “holy,” as its message of liberation and freedom was seen as part of 
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the state’s “historic mission” for human history.61 Such language cast the war as a quasi-holy 
movement that left no neutral ground. 
As a result, propaganda described the ways in which war brought together “all strata of 
the Soviet people, all parts of the Soviet state into a single war camp,” catalyzing interaction and 
collaboration.62 This unity was described along several important and overlapping lines, which 
simultaneously hinted at persistent social divisions. First, as before the war, there was a strong 
emphasis on multiethnic unity, which bound a diverse citizenry into a united Soviet people. 
Second, newspapers highlighted the unified efforts of men and women and the old and young, 
further emphasizing how war affected the entire population. Wartime propaganda also brought 
messages of inclusion for religious practices, thereby expanding notions of Soviet identity. 
Finally, geographic unity, most obviously the deep connection between the front and home front, 
represented a key motif in reporting on war. Together, these visions suggested a unity that 
intensified and expanded prewar rhetoric. 
 
Multiethnic Unity 
Perhaps more than before the war, newspapers emphasized the unified, multiethnic 
Soviet people, often contrasting Soviet equality and inclusion with Nazi racial hierarchies.63 
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Echoing the rhetoric of the 1930s, official propaganda saw nationalities policy as an essential 
aspect of the Soviet Union’s cohesion. As Pravda noted in 1942: 
For the first time in the history of humanity, the great idea of fraternal cooperation and 
friendship between peoples has been brought to life in the Soviet Union According to 
Leninist precepts and under Stalinist leadership, a multiethnic state of a new, previously 
unprecedented type has been created in the USSR. It is based not on national inequality 
and oppression, not on the division of people into ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ races, but on 
the complete equality of all peoples inhabiting our country, on their fraternal cooperation 
and on their strong, indestructible friendship. The Hitlerites’ foolish expectations of 
conflict between peoples of the USSR have suffered a shameful failure.64 
 
That German troops mistakenly counted on a complete dissolution of the bonds between Soviet 
citizens featured routinely in wartime articles; the lack of state collapse was deployed as 
evidence of the country’s strength and unity.65 
Wartime reporting deepened the positive propagandistic image of the Soviet people as a 
unified, multiethnic populace. Newspapers routinely highlighted the contributions of Russian and 
non-Russian citizens, bringing new visibility to minorities and their contributions. One unique 
innovation of the wartime period was an increasing presence of non-Russian languages and 
propaganda specifically targeted towards non-Russians. Following the initial invasion in 1941, 
Pravda ran untranslated Ukrainian and Belarusian poems by Pavlo Tychyna and Iakub Kolas, 
respectively, an occurence repeated intermittently throughout the war.66 The poems characterized 
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the German invasion as an attack on “our home” and “motherland,” relying on ambiguous 
language to refer at once to invaded republics and the Soviet whole.67 The occasional publication 
of works in non-Russian languages, best represented in the above-cited 1942 letter to Uzbek 
soldiers, suggested that the state valued the use of ethnic themes and national languages. This 
hearkened back to affirmative action policies of the 1920s and exemplified notions of nested 
patriotism. 
Scholars of wartime propaganda, however, have generally emphasized the prominence of 
imperial Russian motifs and of ethnic Russians in the late 1930s and during and after World War 
II.68 Some ethnic diversification notwithstanding, Russians still played an outsized role in 
symbolic representations of the Soviet people. Even as the press highlighted multiethnic 
contributions, articles described “the great Russian people” as the “first among equals” who 
guided non-Russians into battle and towards victory.69 After the final German capitulation, 
Stalin’s infamous 1945 toast to the Russian people, discussed below, exemplified the view that 
Russians played the leading role in securing final victory.70 Russians’ undisputed dominant 
position contributed to a continuing under-appreciation of non-Russian contributions to the war 
effort and suggested one of the deepest lines of inequality that persisted during and after the war. 
Still, Russian pre-eminence had its limits. Russians comprised more than half the Soviet 
population, somewhat justifying their prominence. But as already noted, World War II saw an 
upsurge in the prominence of non-Russians, contributing to greater visibility of minorities. Even 
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without systematic efforts to include minorities in wartime propaganda, non-Russians often 
featured in newspapers in both formal and informal capacities, reminding readers of the 
country’s diversity. Ukrainians and Belarusians were upgraded rhetorically to “great” peoples, 
like their Russian counterparts.71 Non-Russian historical motifs were deployed to inspire troops 
and demonstrate centuries of cooperation with (and subservience to) Russians.72 Newspapers 
detailed the exploits of non-Russian heroes and highlighted non-Russians’ presence in the key 
moments of war. In 1943, for example, Pravda reported on the Kazakh soldiers who were 
helping liberate Leningrad, noting that they had performed traditional tea ceremonies, national 
dances and songs, and read lectures on Soviet progress in Kazakhstan.73 The central press also 
featured contributions and messages from non-Russians.74 The partial reconstitution of ethno-
territorial units in the army also provided opportunities to valorize and appeal to ethnic 
identities.75 Home-front propaganda initiatives reflected goals of fostering non-Russian 
patriotism and support for the war effort.76 In Kazakhstan, for instance, the state and party 
increased the number of Kazakh-language ideological lectures.77 Appeals to nationalism in the 
South Caucasus helped secure popular support for and participation in the Soviet occupation of 
Northern Iran.78 
As before the war, the concept of the friendship of the peoples did much of the 
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ideological work of emphasizing both diversity and unity. The press celebrated successful 
collaboration and interaction at every opportunity, highlighting examples of cooperation, friendly 
relations, mutual support (emotional, financial, and in deed), and common sacrifice as evidence 
of deepening friendship. In the military, the multiethnic units in which most soldiers served 
illustrated friendship and brotherhood, as soldiers fought side-by-side. Articles and memoirs 
conveyed the sense that bloodshed had forged deep attachments between soldiers of different 
ethnicities.79 Multiethnic gatherings of regional leaders and intellectuals from across the South 
Caucasus in Tbilisi in 1942 and from across Central Asia in Tashkent in 1943 brought together 
political and cultural elites.80 Transethnic adoptions of orphans were also seen as evidence of 
growing interethnic bonds.81 The press detailed examples of multiethnic friendship on collective 
farms and in factories deep in the rear, suggesting that examples of unity and friendship could be 
found everywhere.82 
Literature and poetry emphasized collaboration and friendship. The celebrated Kazakh 
poet Jambyl Jabaev penned Russian-language poems considered exemplary of Soviet patriotism. 
His most famous poem, “Leningrad, Children of Mine” (1941), testified to feelings of kinship 
with citizens in occupied territories. The poem served as a model for letters of support penned by 
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communities across the Soviet Union for citizens stuck in the Leningrad blockade.83 The Tatar 
poet Akhmed Erikeev employed the same themes in his tale of “two Soviet heroes—Akhmed 
and Stepan,” a Tatar and Russian, who served side-by-side and were shot, embracing, in 
captivity. The poem, translated from Tatar, closed with an image of the “fascist villain” 
surveying the corpses of the dead as he realized that “he could kill imprisoned Soviet people 
(liudi), / but to kill their honor, their friendship is impossible.”84 Such works aimed to deepen the 
affective ties that bound citizens across potentially divisive ethnic lines. 
 
Every Man, Woman, and Child 
 Alongside multiethnic unity, newspapers and leaders also highlighted how the war effort 
transcended generational and gender divides. Although wartime propaganda sought primarily to 
prepare relatively young men for the front, women, children, and the elderly also contributed. 
Propagandists focused efforts towards women and rural inhabitants, many of whom had 
heretofore been viewed as beyond the state’s ideological reach.85 Schools also served as sites of 
patriotic education, as educators worked to raise the vigilance and patriotism of both pupils and 
parents.86 As propaganda made clear, war did not discriminate, and all needed to defend the 
country. Reflecting the need for universal participation, propaganda promoted the idea that 
everyone played a role in the war effort. Gender and generational differences shaped divisions of 
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labor and sacrifice: young men (and the occasional young woman) headed to the front while the 
elderly, young, and female toiled in the hinterlands. Even while reifying gender and generational 
difference, war contributed to subtle alterations in presumed roles and created opportunities for 
innovative participation in the war economy and frontline battles. 
 As suggested by the prominence of reports on German atrocities, women, children, and 
the elderly frequently occupied the role of victims in wartime propaganda. Though passive, this 
role nevertheless motivated soldiers and civilians to avenge and protect fellow citizens.87 Elderly 
parents, wives, and children were also praised for sending their children, husbands, and fathers to 
war, a status that afforded them slightly more agency even as it entrenched established gender 
and generational roles. Much like victims of Nazi aggression, those left behind were seen to need 
care and protection, as local state and party organs and citizens were expected to provide for 
their needs.88 Women contributed by raising patriotic citizens and exhorting their sons and 
husbands to fight bravely.89 Letters from home, one article noted, boosted frontline morale and 
courage: after one Uzbek wife’s letter encouraging her husband “mercilessly to smash Hitlerite 
monsters and return home with victory and honors” was published in a military publication, 
“Takhtobaev began to fulfill his duties even better.”90 Charles Shaw has noted that women 
inspired soldiers as romantic objects.91 As discussed above, citizens also supported the front 
through donations and labor, sacrifices that were made for the good of the entire Red Army in 
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the name of their loved ones. 
 War also created new opportunities for civic participation. As Kalinin noted in his 1943 
New Year’s address, this included children: “Literally every citizen, even children, strives to 
mark his or her concern and attention for a soldier of the Red Army.”92 Arkadii Gaidar’s popular 
1940 children’s book, Timur and His Squad, which featured an eponymous hero and a team of 
do-gooders, inspired children’s participation. The press praised adolescent-led initiatives of self-
proclaimed ‘Timurovites’ to care for the families of front-line soldiers and collect scrap metal.93 
In a discussion of the book’s influence, writer Iurii Nagibin noted, “As soon as the book 
appeared and was read, hundreds of Soviet children wanted to imitate Gaidar’s proud, good, 
courageous, happy hero. The most fervent children began to spend their youthful energy, the 
strength of small fists, bravery, and passion for unusual exploits not on empty tricks but on 
helping people in need.”94 Along the frontlines, Pioneers were praised for recognizing foreign 
accents and slyly misdirecting German soldiers towards Red Army units ready to overtake 
them.95 Summers also brought opportunities for children to work on collective farms and in 
factories, another field of wartime participation.96 
 Women, too, entered new roles in factories, fields, and even on the front, filling roles 
historically occupied by men. As T. Kuliev, head of the Soviet of People’s Commissars of 
Azerbaijan noted in a review of the work of collective farms, “A massive movement of women 
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has begun to master the art of driving tractors. Short-term courses for tractor drivers have been 
organized. Many girls, having studied this profession earlier, have gotten behind the wheel.”97 
Wives of frontline soldiers were praised for their participation in the workforce, suggesting the 
family as another mode of nested patriotism.98 Makhsuda M., a diarist who spent the war years in 
and around Tashkent, recalled high numbers of women entering universities as their male peers 
went off to war.99 As Anna Krylova shows, women participated in frontline battles in 
unprecedented numbers, taking on unconventional responsibilities as they adhered to “non-
oppositional though still binary” gender roles.”100 More than thirty women, including non-
Russians, were recognized as Heroes of the Soviet Union during the war (and more afterwards 
for their wartime efforts), suggesting new possibilities for glory and honor.101 
 
Expanding the Body Politic: Wartime Religious Inclusion 
 While discussions of generational and cross-gender unity included citizens in ways that 
echoed discourses of the 1930s, the needs of war necessitated appeals to previously excluded 
segments of the population. This included making peace with and legalizing some religious 
communities and practices. The partial re-legalization of religion indicated an expansion of the 
theoretical conception of the Soviet people that broke from previous religious oppression and the 
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widespread proselytization of atheism.102 Although the change in emphasis could in no way be 
equated with religious freedom, newspapers and the party propaganda apparatus articulated 
greater religious tolerance. This, as will be seen in Chapter 4, promoted a religious revival of 
sorts that leaders would feel obligated to address in subsequent decades. 
In theory, Article 124 of the 1936 Constitution had guaranteed religious freedom, and its 
passage ushered in a brief cessation of anti-religious propaganda, including the closure of the 
Bezbozhnik (Godless) newspaper. This scaling back, however, had already been reversed by the 
late 1930s, when the League of the Militant Godless revived its activities.103 During war, the state 
again pursued conciliatory policies towards religion. Initially, these efforts were quietly directed 
towards the faithful. For instance, the Muslim Spiritual Authority, headed by Abdurakhman 
Rasulev since 1936, regularly exhorted Muslims to support the war effort. In a May 1942 
statement, Rasulev described Nazi atrocities as directed specifically against Soviet Muslims and 
reminded believers that the Prophet had commanded them to love their motherland.104 
Propagandists were instructed to act with greater respect for religious compatriots. An 
undated draft directive to leaders of oblast propaganda and agitation divisions in Kazakhstan 
urged a more “sensitive relationship” (chutkoe otnoshenie) towards believers. The directive 
implored propagandists to scale back atheist messaging and instead emphasize hatred towards 
fascism by reminding people of German atrocities in occupied territories. The League of the 
Militant Godless, with its extensive network of propagandists with local experience, was an 
important partner in this effort. Although the instructions did not forbid anti-religious work, anti-
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fascist propaganda would be the main focus.105 Sh. Galikhaidarov’s June 1942 report on the 
activities of the Kazakh League of the Militant Godless in the first year of war confirmed this 
reorientation. In speeches and conversations, atheist activists spoke on the tasks and goals of the 
war and urged discipline in industry, agriculture, and the Red Army. In South Kazakhstan, the 
most religious region of the republic, the League prepared Kazakh-language exposés on Nazi 
race theory and highlighted patriotism among believers, encouraged by Rasulev’s statements.106 
Public support for the state-led war effort and for Stalin himself from Russian Orthodox 
and Islamic leaders began to appear in central newspapers in late 1942.107 In subsequent years, 
Pravda and Izvestiia routinely ran letters from church hierarchs pledging monetary support for 
the war based on donations from the faithful. Muslim leaders also pledged money and, in the 
words of one Pravda announcement, “commanded all believing Muslims to follow the example 
of Kazakh collective farmer Berdybekov and give the state all available means for accelerating 
the victory over the Hitlerite bands.”108 Though such statements were seemingly insignificant and 
often buried in the back pages of newspapers, they hinted at a sea change in the administration of 
religious practice. 
Recognition of religion became more formalized in 1943. Signaling a monumental policy 
change, on September 4, 1943, Stalin and Molotov met with the three Orthodox hierarchs, Sergii, 
Acting Patriarch and Metropolitan; Aleksii, Metropolitan of Leningrad; and Nikolai, Exarch of 
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Ukraine. The following issue of Pravda announced the meeting and an imminent synod to elect a 
new patriarch.109 On September 8, Sergii was unanimously chosen to be the first Patriarch of 
Moscow and All Russia since Tikhon’s death in 1925.110 To oversee church matters, the state 
created the Council for Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (CAROC) the following month 
and appointed Georgii Karpov as its chairman.111 Following this de facto re-legalization of 
Orthodox religious practice, the church played a more visible, if still relatively marginal, role in 
patriotic activity in the remaining months of the war. After Sergii’s death in May 1944, Karpov 
participated in the special synod convened in January 1945 to elect his successor, Aleksii. 
Shortly thereafter, Stalin officially received the newly elected patrioarch, evidence of increased 
state-church cooperation.112 
A parallel process unfolded among Muslim groups. The state approved the formation of 
the Spiritual Authority of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in October 1943, along with 
analogous organizations for the North Caucasus, the South Caucasus, and the European RSFSR 
and Siberia.113 In May 1944, the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC) was 
established to oversee religious affairs for non-Orthodox groups. Konstantin Zaitsev initially 
headed the council but Ivan Polianskii replaced him just a month later. 
                                                            
109 “Priem tov. I.B. Stalinym Mitropolita Sergiia, Mitropolita Aleksiia i Mitropolita Nikolaia,” Pravda, 5 September 
1943, 1. 
110 “Sobor episkopov pravoslavnoi tserkvi,” Pravda, 9 September 1943, 2. 
111 For general discussions of wartime changes towards the Orthodox church, see Nathaniel Davis, A Long Walk To 
Church: A Contemporary History Of Russian Orthodoxy, 2nd edition (Boulder: Routledge, 2003), 15–24; T. A. 
Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev Years, 
trans. Edward E. Roslof (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 15–86. Dates of the creation of the CAROC and the 
Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC) are outlined in the archival records of their successor institution, 
the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA), GARF f. R-6991. Pravda and Izvestiia announced the formation of 
CAROC, see “Ob obrazovanii Soveta po delam Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi,” Pravda and Izvestiia, 8 October 
1943, 1. As Eren Tasar notes, both Polianskii of CARC and Karpov CAROC were well-established secret police 
professionals, see Tasar, Soviet and Muslim, 78–79. 
112 See “Rech’ Predsedatelia Sovetskogo Pravitel’stva—Predsedatelia Soveta po delam Russkoi Pravoslavnoi 
Tserkvi pri Sovnarkome Siuza SSR G.G. Karpova na Pomestnom Sobore,” Izvestiia, 4 February 1945, 2, and 
Pravda, 5 February 1945, 2. Sergii’s death and burial were announced in Pravda and Izvestiia, see Izvestiia, 16 May 
1944, 1; “Pokhorony patriarkha Sergiia,” Pravda and Izvestiia, 20 May 1944, 2. 






The formation of these regional councils paved the way for what Eren Tasar has called 
“religiously informed patriotism” among Soviet Muslims.114 This was, in essence, another 
iteration of nested patriotism, this time in religious terms. Support letters to Stalin from religious 
leaders articulated state patriotism with Quranic and biblical citations and exhortations to 
believers. One May 1944 letter, titled “From the Kurultai [council] of Muslim clergy and 
believers,” closed with a declaration of state loyalty and prayers for Allah “to watch over the 
victorious path of our valorous warriors and to help them to obliterate the fascist evil spirits from 
the face of the earth forever.” The letter also offered prayers for Stalin’s good health.115 The 
following month, another letter closed with a prayer for Allah to bring victory, unleash his wrath 
against the Germans, and bring glory to the Soviet state: “O great Allah! Exalt our glorious great 
Soviet homeland, bring happiness to the spirit of the multimillion Soviet people, living in 
brotherhood and friendship, both in the years of peaceful constructive labor and in the years of 
struggle with foreign invaders.”116 Statements from the Russian Orthodox Church similarly 
invoked scriptural citations in addresses to Christians at home and abroad.117 
 
Geographic Unity 
 As religious appeals enabled new forms of unity and patriotism previously excluded by 
the state’s anti-religious stance, the press regularly capitalized on another discourse of unity: 
unity across the geographic expanse of the Soviet Union. This was articulated in two primary 
modes. First, utilizing another form of nested patriotism that echoed the ethnically informed 
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patriotism described above, propaganda encouraged citizens, particularly non-Russians living far 
from the front and evacuated citizens living far from their homes, to treat all Soviet territory as 
their own. Second, wartime propaganda systematically described the deep connections between 
the front and the home front. These discourses reminded citizens that all wartime efforts, whether 
through labor in the rear or through service on the front, contributed to eventual victory. 
 Wartime propaganda encouraged non-Russian soldiers to see the country as a single 
geographic whole, a discourse that invited them to defend occupied territory with the same 
passion otherwise reserved for their native lands. A public letter to Kazakh soldiers from the 
Kazakh people made this connection explicit: 
The unbreakable friendship of the peoples has become the basis of love for one’s 
homeland. Now, the Kazakh, gazing at the palaces of Leningrad, at the full-flowing Neva 
River, at the dense northern forests, at the splendor of the Black Sea, at the volcanoes of 
the Far East, can rightly say, “This is my motherland. And everything that is mine is 
yours, neighbors and brothers, and everything that is yours is mine. Everyone remembers 
Ukrainian film director Dovzhenko’s story about how the Kazakh soldiers upon entering 
the first inches of liberated Ukrainian land fell to their knees and with their rough hands 
smoothed and kissed this suffering earth, permeated with the blood of her sons. They did 
this not only because the steppes of Ukraine reminded them of their native expanses, but 
because this was now dear and sweet earth also for them, Kazakhs.118 
 
In a radio address to Kazakh soldiers, Nurtas Ondasynov, head of the Kazakh Soviet of People’s 
Commissars, made connections between Stalingrad and Kazakhstan: “In defending the great 
Russian Volga River, you are defending your own sunny Kazakhstan.”119 
 Such formulations were common. The Red Army soldier Sh. Kenashvili addressed his 
fellow Georgians in their native language at a Red Army gathering on the banks of the Black 
Sea: “When the enemy attacked our land, my brothers ran off in defense of the motherland. They 
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defended the happiness of Georgia in Ukraine and the Kuban [Southern Russia].”120 Another 
article likewise noted, “The front is far from Georgia, but the motherland of every Georgian is 
the entire Soviet Union.”121 Tajik soldiers, too, were encouraged to see all of the Soviet Union as 
their own, with allusions to landscapes of Tajikistan: “Wherever you fight—on the banks of the 
Don River, on the steppes of Ukraine, on the outskirts of Leningrad—you are defending 
Stalinabad, the banks of the Panj River, the Pamir Mountains, the Vakhsh and Leninabad 
valleys.” Assertions of Soviet friendship ensured this unbreakable connection between land and 
people.122 
 In the rear, the evacuated were encouraged to think similarly. One letter addressed to the 
Ukrainian people noted that Ukrainian collective farmers worked on evacuated collective farms 
“with the same energy as in their native lands.” In a literal sense, the article noted, Ukraine’s 
evacuated factories continued to produce for the needs of the front, providing a link between 
“home” and evacuation.123 As discussed above, literary compositions deepened patriotism by 
appealing to citizens’ love for their native land, using ambiguous language that allowed 
“motherland” to be interpreted as both the entire Soviet Union and more localized territories. The 
central press singled out Ukrainian writers, including Maksym Ryl’s’kyi, Pavlo Tychyna, and 
others, for their use of Ukrainian motifs and descriptions of Ukrainian land in wartime poetry.124  
 Wartime propaganda also declared geographic unity in the frequent assertion of the 
unbreakable connection between front and rear, reflecting the understanding that production of 
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industrial and agricultural goods was as necessary to ongoing battles as the fighting itself. That 
workers in the rear could work “in a soldier-like manner” (po voennomu), “in the manner of the 
front” (po frontovomu), or simply with the same organization and discipline as on the front 
erased the rhetorical boundaries between the front and rear. In his July 1941 address, Stalin 
called for the entire country to “restructure all our work in a military mode (na voennyi lad).”125 
Another article noted, “The whole country works for defense, and each production site is an 
important frontier (rubezh).”126 The fact that the German military pressed deep into Soviet 
territory in the summer and fall of both 1941 and 1942 also reminded many citizens that the front 
was never far away.127 Further underscoring this geographic unity, many articles pointed to the 
fact that people worked towards victory “from all corners of the great Soviet land.”128 
 Regular communication between soldiers on the front and loved ones in the rear further 
collapsed the distances separating them. Public letters addressed to soldiers of specific ethnicities 
exemplified this trend and promoted a sense of community that bound citizens of the same 
ethnicity across the geographic expanses that divided them. Soldiers officially responded to these 
letters, suggesting a two-way connection.129 The press also emphasized emotional bonds: war 
was not only about protecting the country in the abstract, but about supporting sons, fathers, 
husbands, brothers, and neighbors. And it was not just letters. Gifts, particularly when they 
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actually reached their destination, were seen as physical manifestations of citizens’ love and care 
for soldiers.130 In the words of one front-page editorial, “Our army is connected to our people 
with millions of threads,” as everyone provided for the front.131 
 
“Stalin Leads Us to Victory”132 
To divert attention away from hardships, tensions, and strategic blunders, the propaganda 
apparatus focused on the ultimate, inevitable victory that would justify all sacrifice and 
difficulties. From Molotov’s initial pronouncement onward, leaders emphasized eventual victory. 
Stalin repeatedly argued that Hitler had severely underestimated the country. Soviet soldiers had 
defied all expectations and fought valiantly. Indeed, Stalin emphasized the country’s unique 
qualifications to lead the world in World War II in his 1942 speech on the anniversary of the 
revolution: “I think that no other country and no other army could withstand such an onslaught of 
brutal bands of German fascist robbers and their allies. Only our Soviet country, and only its Red 
Army is capable of withstanding such an onslaught. And not only of withstanding it, but 
overcoming it.”133 
The central press frequently published similar assertions, though not always with hope 
for a swift conclusion—particularly not as German troops pushed to the outskirts of Moscow 
during the bleak autumn of 1941. A Pravda editorial that fall concluded, “No matter how hard 
the struggle, no matter how serious the sacrifices, no matter what tests lie ahead—the ultimate 
victory will be ours.”134 Soviet forces slowly repelled German troops through the winter and 
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spring, only to face a renewed German campaign during the late spring, summer, and fall of 
1942. That fall, as German troops pushed deep into Soviet territory at Stalingrad and the siege of 
Leningrad seemed unending, Izvestiia reminded readers, “Stalin leads us to victory”: 
‘There will be celebration on our streets!’ declares our leader and commander, and these 
weighty, assured words enter the soul of the people with great celebration. ‘There will be 
celebration on our streets!’—all workers of all countries take up these words. From 
Vladivostok and Tbilisi, Kalinin and Sverdlovsk, Gorky and Novosibirsk, Frunze and 
Almaty—from all cities and villages, where thousands and tens of thousands of workers, 
collective farmers, Soviet intelligentsia listened to Stalin’s speech by radio, where the 
words of his military order sounded, the people’s living and ardent response sweeps 
over.135 
 
 As wartime fortunes gradually shifted and war transformed from a defensive battle on 
Soviet territory to the liberation of Eastern Europe and ultimately Berlin, discourses of victory 
became more prominent. As Jan Plamper notes, Stalin’s name and image was tightly associated 
with wartime success, becoming more present in 1945 as victory neared.136 Stalin was frequently 
praised as the architect of victory, who led the Soviet people and the Red Army successfully into 
battle for the defense of their country.137 Credit, however, went not to Stalin alone; rather, the 
press described victory as the accomplishment of the military and the Soviet people as well. As 
the war’s end approached, the central press adopted a more celebratory tone, placing the long-
promised and now eagerly-anticipated victory onto the Soviet people’s ever-growing list of 
accomplishments.138 
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 Victory was described as both a collective, multiethnic victory as well as a specifically 
Russian accomplishment. The latter theme would become especially prominent after the war, 
most famously in Stalin’s toast to the Russian people, delivered at a Kremlin reception for Red 
Army commanders in May 1945, to “thunderous, continuing applause and shouts of ‘Hooray’”: 
I would like to raise a toast to the health of our Soviet people and, foremost, of the 
Russian people. I drink foremost to the health of the Russian people because it is the most 
distinguished nation (natsiia) of all the nations that form the Soviet Union. I raise a toast 
to the health of the Russian people because it earned in this war general recognition as the 
leading force of the Soviet Union among all peoples of our country. I raise a toast to the 
health of the Russian people not only because it is the leading people but because it 
possesses a clear mind, steadfast character and patience… The Russian people’s 
confidence in the Soviet government proved to be the decisive force that ensured the 
historic victory over the enemy of humanity—over fascism. Thanks to it, to the Russian 
people, for this confidence.139 
 
Even as such statements arguably undermined images of multiethnic contribution, the Soviet 
press celebrated the victory as one of the entire Soviet people. In the war’s final days and after 
victory, newspaper reportage from across the country and a multiethnic cast of writers and poets, 
mostly written in or translated into Russian, symbolically reminded readers of non-Russian 
participation.140 The press extensively catalogued countrywide victory celebrations.141 As noted 
in a lead editorial in Pravda, “May 9 was a day of celebration of the friendship of all peoples of 
the Soviet Union. Kyiv, Minsk, Baku, Tbilisi, Tashkent, Ashgabat, Stalinabad, Riga, all capitals 
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of Soviets republics, all their cities rejoiced and celebrated like Moscow. All eyes were turned to 
Moscow, to the Kremlin, to Stalin!”142 The diarist Makhsuda M. described the celebrations in 
Tashkent: “The entire city poured out onto the streets. Music sounded from the loud speakers. 
On that day, it seems people did not go home. They played accordion, sang, danced, everyone’s 
eyes shined. I never thought that so many people lived in Tashkent. With flowers in their hands.” 
She recalled the celebratory, “real” plov—with meat—prepared in honor of victory, and mused 
about the better fortunes and reduced workloads that would surely come.143 
 Above all, Soviet propaganda described the population in terms of its deep unity across 
many possible divides. This was not merely a theoretical assertion. Discussion of the many ways 
that civilians and soldiers had united to wage a massive, unprecedented campaign against the 
invading enemy dovetailed with citizens’ own experiences. Movement of people and goods both 
between and within the battle and home fronts created conditions that had made the country 
operate more like a coherent, unified whole. This experience, however, did not universally 
reflect the positive messages that emanated from the press and the propaganda apparatus. Indeed, 
war often brought to light disparities and inequalities—even hatreds—that divided citizens in 
ways that both exposed and challenged the Soviet Union’s imperial structure. 
 
Shoulder-to-Shoulder: Interethnic Relations and Interactions in the Military 
The military provided one of the most important sites of interethnic, cross-geographic 
interactions for citizens during World War II. Echoing prewar discourses, the press typically 
characterized the military as a quintessential institution of the entire Soviet people and frequently 
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highlighted interethnic cooperation within its ranks.144 Soldiers generally served in multiethnic 
units and the military was an important site of cultural, linguistic, and political integration. At the 
same time, routine interactions often exposed and intensified any number of countervailing 
inequalities and hierarchies, particularly along lines of ethnicity and language proficiency. 
 That the military was an important site of integration was hardly unique to the Soviet 
Union. Historians of empire have often noted that militaries frequently cultivate civic loyalty 
across linguistically and ethnically diverse polities.145 In the case of the U.S., for instance, Gary 
Gerstle demonstrated that World War II was a critical moment in the integration of white 
Americans, even as it was a time of segregation and exclusion of non-whites.146 Even in the 
Russian Empire, much maligned by Bolshevik leaders, military service enabled integration and 
upward mobility for selected non-Russian minorities.147 By World War II, the Soviet Union had 
made significant strides towards inclusion and a more egalitarian military, including the 
recruitment of Central Asian soldiers and others who had been prohibited from active service 
before 1917.148 
 The press hailed this post-revolutionary inclusion of all citizens in the military and the 
use of native languages in recruitment and training. “Ethnic minorities in the ranks of the Red 
Army,” one 1926 article noted, “should not feel for a minute that they are some sort of ‘second 
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class citizens.’ At the time they are drafted, the native language should make all recruits feel that 
they enter their own dear (rodnoi) Red Army as comrades and friends.”149 The shift to universal 
male conscription in 1936, the near-complete elimination of territorial units by 1939, and the 
1939 decision to lower the draft age from 21 to 19 transformed the military into a more 
representative institution.150 As the first major foreign war on Soviet soil since the Bolsheviks 
assumed power, World War II placed recruits on the frontlines in unprecedented numbers. 
Wartime policies to integrate soldiers reflected the dual propagandistic emphasis on the 
simultaneous unity and diversity of the body politic. The Red Army embodied the cultivation of 
both ethnic and civic identities and provided an important site of nested patriotism. On one level, 
the Russian language was a critical aspect of all-Soviet socialization. In a 1943 speech to military 
agitators who worked among non-Russian soldiers, the head of state and politburo member 
Mikhail Kalinin indicated the importance of Russian. Studying Russian, he declared, was 
“exceptionally mandatory. Our military statutes are compiled in Russian, and the military orders 
given by commanders are also written in Russian. Russian provides for the communication 
between all peoples of the USSR. The Russian language is the language of Lenin. In this 
language, our vozhd’ Comrade Stalin addresses Soviet people [liudi] and the Red Army.”151 
Although Kalinin and others simultaneously acknowledged the value of native languages in 
political socialization, Russian remained supreme as the language of both the Soviet people and 
the Red Army.152 As Charles Shaw notes, recruits “needed to adapt to the predominant Russian 
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culture and language of the army, regardless of nationality.” Shaw observes a tendency among 
Uzbek recruits to self-identify by Russian names and to write in Russian, even addressing fellow 
Uzbeks, many of whom had limited knowledge of Russian.153 
Learning Russian helped integrate troops both laterally and hierarchically, as the 
language became the medium for communication among soldiers and with commanding officers. 
Russian-speakers featured disproportionately in higher ranks and in non-combatant personnel, 
presenting communication problems for non-Russian recruits, many of whom spoke limited 
Russian.154 A draft report on political work in the Red Army observed that political workers and 
commissars often struggled to speak with non-Russian soldiers, creating tensions within the 
ranks: “Here, the cadres of political workers and commissars often do not know the language of 
the ethnicity to which a significant section of the soldiers belong, they do not understand them, 
they speak to them through translators, they cannot develop good rapport with soldiers, they lack 
credibility.”155 Kalinin, too, suggested that many soldiers’ command of Russian was sufficiently 
limited “in the first stages” as to necessitate ideological work in native languages, subtly 
suggesting an expectation of eventual proficiency. To combat non-fluency, the military, party, 
and state emphasized Russian education for recruits in schools and in military training.156 
Still, successful military service did not entail wholesale adoption of “Russianness.” 
Alongside the focus on improving Russian proficiency and reflecting the belief that non-Russian 
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soldiers’ limited command of Russian could prevent ideological integration, the state recruited 
propagandists who could work with recruits in their native languages, an example of nested 
patriotism at work.157 Boram Shin describes this as a “reciprocal” arrangement, whereby the Red 
Army tried “to speak the languages of its Central Asian soldiers and modify its propaganda to 
better appeal to the Central Asian population” as “Central Asia too acquired fluency in speaking 
the Soviet.”158 As Brandon Schechter observes, these efforts were targeted specifically towards 
soldiers from Central Asia and the South Caucasus, who were presumed to have more limited 
mastery of Russian than their Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian counterparts. In part, this 
reflected concern about high desertion rates and low political awareness among soldiers of 
particular ethnicities, as well as ongoing inequalities in the perceptions of minority soldiers.159 
 The adjustment of propaganda was not limited to use of soldiers’ native languages, as 
Kalinin emphasized to propagandists. He outlined the importance of celebrating a diverse cast of 
heroes, including non-Russian military officers who had risen through the ranks, believing such 
examples to have mobilizing power: “Everyone, including Russians, is proud of their ethnicity—
and it can’t be any other way: he is a son of his people!” Noting the “very deep significance” of 
this fact, he exhorted propagandists to use national themes in their interactions with non-Russian 
soldiers: “Go and foster in our people Soviet patriotism, national pride; remind every soldier 
about the heroic traditions of his people, about its wonderful epics and literature, about the great 
people, like commanders and military leaders, about the warriors for the liberation of the 
masses.160 The 1942 Pravda letter to Uzbek soldiers reflected this strategy, appealing to Uzbek 
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history and to the physical and cultural geography of Uzbekistan.161 Similar motifs ran through 
letters addressed to non-Russian soldiers published in Pravda and Izvestiia throughout the winter 
of 1943, which brought similar visibility to other non-Russian soldiers on the front while 
appealing to them through forms of nested patriotism.162 
In 1941, the state also partially reinstituted the territorial military units that had been 
abandoned in the late 1930s, offering them as an example of ethno-territorial patriotism in 
practice. Alongside regular military units that bridged republic boundaries, these territorial units, 
comprised primarily of titular minorities, offered a practical manifestation of nationalities policy. 
As Roberto Carmack observes, the actual work of these units betrayed ongoing tensions and 
inequalities. Titular minorities may have filled the ranks, but commanding officers were often 
ethnic Russians. This illustrated the hierarchical relations between Soviet peoples and ensured 
reliance on Russian as the lingua franca. Furthermore, the state expected republics to equip their 
own ethno-territorial units despite the fact that many republic-level administrations lacked access 
to necessary supplies. This meant that territorial units were ill equipped relative to regular units, 
limiting their efficacy and endangering soldiers.163 
As suggested by the experience of territorial units, military service reinforced non-
Russians’ second-class status in ways that qualified their symbolic importance both explicitly 
and subtly. Although in a 1941 speech Stalin emphasized that all citizens fought together, 
wartime realities on the ground betrayed deep rifts.164 A 1942 report discussed condescending 
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attitudes from military leaders towards Georgian, Azerbaijani, Dagestani, and Uzbek recruits. 
The same report also detailed rumors that one commander had proposed using non-Russian 
soldiers as a human shield to protect more valuable Russian and Cossack soldiers.165 Such 
attitudes were not surprising given Russians’ implied and asserted superiority. Kalinin concluded 
his 1943 speech with words that dripped of condescension towards “previously very backward” 
peoples and hinted at the embedded hierarchies that placed non-Russians distinctly below their 
Russian peers by reinforcing their need to follow the example of their Russian “older 
brothers.”166 Despite efforts to provide additional training to non-Russians, many felt judged for 
their lack of Russian proficiency. Military leaders, newspapers, and elites complained that poor 
Russian language skills hindered communication and threatened military efficacy.167 These and 
other occurrences underscored the continuing second-class status of non-Russians relative to 
their Russian peers. As much as the state emphasized multiethnic contributions, non-Russians 
had neither equal footing nor equal recognition, even in the military. 
 
Everything for the Front: Civil Mobilization and Interethnic Relations on the Home Front 
 As wartime propaganda repeatedly emphasized, the experience of war was not limited to 
the battlefields of the Eastern Front and the Far East. Rather, the war was a collective effort, as 
citizens and goods were called into service. The rear, especially (non-Russian) Central Asia and 
Western Siberia, served as a source of material support and able bodies, one that the state 
routinely mined and depended upon for the success of the long campaign. World War II 
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transformed the hinterlands from peripheral territories to essential sites of industrial and 
economic production and a key place where citizens across a wide geographic and cultural space 
interacted with new intensity. Whether recruited to far-flung worksites, evacuated to safety in the 
hinterlands, or forcibly resettled as part of ongoing campaigns to clear occupied territory of 
alleged traitors, citizens encountered both one another and the vast, diverse territory of the Soviet 
Union. These interactions simultaneously confirmed the functioning of the state as a singular 
nation-like whole and exposed enduring inequalities between citizens. 
 The German invasion, though not unanticipated in general terms, caught the Soviet Union 
by surprise. As already noted, the German army pressed deep into Soviet territory, threatening 
land, infrastructure, and people. In response, the state embarked on one of the most ambitious 
evacuations of citizens and industry in history, transferring them from regions threatened by the 
German advance into the hinterlands. The Urals, Western Siberia, and Central Asia became the 
chief receiving regions, as millions of citizens headed east (and occasionally west) and south to 
places of relative safety. Wartime evacuations, however, were not the only way that people and 
industry found their way into Central Asia. Beginning in the 1930s, Central Asia and Western 
Siberia also became sites for massive forced resettlement campaigns of suspicious or supposedly 
unreliable populations, particularly those living along contested borders in the far west and east. 
Resettlement to the interior began in the mid-1930s, while the state renegotiated its 
nationalities policy. The state resettled significant numbers of Poles, Germans, and Koreans from 
regions of strategic interest and danger, as the state itself anticipated the near inevitability of war 
along both its western and eastern frontiers.168 Many who were forced to leave homes in border 
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regions with Poland and the Far East found themselves resettled in the (now emptied) steppe of 
Northern Kazakhstan, newly available as the result of brutal sedentarization policies against 
previously nomadic peoples, and other sites in Central Asia.169 Although these continued a longer 
pattern of European settlement of the steppe, Soviet policies differed dramatically in both scope 
and impact. Resettlement intensified with the outbreak of war, as the so-called “punished 
peoples” found themselves deported en masse to communities in Central Asia, Western Siberia, 
and the Urals, bringing large numbers of Chechens, Germans, and others. 
The hinterlands also received a large influx of evacuees from the front. As Rebecca 
Manley notes, populations selected for official evacuation reflected the state’s priorities and 
represented the most privileged members of society: artists, writers, poets, and essential 
personnel.170 Citizens were resettled in cities and villages across Central Asia, which became, in 
Natalie Belsky’s words, “zones of contact,” connecting people to one another in new and often 
personal ways.171 Evacuation and forced resettlement familiarized populations with new parts of 
the country, offering first-hand experience with previously unfamiliar territories and peoples.172 
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Alongside people, the state also moved strategic factories and their essential personnel to 
places of relative safety far from the advancing German line. By the end of 1942, nearly 2600 
factories and industrial institutions had been relocated to the Urals, Western Siberia, Central 
Asia, and elsewhere.173 Because of their distance from the front, the hinterlands became critical 
for wartime economic production.174 Newspapers offered evidence of republic contributions, as 
articles highlighted the Tajik SSR’s agricultural output or the Kazakh SSR’s industrial and 
scientific contributions.175 War increased the industrial output of formerly backwater regions, 
transforming peripheries like Central Asia into centers of wartime production. The simultaneous 
destruction of and threat to western territories increased the relative importance of hinterlands. 
Whether citizens arrived as part of privileged, evacuated groups or as one of the 
oppressed, alien peoples, their arrival brought a greater degree of interethnic interaction and 
familiarity with both the territory and the local people in resettlement sites. Such interactions 
underscored a sense of common belonging to a unified state while simultaneously creating 
tensions as citizens competed for limited resources and navigated the complex world of social 
inequalities. These interactions contributed to the existence of a Soviet identity, often mediated 
through the Russian language, that worked both in tandem with and in opposition to ethnic 
identity. 
 Evacuated and resettled peoples both strained and supplemented limited local resources. 
Makhsuda M., a young mother who spent the war years between Chirchik and Tashkent, 
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Uzbekistan, recalled the dire situation just outside Tashkent in her diary: 
Before the war, the ravine was an inconvenience for residents, but now it has become a 
real affliction. The population of the mahalla [neighborhood] doubled, and maybe tripled. 
Evacuees lived in every home. In the courtyards, the trash pits are overfilled, and all trash 
is thrown away at night, and sometimes even in the light of day, into the ravine. After the 
melting of snow, the scent of the rotting trash penetrates every home. The overpopulation 
and non-sanitary conditions frighten me. I feel bad; apparently the undernourishment 
speaks for itself. I have lost weight, darkened, and I always want to sleep.176 
 
Later, she found herself in Tashkent, where she noted that teaching staff of the local teachers’ 
institute, previously comprised primarily of ‘Turkestani Russians’ (those born in Tashkent and 
elsewhere in the region) had been joined by evacuated teachers from Moscow and Kyiv, as well 
as many Uzbeks, Tajiks, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Jews.177 Memoir and oral history 
accounts of ordinary workers and collective farmers discussed their integration into local work 
collectives. As one Karelian evacuee to Kazakhstan remembered, “We worked in the kolkhoz in 
every season in various kinds of field work. We collected grain, ground millet, etc. We worked a 
lot and with pleasure. The command ‘Everything for the front…’ was not empty words.”178 War 
intensified the feeling that many worked together for a common cause. 
 As they arrived in new territories, evacuees changed the human landscape of their 
wartime host communities. Makhsuda’s diary entries hinted at changing lifestyles and 
populations in Tashkent, signaled by the influx of soldiers at the local military hospital: 
On the streets, men and women in military uniforms meet. Generally, they are people 
who are healing in the Tashkent military hospital. They confirm: “Tashkent is a city 
where the soul exhales from war.” In both the new city and the old, there are many 
evacuated people, especially Jews from Ukraine. In comparison to those who live in 
Igarchi, they are educated people, among them there are even famous people.179 
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She also noted changes in local fashion, as women walked Tashkent’s streets in high heels.180 
Evacuees also changed the social landscape as they interacted with local populations and 
gave residents and evacuees alike first-hand experience with the theoretical “friendship of the 
peoples.” Makhsuda’s diary indicates that she felt her social and intellectual worlds expand with 
the arrival of her neighbor, Larissa, who had been evacuated to Tashkent in late 1941 with her 
husband and his co-workers at the Moscow Civil Engineering Institute. Larissa offered 
Makhsuda reading recommendations and advice for taking advantage of her husband’s party 
administrative position. Interactions with Russians acquainted Makhsuda with the lifestyles, 
habits, and comparative wealth of her neighbors and compatriots, signified by their collections of 
elegant household items and books.181 
In many cases, interactions entered into the intimate family realm. Many evacuees were 
housed in the physical living spaces of local residents, bringing them into sustained personal 
contact with local populations. In some cases, these interactions permanently altered families. In 
a report, Deputy Head of the Division for Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of 
the Kazakh Communist Party Liubov Balagurova highlighted the adoption of 2000 orphans from 
occupied territories and the front in Kazakhstan. She detailed several cases: a woman who 
adopted an orphaned two-month-old Russian baby that would grow up to be “an honored jigit” (a 
term used exclusively for a young Kazakh man); a Ukrainian boy who immediately attached 
himself to his adoptive mother when she arrived at the orphanage; and cases of Kazakh and Tatar 
women adopting Russian and Belarusian orphans.182 Adoptions made for excellent propaganda, 
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and the press celebrated these cases as examples of the friendship of peoples in action.183 The 
Uzbek blacksmith Sh. Shamaxmudov, who adopted 15 war orphans with his wife, inspired the 
Uzbek poet G’afur G’ulam’s “You are not an orphan” (Sen yetim emassan). The poem, originally 
in Uzbek, was translated into Russian, published in Pravda in 1942, and inspired a 1964 
movie.184 
Wartime evacuations also provided unprecedented opportunities for collaboration and 
interaction, reflecting the positive propagandistic image of the Soviet people. Ábdılda Tájıbaev, 
the Secretary of the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Writers of Kazakhstan, sent a report to the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and the Soviet of People’s 
Commissars, in which he mused about how to take advantage of the talents and abilities of 
evacuated writers, poets, artists and composers in a 1941 report. He proposed forming agitation-
literary brigades to perform in any and all possible performance spaces, including lecture halls, 
parks and gardens, and hospitals.185 Such collaborative projects were not merely theoretical: one 
article highlighted works produced by Central Asian and Russian writers, including collaborative 
works by Kazakh Muhtar Áýezov and Russian Leonid Sobolev, and by Russian playwright 
Nikolai Pogodin and Uzbek writers Hamid Olimjon, Uyg’un (Rahmatulla Otaqo’zi), and Sobir 
Abdulla. Evacuation, the article continued, had also increased interactions between actors and 
directors of different republics, and had thus “allowed them to get to meet and befriend one 
another, which, without a doubt, enriches the creativity of one and the other.”186 Evacuation also 
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familiarized Russian writers with the work of their non-Russian compatriots.187  
These mutual interactions are also evident in memoirs and oral histories. The Ukrainian 
writer Vasyl’ Sokil recalled that his evacuated theatre collective expanded to include performers 
from other cities, who together prepared popular performances on patriotic and “anti-Hitlerite” 
themes with financial support from the Uzbek SSR.188 Later, he summarized general wartime 
conditions: “At a time of great shocks, people unite into a single pursuit. War proved this…one 
idea dominated: to fight the enemy. And writers one way or another coalesced under a single 
flag. War conditions simplified creative tasks and identified the main ideas: patriotism, heroism 
in battle and labor, hatred toward the enemy, and readiness to sacrifice oneself in the name of 
victory.”189 The dancer Maksim Gavrilov recalled the warm reception his evacuated Karelian 
dance troop received from their “Kyrgyz brothers” and injured Kazakh and Kyrgyz soldiers.190 
Large-scale labor mobilizations put citizens on the move, placing many in factories and 
collective farms in territories deprived of their workers by military mobilization.191 Those 
mobilized for labor faced vastly unequal conditions. A 1943 report, for example, noted the recent 
arrival of a large group of unskilled Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tajik workers at various sites in the 
Udmurt ASSR. The report decried the low quality of living conditions, insufficient Russian 
proficiency, and too-limited propaganda and agitation work in their native languages, which led 
to poor work discipline and low production. Blaming the party and local authorities for lack of 
attention, the report also paternalistically cast judgment on workers’ unhygienic and ignorant 
                                                            
187 E.g. Writer Kornei Chukovskoi wrote about the work of various Uzbek writers, including poet G’afur G’ulom, 
see Kornei Chukovskoi, “Saliam,” Literaturnaia gazeta, 4 December 1943, 3.  
188 Vasyl’ Sokil, Zdaleka do blyz’koho: spohady, rozdumy (Edmonton: Kanads’kyi instytut ukr. studii, 1987), 139. 
189 Sokil, 152. 
190 Makurov, Evakuirovannaia Kareliia, 263–65. 
191 Wendy Goldman, “The Stalinist State and Mass Mobilization: From Evacuation to the Labor Draft to Factory 
Canteens” (Paper presented at Stalinism and War, Moscow, Russia, 2017). Her forthcoming publication with 
Donald Filtzer also addresses this phenomenon, see Fortress Dark and Stern: Life, Labor and Loyalty on the Soviet 






habits, highlighting dirty laundry and a propensity to sell spare clothing, even underwear. The 
report nevertheless noted improvements, both in their daily habits and industrial output.192  
The arrival of evacuees, deportees, and recruited labor in sites of resettlement placed new 
arrivals into direct contact with locals, which, whether by design or circumstance, emphasized a 
more universal Soviet culture, affecting host communities and resettled peoples alike. Russian, 
celebrated in official propaganda as the language of interethnic communication, often served as 
the default language. This was further catalyzed by the promotion of Russian in educational 
spheres. In some cases, native language use was tightly controlled and even prohibited, 
particularly for Soviet Germans and other deported groups. As Kate Brown describes, Germans 
and Poles gradually lost their sense of national affiliation and “began gradually to fuse into 
Soviet identities as they assimilated into Russian-Soviet culture.”193 In other cases, the shift to 
Russian happened by default. Party documents from 1942, for instance, highlighted the limited 
number of qualified Ukrainian teachers for evacuated children in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, and elsewhere.194 Limited textbooks, teachers, and classrooms often meant that 
Russian became the default language of instruction, since it was perceived as more accessible. 
On the ground, interactions often highlighted de facto differences and inequalities in the 
strained conditions of war. Reports highlighted tensions that developed as citizens competed for 
limited resources. As Natalie Belsky demonstrates, “contact zones” were often characterized by 
conflict and friction.195 Interethnic interactions also threw into relief inequalities between 
citizens. As Manley notes, the state’s very preference for evacuating some populations (the 
intelligentsia, for example) over others reinforced hierarchies embedded in the state’s approach 
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to both people and places.196 Receiving populations acutely felt the strain of limited resources, as 
many perceived state preference for evacuees, especially in large cities like Tashkent, Almaty, 
and Ufa, which received the country’s most important citizens. Deportees also faced social 
stigma, even as deportation intensified their assimilation into Soviet culture.197 
 
After Victory: Soviet ‘Nation-Building’ in a Postwar World 
As territories were liberated from German troops between 1943 and 1944, the Soviet 
Union plunged into a long, extensive process of reestablishing its rule. The physical 
reconstruction of cities and the countryside took many years and presented one of the most 
ambitious aspects of this postwar agenda, as the state and citizens struggled to reestablish 
industrial and agricultural production and ordinary life.198 Processes of physical reconstruction 
went hand in hand with an intense campaign to (re)establish and entrench Soviet institutions into 
everyday life, foremost in those territories newly incorporated into the USSR, such as Western 
Ukraine, Western Belarus, and the Baltic Republics, and South Sakhalin and the Republic of 
Tuva in the east.199 
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At least equally important—and my focus here—was reasserting the state’s ideological 
project among its citizens, particularly in territories where Soviet rule had only been superficially 
established during the brief occupations of 1939–41. To reintegrate state and society across the 
deep divides imposed by war, the state relied on several interconnected processes that extended 
prewar and wartime practices. These processes included resettling cities, demobilizing soldiers, 
temporary and long-term population transfers, identifying and managing the politically suspect, 
cultural exchanges, and cultivating a postwar narrative that would, in one scholar’s words, “make 
sense of war.”200 The postwar period saw a culmination of the identity discourses that had 
circulated throughout the war, now modified and adapted for the early Cold War. Hierarchical 
divisions between citizens, both ethnic and otherwise, were supplemented with new 
consideration for wartime activities, both among soldiers and civilian populations. The focus on 
the limits of the Soviet people also continued, not least among new citizens, whose allegiances 
and loyalties were viewed with suspicion. The emphasis on a warlike atmosphere and external 
enemies continued, now adapted for Cold War conditions. Together, these processes contributed 
to the emergence of a postwar Soviet identity that was deeply inflected by the experience of war. 
 
(Re)establishing Rule: Repopulation, Retraining, and Cleansing 
 With the Red Army’s reentry into depopulated and destroyed cities, the process of 
rebuilding and reasserting control over a wide swath of territory began in earnest. Aside from the 
physical and institutional reconstruction, which is beyond the scope of this chapter, population 
management played a significant role in establishing a postwar order. The state’s handling of 
these questions—from demobilizing of soldiers to the return of civilian populations from 
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wartime evacuation and labor conscription, as well as managing the unintended consequences of 
war—reflected and built upon existing processes. At the same time, the war loomed large, not 
least because wartime activity became grounds for determining access to limited resources, 
whether in offering special privileges to veterans or punishing wartime collaboration. 
 Despite the state’s efforts to manage the resettlement of cities and the return of citizens 
from evacuation sites across the hinterlands, the actual process of resettling cities tended toward 
the chaotic. Many citizens, eager to return home and take stock of war’s consequences, refused 
to wait for re-evacuation orders and instead found their own way back to their former homes 
spread across formerly occupied or otherwise endangered territories.201 Others, as Lewis 
Siegelbaum and Leslie Moch note, chose not to return ‘home,’ preferring instead to live 
permanently in their adopted sites of evacuation.202 Citizens who returned confronted terrible 
conditions and a complex web of negotiations to secure the return of prewar dwellings and 
belongings, generally without success. The wartime destruction of urban housing stock created a 
veritable crisis, and disorder was rampant. In Kharkiv (Eastern Ukraine), oblast officials claimed 
not a single resident occupied their prewar residence.203 Even if exaggerated, the claim hints at 
the near total displacement and destruction. 
 Those who returned found themselves subject to the state’s hierarchical approach to 
managing citizens. As Manley notes, the “emergent hierarchy” for adjudicating housing claims 
“reflected both wartime service and pre-war statures,” suggesting that war had introduced new 
variables to established patterns. Soldiers and soldiers’ families, as well as political and cultural 
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elites, often received first priority. Those forced into evacuation or who otherwise spent the war 
years in the hinterlands encountered a range of discriminatory measures that gave them little 
recourse to make claims for prewar housing. The charge of service on the “Tashkent front” was 
negatively leveled against citizens—foremost Jews—who had “sat out” the war years in the 
relative comfort and safety of evacuation, despite the fact that most actively supported the front 
with their labor.204 Recent work on postwar urban history, too, suggests that remaining in place 
during the war was perhaps even more suspect, subjecting citizens to questions about their 
wartime activities and possible collaboration with occupying forces.205 
 During wartime, the number of military personnel had swelled, creating unprecedented 
numbers of soldiers who would need to be returned to civilian life, another challenge for the 
postwar state. Demobilized soldiers were generally an entitled group, and they received priority 
in access to housing, job training, and medical services. In addition to legal privileges in the first 
years after the war, soldiers benefited from social prestige as the war cult grew.206 The 
privileging of soldiers’ perceived wartime heroism helped make war a foundational moment.  
 Alongside efforts to rebuild cities and re-establish institutions, leaders were concerned 
about ensuring the reliability of citizens, reflecting a desire to manage and control the long-term 
consequences of war. This process took different forms, including the identification and 
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deportation of the politically suspect, reasserting control over nationalist and other ideological 
discourses that had proliferated during World War II (often with official sanction), and managing 
religious practices that had gained considerable ground during war itself. Postwar cleansing, 
often violent, contributed to the ongoing negotiation of the nature of and limits of Soviet identity. 
 Perhaps the most visible—and most discussed—elements of postwar cleansing were 
efforts to root out underground nationalist organizations, foremost in Nazi-occupied territories of 
the far west. In Western Ukraine and the Baltic republics, the process was especially violent, 
accomplished through raids of real and suspected members of nationalist groups and broad, often 
indiscriminate deportations of civilians.207 Expulsions of Polish and German minorities from 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kaliningrad (and the reciprocal expulsions of Lemkos from Poland to 
Ukraine) further set the tone for postwar ethnic relations and deepened notions of ethnic 
hierarchies.208 Attempts to contain nationalism and manage ethnic relations were not limited to 
new territories. The 1949 deportation of Greeks from the Caucasus to Kazakhstan reflected 
suspicion of “foreign” ethnicities, a suspicion also directed towards German subjects.209 Stalin’s 
final purge in the 1953 Doctors’ Plot reflected the most public manifestation of state-sponsored 
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anti-Semitism.210 There were also fears of resurgent nationalism in the Caucasus, suggesting new 
limits on acceptable forms of nested patriotism.211 As historians have noted, the population 
within the Gulag system and assorted special settlements swelled, reaching its pinnacle in the 
postwar years, making repression a key feature of the postwar order.212 
 Religion represented an arena of deep suspicion that required careful attention after the 
war. State cooperation with and recognition of certain religious groups during the war—the 
Russian Orthodox Church and Islam most prominently—had offered an official seal of approval 
for a revival of religious practice, one that did not extend to unrecognized groups, like Baptists 
and other Protestants. In liberated territories, officials frequently expressed concern about the 
growth of religious activism, not only in newly incorporated territories but also in areas that had 
already been subjected to decades of Soviet rule.213 Newly incorporated territories were yet to be 
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reached by atheist propaganda. Across the country, the state set to work closing, imposing limits 
on religious activity, and reviving atheist propaganda.214 
 New territories were also home to religious groups with little prewar representation, 
including Baltic Protestants and Catholics, Ukrainian Greek Catholics (members of an Eastern 
rite Catholic church) in Western Ukraine, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Each of these groups 
presented specific challenges for integration, and the state devoted special attention to groups 
closely tied to national identity (Greek Catholics in Western Ukraine, for example) and religious 
groups with authority abroad (all Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses). Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
although few in number, presented particular problems, thanks to their propensity toward 
proselytization, foreign connections, and general disengagement from civic life, which 
contradicted to the Soviet emphasis on participatory citizenship.215 Moves to abolish the Greek 
Catholic Church and “reunite” it with Russian Orthodoxy were part of a general strategy to 
circumvent, mitigate, and control its foothold in Western Ukraine.216 Brutal repression of 
nationalism, deportations, and suspicion of religious groups shaped the boundaries of postwar 
citizenship, as certain practices were deemed incompatible with Soviet life. Navigating this 
boundary was a complex, fraught process, as other forms of nationalism and religious life were 
encouraged or at least tolerated. 
Repression, however, was only part of the story. There were also attempts to forge new 
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connections between citizens, processes that provided a more constructive vision of postwar 
citizenship, particularly in territories where Soviet rule had been only briefly implemented in 
1939–41. In Western Ukraine and Transcarpathia, authorities focused especially on young 
people. The party and state sought to forge lateral connections between citizens through 
exchange programs in Eastern Ukraine and elsewhere. Such exchanges indicated a continuing 
dependence on nested forms of identity in making new citizens. 
In 1950, for instance, local party leaders organized an exchange for 317 university 
students and instructors from Western Ukraine and Transcarpathia. On July 9, 1950, the entire 
group met in Lviv and was divided into groups, which spent two weeks in Moscow (81 people), 
Leningrad (78 people), Kharkiv (61 people), Stalino (47 people), and Odessa and Zaporizhia (50 
people). Participants attended plays and cultural programs and visited museums, collective 
farms, factories, and historical sites, with emphasis on places associated with Lenin. At the end 
of the trip, everyone reconvened in Kyiv to visit museums and monuments before returning 
home on July 25.217 The final days centered on sites connected to Ukrainian poet Taras 
Shevchenko, including museums and monuments in Kyiv and his burial site in Kaniv. Museums 
and exhibits portrayed the poet as a revolutionary-democrat and highlighted his “friendship with 
the great Russian people.”218 The finale in Kyiv encouraged students to envision themselves as 
part of Soviet Ukraine and to see the Soviet Union as deeply invested in Ukrainian identity. 
Participants praised the opportunity to better understand the Soviet Union and fellow 
citizens. In meetings and in post-trip conversations and writings, citizens declared that they “felt 
even more certain of the might of their socialist Motherland, of the firm confidence of the Soviet 
people in their own strength, in their boundless devotion to the Bolshevik party and to their great 
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vozhd’ and teacher Stalin.” Leaders described how the trip inspired loyalty to the party, the 
Soviet Union, and Stalin. Senior instructor A.D. Kovbuz, of Lviv, reported: “For my whole life, 
all of this will remain in my memory… I am endlessly happy that, despite my age, the Soviet 
state gave me the possibility to see this.” Others were awestruck by the sheer productive capacity 
of factories and collective farms. Students especially praised personal interactions with fellow 
citizens. In meeting with workers, farmers, academics, and students, participants “saw the 
manifestation of the brotherly friendship of the peoples of the USSR.” 219 Such exchanges gave 
participants a connection to fellow citizens and reminded them of their common future. 
This exchange program was not one-of-a-kind. Other initiatives connected collective 
farmers across Ukraine. In an internal party report to Georgii Malenkov in 1950, Ukrainian Party 
First Secretary Leonid Mel’nikov catalogued exchanges that connected 1435 collective farmers 
from western oblasts with the republic’s most innovative collective farms, machine and tractor 
stations, and state farms.220 The benefits were two-fold. Professionally, exchanges acquainted 
western Ukrainian farmers, who had little first-hand experience of Soviet agriculture, with the 
work of successful collective farms. Many were impressed by the sheer scale and quality of 
agricultural production and shared their impressions with their communities upon their return.221  
On a second level, visits also inculcated a sense of identity and belonging both to the 
Soviet Union as a whole and Soviet Ukraine specifically, an explicit invocation of nested 
identity. Participants praised trips for giving them positive impressions of the country and the 
opportunities it offered. G.F. Arabadzhi, a field brigade foreman from the Izmail Oblast who had 
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visited a collective farm in the Odessa oblast, felt that Romanian authorities mischaracterized the 
Soviet Union and declared, “Soviet power is our native (rodnaia) power.”222 He praised Stalin 
and the Communist Party, and vowed to take this new knowledge back to his coworkers. 
Another farmer from Transcarpathia declared his pleasure at Ukrainian unification by Soviet 
authorities. T.L. Hnatiuk, a Lviv University student who participated in the student exchange, 
noted that he was thankful that, despite being the son of a poor peasant, he enjoyed 
unprecedented access to higher education in his native Ukrainian.223 This would have been 
unimaginable for many peasants before postwar integration, a reminder of the real upward 
mobility that many peasants and workers experienced under Soviet rule.224 
Although it is hard to say to what extent these exchanges were practiced elsewhere, they 
provide a useful reminder that postwar processes did not simply oppress people into obedience. 
Exchanges were part of a deliberate effort to build social networks both within and across 
republics. Malenkov’s own awareness of these exchanges suggested that such exchange 
represented a key priority in the postwar period. By encouraging lateral ties between citizens, the 
state demonstrated continuing commitment to fostering a community of citizens, attached both to 
the Soviet Union as a whole as well as to their sub-state identities (here, Ukrainian). This 
suggested the perceived compatibility of civic and ethnic identities and the ongoing cultivation 
of affective bonds to the state. 
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From the Great Patriotic War to the Cold War 
  No sooner had the Great Patriotic War ended than the Soviet Union found itself at the 
center of a new conflict, this time—the Cold War with the West. Much like the threat and 
experience of World War II had contributed to the mobilizing discourses of the 1930s and early 
1940s, the Cold War offered new opportunities for internal cohesion in the face of a shared 
external enemy. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe drove a wedge between the Soviet 
Union and its wartime allies, straining an already tenuous relationship. In subsequent years, 
tensions ebbed and flowed, but the overall atmosphere of distrust remained a key backdrop to the 
postwar order, as leaders relied on new enemies and new threats of war.225 
 In the aftermath of war, Stalin drew direct lines of continuity between Nazi Germany and 
the Soviet Union’s erstwhile allies, creating a new atmosphere of present danger and distrust to 
mobilize the population. In an interview with Pravda following Winston Churchill’s 1946 “Iron 
Curtain” speech, Stalin declared the speech a “dangerous act”: “Churchill and his friends in this 
respect strikingly recall Hitler and his friends.” Comparing Nazi and English race theories, Stalin 
warned citizens about western warmongering. He reflected that former allies had little 
appreciation for the “colossal sacrifices of the Soviet people” and little understanding of what 
had made new governments in Eastern Europe so eager to align themselves with the Soviet 
Union. In portraying the growth of communist movements across Eastern Europe as the outcome 
of communism’s victory over fascism, he suggested new global interest in communism was only 
natural.226 
 Stalin’s statements initiated a public discourse that contributed to a polarized postwar 
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international order, one that pitted a peace-loving Soviet people against aggressive, capitalist 
enemies abroad. Two months later, a front-page Pravda editorial noted citizens’ full support for 
the postwar foreign policy: “victory has not gone to the heads of Soviet people. They are alertly 
and vigilantly observing the postwar international situation, fixedly remembering their basic and 
main task: to strengthen victory and guard peace and security from the schemes of the 
international reaction.”227 The following year, in September 1947, Andrei Zhdanov, the Second 
Secreatary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, addressed the newly formed Communist 
Information Bureau and interpreted the end of World War II as the beginning of a new phase of 
tension between the capitalist west and the socialist east. Like Stalin, Zhdanov linked Nazi 
aggression with western anti-communist movements, singling out the U.S. nuclear program as a 
weapon directed against the Soviet people.228 Deepening the focus on the U.S., an editorial 
published on the anniversary of Lenin’s death in 1950 warned readers that U.S. military 
expenditures represented 71 percent of the U.S. budget. Meanwhile, the U.S. allegedly devoted 
less than two percent to education and health, a sign that the “camp of imperialism is searching 
for the way out [of crisis] by preparing new military adventures.”229 Lecture propaganda included 
a new focus on the “international situation,” providing the public with the latest information 
about western aggression.230 The state-sponsored Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, a 
voluntary association founded in August 1949, offered a public forum for citizens to promote 
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peace and oppose western imperialism. Newspapers hailed the organization as evidence of a 
widespread commitment to peace, a supposedly inherent trait of Soviet citizens.231 
 Concerns grew dramatically after the outbreak of open hostilities on the Korean 
Peninsula in June 1950. In early July, the press was awash with public condemnations of 
“American aggression” in Korea, and described the Soviet people as a bastion of peace.232 The 
following fall, the second meeting of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace offered 
another opportunity for the press to claim commitment to peace as an intrinsic characteristic of 
the Soviet people.233 The escalating Cold War solidified the Soviet people in propaganda as a 
force against the West, defining the populace once again in contradistinction to its enemies 
abroad. 
 
The Soviet (and Russian) People Victorious 
 As postwar policies generally inculcated citizens with new values and a sense of Soviet 
identity, deepened connections between citizens, and rooted out elements deemed incompatible 
with Soviet life, war was understood to have drawn citizens closer together.234 Even before the 
war had come to an end, leaders already focused on how to commemorate the experience. As 
early as 1942, the state considered how to memorialize the war experience and offer a tribute to 
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the “best sons of our multiethnic country” and to glorify their anticipated victory.235 After 
German capitulation, leaders portrayed the war as a new point of origin, a moment of common 
historical experience. Use of the term “Soviet people” in the central press escalated after the war, 
with especially high usage between 1949 and 1952 (see Figure 2, in Chapter 1). The mention of 
the Soviet people became a formulaic part of official speeches. Even when celebrating the 
October Revolution, it became customary to refer to World War II, turning the war into a major 
plot point in the unfolding narrative of the Soviet people.236 After the war, public 
commemorations teemed with the vocabulary of sacrifice, unity, and victory, now seen as 
foundational elements of the Soviet experience and of Soviet identity. 
 World War II thus became a core part of the state’s legitimation. In an official address to 
voters across the country on the eve of Supreme Soviet elections in 1946, the Communist Party 
emphasized its role in victory. Citing the reunification of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, the 
liberation of the Baltic republics, and the incorporation of new territories in Kaliningrad, South 
Sakhalin, and the Far East, the address declared “the victory of the Soviet people” to be a 
“triumph of the politics of the All-Union political party.” This, the address declared, should 
motivate citizens across the country to support their agenda at the polls.237 Five years after 
German capitulation, Pravda likewise credited victory to the party’s leadership.238 The press 
similarly praised Stalin, whose role in guiding the Soviet people to victory became nearly 
definitional as his cult of personality only grew, best exemplified in the union-wide celebration 
                                                            
235 See especially “Programma na sostavlenie eksiza—idei pamiatnika geroiam Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,” from 
September 3, 1942, a document that was sent to members of the Union of Soviet Architects and the Union of Soviet 
Artists of the Belarusian SSR, reproduced in N. A. Denisova et al., eds., Pamiatniki Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny v 
Belarusi, 1942–1991 gg.: dokumenty i materialy (Minsk: Natsional’naia biblioteka Belarusi, 2015), 9–10. 
236 E.g. “Pod znamenem partii Lenina-Stalina k pobedu kommunizma,” Pravda, 21 August 1952, 1; "Velikaia 
pobeda sovetskogo naroda,” Pravda, 9 May 1950, 1; “Pod znamenem Lenina-Stalina,” Pravda, 7 November 1952, 
1. See also Weiner, Making Sense of War. 
237 “Obrashchenie Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii,” Pravda, 2 February 1946, 1. 






of his 70th birthday in 1952.239 
 Although memories of war would become more firmly attached to Soviet identity in 
subsequent decades, it was not merely a collective victory that bound Soviet citizens together. 
Rather, the experience of the war itself had shaped the contours and outlines of postwar 
narratives. Because war was experienced on a colossal and unprecedented scale, it served as a 
touchstone in collective memory. This underscored the fact that the war, perhaps more than any 
experience before or after, cemented the citizens into a unified Soviet whole. 
 Continuing the pattern laid out in the late 1930s, discussions of the Soviet people placed 
heavy emphasis on ethnic Russians, heightening their implicit privilege. As already noted, 
Stalin’s famous postwar toast privileged Russians’ leading role in securing victory. The 
centering of the Russian people, if anything, intensified later in the postwar period. Anna 
Pankratova’s The Great Russian People, published in 1948 and revised for an expanded second 
edition in 1952, continued this line of reasoning, noting how the “Russian people led the fight of 
the peoples of the USSR for the honor, freedom and independence of their Motherland, and the 
enemy was defeated.”240 Chapters outlined Russians’ role in countering oppression, leading the 
revolution, establishing Soviet power, leading fellow citizens in war, and now guiding an 
international coalition of socialist countries in the Warsaw Pact. The book was full of quotations 
from poets, politicians, and public figures from ethnic minorities and countries abroad, who sang 
the praises of the great Russian people. Pankratova also prepared a methodological guide for 
teachers of Soviet history in 8th–10th grades, in which she urged teachers to expound on the role 
of the Russian people, with emphasis on the positive influence of “progressive Russian culture” 
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on the culture of ethnic minorities.241 This rhetoric increased Russians’ dominant role in society. 
 At the same time, the state continued to emphasize the unity and diversity embedded 
within the Soviet people, building on discourses that had circulated before and during the war. A 
1949 Komsomol publication, Nikolai Mikhailov’s On the Map of the Motherland, offered a 
thorough presentation of the country’s physical, economic, and human geography. The 
introduction urged its diverse young readers to see the entire country as their own: 
Reader! Muscovite and Uralite, Ukrainian and Kazakh! Citizen of the Country of 
Soviets! Look at the map of the Motherland. Reflect on the map like a master looks at the 
design of his home, like an engineer looks at a blueprint as a road for his machine, like an 
artist looks at his best creations. Before you is your property. Before you is your country. 
Here everything is yours: your mountains and your cities, your forests and your fields. 
All of these riches belong to you. And you, a Soviet person (chelovek), by your collective 
senses and as an owner, have taken possession of the riches that belong to you.242 
 
After discussing various aspects of the country and the common history of revolution, socialist 
construction, and World War II that bound citizens together, the book closed with ever tightening 
focus, moving from Moscow to Red Square to the figure of Stalin in his Kremlin office. “There 
is nothing more magical than the view of Red Square on days of public festivities. Each year, the 
stream of people flows broader… the whole-hearted shout of greetings, with which the people 
address their great leader, run unabated and speak to the unbreakable unity of the Soviet people, 
about its dedication to the ideas of communism, about its ardent love for its father and teacher, 
Stalin.”243 Reflecting on the friendship of the peoples and the love for Stalin that drew citizens 
together, the book emphasized both the unity and diversity of the country and its people, a 
testament to the ongoing power of ideas that had first circulated in the 1930s. 
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Conclusion: Center and Periphery in Flux 
As leaders demanded full participation from citizens regardless of ethnicity, age, gender, 
confession, or location, wartime propaganda promoted an inclusive, expansive vision of the body 
politic that extended the discourses of the 1930s. Even as official rhetoric implied the 
compatibility of ethnic and civic identities, citizens did not have equal claims on this identity. 
Scholars have frequently defined empire as multiethnic polity characterized by regimes of 
unequal rule (“rule by difference”), pointing both to differences in the treatment of the ruled, as 
well as between the center and its peripheries.244 Scholars of Soviet history, particularly of 
nationalities policy, generally agree on the appropriateness of defining the Soviet Union as an 
empire. Yet empires do not merely exist; rather they are created both holistically, through state 
policies, and subtly, through countless smaller interactions between citizens. As citizens engaged 
with one another and with state institutions during and after World War II, the Soviet Union’s 
status as an empire was perpetually negotiated and constantly remade, both intensifying and 
disrupting modes of imperial rule. 
On one hand, inequalities between citizens, most sharply between Russians and non-
Russians, continued into and beyond World War II. The privileged position of Russians, 
embodied in repeated reminders that they were the ‘older brother’ and ‘first among equals,’ and 
the reliance on the Russian language highlighted persistent imperial hierarchies. Non-Russian 
soldiers, particularly those with a limited grasp of Russian, faced attitudes of condescension from 
their military superiors and were likely placed into positions of greater danger, an inequality that 
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was intensified by the lower quality of their training and weapons. The use of ethnicity, too, 
underscored a separate-but-equal approach to managing diversity, wherein true equality 
remained elusive. In evacuation, local populations frequently observed disproportionate 
privileges and resources devoted to Russian (and other Slavic) evacuees, further creating the 
sense of inequality. Institutional inequalities were in no way limited to questions of ethnicity. 
Evacuation plans prioritized urban elites over rural peasants and skilled over unskilled workers. 
Military service afforded men more opportunities for integration than women. Peripheries also 
continued to have a position of relative subservience to the center, as they provided people and 
goods for the war. 
At the same time, as a result of wartime conditions and policies, the Soviet Union began 
to function and be experienced as a nation-like polity more than ever before, erasing some of the 
politics of difference in new and important ways. Prewar policies created increased union-wide 
uniformity through the study of Russian and the cultivation of shared heroes. The invasion of a 
giant swath of Soviet territory had altered established special hierarchies between center and 
periphery.245 Previously peripheral regions, such as Central Asia and Siberia, became important 
sites of economic production and interethnic interaction, as citizens encountered one another in 
cities, villages, workplaces, and even their homes. The periphery consequently became a central 
site for the production and experience of Soviet identity, as citizens living there became familiar 
with one another and the vast country. Demands for production and the use of people for labor 
and on the front, however, were not uniquely or even particularly unequally borne at the 
periphery. In fact, in light of previous tsarist-era inequalities, World War II represented a 
dramatic step forward for many non-Russians in terms of access to the privileges and burdens of 
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To secure widespread, multiethnic loyalty, the state demonstrated broad commitment to 
its citizens through increased representation of non-Russians in central newspapers, native-
language propaganda and agitation, and appeals to religious minorities. These efforts offered 
evidence that ethnic and civic identities were not only compatible but mutually constitutive, as 
ethnic pride, religious affiliation, and even familial devotion were cultivated as potential sources 
for nested civic patriotism. The continuing reliance on the rhetoric of the Soviet people 
emphasized the common belonging of all citizens, even as it frequently afforded Russians a 
privileged position. As the country moved from fighting for Soviet territory to extending its 
borders, the military relied less on appeals to ethnicity and instead relied on the idea of the Soviet 
people, which rose in prominence in the aftermath of victory. The rhetoric of the Soviet people 
melded sub-state and civic modes of identification to remind citizens of their common belonging. 
Despite—indeed, perhaps because of—inflicting unprecedented destruction on land and citizens, 








“Citizen of the Soviet Union: It Sounds Dignified”: 
Soviet Identity under Khrushchev and Brezhnev 
 
 
 In a 1977 letter addressed to the commission convened to prepare a new constitution, I. 
Yakovenko of Minsk wrote to suggest that all passport ethnicities be replaced with the word 
“Soviet.” “After sixty years of Soviet power,” he argued, “a new community of people has been 
created among us—the Soviet people; and so it should be expressed in our Constitution.” 
Changing passport ethnicity, he claimed, was no mere formality. Rather, he believed this change 
would offer powerful evidence of the progress made on the so-called “national question” since 
the revolution. Recategorizing all ethnicities as Soviet, he believed, would “testify to the genuine 
patriotism of our citizens, whom we call citizens of the USSR.”1 
 Yakovenko’s assertion about the primacy of Soviet identity was a small contribution to a 
decades-long discussion about identity in the Soviet Union. His words, foremost the phrase “a 
new community of people,” borrowed almost verbatim from General Secretary Leonid 
Brezhnev’s introductory remarks at the 24th Party Congress in 1971, which had described the 
Soviet people as a “new historical, social, and international community of people.”2 Of course, 
the notion of the Soviet people was not new: as already discussed, the phrase had been 
commonly used since the 1930s. By the late 1970s, however, articulations of Soviet identity had 
changed significantly from the Stalinist context in which they originated. The upheavals of 
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revolution, crash industrialization, collectivization, and war that characterized the first decades of 
Soviet rule had given way to a more confident, established state that relied more on tacit 
consensus and support than terror to pursue its aims on both the domestic and international stage. 
Under Stalin’s successors Nikita Khrushchev (First Secretary, 1953–64) and Leonid Brezhnev 
(First/General Secretary, 1964–82), changing circumstances enabled new conversations about 
Soviet identity, as articulated by both leaders and citizens. 
 In the wake of Stalin’s death, political elites and citizens envisioned a more collaborative, 
cooperative relationship between state and people that suggested a deeper, more developed sense 
of civic identity and affective attachment to the Soviet Union. Embedded in this identity, as 
articulated by party-state leaders, scholars, and citizens, was a conviction that the Soviet people 
was a real, existing, and meaningful community. Although the mobilizing patriotic discourses of 
the Stalin era continued, notions of Soviet identity, particularly the concept of the Soviet people, 
expanded into new arenas. Two-way conversations unfolded not only between the state and its 
people but also within the state and party apparatus, between scholars, and among citizens. 
The expanded notions of civic identity that proliferated under Khrushchev and Brezhnev 
reflected three significant transformations specific to the era. First, Stalin’s death catalyzed major 
changes in ideological discourse, as de-Stalinization paved the way for a greater emphasis on the 
state, the party, and the people, instead of on the leader. Second, for the first time in its history, 
the country ceased to operate in perpetual crisis mode. This created greater stability and enabled 
the party-state to devote more attention to providing for citizens rather than merely to forcing 
them into obedience. Although elements of terror (and memories of it) never disappeared, the 
state and party operated in ways that mirrored the rise of postwar welfare states in Western and 






policies in Western Europe, the country was far from an outlier. Finally, as first-hand memories 
of revolution and civil war faded into the annals of history, a greater percentage of citizens had 
grown up exclusively in the Soviet Union. If the first generation of Soviet-born citizens had 
come of age on the eve of and during World War II, a second generation emerged beginning in 
the 1960s. As the common past and shared memories grew longer, this generational change 
contributed to a sense of permanence, as letters like Yakovenko’s attest. 
 In this chapter, changing and expanding notions of Soviet identity under Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev are treated as distinct and interrelated trends. The first section considers the impact of 
Stalin’s death on ideology generally and on notions of the Soviet people specifically. Stalin’s 
absence set the stage for new conceptualizations of identity that placed greater emphasis on the 
relationship between the party-state apparatus and citizens. The second section looks at patriotic 
discourses, drawing heavily from the central press. Here, I show that post-Stalin patriotism 
borrowed heavily from Stalin-era discourses, adapting them for new conditions with mixed 
success. I then analyze conversations within the state and party apparatuses and among scholars, 
as seen in published party documents and in academic literature. Elite discussions indicated a 
deeper conviction of the Soviet people’s existence. Finally, I examine how citizens articulated 
similar ideas about their own identities, looking specifically at letters about eliminating passport 
ethnicity from the 1960s and ‘70s, which were collected in the State Archive of the Russian 
Federation. These letters provide a rare glimpse into how citizens grappled with ideology and 
state policies while expressing their identities. Together, elites and citizens articulated growing 
confidence and awareness of a distinctly Soviet identity that had gradually emerged after the 







Stalin’s Death and the Evolution of Ideological Rhetoric 
 Stalin’s death paved the way for an overhaul in ideological rhetoric, suggesting a major 
change in public understanding about the nature of Soviet identity and citizenship. Perhaps the 
biggest change was the evolving role of Stalin himself. As we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, Stalin 
had been a focal point of civic identity throughout his long rule. Because of the close association 
between Stalin and the Soviet people, the reconsideration of Stalin and his legacy was by 
definition a renegotiation of Soviet identity. In the first weeks after Stalin’s death, his specter 
hung over ideological rhetoric, as his demise became another struggle and tragedy for citizens to 
overcome collectively. With time, his historic role was reevaluated. By the mid-1950s Nikita 
Khrushchev led a far-ranging campaign of de-Stalinization, opening the doors for a renegotiation 
of the relationship between the party-state apparatus and the Soviet people. In this way, Stalin’s 
death was a precondition for the more collaborative vision of state and society that emerged 
among elites and citizens under his successors. 
 
Mourning as Patriotic Duty in the Wake of Stalin’s Death 
 Although Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953, would ultimately hasten social and political 
transformation, the event itself did not catalyze immediate changes in ideological discourse. 
During the first years after his death, the concept and use of the Soviet people changed relatively 
little from its Stalin-era usage. As before, the term remained a hallmark of patriotic discourse and 
symbolized citizens’ ongoing patriotic participation in public life. Stalin’s death, in fact, added to 
the trials and tribulations of the Soviet people, as citizens mourned collectively. 
 The Central Committee announced his death the next day in Pravda and Izvestiia in a 






The heart of Lenin’s comrade-in-arms and the brilliant continuer of Lenin’s cause, the 
wise leader and teacher of the communist party and the Soviet people, Iosif 
Vissarionovich STALIN, has stopped beating. The name STALIN is endlessly dear to our 
party, the Soviet people, and to workers of the whole world… Comrade STALIN led the 
Soviet people to the world-historic victory of socialism in our country. Comrade STALIN 
led our country to the victory over fascism in World War II, fundamentally altering the 
entire international situation. Comrade STALIN armed the party and the entire people 
with a great and clear program of building communism in the USSR. 
 
Stalin’s death, the obituary continued, became a moment of unity, as “all the peoples of our 
country rally closer in a great fraternal family under the tested leadership of the communist party, 
created and reared by Lenin and STALIN.”3 
 The theme of unity ran through the central press, as funeral arrangements, public 
mourning, and Stalin’s own image dominated newspapers for days on end. Citizens across the 
country gathered to mourn their departed leader, a shared experience—mediated through press 
coverage—that bound the country together. This public mourning, a quintessential display of 
civic emotion, knew no generational, geographic, or ethno-linguistic boundaries. Reports from 
various cities, factories, collective farms, and representatives of the intelligentsia detailed the 
outpouring of grief and emotion from every corner of the country, frequently under headlines 
like “Unity of the people” and “The entire country accompanied the great leader (vozhd’) and 
teacher of the Soviet people and all progressive humanity on his final journey.”4 After the 
funeral, held in Moscow at noon on March 9, 1953, the press published photos of concurrent 
gatherings in Riga (Latvian SSR), Tashkent and Chirchik (Uzbek SSR), Almaty (Kazakh SSR), 
Tbilisi and Gori (Georgian SSR; Gori was Stalin’s birthplace), and elsewhere.5 Newspapers 
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emphasized the simultaneity of these gatherings, as citizens joined together to commemorate 
Stalin’s life and mourn his death.6 
 Even in grief, citizens were called to contribute to the state’s economic and political 
goals, continuing the emphasis on active patriotism. At the funeral, Georgii Malenkov (Stalin’s 
successor as Premier of the Soviet Union), Lavrentii Beria (Minister of Internal Affairs), and 
Viacheslav Molotov (Minister of Foreign Affairs) commanded citizens to devote their energies 
and labor to continuing Stalin’s mission. Malenkov noted that Stalin’s death “imposes upon all 
Soviet peoples the obligation to multiply their efforts in realizing the grandiose tasks before the 
Soviet people, to increase their contribution to the common cause of building a communist 
society and strengthening the might and defense capacity of our socialist Motherland.”7 Two 
days after running transcripts of their speeches, Pravda noted an uptick in patriotism as letters 
pledging commitment to Stalin’s agenda poured into newspaper offices.8 The press detailed 
citizens’ resolve to carry on Stalin’s work.9 
 Together with the central press, leaders charted the ongoing history of the Soviet people, 
now expanded to include confronting the tragedy of Stalin’s death. In the first weeks, the press 
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emphasized Stalin’s leadership in revolution, development, and war.10 A year later, a front-page 
Pravda editorial reflected on the relationship between Stalin and his people: 
During the prewar five-year plans, the Soviet people brought into being the Leninist 
program for socialist construction, successfully brought about the industrialization of the 
country and the collectivization of agriculture, built a socialist society, and radically 
improved the working people’s material situation and raised its cultural level… Thanks to 
the power of the Soviet state, the wise leadership of the communist party, and the selfless 
heroism of Soviet people (liudi), our people (narod) won a world-historic victory over the 
fascist aggressors and defended our fatherland’s freedom and independence… All these 
victories of the Soviet people are inextricably linked with the name of Stalin…11 
 
The communist party, Stalin, and the Soviet people were seen to be collectively responsible for 
victories on the economic, cultural, and military fronts, echoing established patriotic rhetoric. 
 The period of active mourning was short. Much as leaders publicly praised Stalin for 
guiding the country through revolution, war, and economic development, they seemed to 
recognize his toxic legacy. As Plamper notes, Stalin’s image appeared only five times in Pravda 
between late March 1953 and year’s end, signaling a subtle, “silent phase of de-Stalinization.”12 
This change in Stalin’s representation reflected an ongoing negotiation of his legacy. De-
Stalinization, both in its subtle, “silent phase” and its active, more explicit form, paved the way 
for a new relationship between state and society, one that relied more on civic and institutional 
structures than on personal power and coercion. Though these negotiations mostly concerned 
Stalin’s role, they also represented a subtler renegotiation of the role of the Soviet people. 
 
De-Stalinization and the Changing Relationship between State and Society 
 After Stalin’s death, the ideological work of replacing him began in earnest, even as 
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citizens and the state were still in mourning. It was almost immediately evident that the party, 
and not another individual, would take up his mantle as the leader of the Soviet people. Even his 
death announcement made this clear: love for the party would unite citizens and lead the country 
towards a brighter future. Guided by the party, “the peoples of the Soviet Union… advance 
confidently toward fresh successes of communist construction in our land.”13 Three weeks after 
Stalin’s death, V. Stepanov declared the party to be the “leader (vozhd’) of the Soviet people.” 
The title, previously reserved for Lenin and Stalin, had been historically connected to Stalin’s 
cult of personality. With his emphasis on Stalin’s historic role, Stepanov implied that no single 
individual could fill his shoes. Bequeathing Stalin’s former epithets to the party, he concluded, 
“The communist party, the proven, combative leader (vozhd’) and wise teacher of the Soviet 
people, strongly holds in its hands the steering wheel of the state ship and knows where to lead 
it.”14 The focus on the party as a united institution, without reference to specific leaders, also 
distracted from the unfolding leadership struggle within the party, from which Khrushchev 
would eventually emerge as leader. 
Articles like Stepanov’s bridged the country into a post-Stalin era. In the first year after 
his death, Stalin’s cult of personality remained entrenched in ideological discourse, but his 
prominence faded quickly. In Stalin’s place, there was a consistent emphasis on other familiar 
sources of unity: the party, the state, and the people itself. Although none of these emphases 
were new, they became more prominent in Stalin’s absence. His diminished position made space 
for the Soviet people, who now coalesced exclusively around the party and state. This signaled a 
shift in discourse from the personal to a civic, institutional dimension. As noted in the lead 
Pravda editorial on Victory Day in 1953, citizens’ primary loyalty was to the country itself: 
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“Soviet patriotism does not separate nations (natsii) and ethnicities (natsional’nosti), but on the 
contrary, rallies them into a united, fraternal family,” united by “the people’s deep devotion to 
their socialist Motherland.”15 Stalin’s role, though reduced, was not yet omitted: the article 
credited his and Lenin’s leadership for eliminating class-based and ethnic persecution and 
establishing the Soviet Union, which laid the groundwork for unity. Such perfunctory statements 
were dwarfed by the sense that the party and state would take over. 
  The one-year anniversary of Stalin’s death was greeted with various articles illuminating 
his historic role. Yet even these suggested a severely diminished cult of personality. Pravda ran a 
quarter-page image of Stalin alongside an editorial that declared him to be the “great continuer of 
Lenin’s cause” and reported on speeches and events held in his memory.16 The re-centering of 
Lenin demoted Stalin: it was only as Lenin’s heir—and not as a leader in his own right—that 
Stalin was now recognized.17 The following year, Pravda’s discussion of the anniversary was 
relegated to a theoretical article about Stalin’s role in communist construction buried on the 
inside pages.18 Izvestiia omitted references to Stalin entirely. 
Khrushchev’s 1956 speech, “On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences,” signaled 
a more deliberate and active process of de-Stalinization. Delivered to a closed session of the 20th 
Party Congress on February 4, 1956, the speech repudiated Stalin and his actions against the 
party and society. This marked a decisive shift in rhetoric, and the not-so-secret speech circulated 
throughout party organs and society in edited form in subsequent weeks and months.19 Stalin and 
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his cult of personality, previously omitted, were now overtly criticized. In his place, the party, 
state, and people became more prominent, signaling a deeper trust in citizens. Pravda attested to 
the Soviet people’s prominence quantitatively: Khrushchev’s years in power (1953–64) roughly 
correlated with a surge in invocations of the Soviet people. Between 1956 and 1962, use of term 
in Pravda reached unprecedented levels that would never again be matched, while Izvestiia also 
used it in a highly conspicuous way.20 This embedded the Soviet people deeply in the ideological 
norms of the post-Stalin era. 
In his study of the ‘last Soviet generation,’ Alexei Yurchak contextualizes changing 
ideological norms in the wake of Stalin’s death. He explores the “standardization of discourse 
during the Soviet period, epitomized in the ubiquitous ideological slogans and posters that 
covered urban space.”21 Stalin’s rise in the late 1920s, in Yurchak’s view, was the source of this 
uniformity, as the party dominated the language of state, ending the experimentation of the 
1920s.22 Stalin embodied the role of an “external master” who stood outside the system, infallible 
and impenetrable, and who alone could signal ideological changes. Stalin’s death triggered a 
systemic transformation. Language underwent a “progressive normalization,” as political 
speeches became standardized and ideological work became a “technical skill of reproducing the 
precise passages and structures of that language in one’s texts and speeches,” demonstrating 
intertextuality and circularity.23 The quantitative prominence of the Soviet people illustrates what 
Yurchak calls the “hegemony of form” of late Soviet ideology: after Stalin’s death, mention of 
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the Soviet people continued to be a pro forma aspect of patriotic rhetoric, invoked readily by 
leaders, the central press, and citizens. 
 Yurchak, however, is overly dismissive of ideological rhetoric. He interprets formulism 
as a shift towards meaningless, performative speech: “Linguistic, narrative, and rhetorical 
structures were not read by most Soviet people at face value, as constative descriptions of the 
world (either true or false)… In fact, because authoritative language was hegemonic, 
unavoidable, and hypernormalized, it was no longer read by its audiences literally, at the level of 
constative meanings.”24 Yet the quantitative prominence of the Soviet people did not mean that 
the term ceased to take on new meanings, particularly not in the 1960s and ‘70s, a little before 
the period of Yurchak’s primary focus. Indeed, although elites and the press relied on familiar 
patriotic rhetoric to mobilize participation in civic life, this rhetoric was constantly adapted for 
changing circumstances. Political elites and citizens actively engaged with ideological concepts 
and rhetoric in new ways, suggesting that notions of Soviet identity were dynamic and relevant 
for a new generation living in dramatically different circumstances than their predecessors. 
 
Mobilizing Soviet Identity in the Cold War 
 In objective terms, domestic and international circumstances under Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev had little in common with the upheavals experienced under Lenin and Stalin. In prior 
decades, the country battled for existence both literally and ideologically. From revolution to 
civil war, from crash industrialization and collectivization to party purges, and from victory to 
reconstruction, leaders and citizens found themselves in a state of perpetual change and almost 
unfathomable uncertainty. Beginning with victory in World War II, however, the question of the 
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country’s survival receded to the background as the state not only became more entrenched and 
powerful domestically but also projected greater power on the international stage.25 
 Despite the changed circumstances, propaganda still relied heavily on the patriotic 
rhetoric of war to encourage participatory notions of belonging among citizens. As in previous 
decades, the state used the press, foremost its central newspapers, to shape public understandings 
of civic belonging and state patriotism. Using the rhetoric of war, patriotic discourse encouraged 
active participation in civic life, whether defending the country from potential traitors and 
enemies, celebrating new scientific and economic accomplishments, or contributing to the state’s 
economic and political goals. At the same time, inspired perhaps by developments elsewhere, the 
state devoted significant energy to projecting care and concern for its citizens, broadcasting a 
more collaborative, expansive relationship between state and society. In each of these arenas, 
public discourse adapted earlier discourses of active, sacrificial patriotism to Cold War 
conditions, with an eye to both the domestic and international spheres. 
 
Holidays and Anniversaries in Patriotic Rhetoric 
Holidays continued to be a central focal point in patriotic discourse. As we will see in the 
next chapter, public celebrations still served as rituals of citizenship, reminding citizens of their 
common belonging to the state. Here, I focus on the rhetoric surrounding two holidays—Victory 
Day (May 9) and the anniversary of the revolution (November 7)—to see the changing messages 
of the party-state. Although the language surrounding holidays was often uniform and formulaic, 
close analysis suggests subtle changes at work. 
In Stalin’s lifetime, holiday rhetoric centered on the leader himself. The 1947 
commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the revolution exemplified this: Lenin and Stalin’s 
                                                            






portraits dominated the entire top half of the front page of Pravda and appeared above Molotov’s 
address. Molotov praised Stalin for his role in developing the country and securing victory in 
World War II. The fourth page of the paper ran a letter to Stalin from grateful citizens, thanking 
him for his leadership, wishing him good health, and glorifying him as the “leader of the peoples, 
the architect and organizer of all our victories, the dear and beloved comrade Stalin.”26 The fifth 
anniversary of victory (1950) was treated similarly: although Pravda’s main editorial praised the 
“Great Victory of the Soviet people,” the article ran below a quarter-page portrait of Stalin and 
attributed victory to his leadership.27 General Vasilii Chuikov, who delivered the main speech, 
similarly emphasized Stalin’s role in victory.28 Even an article ostensibly praising the “soldier-
patriots” who had won on the battlefield diverted significant attention to Stalin.29 
 After Stalin’s death, celebratory forms barely changed, but the rhetoric suggested new 
focal points for patriotism. On the tenth anniversary of victory (1955), with de-Stalinization still 
in its silent phase, Stalin’s portrait featured only as the backdrop of the stage where leaders had 
gathered, a large but silent relic. The annual slogans omitted all references to him and instead 
focused on the Soviet people, the military, and the party, which was described, using language 
previously reserved for Stalin, as the “architect and organizer of all our victories.”30 With only 
passing reference to Stalin, Marshal Ivan Konev’s speech focused on the party’s leadership and 
the patriotism and sacrifice of rank-and-file soldiers and ordinary citizens.31 
 Images of the celebratory stage set up for annual celebrations of the October Revolution 
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from 1954, 1955, and 1956, as published in Pravda each year, are especially evocative of the 
ongoing negotiation of Stalin’s legacy. In 1954, Lenin and Stalin’s profiles appeared in the 
center of the backdrop with Stalin foregrounding his predecessor. The set up for 1955 was nearly 
identical, save for a change in Stalin in Lenin’s relative positions, with Lenin now in front. 
Leaders commissioned a new stage for the celebrations in 1957. Stalin’s image was removed 
entirely, replaced by an enormous front-facing bust of Lenin who dominated the background, a 
visual demonstration of Stalin’s demotion. The same set-up would be used in 1958, to be 
replaced with a more classic Lenin portrait the following year.32 
 Under Khrushchev, holiday speeches looked to the future. In 1957, with de-Stalinization 
in full swing, the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution showcased a new political agenda. 
The Supreme Soviet’s official statement to citizens emphasized the post-revolutionary 
emergence of a “socialist society, created by the labor of the Soviet people,” ready to face the 
challenges of building communism. Naming each of the titular ethnicities of union republics 
individually and of autonomous republics collectively, the statement highlighted unity and 
friendship, noting how citizens worked together to improve the country’s outlook. The ongoing 
building of communism would guarantee better living standards in housing, food, clothing, 
furniture, and other basic necessities. Khrushchev’s speech at the same time focused on 
communist construction, prefiguring his 1960 declaration that communism would be built by 
1980. Aside from criticizing Stalin’s cult of personality, Khrushchev focused on the production 
of household goods and living space rather than on industrial output.33 The emphasis on quality 
of life differed sharply from the discourses of sacrifice and revolutionary asceticism of prior 
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 Under Brezhnev, in contrast, major commemorative speeches tended to look backwards. 
This trend was exemplified in the commemorations of the 20th anniversary of victory in the 
Great Patriotic War, in 1965, which marked the beginning of a new focus on World War II. For 
the first time since 1946, Victory Day was elevated to a non-working holiday, a status it retained 
for the remainder of the Soviet period (and indeed, across most of post-Soviet space today). The 
holiday became a centerpiece in the reinvigorated cult of World War II, as military parades, 
speeches, commemorations, and memorials drew attention to the war and its impact on society.34 
 The 50th Anniversary of the Revolution, celebrated on November 7, 1967, marked one of 
the biggest public celebrations in all of Soviet history, with an enormous parade in Moscow and 
smaller-scale celebrations across the country. The party-state’s official address to the Soviet 
people, published ahead of the anniversary, noted the tasks of communist construction and the 
ongoing focus on raising living standards, highlighting the state’s care and attention towards 
women and youth.35 Brezhnev suggested similar themes in his November 3 speech, which 
outlined the progress made over the last 50 years and the tasks that lay ahead. His emphasis on 
the ongoing commitment to improving living standards garnered loud applause.36 On the 
anniversary, Premier (Head of State) Aleksei Kosygin reflected on the accomplishments of a 
half-century of rule.37 
 In letters, citizens noted the importance of these anniversaries. Several suggested the 50th 
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anniversary might be a good occasion for the state to unveil a new constitution, while others 
reflected on the progress the state had made in its 50-year existence. Vladimir E., of Turkestan 
(KazSSR) wrote, “For 50 years, Soviet power has existed. After 50 years, divisions based on 
ethnic characteristics have lost their necessity. We live by the thoughts and deeds of the entire 
country, the successes in any part of the country are dear to us, and the Motherland among us is 
one and the same—the USSR.” Together, he continued, citizens established Soviet power in 
1917, defended the country in World War II, and achieved economic and political successes.38 
 A 1977 edition of a history textbook for tenth graders highlighted the “great historical 
dates” of the late 1960s and early ‘70s, singling out the 25th anniversary of German soldiers on 
the doorstep of Moscow (1966), the 50th anniversary of the revolution, and the 100th 
anniversary of Lenin’s birth (April 21, 1970). The textbook saw war memorials as meaningful 
reminders of struggle and sacrifice, with reference to the monument to the unknown soldier in 
Moscow and the 1967 opening of the Mamaev-Kurgan memorial complex at Stalingrad.39 Such 
descriptions conveyed the significance of historical events for a young generation in hopes of 
continuing the revolutionary legacy. In this way, holiday rhetoric reflected and contributed to a 
sense of common experience across time and space. Looking both backwards and forwards, 




                                                            
38 GARF, f. 7523, o. 131, d. 357, l. 105ob. For additional letters on the importance of the 50th anniversary, see also 
GARF, f. 7523, o. 131, d. 312, l. 4; GARF, f. 7523, o. 131, d. 313, l. 6. Once the revolution’s 50th anniversary had 
passed, others suggested the 50th anniversary of the USSR’s founding and of the 1924 constitution, celebrated in 
1972 and 1974, respectively, as other opportunities to pass a new constitution, see GARF, f. 7523, o. 131, d. 317, l. 
10; GARF, f. 7523, o. 131, d. 318, l. 5; GARF, f. 7523, o. 131, d. 320, l. 17. The context and content of these and 
other letters will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
39 “Velikie istoricheskie daty,” in P.I. Potemkin et al., Istoriia SSSR (1938–1976): Uchebnik dlia 10 klassa, ed. M.P. 






Education for Citizenship: Curricular Changes under Khrushchev and Brezhnev  
 Holidays may have served a pedagogical, participatory function for all citizens, but it was 
in schools that the country invested the most resources for educating and preparing the next 
generation. This process was tightly bound with institutions of participatory citizenship and 
patriotism. Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, changes to school curriculum affected nearly all 
aspects of teaching and reflected evolving ideas about raising the next generation. Under 
Khrushchev, the 1958–59 school reform, which ostensibly strengthened the connection between 
“school and life,” emphasized technical education and practical training while altering one of the 
foundational elements of nationalities policy. This change was buttressed by more subtle 
curricular changes. Under Brezhnev, emphasis on technical education continued, while the state 
instigated an administrative overhaul within the union-wide educational system. These curricular 
and administrative changes suggested subtle negotiations of Soviet identity. 
The 1958–59 school reform marked a massive restructuring of the educational system. 
The reform’s full title, “Law on the Strengthening of the Relationship of the School with Life 
and on the Further Development of the System of Public Schools in the USSR,” hinted at its 
practical orientation. Discussions of major policy changes began when Khrushchev criticized the 
educational system at the 13th Komsomol Congress in Leningrad in April 1958.40 The following 
September, Khrushchev identified the “separation from life” (otorvannost’ ot zhizni) as “the 
main, fundamental defect (porok) of our secondary and higher schools.”41 New school programs 
combined scientific and practical training to give students first-hand experience with labor, often 
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in collaboration with local factories, collective farms, and other institutions,.42 
The reform also marked a major shift in the underlying foundations of nationalities 
policy. As we will see in Chapter 5, the reform eliminated formal requirements for the language 
of school instruction, leaving parents to decide whether to send children to national or Russian 
schools. Theoretically, the change allowed parents to opt out of either Russian or native language 
education, but in practice, the reform contributed to a prioritization of Russian across the 
country.43 Moreover, because Russian was closely associated with Soviet identity, the question of 
school choice implied a certain tension between ethnic and civic identities that had been less 
present when national schools had been formally mandated. Many parents saw the opportunity to 
enroll children in Russian schools as a way to ensure upward mobility, but this often came at the 
cost of declining native-language proficiency in some republics. This policy encouraged a view 
of language education as a zero-sum game, rather than as an opportunity for mutual enrichment. 
While the school reform emphasized uniformity and set the stage for a more universal 
curriculum, regardless of the language of instruction or the geographical location, an October 
1959 joint resolution from the Soviet of Ministers and the Central Committee introduced greater 
differentiation in history curriculum. The resolution, “On several changes in the teaching of 
history in schools,” mandated teaching republic history in all schools, a move that reflected a 
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new focus on local history.44 Teaching republic-level history was not unprecedented: some 
republics, Armenia most notably, had commissioned and implemented local history into school 
curriculum with some degree of state and party sanction in the postwar period. The 1959 decree, 
however, signaled a greater institutionalization of the process.45 
The decree tasked republics with developing curriculum, decentralizing the process and 
offering local scholars opportunities to lead the initiative. In Kazakhstan, curriculum for fourth 
graders was even compiled in Kazakh and introduced in Kazakh schools before Russian versions 
were ready.46 In both versions, the fourth grade textbook opened with a description of “Our 
Kazakhstan,” which promoted a patriotic love for both Kazakhstan and the Soviet Union, 
recalling wartime tropes of nested patriotism. In language accessible to its fourth grade audience, 
the introduction described Kazakhstan’s diverse territory, economic sectors, and people. “You 
should know how your happiness was won,” the introduction concluded. “For this, you must 
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study the history of your country (strana).”47 The same author, T. Turlyǵulov, emphasized the 
same point in his methodological guide for teachers, first published in 1970: “the history of the 
Kazakh SSR should inculcate a feeling of ardent love and whole-hearted loyalty to the Soviet 
fatherland (otchizna) and train them in a spirit of internationalism and friendship of the peoples.” 
This was seen to be of special importance in Russian schools, where the history of the Kazakh 
SSR was the only mandatory class that focused specifically on the republic.48 
Similar discussions took place concerning new curriculum for Ukrainian history. One 
reviewer praised the textbook, which  
correctly reveals the main stages of the heroic history of the Ukrainian SSR as an integral 
part of the Motherland (Bat’kivshchyna). The idea of the friendship of the peoples runs 
through the entire course. The role of the masses as the creators of history and the role of 
class struggle in the development of a class-based society are sufficiently clear. Clearly 
underscored in the book is the leadership of the communist party and of V.I. Lenin in 
particular in the history of the Ukrainian people, the idea of friendship of the peoples, 
patriotism, and internationalism.49 
 
The inclusion of local history would teach students about the diversity and unity of the country 
and its people, suggesting the continued importance of nested patriotism and the role of republics 
in developing school curriculum. As will be seen in Chapter 4, this also coincided with the 
reinvigoration of ethnic holiday celebrations and the formation of new Soviet rituals, which 
similarly drew from ethno-national cultures, suggesting the state’s broad commitment to the 
continued development of its ethnic minorities, at least in specific, circumscribed arenas. 
 Also under Khrushchev, the state dramatically expanded civic education within schools. 
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Shortly following the adoption of the 1936 Constitution, students studied the constitution as a 
stand-alone subject in all schools. As evident from textbooks, the course provided a general 
overview of the structure of the state and society focused around the constitution.50 By the late 
1950s and early 1960s, the subject was expanded into a more general course in “social studies” 
(obshchestvovedenie), required of all students in their final year of education.51 Relative to the 
earlier manifestation, the new course, influenced by the 1961 Party Program, offered a broad 
introduction not only to the basic structure of the state but to Marxism-Leninism, comparative 
world systems, and future development. The introduction suggested that broad knowledge of 
social and political systems would prepare students for their lives as independent, full-fledged 
citizens.52 The curricular shift reflected more expansive notions of citizenship typical of the 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras. 
 After Khrushchev was removed from office in 1964, the state continued to emphasize 
technical and practical training, but the most significant educational change was administrative 
rather than curricular. In 1966, the establishment of the Ministry of Education of the USSR (MP 
SSSR) signified a shift to a more rationalized and organized means of managing education. 
Previously, an ad hoc mix of the communist party (which had dominated policy in the 1930s and 
40s), the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR, the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of 
the RSFSR, and the Ministry of Education of the RSFSR had managed educational policy. The 
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latter only officially had direct authority over schools in the RSFSR and Russian schools in other 
republics, but it set informal education standards that were generally observed by local republics, 
at least to the extent resources permitted. Implementation of the 1958–59 school reform 
illustrated the difficulties of this administrative structure: after a general law was passed by the 
Soviet of Ministers in December 1958, each republic adopted its own version of the law, with 
slight adaptions for local circumstances. After several republics passed versions of the law out of 
keeping with Moscow’s desires, this process culminated in purges in several republics.53 The 
1966 creation of the MP SSSR offered a clear administrative center for educational matters and 
streamlined the management of education policy and curriculum across the country.54 
 Under Stalin’s successors, schools remained an important site for preparing young 
citizens for civic life. This preparation combined both all-union and more localized practices and 
knowledge, implicitly conveying the ongoing relevance and coexistence of ethnic and civic 
identities. Although these two loci of identity continued to be seen as compatible, the state did 
not always promote a clear message about how civic and ethnic worked together within the 
educational system. On one hand, the introduction of the principle of school choice as a result of 
the 1958–59 reform suggested the implicit limitations of ethnic and civic identities. At the same 
time, regional history curriculum inculcated students with a deeper sense of place that would 
inform who they were as citizens. There were other mixed messages as well. The overarching 
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emphasis on technical education revealed ongoing prioritization of economic development in 
industrial terms. This somewhat contrasted with the goals of more expansive social studies 
curriculum, which trained students for a much broader participation in civic life. 
 
Vigilance, Defense, and Patriotism in the Cold War 
 Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, notions of Soviet identity remained closely connected 
with an implicit sense of danger and precarity, heightening the stakes for participation. To 
foment continued revolutionary fervor and passionate patriotism among citizens, the rhetoric of 
war and defense of the homeland pervaded ideological discourse long after there existed any 
existential threats to security. The ideological landscape of the Cold War consolidated notions of 
Soviet identity around Marxist-Leninist ideology, always with at least one eye to the principal 
threats facing the country domestically and abroad. 
 Mimicking the defensive tone of the 1930s, vigilance (bditel’nost’) continued to be seen 
as a key attribute of the Soviet people. Presaging a political crisis as Stalin lay dying, the party 
and state issued a joint statement expressing “confidence that our party and the whole Soviet 
people will in these difficult days show the greatest unity and cohesion, firmness of spirit and 
vigilance, will redouble their efforts in the building of communism in our country, will rally ever 
closer around the Central Committee of the communist party and the government of the Soviet 
Union.”55 Quoting this statement, a 1953 front-page editorial in Pravda noted, “unity and 
cohesion, firmness of spirit and vigilance—these [are the] marvelous qualities [that] Stalin, 
Lenin, and the heroic communist party created and nurtured in our people.”56 
By definition, vigilance called upon citizens to defend their country; the Cold War was 
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rife with opportunity. In a June 1953 article in Izvestiia, V. Nikolaev described the dangerous 
present conditions: “The Soviet people, engaged in building communism, cannot for a moment 
forget the capitalist encirclement, the cunning intrigues of the imperialist intelligence services. 
High political vigilance and an uncompromising position towards any possible manifestations of 
carelessness and gullibility should be an inviolable law for every Soviet person.”57 He envisioned 
vigilance as a universal duty and called citizens to constantly monitor the world around them for 
any security breaches that might threaten the integrity of the state.  
 This language permeated discussions of the state security apparatus, which could protect 
citizens only with extensive popular participation. On the 40th anniversary of the 1918 founding 
of the Cheka, KGB chief Ivan Serov noted the importance of vigilance in relations between the 
state, the security apparatus, and the population: “A most important principle in the work of the 
Soviet state security organs is reliance on the masses, the millions of workers, peasants and 
intelligentsia. The help given by the people to the state security organs, resulting from the 
patriotism of Soviet people (liudi) and their correct understanding of the interests of the socialist 
motherland, is extensive and manifold.” Continuing, he saw “high vigilance” as a “patriotic 
duty” of all citizens, while the state security apparatus battled with ideological foes.58 Such 
rhetoric envisioned cooperation between the state security apparatus and citizens. This 
devolution of responsibility, also present in the 1930s, emphasized citizens’ participation. 
 The theme of vigilance continued into the Brezhnev era, as the Cold War suggested the 
image of a people locked in a fierce battle with capitalism. In a 1965 essay prepared for Armed 
Forces Day (February 23), Marshal Rodion Malinovskii highlighted civil and military 
participation in the country’s “high patriotic and international mission.” He described the 
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military’s essential role in promoting Soviet values at home and abroad, accomplishments that 
were attributed the entire population: “In the heat of fierce battles with Hitler's aggressors 
the Soviet people not only defended the honor, freedom and independence of our homeland but 
also played a decisive role in saving all mankind from the threat of fascist enslavement. Soviet 
people (liudi) have demonstrated through deeds their loyalty to proletarian internationalism, 
rendering selfless aid to the peoples of Europe and Asia in their liberation struggle.”59 Citing the 
“aggressive plans” of the country’s opponents, chiefly the United States, Malinovskii 
emphasized the need to support the military and soldiers, who ensured the long-term success of 
the country’s domestic and international agendas. This signaled the tight association between 
patriotism and Cold War-era defense concerns. 
A 1966 party publication, “Be Vigilant,” similarly urged the diligence of all citizens in 
their battle against espionage and the penetration by agents of hostile nations in the west, the 
United States first and foremost.60 Patriotism and vigilance remained tightly connected, as a 1967 
Pravda editorial emphasized the connection between patriotic education (vospitanie) and 
vigilance. Soviet patriotism, the article suggested, emerged from citizens’ deep love for their 
country and the communist party, their conviction in the tenets of communism, and their 
commitment to the country’s domestic and international agenda. This patriotism, the article 
concluded, bound citizens together in quasi-religious attachment to the state: “‘I am a citizen of 
the Soviet Union!’ With pride every patriot pronounces these words. To be a son or daughter of 
the socialist Fatherland is a great honor. And workers of our country, nurtured by the Leninist 
party, piously (sviato) cherish the high honor and stature of the Soviet patriot.”61 
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 As with vigilance, the rhetoric of war encouraged patriotic attachment. Allusions to war 
and patriotism featured prominently in discussions of technological advances, a field closely tied 
to defense. The 1957 launch of Sputnik was described on its first anniversary in Izvestiia as the 
“natural (zakonomernyi) outcome of the immense progress of the spiritual and material powers 
of the Soviet people.” The successful launch, the article noted, showcased the country’s scientific 
capabilities to the world, deliberately contextualizing the satellite in the ongoing Cold War. The 
article dwelled on American mischaracterizations of the “killer-satellite”: “The world can be 
once again certain that the bloody hand of capitalism strives to orient against humankind any 
scientific discovery capable of lightening the labor of people and increasing their power over 
nature.”62 The successful space expedition of the three-man crew of the Voskhod-1 in October 
1964 inspired similar pride. As the official statement noted, “The new, great victory in the 
conquest (pokorenie) of the cosmos boosts the glory of our socialist Motherland even higher. It 
clearly demonstrates to the entire world what kind of unseen heroic feats the Soviet people are 
capable of, [once] freed of class and national oppression, what gigantic powers and talents are 
born of revolutionary energy in [the Soviet people].”63 
 In connecting space exploration with long-term revolutionary processes and emphasizing 
its international and patriotic function, such statements reflected the general backdrop of the 
Cold War, which defined the Soviet people in opposition to its enemies in the West. More 
generally, the language of space exploration reflected Soviet ambitions: the “conquest” 
(zavoevanie, derived from the same root as war; and pokorenie, used historically to describe the 
“subjugation” of peoples of Siberia, Crimea, and elsewhere) and “opening” or “acquisition” 
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(osvoenie, often used in the context of imperial Russian expansion into Siberia) of the cosmos 
borrowed from the vocabulary of expansion and war. This suggested that space was another 
arena in which the country fought for dominance on both a domestic and international stage. 
 Cold War incidents also provided opportunities for the state to celebrate the distinctly 
Soviet character of its citizens, as suggested by a minor incident in 1960. After a terrible storm, 
the four-man crew of a self-propelled barge spent most of two months adrift in the Pacific Ocean 
with limited supplies, forcing them to resort to eating the leather from their boots and belts. Upon 
their rescue by a U.S. ship, the four soldiers, led by Tatar junior sergeant Askhat Ziganshin, were 
taken back to San Francisco. In a press conference with American journalists before their return 
home, the soldiers emphasized their ordinariness. “Nothing extraordinary happened,” said one 
soldier to journalists: “Every Soviet soldier in our place would have done the same.” When asked 
what kind of people they were, Ziganshin simply replied, “Ordinary. Soviet! (Obyknovennye. 
Sovetskie!).” Pravda interpreted this statement as a clear demonstration of Soviet character: 
“These two simple words clearly express the exceptional modesty, high sense of dignity, calm, 
self-confident force of character of the Soviet person—a person of a new world, raised by the 
communist party.” The soldiers were praised for demonstrating Soviet values, character, and 
patriotism to the entire world, showing what revolution and socialism had accomplished within 
Soviet citizens in explicit contrast to the country’s Cold War rivals.64 
 Propaganda warned citizens about the potential dangers of misleading and inaccurate 
characterizations of Soviet politics and society abroad, seeking to inoculate citizens from 
pernicious foreign influences. Party documents were rife with concerns that bourgeois, anti-
communist, and anti-Soviet ideologies could penetrate society. Lecture campaigns and other 
propaganda initiatives portrayed the Soviet Union as locked in a fierce ideological battle with the 
                                                            






west, echoing past discourses of capitalist encirclement and external enemies.65 As the country 
struggled with enemies abroad, patriotic rhetoric encouraged citizens to support and promote 
Soviet ideology at home. 
 Travel, both within the Soviet Union and in the “near” abroad in the aligned countries of 
Eastern Europe, also promoted identification as Soviet citizens. As Zbigniew Wojnowski has 
noted, travel to Poland, Hungary, and other border regions almost paradoxically promoted 
notions of Soviet patriotism in a region (Western Ukraine) not typically associated with high 
levels of attachment to the Soviet state. He argues, “Cross-border travel became an important 
vehicle of de-Stalinization, as it helped to forge new ideas of what it meant to be Soviet in 
western Ukraine… Following Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalinist terror, the cautious 
opening of the Soviet border was part of a larger attempt to find fresh sources of popular support 
and enthusiasm for the regime’s ‘communist’ project.” Although the success of this project was 
somewhat mitigated by illegal smuggling in the 1970s and tensions between Ukrainians and 
Poles, travelers were expected to project their status as Soviet citizens in their interactions 
abroad. This helped cement the Western Ukrainian experience, at least in the 1950s and ‘60s, to 
the Soviet whole.66 As Anne Gorsuch notes, domestic tourism could also help develop notions of 
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Soviet identity and a sense of belonging to the Soviet whole.67 
 
Patriotism on the Economic Front 
 While descriptions of vigilance and the defense industry had quite obvious connections to 
war and frequently looked outwards towards Cold War rivals, similar vocabulary carried over 
into domestic arenas, where belligerent rhetoric heightened the general sense of urgency. 
Publicly, the regime remained committed to establishing communism (and indeed, worldwide 
revolution), but the content of this rhetoric evolved as the state and party apparatus aged and 
revolutionary fervor receded. The rhetoric of war, battle, and ‘capitalist encirclement,’ all of 
which had been prominent under Stalin with much more immediate threats, were repurposed for 
a more humdrum political agenda that interpreted economic development as the key task of 
building communism. War-infused patriotic rhetoric urgently charged citizens with participating 
in both ordinary and more experimental economic measures to ensure the long-term viability and 
success of the state and communist party. 
 This rhetoric was most at work in the ideological discourses surrounding communist 
construction, which remained the country’s principle task. As outlined by the party’s theses on 
the revolution’s 40th anniversary, the transition to communism rested upon continued economic 
development, both industrial and agricultural, which in turn depended upon the productive 
energies of the Soviet people. To hasten the transition, the theses emphasized economic policies, 
including ongoing attention to the ‘material-technical base,’ increasing living space and 
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improving living conditions, and the Virgin Lands campaign.68 The drive to “catch up and 
overtake” the U.S. in economic output placed internal domestic policies firmly within the Cold 
War.69 Khrushchev’s 1961 pronouncement at the 22nd Party Congress that communism would be 
largely built in 20 years indicated the state’s dedication to its ideological and economic goals and 
tasked citizens with participation. Echoing this declaration, the 1961 Party Program adopted by 
the congress closed with the phrase, the “current generation of Soviet people will live under 
communism.”70 Such rhetoric raised the stakes for building communism. 
 Although Khrushchev’s contemporaries and successors mocked his tactics, Brezhnev 
largely extended his predecessor’s Cold War rhetoric. Under Brezhnev, the party continued its 
formal pursuit of building communism. In the theses prepared for the 50th Anniversary of the 
October Revolution, industrial and agricultural progress were seen as essential for guaranteeing 
long-term improvements to citizens’ quality of life. Alongside this focus, the 1967 theses placed 
considerably more weight on the role of science and on promoting communist morality and 
principles among the population.  
 Under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, ideological discourse infused both ordinary and 
experimental processes of economic development with war-oriented, patriotic rhetoric to 
encourage participation in the economy. This was most evident in extraordinary economic 
campaigns. The Virgin Lands campaign showcased popular participation, with its plan to boost 
agricultural output in the untapped, agriculturally unproductive lands of the Kazakh steppe and 
other underdeveloped areas. Beginning in 1954, the state recruited primarily young activists to 
cultivate the land to ensure a greater degree of food self-sufficiency. Recruitment capitalized on 
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young citizens’ patriotism and commitment to the country’s economic goals.71  
 This peaceful economic process was often described with the rhetoric of war. Echoing the 
vocabulary of space exploration, the campaign was often termed the osvoenie (reclamation, 
settlement, acquisition) of the virgin lands. Brezhnev, appointed First Secretary of the Kazakh 
Communist Party and tasked with leading the process there, made extensive comparisons to 
World War II in his 1978 memoir: 
Again one recalls the war. The people who took part in it were stretched to the limits of 
human endurance. They went short of sleep and food, they got soaked in the trenches, 
they lay for days on end in the snow, they plunged into icy water, and yet hardly anyone 
suffered from colds and other “peacetime” ills. Something similar was to be seen in the 
virgin lands. I have already compared the great epic of the virgin lands to a wartime front, 
to a great battle won by the Party and the people. The memory of the war will always be 
with us frontline men, and it is, after all, an accurate enough comparison. Of course, in 
the virgin lands there was no shooting, no bombing, no shelling, but all the rest was like a 
real battle.72 
 
Such comparisons permeated Brezhnev’s memoir, suggesting an attempt to infuse late Soviet 
economic projects with the same urgency of prior eras. The last great Soviet construction project, 
the building of the Baikal-Amur railroad that began in 1974, similarly recruited Soviet citizens, 
primarily young ones. The campaign was hailed as an example of interethnic friendship, raw 
industrial power, and citizens’ dedication to the state’s agenda, even as the construction itself 
was ultimately a disastrous failure.73 
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Raising Living Standards for the Soviet People 
 While discourses of patriotism and Soviet identity ran through discussions of dramatic 
economic projects, similar language carried over into the more routine projects of everyday life. 
The post-Stalin period placed new emphasis on rising material standards, underscoring the more 
benevolent relationship the government was attempting to forge with its citizenry. Like 
discussions of science, technology, and defense, the focus on improving living standards also had 
manifestations in the international sphere. Perhaps most famously, the 1959 “kitchen debate” 
between Nikita Khrushchev and visiting Vice President Richard Nixon at a Moscow exhibition 
placed consumer goods at the heart of Cold War competition. As Greg Castillo observes, this 
was part of a long, extensive Cold War-era focus on providing citizens with material goods, with 
manifestations on both sides of the Iron Curtain.74  
 In directing new attention to citizens’ quality of life, the Soviet Union took part in a 
global conversation about the role of the state. Across Western and Eastern Europe on slightly 
different timelines, the postwar years brought a new focus on providing for citizens. In Western 
Europe, these conversations intensified immediately after the war with the rise of the welfare 
state and a wider breadth of state services.75 Eastern Europe, which emerged from the war in 
more dire straits, took cues from the Soviet Union. By the 1950s, as Krisztina Fehérváry notes, 
patience with sacrifice and privations had grown thin, not least as East Europeans eyed the 
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relative prosperity of their neighbors further west.76 Beginning in the late 1950s, Eastern Europe, 
including the Soviet Union, responded to this ideological battle by devoting attention to 
constructing apartments and producing household goods and modern conveniences.77 
 In the Soviet Union, there was some precedent for the post-Stalinist focus on rising living 
standards. Stalin’s famous 1935 declaration, that “Life has become better, comrades. Life has 
become more joyous,” indicated a shift away from the revolutionary asceticism that had 
characterized early Soviet life.78 This language, however, largely disappeared in the immediate 
postwar period of extreme deprivation, when living standards declined sharply. Vladislav Zubok 
notes, “Stalin returned to the prewar policy of impoverishing the Soviet people, especially the 
peasantry and agricultural workers, in order to provide money for industrial rebuilding and 
rearmament.”79 After Stalin, ideas about improving material conditions took on a different tone, 
as political leaders emphasized what the government provided citizens. This was not just about 
housing. As Gorlizki and Khlevniuk note, top priorities following Stalin’s death included long-
needed reforms to and reorganization of the Gulag and agricultural distribution system, both of 
which reflected the interest in improving citizens’ lives.80 
 Material concerns, above all standards of living, marked a new invocation of the concept 
of the Soviet people, as the government focused on providing better living conditions to the 
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population as a whole. This was also a departure from Stalin’s 1935 language, which indicated 
rising standards for the best workers while standards for the rest of the population lagged. A 
1953 editorial made the new relationship explicit: “The communist party has no other interests 
than those of the people. Its entire policy is directed at strengthening the economic might of our 
state, at improving in every way the material wellbeing and cultural level of the Soviet people.” 
This concern for wellbeing, the article continued, in turn drove citizens’ “undivided faith in and 
love for their own communist party,” suggesting a reciprocal relationship between the party and 
people.81 The ability to provide was seen as a precondition of this new relationship; failure would 
not be tolerated.82 
Khrushchev underscored this same dedication through the pursuit of a new policy: the 
abolition of taxes and wage reduction. The policy, Khrushchev made clear in his 1960 
address to the Supreme Soviet, sought to raise the living standards of the entire citizenry: 
Now this agenda is familiar to the whole world. The USSR Soviet of Ministers is 
submitting to the Supreme Soviet for consideration the draft of a Law on Abolishing 
Taxes on the Wages of Workers and Employees, as well as other measures aimed at 
raising the wellbeing (blagosostoianiia) of the Soviet people. The second question 
concerns measures for completing the changeover of all workers and employees to a 
shorter working day in 1960. As you see, the day’s agenda fully corresponds with 
spring fever and joy, [and] it reflects the concern of our party and government for the 
steady growth in wellbeing of the Soviet people, and once again convincingly 
corroborates the peace-loving character of the policy of the Soviet socialist state.83 
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The 1961 Party Program repeated the party’s commitment to raising living standards.84 Such 
formulations dominated political discourse, suggesting that the party sought to serve citizens. 
Rather than a pre-formulated, rigid patriotism expressed in correlation to defense of the state or 
the promotion of its ideology, dedication to improving material conditions conveyed a sense of a 
shared and equalized experience. 
 Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this focus was a greater emphasis on the 
construction and distribution of housing. Although block housing has often been seen as 
emblematic of the low living standards and gray cityscapes of late socialism, the so-called 
Khrushchevki (or, more derisively, khrushchoby—the Khrushchev-slums) represented a massive 
improvement over the communal apartments that had dominated urban life since the revolution. 
These pre-fabricated, typically five-story complexes, intended to be temporary, suggested a new 
emphasis on increasing housing stock and improving the material conditions of Soviet living. 
Dmitri Shostakovich’s operetta, Cheremushki (Cherry-Town, a district of Moscow named for the 
trees planted between housing units), adapted into an eponymous 1962 musical comedy film 
directed by Herbert Rappaport. The film immortalized the material promises of what one 
character called “the age of reinforced concrete,” suggesting the hopes placed on the state’s 
housing program. For many, the transition to the dull, gray housing blocks represented a 
dramatic leap forward in terms of quality of living.85 
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 This focus continued into the Brezhnev era. Public statements from leaders and in 
newspapers emphasized that improvements in living standards would be accomplished through 
collaboration between the state and people. A series of slogans for the anniversary of the October 
Revolution in 1964, just after Khrushchev’s ouster, emphasized this cooperative undertaking: 
“The Party appeals to Soviet people (liudi) persistently to raise labor productivity, to struggle for 
improvement in the quality and reduction in the cost of products, to do everything possible to 
economize in the use of material resources.”86 Improvements in living conditions, the article 
continued, depended on scientific progress, foremost in the chemical industry, as “one of the 
decisive conditions… for a further rise in the wellbeing of the people.”87 Leaders emphasized 
policies that improved living standards for ordinary citizens, including higher minimum wages, 
expanding pensions, better housing, decreasing weekly working hours, and greater equality 
between rural and urban areas. Officials repeatedly stressed that “raising the wellbeing of the 
Soviet people” was its “most important task,” which could be accomplished only through 
working with citizens.88 
 Amir Weiner has interpreted this focus on living standards as part of the state’s ongoing 
renegotiation of the revolutionary legacy. As the revolution entered its 50th year, he writes, “The 
regime could no longer conceal the visible strains between an ageing revolution and a leadership 
fighting to preserve their life achievements at home and abroad, and a rather confused generation 
simultaneously proud of their fathers’ sacrifices…yet detached from the formative experiences 
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of the founding fathers.” To relieve these strains, the regime provided “material improvement in 
exchange for unchallenged political and ideological hegemony.”89 Weiner suggests this choice 
was primarily instrumental: a naked attempt for aging party elites to consolidate and maintain 
power. Yet the language used by elites, not only in public-facing conversations about rising 
living standards, but also amongst themselves—in closed party conversations, academic and 
party journals, and government documents—reflected a more robust conversation about the 
existence of the Soviet people, which contributed to the changing relationship between state and 
people. I propose that the interest in providing for ‘the people’ may not have been merely 
instrumental but may as much have been borne of a conviction of the populace’s importance. 
Newfound attention to the Soviet people as a topic of conversation among political and cultural 
elites hinted at an increased faith in the existence and significance of the Soviet people.  
 
Elite Conversations: High Ideology and Academics on the Soviet People 
 In Stalin’s lifetime, discussions of the Soviet people had been primarily the realm of 
mobilizing patriotic discourse, aimed toward the general populace. As already seen in Chapter 1, 
the term burst onto the scene in the mid-1930s, but it was notably excluded from the 1936 
Constitution and the Short Course. The term was also largely absent from internal ideological 
discussions, suggesting that its primary purpose was to promote patriotism among citizens. In the 
decades after Stalin’s death, the term expanded into the realm of “high ideology” and found a 
place within official party documents, in ideological discussions in literature intended for party 
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members, and among the academic establishment.90 Although much of this work was technically 
available to the general public—at least those interested in following the latest ideological 
discussions—these discussions took place within an elite context. The new focus and 
proliferation of this material reflected confidence in the existence of the Soviet people at the 
highest levels of society. 
 
The Soviet People in the 1961 Party Program and the 1977 Constitution 
The 22nd Party Congress, convened in October 1961 and attended by over 4,000 
delegates and representatives of communist parties abroad, marked the Soviet people’s elevation 
to a concept enshrined in high ideology. Opening this massive congress at the Moscow Kremlin, 
Khrushchev took the podium to lay the framework for the next two weeks. His very long speech, 
comprising some 190 pages of text in its English translation, addressed three main topics: the 
situation in the world at large, the state of communist development in the USSR, and the role of 
the party. His opening discussion, however, notably developed the concept of the Soviet people. 
He identified citizens’ shared past under socialism, their connection to the Communist Party, and 
their common destiny under communism: “The party and the entire Soviet people have exposed 
the intrigues of our enemies and have emerged from all trials with Honor. The Soviet Union is 
today stronger and more powerful than ever before!” Continuing, he emphasized their future 
under communism: “It has fallen to the lot of the Soviet people, of the Party of Communists of 
the Soviet Union to be pioneers in the great mission of communist construction and advance to 
the victory of communism over uncharged paths.”91 
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Chief among the achievements of the 22nd Party Congress was the adoption of a new 
Program of the CPSU, replacing past programs produced in 1903 and 1919. Accordingly, the 
1961 Program of the CPSU represented an important shift towards a more open record of the 
goals of the party and state apparatus. 92 As a testament to the public nature of the program both 
within the Soviet Union and outside it, the text was submitted for publication just two days after 
the conclusion of the congress.93 Two years later, the state also prepared an English-language 
edition for publication abroad with a special preface by Khrushchev.94 
  The program reflected on the concept of the Soviet people in its introduction: “The Party 
considers communist construction in the USSR as the great, international task of the Soviet 
people, a task corresponding to the interests of the whole world socialist system and to the 
interests of the international proletariat, [and of] all humanity.”95 The program was divided into 
two parts: the first detailed the development from capitalism to communism, and the second 
detailed the party’s tasks towards establishing a communist society. While the first part was 
more or less a standard Marxist-Leninist history of Soviet socialism, the second part suggested 
that the country had entered a new developmental epoch: the building of communism. The 
Soviet people was to play a major role in this transition.96 The party—most passionately 
Khrushchev himself—emphasized the building of communism, a task that would unify citizens 
in their commitment to the state.97 
 Alongside the new party program, Khrushchev also announced plans to draft a new 
constitution to replace the now-problematic one adopted under Stalin in 1936, during the cult of 
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personality. A constitutional commission was formed to review the process of the preparation 
and discussion of the 1936 constitution, which was robustly criticized for the lack of serious 
input taken from citizens themselves, and to begin framing a new constitution. In archived 
reports, the commission noted that despite receiving many suggestions from citizens in 1936, the 
constitutional commission had introduced only minor editorial changes between the draft version 
and the final document.98 In addition to writing a new constitution, the commission collected 
unsolicited letters from citizens, hundreds of whom wrote to offer their own suggestions, 
adjustments, and even alternative drafts for the constitution. This process, discussed below, was 
seen to be indicative of much more cooperation between the party, state, and citizens than had 
been the case in the 1930s. After Khrushchev’s 1964 ouster, progress on the new constitution 
slowed, however, to be picked up again only in the 1970s. 
Institutionalized constructions of the Soviet people developed further under Brezhnev’s 
leadership. Ten years after the 22nd Party Congress, Brezhnev made a similar address at the 24th 
Party Congress in March 1971. Like Khrushchev’s speech ten years earlier, Brezhnev’s six-hour 
televised address outlined the party’s political agenda for the coming five years. In what was 
perhaps the most developed understanding yet, Brezhnev spoke of the Soviet people as a “new 
historical, social, and international community of people having a common territory, economy, 
and socialist content; a culture that reflected the particularities of multiple nationalities; a federal 
state; and a common ultimate goal: the construction of communism.”99 
The term also appeared prominently in the 1977 Soviet Constitution, adopted after an 
extensive public discussion of its contents. The preamble developed the characteristics of the 
emergent Soviet people, who were said to have granted the constitution its very legitimacy: 
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The Soviet people, 
• guided by the ideas of scientific communism and true to their revolutionary traditions, 
• relying on the great social, economic, and political gains of socialism, 
• striving for the further development of socialist democracy, 
• taking into account the international position of the USSR as part of the world system 
of socialism, and conscious of their internationalist responsibility, 
• preserving continuity of the ideas and principles of the first Soviet Constitution of 
1918, the 1924 Constitution of the USSR and the 1936 Constitution of the USSR, 
hereby confirms the principles of the social order and policies of the USSR, establishes 
the rights, freedoms and obligations of citizens, [establishes] the principles of the 
organization and aims of the socialist all-people’s (obshchenarodnyi) government, and 
proclaim these in the present Constitution.100 
 
By claiming legitimacy through citizens’ approval, the government indicated its collaborative 
relationship with society, further demonstrated by the extensive discussion of the document. 
Use of the phrase “Soviet people” in the constitution indicated a greater 
institutionalization and legal framework while endowing this “people” with more concrete 
attributes. Rather than invoking a vague concept, leaders identified the Soviet people by its 
common characteristics, implicitly echoing Stalin’s definition of “nation.” The Soviet people 
was now a “historic community” with a common past—forged in revolution, development, and 
war—that was moving towards a common future in communism. If Stalin defined the nation 
(natsiia) as a historic community that shared a language, territory, economic life, and 
culture/national character, there could be little doubt that the Soviet polity was progressively 
assuming these characteristics.101 Despite these obvious connections, leaders spoke of the people 
(narod) rather than a nation (natsiia), thereby avoiding association with what they saw as a 
temporary and bourgeois concept. 
Engagement with the concept of the Soviet people within the party apparatus marked a 
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departure from the more narrowly mobilizing invocations of the term under Stalin, suggesting a 
new prioritization of the concept within state and party circles. As leaders invoked the concept 
not only in their public appearances but behind the closed doors of party meetings, they hinted at 
a deeper conviction about the existence and the significance of the Soviet people. These 
conversations also carried over into contemporary academic writing. 
 
From Popular Phrase to Theorized Concept: Scholarly Views on the Soviet People 
As party documents and political elites placed new weight on the existence of the Soviet 
people, similar discussions unfolded in elite publications among scholars and leading ideologues. 
Theoretical and academic literature on the nature and existence of the Soviet people proliferated 
throughout the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s. Those specializing in the history and nature of the Soviet 
people were a diverse and interdisciplinary group of historians, ethnographers, sociologists, and 
demographers based both in Moscow and across the Soviet Union. Together, they offered new 
evidence about the emergence of the Soviet people, providing the raw material that enabled 
political leaders to make sweeping statements about progress in the apparently resolved “national 
question.” While emphasizing diversity, scholars pointed to the commonalities that united many 
peoples into a single Soviet people. 
Under Khrushchev, scholarship on the Soviet people tended towards the general. G. I. 
Ivanov’s 120-page pamphlet, The Soviet People—Builder of Communism (1954), offered little 
more than platitudes about the rise of the Soviet people and its deep connection to the party. The 
book offered a cursory overview of Soviet history, from the revolution, through the building of 
socialism to the present, as the Soviet people continued the work of building a communist 






both Lenin and Stalin’s leadership. Other than a shared history since the revolution, the book 
offered little development of the idea of the Soviet people except as subjects of the Soviet 
state.102 Ivan Shkadarevich’s The Soviet People: Creator of a New Life (1958) similarly avoided 
deep engagement with the concept. His work, devoid of references to Stalin, focused on the 
Soviet Union’s unprecedented industrial and agricultural development and the leadership’s focus 
on rising living standards. The party’s focus on improving citizens’ quality of life, Shkadarevich 
argued, distinguished it from its bourgeois rivals, as the country presented to the world an 
example of peace, equality, and friendship.103 Kommunist, the party’s leading ideological journal 
also discussed the concept more routinely in the late 1950s.104 
The 1961 Party Congress, at which Khrushchev extensively discussed the Soviet people 
ahead of the approval of the 1961 Party Program, marked a new phase of public engagement 
with the concept of the Soviet people. The scholar of philosophy Ivan Tsamerian hailed the 
congress and Khrushchev’s speech for ushering in a “new phase in the development of ethnic 
relations in the USSR.” Economic, political, and cultural development, he noted, had drawn the 
various Soviet peoples ever closer together, forging a new historic community, as outlined in the 
program. With guaranteed equality, the growth of economic and cultural connections, use of the 
Russian language, citizens grew ever closer. “In all Soviet people (liudi) of all nationalities,” he 
wrote, “shared characteristics are taking shape, like deep conviction and loyalty to the ideas of 
communism and his or her socialist Motherland, an uncompromising attitude and intolerance to 
all forms of social and national oppression, internationalism and respect for the national feelings 
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of all peoples, peacefulness and hatred towards militarism, a feeling of collectivism and 
comradeship, etc.” These values established the Soviet people as a new historic community.105 
Tsamerian’s writing reflected the emerging consensus among scholars about a three-
phase sequence for the development of national cultures, with distinct but overlapping stages. 
This process of development, scholars held, distinguished the Soviet Union from its predecessors 
and contemporaries, offering a unique course of development that shared much in common with 
what Francine Hirsch has termed “state sponsored evolutionism.”106 In the first phase, rastsvet 
(development or flourishing), individual nations or ethnicities would flourish under socialism, a 
process that was economic, political, and cultural. As this process unfolded across the country 
and within every ethnic group, it paved the way for the second phase: the sblizhenie (coming 
together, or getting closer) of Soviet nations (natsii) and ethnicities. The economic, political, and 
cultural development of each nation, which happened in tandem across ethnic boundaries, would 
bring them ever closer together. This in turn ensured the growth of common characteristics and 
values amongst peoples, slowly bringing into existence the final phase of national development, 
the sliianie (fusing) of peoples. Although scholars generally held that this final stage would be 
years in the making and remained largely theoretical at present, many nevertheless looked for 
signs that the process was already underway. 
General thinking about these three phases was not new: Lenin wrote of the drawing 
together and fusing of nations as early as 1916.107 By the 1960s and ‘70s, however, scholarly 
communities devoted newfound attention to these developmental stages, often specializing or 
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focusing on one phase or another in their work. Those focusing on the rastsvet, or flourishing, of 
peoples, pointed to the state’s broad agenda of promoting and developing its minorities, often 
with reference to local conditions. Typical of this trend was Mykhailo (Mikhail) Kulichenko and 
Valentyn Malanchuk’s 1971 work on the “national question” in Ukraine, which traced the 
political, economic, and cultural development of Ukraine under Soviet rule.108 Numerous more 
general studies, including Kulichenko’s later work, offered similar perspectives on the Soviet 
Union’s developmental benefits for ethnic minorities across the country.109 Writing on sblizhenie 
often emphasized the simultaneity of development across the country. With analogous structures 
of political power, economic growth, and cultural expression, nations and peoples within the 
Soviet Union took on common characteristics, leading to the rise of a more common Soviet 
culture that unified all citizens. Importantly, this would not mark the end of national, ethnic, or 
linguistic difference. Rather, nations achieved higher levels of development in tandem with one 
another, drawing them closer to one another as their cultures rose to new heights.110 The idea of 
sblizhenie was thus a new articulation of the simultaneous unity and diversity of the Soviet 
people. 
Least discussed was the final phase, the eventual fusing of nations that would occur only 
under communism. To the extent that most writers discussed the eventual sliianie of nations at 
all, it was generally in the abstract, about a distant future far from the present. As Kulichenko 
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noted, this future national/ethnic fusing extended beyond Soviet borders; it would encompass the 
entire world under communism. Visions of what this global communist society might look like 
consequently remained vague and unresolved. Indeed, as Kulichenko admitted, there was some 
chance that diversity in language and culture would remain. Noting that communism itself 
helped nations flourish and develop, this “ostensibly shows the ‘obvious illegitimacy’ of the 
opinion that all nations, national languages, and forms of culture would disappear with the final 
victory of communism on a global scale.”111 Suggesting a slightly different view, Tsamerian 
bristled at the idea that sliianie denoted cultural assimilation. Instead, he clarified that the 
eventual sliianie would not mean the averaging out of national characteristics but would rather 
be the sum total of their complete and all-sided development. Although this would mean a slow 
disappearance of some ethnicities (narodnosti) and the emergence of a common language (not 
necessarily an exclusive one), sliianie would not necessarily entail a complete disappearance of 
national characteristics, except perhaps in a very distant future.112 
Conferences and edited volumes contributed to understandings of the Soviet people as a 
historic community, as scholars collectively considered the origins and history of Soviet citizens 
as a unified body politic. At a large conference in Volgograd in October 1969, more than 300 
scholars, primarily from local state, party, and educational institutions but with representation 
from 11 different republics, offered varying perspectives on the theoretical foundations, history, 
socio-economic development, and moral and political unity of citizens.113 Another volume, 
collectively written at the Institute of History at the Academy of the Sciences of the USSR and 
edited by the historian Maksim Kim, offered a theoretical and historical overview of the 
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processes that had brought the Soviet people into existence, with chapters that traced the history 
of the Soviet people from the revolution through the Great Patriotic War into the current era of 
developed socialism and constructing communism. Additional chapters considered the “spiritual 
profile” (dukhovnyi oblik) of the Soviet people, the development of “all-Soviet characteristics in 
the cultures of peoples of the USSR,” and the role of national and Russian languages in Soviet 
society.114 These and other works offered historical perspective on the Soviet people as a 
community that had come into being as a result of the combined processes of state policies and 
individual and collective experiences.115 
While historians and political theorists looked to the past to understand the creation and 
emergence of the Soviet people, ethnographers, sociologists, and demographers looked at 
ongoing processes that pointed to the existence of the Soviet people. Perhaps most prominent 
was Iulian Bromlei, an ethnographer based at the Academy of Sciences, whose theoretical 
writings on the concept of “ethnos” (etnos, essentially ethnicity) brought renewed attention to the 
study of ethnicity and “ethnic processes” among Soviet ethnographers in the 1970s and ‘80s.116 
Relying on a mix of ethnography in the field and comparative and historical statistical analysis, 
scholars offered perspectives of changing habits and ethnic identification within the Soviet 
Union. In their view, these pointed to the growth of shared traits and characteristics that 
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demonstrated unity among citizens.117 
Chief among the indicators of the emergence of the Soviet people was the high incidence 
of interethnic marriage. As Adrienne Edgar notes, the state historically viewed interethnic 
marriage as just such a sign of the emergence of the Soviet people. In the 1930s, the party saw 
interethnic marriage as a tool for hastening the formation of the Soviet people. By the 1960s and 
‘70s, literature on the topic proliferated, as official ideology and popular literature “touted mixed 
marriages as proof of the success of Soviet nationality policy and a harbinger of the 
consolidation of an overarching Soviet identity.”118 Scholars of the 1970s and ‘80s believed that 
high levels of interethnic marriage reflected the greater equality between both men and women 
and people of different ethnicities. As citizens lived within multiethnic communities (foremost in 
cities) and shared a common language (generally Russian), the conditions were favorable for 
interethnic marriage. Writing in the 1960s, Antatolii Kharchev observed especially high levels of 
interethnic marriages in Tashkent, Samarkand, and Leningrad and posited that these were a 
“circumstantial indicator” of significant changes in family relations. “With the elimination of 
racial, ethnic, and class inequalities,” he concluded, “the range in the choice of a future spouse 
has broadened considerably. The bridging of gaps of education and culture between the urban 
and rural populations and between the intelligentsia and the worker-peasant masses has an effect 
in the same direction.”119 
L.N. Terent’eva linked interethnic marriage and the sblizhenie (drawing closer) of 
peoples in a 1975 book on ethnic processes in the Soviet Union: “In the USSR, the development 
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of mutual interethnic relations is on the path towards ever greater sblizhenie of peoples—a long 
and complicated process. To a certain extent, this process is reflected in the growth in the 
number of interethnic marriages resulting from the expansion of objective possibilities for 
interethnic contacts.”120 Census statistics, Terent’eva observed, suggested a total growth in 
interethnic marriages, up from 10.2 percent of all families in 1959 to 14 percent in 1970. In some 
republics, including Latvia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and in most large cities, interethnic 
marriages were even more common. After outlining major trends in cities and communities, she 
concluded that interethnic marriage played a largely positive role in the sblizhenie of peoples and 
strengthened interethnic contacts. Urbanization and greater mobility, she finished, would only 
continue this trend.121 Iulian Bromlei, who wrote extensively about endogamy, interpreted high 
levels of interethnic marriage as an indication that groups were growing closer.122 
 Alongside interethnic marriage, scholars pointed to language habits as further proof of 
the existence of the Soviet people, focusing on patterns in both Russian and native language use. 
Higher Russian proficiency across the country, as we will see in Chapter 5, was seen to reflect 
the ties that bound citizens together. A new census question in 1970 asked citizens about Russian 
proficiency. Rising fluency, as demonstrated by comparison of the 1970 and 1979 censuses, was 
interpreted as an unambiguously positive development. As one book noted, Russian proficiency 
among non-Russians “broadens the sphere of integration processes. It demonstrates, in part, that 
the non-Russian population not only studies Russian, but reads Russian language newspapers, 
books, journals, listens to radio and watches television, wants to educate their children in 
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Russian schools, etc.” Interactions between people of different ethnicities, the book continued, 
would be “unthinkable without the language of interethnic communication.”123 
 Native languages, too, were widely seen to contribute to the ongoing sblizhenie of Soviet 
peoples. Like historians, ethnographers and demographers believed the state’s prioritization of 
native languages had helped to raise the culture of non-Russian peoples, a precondition to their 
integration into the Soviet people. Literacy, education, and national presses paved the way for 
participation in civic life for all citizens.124 Bilingualism, foremost dual fluency in a native 
language and Russian, became the subject of serious academic inquiry throughout the 1970s and 
‘80s, as scholars sought to understand the mechanisms, impact, and significance of dual-
language proficiency.125 As one book noted, 
Improving social relations presupposes the long-term expansion of communication 
between ethnicities of the USSR. Therefore, the propaganda of national-Russian 
bilingualism, systematic study of modern ethno-linguistic processes, and the analysis and 
clarification of the significance and social importance of national-Russian bilingualism in 
the long-term strengthening of the multicultural (internatsional’nyi) unity of the Soviet 
people emerge as important tasks of ideological and educational work.126 
 
Recognizing the social importance of bilingualism, many scholars called for continued attention 
to developing and encouraging dual language proficiency among ethnic minorities across the 
country, another reminder of the perceived compatibility of ethnic and Soviet identities. 
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 Finally, many scholars identified the traits and practices that unified citizens into a 
common, shared culture, often described as shared “spiritual culture.” Using a combination of 
statistics and more general observations, scholars pointed to common cultural forms, including 
shared holidays, rising education levels, cultural institutions, and other traits. On the basis of 
ethnographic research, scholars described the multiplicity of these forms, which differed across 
ethnic communities, geographic communities, and even generational divides, as well as the ways 
that ethnic and regional cultures contributed to an all-encompassing, multiethnic Soviet 
culture.127 As we will see in Chapter 4, new rituals for marking citizens’ life milestones from 
birth to death exemplified the complementary nature of ethnic and civic identities. Under 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev, new rituals, developed primarily at the republic level, drew heavily 
from ethnic and regional traditions while confirming citizens’ civic belonging.128 
 Scholars like Maksim Kim, Mykhailo Kulichenko, Iulian Bromlei, and others generally 
wrote for a scholarly audience within the Soviet Union, but their work was also influenced by 
and contributed to Cold War conversations. Many scholarly works paid more than passing 
reference to the supposedly dangerous ideas circulating abroad, often with specific reference to 
scholars like Richard Pipes, Theresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Leonard Shapiro, and others. They 
saw their own work as an opportunity to correct the record.129 
 To expand the reach of this effort, the state put considerable resources and energy into 
translating, publishing, and distributing a selection of scholarly work abroad. These works 
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exposed false representations of Soviet nationalities policy and described the “real” nature of 
interethnic relations and Soviet identity. As the official description of Eduard Bagramov’s The 
CPSU’s Nationalities Policy: Truth and Lies (1988) noted, “Mountains of lies have been created 
in the West on the state of the nationalities question in the USSR.” Noting Western scholars’ 
(deceptive) emphasis on forced Russification and the suppression of ethnic minorities’ civil 
rights, the book bemoaned the woeful state of academic knowledge on the Soviet Union: “it is 
almost unlikely that one could find any serious works in the West which are devoted to a 
scientific analysis of the formation of a new historical community of people known as the Soviet 
people.”130 He and others sought to show, in the words of a translated Kulichenko book, “how 
the USSR solved the nationalities question,” offering rose-colored views of Soviet policies 
toward ethnic minorities for a foreign audience.131 
 In addition to publishing translated versions abroad, scholars also regularly published 
their findings in the central press. These adapted and accessible articles ensured that the public 
could access the latest historical, ideological, and sociological research on the nature of Soviet 
identity and understandings of the Soviet people.132 By positioning themselves as quasi-public 
intellectuals, the scholarly elite could reach an audience that extended beyond the more limited 
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confines of their dry, academic work. Many citizens were self-evidently aware of leading 
thought and changing statistics in matters of identity and society, suggesting broad participation 
in the ongoing conversation about the nature of Soviet identity. 
 
The ‘People’ Speaks: Letter Writing and Self-Identification in Late Socialism 
 As elites in the party, state, and academia considered the emergence of the Soviet people 
as a real, existing community, citizens drew similar conclusions based on their own observations 
and experiences of the world around them. As we have already seen, the state encouraged letter 
writing as a means of expressing both discontent and loyalty from the Soviet Union’s very 
inception.133 Letter writing, a key component of the discussions of the 1936 Constitution, also 
served as a key form of civic engagement under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. As before, letters 
offered an opportunity for citizens to reflect on their own identities and the future of the state. 
Although there has been a tendency among scholars of Soviet history to deemphasize or dismiss 
these letters, many Soviet citizens clearly saw the ritual of letter writing as an integral part of 
loyal, engaged citizenship. Here, I focus specifically on letters written in connection with the 
1977 Constitution, a process that began in 1962 when Khrushchev first announced plans to 
replace the 1936 Constitution. 
In contrast to the 1936 discussions, letter writers who addressed plans for a new 
constitution in the 1960s and ‘70s did not respond specifically to a proposed draft (though some 
commented on the existing version), and many took considerable liberty in exploring new 
possibilities and ideas. Several even prepared alternative constitutions, some more than a 
hundred pages long, suggesting a deep engagement with and commitment to the state and its 
                                                            






ideology.134 Letters themselves expressed a range of opinions that touched upon all aspects of the 
existing constitution and their hopes for the future one and reflected on nearly every facet of life. 
Although a full discussion of the range of opinions is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
citizens responded with particular fervor on matters relating to the symbolism and structure of 
the state. Multiple letters, for example, proposed new flags, seals, and other state symbols, 
complaining that the hammer and sickle was a poor representation of the modern state in which 
they lived. Some even included hand-sewn or drawn examples of improvements, including one 
that proposed adding a satellite to the state seal.135 Several offered updated versions of the 
national anthem, noting specifically the current text’s problematic connection to Stalin.136 Many 
explicitly referenced problems associated with the cult of personality and pondered new ways for 
society to move forward. Others even suggested that the country was now ready for competitive 
elections, justified, as one letter noted, by the fact that nearly everyone supported the communist 
party platform. Others believed competitive elections might encourage closer connection with 
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voters.137 The breadth of letter content confirms recent scholarly discussions that emphasize the 
range of opinion and engagement with ideology in the late Soviet period, particularly in the wake 
of de-Stalinization.138 
Letters concerning nationalities policy—including territorial delineation, language use, 
and how and when to use ethnicity—featured especially prominently among the hundreds of 
letters received between 1962 and 1977.139 At least three dozen of these letters, my focus here, 
rejected ethnic categorization and proposed the elimination of passport ethnicity with an 
outspokenness that suggested a deep sense of civic identity.140 Citizens actively engaged with 
ideology and existing conditions to express ambivalence about ascribed ethnicities, both their 
own and in general, and to articulate commitment to the state. Their words belie the assertion 
that Soviet identity was simply a “figure of speech” or an empty, meaningless category. In 
proclaiming the primacy of their Soviet identities, citizens suggested the affective pull of Soviet 
citizenship and the state’s success in cultivating civic identity. 
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Letter Writing after Stalin 
 Two major all-union discussions took place under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the first in 
connection with the Party Program in 1961, and the second in connection with the 1977 
constitution. Reflecting the more collaborative relationship between the state and its citizens and 
in contrast to 1936, drafts of both the 1961 Party Program and the 1977 Constitution differed 
noticeably from adopted versions, suggesting that leaders took formalized discussion of these 
documents more seriously (or at least needed to demonstrate that they did).141 Because only 
summaries of the letters for the 1961 program seem to have been preserved, here I focus on the 
discussion of what would eventually become the 1977 Constitution. 
 Discussions of the 1977 Constitution began in 1962, when Khrushchev announced plans 
to draft a new constitution. A constitutional commission was formed with working groups to 
discuss thematic aspects of the planned constitution. This commission also collected letters from 
citizens and prepared regular summaries of their contents and general trends for Khrushchev. 
Although active work on the constitution was largely halted following Khrushchev’s 1964 
removal, citizens continued to write letters, which were detailed in routine reports to Brezhnev. 
The thousands of preserved letters collected between 1962 and 1977 offer critical insight into 
how people made sense of the messages they received. Those who wrote prior to the formal 
discussion of the draft Constitution were, of course, a self-selecting, motivated group of citizens. 
Among their themes of choice, petitions to remove passport ethnicity were a persistent and 
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drafts of what would eventually be the 1977 Constitution, see RGANI, f. 5, o. 30, d. 385, ll. 22–100; RGANI, f. 5, o. 






repeated trend across the 1960s and ‘70s.142 Many letter writers noted their belief that many 
shared their opinion and theorized the elimination of passport ethnicity would be popular. 
Although it would be impossible to judge to what extent this was true, letters nevertheless offer 
valuable insight into how individuals grappled with questions of ethnicity, identity, and ideology. 
 Letter writers who wrote about the elimination of passport ethnicity represented a variety 
of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and geographic backgrounds, but some generalizations can be 
made. All the letter writers discussed here wrote in Russian, and most wrote from large urban 
centers of the RSFSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan, the most ethnically 
heterogeneous republics. Most had names that suggested Slavic, Jewish, or otherwise European 
(i.e. Baltic, German) ancestry, and a disproportionate number self-identified as or were likely 
Jewish.143 Several cited or implied experience with or observation of discrimination or 
repression, suggesting a desire to overcome unpleasantries resulting from association with 
certain ethnicities. Most drew from their own deep familiarity with interethnic relations, whether 
as participants in, products of, or witnesses to interethnic marriage; as ethnic minorities living 
outside their ‘own’ republics; or simply as people with diverse friends, colleagues, and 
neighbors. Most exuberantly declared ‘Soviet citizen’ as their primary identification. 
 Petitions for the removal of passport ethnicity made sense only in the context of 
nationalities policy and ideological discussions, which, as we have seen, simultaneously 
promoted both ethnic and civic notions of identity. Official policy saw ethnicity as a functional 
rather than descriptive category: although citizens could choose ethnicity according to that of 
either parent, the choices they made affected political representation, language of school 
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instruction, educational and employment quotas, and other aspects of everyday life.144 At the 
same time, the state promoted notions of Soviet identity, most notably through the idea of the 
Soviet people. Because of the state’s insistence on ethnic categorization and rejection of hybrid, 
multiple, or civic identities within the passport regime, citizens could simultaneously express 
deep engagement with state ideology and opposition to its policies concerning ethnicity. 
 
Claiming Soviet Identity: Ideology in Citizens’ Letters 
In many cases, citizens justified the elimination of passport ethnicity along ideological 
lines, either directly referencing Marxist-Leninist theory, or more commonly, alluding to official 
ideological discourse. Anatolii L., whose letter was quoted in the introduction to the dissertation, 
noted that his connection to his assigned ethnicities had nothing in common with “the Marxist-
Leninist understanding of belonging to a nation (natsiia),” implicitly suggesting that the party’s 
own ideology justified the elimination of passport ethnicity. Another letter writer, Artur P., 
writing from Kopeisk (Cheliabinsk oblast, RSFSR), also invoked ideology: “Leninist norms on 
the national question were crudely violated in the period of Stalin’s cult of personality. Instead of 
cooperation between nations (natsii), incorrect nationalities policy sometimes led to ethnic 
animosity between some peoples of the Soviet Union.” Though these problems were being 
addressed, he continued, the time had come to fix the “outdated laws on the national question” 
and eliminate passport ethnicity, a change he believed would be popular.145 
Others emphasized the importance of equality and highlighted commonalities between 
citizens. In a 1962 letter from Minsk (Belarus), Boris Ch. noted: “With the loss of ethnic 
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(natsional’nyi) characteristics by a large contingent of people of every nation (natsiia), a new 
community of people is being formed, a supra-national (nadnatsional’nyi) community, based on 
a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up, which has emerged in 
a community of culture.”146 Invoking but not explicitly citing Stalin’s definition of a nation, 
Boris Ch. argued that society increasingly resembled a national community. He posited that 
citizens were moving towards a moral and political unity that rendered ethnic boundaries 
obsolete, creating conditions for the merging (sliianie) of nations through interethnic marriage 
and the Russian language. These circumstances clashed with what he saw as the “cruel rules of 
our passport system” that assigned ethnicity irrespective of desires and lived realities.147 
 Writing in 1977, I. Yakovenko, also of Minsk and cited in the chapter introduction, saw 
the formation of Soviet identity as the clear result of previous policy. He believed the elimination 
of passport ethnicity had “deep political significance, since the ethnicity ‘Soviet’ would show our 
real accomplishment in the national question in the years of Soviet power (the new community 
of people (liudi)—the Soviet people), and it would be with the goal of showing our perspective 
on the national question on the road to a communist society.”148 He stressed the emergence of a 
unified community as the result of ideology and practices that had united people both 
theoretically and practically. Defining ethnicity in civic rather than ethnic terms, he believed, 
would give the state a chance to demonstrate its achievements.149 
 Others were less explicit in their invoking of ideology but similarly pointed to this sense 
of community. For many, guaranteed equality irrespective of ethnic background constituted the 
critical foundation for unity. V. Teplitskii, a pensioner in Samarkand (Uzbekistan) spoke of pre-
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revolutionary discrimination and contrasted that with the equality guaranteed by the party and 
state. A critical part of this equality, he stressed, was the fact that all nations (natsii) had the right 
to study and speak in the language of their own choosing.150 Boris T., a lawyer from Kyiv, also 
proposed the elimination of ethnicity, since “our society is marching victoriously towards 
communism. ‘Freedom! Equality! Brotherhood!’ are written on our flag. And now there is no 
idea of dividing our people into Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and others. There should only 
be Soviet people (liudi).”151 He believed Soviet policy was out of step with other countries, even 
bourgeois ones, and that it felt positively unnatural: “It’s verging on the absurd… My son—an 
eighth-grader—comes home and asks me with surprise: ‘Daddy, why do they ask me for my 
ethnicity, what does it mean?’ And actually. If we have written on our banner the holy words 
‘equality and brotherhood,’ what are these divisions even for?”152 
Through juxtaposing his son’s confusion over the very concept of ethnicity with its 
omnipresence in everyday life, Boris T. called out what he clearly saw as an illogical system out 
of keeping with its own ideology. This, he further indicated, simply did not make sense at 
present: “There was a time when this was necessary, but now it is superfluous and is even 
harmful. Friendship of the peoples has won and now all nations are unifying into a single, 
monolithic Soviet family. The entry for ethnicity should disappear.”153 Many expressed similar 
sentiments. Semen N., a pensioner and invalid of World War II writing from a small city in the 
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Gorky oblast (RSFSR) in 1972, suggested that Soviet unity made ethnicity obsolete.154 Vladimir 
E. of Turkistan (Kazakhstan) similarly concluded in 1967: “Soviet power has given everyone 
identical rights. Why then are we dividing people by national characteristics?” After 50 years of 
the Soviet Union, he argued, ethnic divisions had disappeared, since people lived and worked 
together in a single, unified motherland that they had collectively defended in World War II.155  
 Many cautioned that the current regime of passport ethnicity was counterproductive, even 
dangerous, hinting at persistent nationalism and anti-Semitism. Vladimir E. warned: “In calling 
one or another citizen of USSR a Tatar, a Chuvash, etc., we are with this very thing in some 
measure reminding him that he is actually a Tatar, that is, we are creating some sort of unwanted 
ethnic divisions. And for what?”156 M. Berman, writing from Moscow in 1964, similarly saw the 
existing passport regime as an anachronism that underscored and promoted ethnic divisions. The 
same year, I. Grishin of Lviv (Ukraine) argued, “a single national consciousness with the 
Russian people cannot be strengthened if a person is endlessly reminded of the nationality of his 
ancestors.” The fixation on assigning ethnicity, he controversially continued, hinted at concerns 
about racial purity and smacked uncomfortably of Nazism.157 These letter writers argued that the 
passport regime hindered the natural assimilation already well underway. Others warned that 
passport ethnicity and ethnic boundaries unintentionally enabled and promoted nationalism and 
anti-Semitism, which many saw as an acute threat to unity.158 The elimination of passport 
ethnicity, they believed, would forge a deeper sense of unity and equality. In doing so, letter 
writers demonstrated a deep commitment to the state’s ideological projects and the long-term 
realization of its goals. 
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The Soviet People in Practice 
 Letter writers frequently emphasized that the Soviet people, a unified community of 
citizens, was not simply an ideological construct, but rather, one that they observed in the world 
around them. As proof of the Soviet people’s existence, many pointed to the same evidence 
identified by scholars, including the frequency of interethnic marriage, the partial loss of 
ethnically specific traits, and improved knowledge and use of Russian. Many emphasized that 
continued use of passport ethnicity poorly reflected everyday realities: differences between 
people had been slowly disappearing, and this trend would become more prominent in future 
generations. Letter writers cited autobiographical details and those of their children, friends, and 
neighbors, as well as hypothetical scenarios as evidence of the impracticality of ethnicity. These 
scenarios correlated with demographic and linguistic changes that scholars observed. 
 Like scholars, letter writers frequently declared that ethnic differences were being erased, 
evidenced by widespread interethnic marriage. Many cited the prevalence of interethnic marriage 
as proof that citizens were not especially motivated by ethnicity in their everyday lives. One 
letter writer, Kazarian, who identified herself only as an expectant mother, wrote in 1964: 
In our country there are many families where the mother and father are of different 
ethnicities, which never happened in pre-revolutionary Russia. I have often had to 
observe how many troubles start in the family with the coming-of-age of the child. If 
ethnicity did not play any kind of role when the parents entered marriage, then the 
troubles start when both love the people of their ethnicity, and the child has to choose for 
himself the nationality of either the mother or the father. There are even families in which 
the blood of different peoples and ethnicities flows, where it is possible to draw lots in 
choosing an ethnicity. And is there even a purpose? We all have a single Motherland, so 
why don’t we bear its ethnicity?! Citizen of the Soviet Union—it sounds dignified.159 
 
By comparing the choice of ethnicity to casting lots, she suggested the unsuitability of ethnicity 
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for children of interethnic marriages. The continuation of passport ethnicity, she argued, caused 
unnecessary, artificial strife and encouraged ethnic chauvinism and anti-Semitism, dangerous 
remnants of the pre-revolutionary past. Although society was not yet blind to ethnicity, she 
believed that eliminating passport ethnicity would be a source of unity. Concluding her remarks, 
she noted that Mayakovsky’s poem on the Soviet passport (quoted in the epigraph) was a 
marvelous tribute to the honor being a Soviet citizen. Repeating her own words, she closed, 
“Citizen of the Soviet Union—it sounds dignified for everyone, for people in the entire world.”160 
 Writers with first-hand experience of interethnic marriage often emphasized the need to 
eliminate passport nationalities with specific reference to their children. Andris A., writing from 
Ogre, Latvia, with occasional Russian mistakes, suggested his marriage to a Finnish woman he 
had met in Leningrad and the birth of his son had impacted his view of ethnicity: “At home we 
speak Russian. Who will our son be? A Finn? A Latvian? Who? By his mother a Finn, by me a 
Latvian! And this is the question that interests me. After all, there are many families that are 
multiethnic. And with every year there are more and more…For us, ethnicity is completely 
immaterial. It has become only a name. And with time, it will disappear completely.”161 Noting 
his son would likely not know the language of his passport ethnicity, he argued that Soviet could 
be the only accurate, truthful, and proper descriptor for the ethnicity of citizens: “After all, we 
are all Soviet people (liudi) and that is and should be our ethnicity. And I think that is how it 
should be under communism. We are Soviet—now and always.”162 
 Andris A. and others highlighted the difficulty of classifying citizens by ethnicities with 
which they had little personal experience. Anatolii L., the young party member cited in the 
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introduction to the dissertation, took his personal background as evidence of the declining 
importance of ethnicity. Half-Ukrainian and half-Polish by birth, raised in Kazakhstan (likely the 
result of forced resettlement), and currently working as a researcher in Kaliningrad (RSFSR), he 
identified only with the Soviet Union and Russophone culture. His lack of familiarity with, 
connection to, and preference for ethnicity, further suggested by his oscillation between Polish 
and Ukrainian passport ethnicities, highlighted the incommensurability of his ethnic identity with 
his lived reality. He was sure that others found themselves in a similar position and expressed 
confidence that this trend would only become more pronounced with time. In demanding the 
right to exclude ethnicity from passports, he hypothesized: “There is no doubt that sooner or 
later, it will be necessary to do so no matter what.”163 
 Like Anatolii L., many writers felt or observed little connection with their assigned 
ethnicities. Vladimir E., writing from Kazakhstan in 1967, highlighted the unsuitability of 
assigned ethnicities for children of mixed marriages through citing his childhood friend, Amiran. 
This friend had been born in Altai krai (South-Central Siberia, RSFSR) to a Georgian father and 
Russian mother. At birth, he had been recorded as a Georgian according to the ethnicity of his 
father, whom Amiran had never met. The connection between ethnicity and identity became 
more tenuous in the subsequent generation, when Amiran’s son, born in Novosibirsk (South-
Central Siberia), was also classified as Georgian, despite the fact that neither parent had so much 
as been to Georgia or could understand a word of the language. Vladimir E. quipped, “What sort 
of Georgian is he?”164 
 Vladimir E. and others stressed that such cases were in no way exceptional. Boris Ch., 
writing from Minsk in 1962, emphasized the significance of interethnic marriages: 
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In a society approaching the construction of communism and a communist relationship 
between people, ethnic differences have long since ceased to determine anything in 
mutual relations between people. Marriages between people of different ethnicities have 
long since become an ordinary occurrence. In the conditions of equality, brotherhood, 
and friendship of the peoples, the percentage of marriage between peoples of different 
ethnicities do not signify anything but a mathematical probability, based on the numerical 
ratios of people of different ethnicities among the entire population of the country.165 
 
Using a formula he devised, he calculated the likelihood of mixed marriage at approaching 50 
percent in most republics, and a trend he believed would continue. In actuality, Boris Ch.’s 
numbers greatly exaggerated the percentage of interethnic marriage, which represented just 10.2 
and 14.9 percent of marriages in the 1959 and 1979 censuses; nevertheless, he interpreted 
interethnic marriage as evidence of the primacy of civic over ethnic identity.166 The rise in mixed 
marriages, Boris Ch. claimed, was the result of two concurrent circumstances: first, ideology had 
largely erased the differences between ethnicities, and second, people were living in contact with 
people of different ethnic backgrounds.  
Boris Ch. relied heavily on changing demographics to make his case: “In every union 
republic, representatives of the most different peoples and ethnicities live and work side-by-side 
with people of the titular nationality.” In many union republics, he continued, nearly a third of 
the population did not belong to the titular nationality, a fact confirmed by postwar census 
data.167 Greater contact between ethnicities, he and others believed, emphasized a common 
Soviet identity, exemplified by the reliance on Russian as a “language of interethnic 
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communication.”168 As such, Russian was indexed and associated with the state as a whole rather 
than just the Russian people. One pensioner in Latvia went so far as to claim that Russian had 
changed enough to justify calling it the “Soviet language.” 169 Whether interpreting bilingualism 
as a sign of ethnic equality or pointing to Russian monolingualism as evidence of merging 
identities, many saw the use of Russian as proof that the Soviet people existed in practice. 
For many letter writers, learning and using Russian in daily life was an important aspect 
of integration and a sign that ethnic identities had become less pronounced. I. Grishin of Lviv 
(Ukraine) noted in 1964, “At present, the consolidation of different ethnicities into a single 
communist nation is taking place in our country. This is a natural process. All people of our 
country are already bilingual. Russian has become the language of interethnic communication 
and is gradually turning into the language of communist society in our country.”170 G. Gardner, a 
school official in the Almaty oblast (Kazakhstan), noted: 
And who wants to speak which language, and which language will be each person’s 
native language—let individuals decide for themselves which language they consider to 
be the best, closest, native. And let our descendants hundreds of years from now say, 
‘Yes, in the Soviet Union lived and live a great Soviet nation (natsiia), which spoke, 
wrote, read, composed, and created in over ninety languages.’171 
 
As will be seen in Chapter 5, such sentiments borrowed from official rhetoric that described 
Russian as a “second native language” (not a foreign language) for all citizens. 
Others actively promoted Russian over non-Russian languages, arguing that a focus on 
native languages was counterproductive to the Soviet Union’s continuing development. 
Grinberg, of Tashkent, claimed that the continued emphasis on ethnicity was “preventing the 
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spread of the Russian language as the language of interethnic relations, preventing the mutual 
enrichment of all ethnicities inhabiting the [Soviet] Union with achievements in the areas of 
science, technology, and culture.”172 A handful of other citizens, not necessarily speaking about 
the elimination of passport ethnicity, suggested the state codify and mandate Russian as the 
official state language in recognition of its importance.173 Some commenters went further to note 
that many non-Russians spoke Russian as their native language, the combined result of 
educational policies, increased interethnic marriages, and more extensive interethnic 
interaction.174 Anatolii L. emphasized that Russian was his native language, and that he did not 
know the “native” language of either his Ukrainian mother or Polish father.175 A. Galadauskas of 
Leningrad similarly noted that despite his Estonian passport ethnicity, he spoke Russian 
exclusively and preferred to be considered a Soviet citizen.176 
A Tatar engineer, R. Khalitov, writing from Tatarstan in 1964, spoke more generally, 
noting that many Tatars, Chuvash, and other minorities did not speak their “native” tongue. 
Russian had become dominant: “We manufacture in Russian, create in Russian, do science in 
Russian, global masterpieces are created in Russian, and finally, a soldier serves in Russian; but 
we teach our children in their ‘native’ language, as we are accustomed to calling it.”177 Continued 
emphasis on native language education, he feared, would hinder young people’s professional and 
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personal development, especially when many had no use for or interest in their native language. 
At a time when “cooperative labor has brought together ethnicities of our Motherland to such a 
degree that it is impossible to think of any sort of ethnic antipathy,” and when “all differences 
between representatives of different ethnicities” would soon disappear, Khalitov believed that the 
state should more formally prioritize Russian-language education.178 
The tendency towards Russian as the primary language of non-Russians hinted at another 
development observed by letter writers: more citizens not only did not speak “native” languages, 
but they were also estranged from their “native” culture. This raised further questions about the 
sustainability of ethnic classification. Many interpreted this as an indication that people had 
become indifferent to their ethnic heritage and more fully integrated into society, seen as 
unambiguously positive developments. Letter writers made these views clear. Boris Ch., perhaps 
influenced by the prominence of Russian in Minsk, noted that through Russian “a large 
contingent of people of different ethnicities have lost their ethnic characteristics and have turned 
into an ethnographic group of a new human community, which retains a bit of local color in 
lifestyle and culture.”179 
Eduard S., writing from the Tula oblast (RSFSR) in 1964, provided perhaps the most 
developed expression of this sentiment and suggested that the determination of ethnic belonging 
was becoming more difficult as the “consolidation of peoples (narody) of the USSR into a single 
nation (natsiia)” progressed. With Russian-language proficiency, the classic markers of ethnic 
belonging had become quite blurred: 
And the question emerges of how to determine the ethnic belonging of a Kazakh, for 
example, who has almost forgotten the language of his ancestors, and speaks, writes, and 
thinks in Russian. His ethnic character is determined by Soviet reality, which determines 
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the character of other people in our country as well. No one in our country, where there is 
no room for racial prejudices, places any significance on external appearance, which is to 
say only his origins separate him from a Russian—his parents were Kazakh, therefore he 
is Kazakh. But if such a Kazakh turned up in a Kazakh aul where they speak only 
Kazakh, he will feel like he is in an awkward position.180 
 
Here, he used the shift to Russian as a native language for his hypothetical Kazakh to illustrate 
that ethnic categories had changed to such a degree so as to render people unrecognizable to their 
former selves and ancestors. Conversational language, not ethnic heritage, he argued, was the 
“most important signifier determining the ethnic belonging of the Soviet person.”181 Others went 
further, questioning the state’s existing ethno-federal structure.182 
 United in the suggestion that passport ethnicity be eliminated or altered, these letter 
writers saw the elimination of ethnicity and/or its replacement with “citizen of the Soviet Union” 
as both descriptive of society in whole or in part and as a tool for the continued reduction of 
ethnic particularism. In both instances, citizens expressed a passionate sense of civic belonging 
that coincided with their own ideal visions for society. Letter writers routinely argued that 
ethnicity had ceased to play a role in everyday life and served, if anything, as a hindrance to the 
complete unity they saw as the outcome of the political agenda of the past decades.  
 
Conclusion: Identity as Conversation 
 The evolution of Soviet identity under Khrushchev and Brezhnev was a story of both 
continuity and change. Discussions of identity, including the concept of the Soviet people, 
borrowed heavily from Stalin-era discourses, most noticeably in the realm of patriotic speech. 
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Indeed, in many cases—on holidays, in economic development, in international relations—the 
mobilizing, patriotic rhetoric remained largely unchanged, save for Stalin’s absence. Despite 
dramatic improvements in the country’s domestic and international situation, the vocabulary of 
war, danger, and crisis infused even the most ordinary processes of economic development with 
a sense of urgency and necessity. On the other hand, the stronger focus on providing for citizens 
in the realm of housing and household goods reflected a larger conversation that saw the state’s 
primary task as providing for its citizens. The Soviet people’s extension into high ideology and 
academic research about the nature of identity further expanded discussions and understandings 
of Soviet identity. No longer simply an instrumental, mobilizing phrase to encourage sacrifice 
and contribution among ordinary citizens, the Soviet people was analyzed from a new starting 
point, one that assumed that it not only existed but was a powerful force that both reflected and 
drove change in society at large. 
 Citizens also participated in the ongoing negotiations of Soviet identity. Schools 
emphasized a combination of practical skills and theoretical knowledge that would transform 
children into economically productive and politically conscious citizens. Through participatory 
rituals—voting in elections, participating in all-union discussions, celebrating holidays, even 
contributing to the Soviet economy—people across the country engaged in the practices of 
citizenship, offering visible proof of their common belonging to the state. In letters, many 
emphasized the overarching importance of their identification as citizens, using their personal 
lives, observations, and knowledge of both theoretical and statistical literature to offer evidence 
of the relevance of Soviet identity. 
 As before, discourses of identity, whether among political elites, scholars, or citizens 






continued to be seen not only as compatible but to be mutually constitutive, as internal passports 
offered tangible evidence of citizens’ civic and ethnic identities. Scholars argued that Soviet 
power had not only promoted ethnic minorities but that state support had led to an intensification 
of ethnic identities, as their national cultures, literature, and arts were elevated into the ranks of 
all-Soviet culture. Mandated study of local history, too, demonstrated how republics and non-
Russian peoples contributed to and participated in the larger processes of history unfolding 
across the country, reminding citizens of the diverse history that made their country. 
 Other statements and practices, however, simultaneously contradicted the apparent 
compatibility of ethnic and civic identities. Although scholars insisted sblizhenie (growing 
closer) would not entail the decline of national cultures but their elevation and that an eventual 
sliianie (fusing) would be generations in the making, both implied a certain decentering of sub-
state identities. The de facto prioritization of the Russian language in both the educational system 
and evolving understandings of the future shape of society, too, betrayed a certain degree of 
inequality that separated citizens from one another and suggested the degree to which Russian 
and Soviet identities continued to be closely intertwined. This signaled the continuing privileges 
afforded to ethnic Russians across the country, belying the assertion of the complete equality of 
citizens. Even individuals expressed ideas about the inherent incompatibility of ethnic and Soviet 
identities. As many clamored to be recognized exclusively as Soviet citizens, they suggested the 
long-term supremacy of civic over ethnic identities. Whether as a declarative statement of 
allegiance to the state, a rejection of the relevance of ethnic identities, or as a tool for avoiding 
ethnic discrimination, their identification as Soviet citizens demonstrated deep commitment to 
the state while simultaneously challenging the state’s official ideology. 






the Soviet people.183 Yet it is clear from this analysis that Soviet society was nothing of the sort. 
While perhaps united around the party and the state, Soviet citizens continued to be a diverse, 
multiethnic body, full of contradictory and irreconcilable ideas and opinions that engaged 
directly with the ideology and discourses promoted by the state. In this sense, Soviet identity 
continued to be a dynamic, evolving set of discourses that enabled a diverse array of actors to 
participate in wide-ranging conversations about the meaning of citizenship. As political elites 
indicated a deepening sense of responsibility towards citizens in their words and policies, they 
envisioned a more cooperative relationship between the state and its citizens. In countless 
conversations, citizens, scholars, and leaders together continued the ongoing negotiation of the 
boundaries, institutions, and practices that forged Soviet citizens.
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“For the Soviet Person, New Rituals”: 
Soviet Identity through Celebrations and Civic Rites1 
 
 
At 11 a.m. on February 22, 1958, a team of horses approached the Palace of Culture of 
Factory 513 in the city of Kalinin (today Tver’), 180 kilometers northwest of Moscow. At the 
factory, artist-in-residence N.A. Adul’skii spent three hours overseeing preparations. Artists 
decorated the sleighs in a “Russian” style, complete with bells and arches painted in the style of 
Palekh miniatures, the small boxes typical of the region. The drivers, dressed in an “ancient 
Russian style—a coachman’s robe, special hats, colorful mufflers, and a red belt”—led horses 
decorated with small bells and multicolored ribbons. A sign affixed to the first sleigh announced 
a “Komsomol Wedding” to onlookers.2 
The preparations complete, an official read a short address in the style of a Russian folk 
tale and dispatched the sleighs to pick up the groom and the wedding party, which included girls 
in traditional costumes, accordionists, a photographer, and male and female “matchmakers” 
dressed in sheepskin coats. The female matchmaker wore a traditional Russian skirt with a 
decorative hem and a floral shawl. The sleighs departed to the tune of Russian and Soviet songs, 
and after picking up the groom, they continued on to the bride’s home.3 There, a friend answered 
the door and requested payment for opening the gate, given in the form of a basket of candy to 
share with her friends. The groom presented himself for inspection, and upon his positive 
                                                            
1 Title from N. Andrianov and A. Belov, “Sovetskomu cheloveku—novye obriady,” Pravda, 28 May 1976, 3. 
2 The wedding is described in RGASPI, f. M-1, o. 32, d. 940, 147–169; here, 150. The Komsomol wedding was put 
together and carried out by N.A. Adul’skii, V.M. Kuz’mina, and P.I. Lariushin. 






evaluation, the bride joined him, and they continued together in the sleigh (Figure 6) towards the 
Palace of Culture, accompanied by relatives and friends, who sang songs about the couple.  
Upon arrival at the Palace of Culture, the couple walked a carpeted path and headed 
inside for the celebratory registration of their marriage, surrounded by fellow Komsomol 
members and their families. As balalaikas played and friends and family looked on, the couple 
approached the table and signed the documents that certified their union. The marriage now 
official, the party continued with champagne and various festivities, complete with Russian 
music, toasts from their classmates and work collectives, and the presentation of bread and salt 
by their parents, another old Russian tradition (Figure 7). A short concert of traditional Russian 
music and Soviet songs followed, with more music, dancing, and singing. 
Figure 6: The bride and groom approach the Palace of Culture, where they will sign their marriage documents. 






This 1958 Komsomol wedding was one of the first in a new set of rituals that elevated the 
signing of marriage documents from a perfunctory exercise into a public celebration. Combining 
older Russian traditions with newer Soviet ones, the ceremony offered a symbolic celebration of 
the formation of a new Soviet family. In the years that followed, the state devoted considerable 
energy and resources to developing, implementing, and popularizing new rituals to mark 
citizens’ life milestones from the cradle to the grave. From birth registrations to funerals, from 
the first day of school to the presentation of the first passport, new ceremonies sought to impart a 
distinctly Soviet identity that drew from ethnic and civic traditions. 
These new rituals were part of a longer history of public celebration that commenced 
immediately after the revolution, one that both reflected and shaped the formation of Soviet 
Figure 7: Parents present the couple with salt and bread, wrapped in traditionally embroidered cloths. RGASPI, f. M-1, 






identity. Decisions about which holidays and life milestones to mark and how to celebrate offer 
insight into how understandings of Soviet identity evolved among leaders and citizens over 
decades, mirroring trends discussed in the first three chapters. Shortly after the revolution and 
throughout the 1920s, experimentation with both holidays and private rituals reflected 
uncertainty about the meaning of the revolution in citizens’ lives. By the 1930s, the party and 
state abandoned more tentative forms in favor of carefully choreographed celebrations with 
widespread popular participation, reflecting the emphasis on active patriotism and a collective 
Soviet identity. These forms of festivity continued under Stalin’s successors, complemented by a 
growing cast of civil ceremonies to mark life milestones, offering ordinary, everyday ways to 
demonstrate and experience civic belonging. According to Soviet specialists, the use of civil 
rituals to mark transitional moments in citizens’ personal lives could deepen emotional 
attachments to the state and enhance popular understandings of what it meant to be a citizen. 
Public holidays and lifecycle rituals also illustrated the changing power dynamics between the 
center and periphery and new understandings about what it meant to be Soviet. 
In the first section, below, I trace the evolution of public holidays from post-
revolutionary experiments to the hegemonic and rigid forms of the 1930s, drawing from both 
press sources and secondary literature on holiday celebrations. I demonstrate that holiday 
festivities contributed to a sense of common experience, as citizens gathered together to celebrate 
important dates and milestones in the history of the state and revolutionary movement. Through 
mass participation, holidays drew private citizens out into public space, a visual and experiential 
reminder of their collective belonging. Civil rituals, the focus of the second half of the chapter, 
had a similar function but a complementary form, bringing the state into the family home and 






proliferating Soviet scholarship on these rituals. Like holiday celebrations, civil rituals originated 
in the post-revolutionary period, when activists experimented with new rituals for birth, 
marriage, and death to limited success. Personal milestones returned to the center of attention 
only in the late 1950s and 1960s, when the state devoted renewed energy to these celebrations to 
reduce religious activity and promote a deeper sense of civic belonging. Through analysis of 
republic, regional, and Komsomol archival sources and of the work of specialists who researched 
and worked both in Moscow and across various Soviet peripheries, I demonstrate that these 
rituals borrowed liberally from local and ethnic traditions, symbolically demonstrating the 
compatibility ethnic and civic identities.  
Soviet literature on holidays and rituals, which proliferated in the 1970s and ‘80s, saw 
celebration as an essential part of Soviet life. The limited historical scholarship on these 
celebratory practices has generally taken narrower approaches to understanding holidays and 
civil rituals, often focusing on only one or the other, and usually within tight temporal bounds. 
Perhaps best studied is the establishment of a revolutionary culture through the heavily ritualized 
process of commemorating the revolution, exploring how the early state told and commemorated 
its origin story.4 Others, as discussed in Chapter 2, have shown how the cult of World War II 
played a similar role in the postwar years.5 More innovatively, Serhy Yekelchyk describes 
celebrations and elections as practices of participatory citizenship in postwar Ukraine.6 
Writing on Soviet rituals has typically been interpreted within the framework of Soviet 
                                                            
4 See Stites, Revolutionary Dreams, 79–100; James von Geldern, Bolshevik Festivals, 1917–1920 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993); Clark, Petersburg, especially 122–142; Frederick C. Corney, Telling October: 
Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Rolf, Soviet Mass 
Festivals, 1917–1991. 
5 Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead; Weiner, Making Sense of War; Merridale, Ivan’s War; Kirschenbaum, The 
Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941–1995; Davis, Myth Making in the Soviet Union and Modern Russia; 
Mijnssen, Cities of Heroes. 
6 Serhy Yekelchyk, “A Communal Model of Citizenship in Stalinist Politics: Agitators and Voters in Postwar 
Electoral Campaigns (Kyiv, 1946–53),” Ab Imperio, no. 2 (2010): 93–120; on elections as ritual, see also Petrone, 






atheism. As Victoria Smolkin observes, the cultivation of civil wedding services, birth 
registration, and funerals were part of a much broader program of atheist propaganda, targeted to 
reduce religious practice.7 Christel Lane’s Rites of Rulers (1981) offers a more comprehensive 
overview of Soviet celebrations. She places ritual practice, both of holidays and public festivals 
and civil rites, into the context of the theory and practice of ritual behavior. After summarizing 
the specific practices associated with various rituals and holiday celebrations, she analyzes them 
in terms of their implicit symbolism and imagery in the context of anthropological theory. She 
concludes that the Soviet Union had a largely unique, highly systematic, and robustly articulated 
approach to “modern rituals” that reflected the specific goals—promoting ideology and 
atheism—of communist elites.8 This chapter’s more integrated approach to the creation and 
observation of public holidays and individual and community life milestones expands this work, 
shifting the focus towards how these celebrations reflected discourses about Soviet identity. 
Holidays and rituals, I argue in this chapter, deepened the affective elements of Soviet identity 
and expanded the boundaries of participatory citizenship. 
 
Public Holidays in the Soviet Union 
 Before the October Revolution, festivals and religious holidays dominated everyday life 
in the Russian Empire. This included a vast number of both Orthodox feast days (as well as other 
religious holidays for the empire’s many minority faiths) and ritualized celebrations of the ruling 
elite.9 Following the October Revolution, early Soviet ideology promoted the idea that revolution 
                                                            
7 Smolkin, A Sacred Space Is Never Empty, 165–93. Richard Stites briefly discussed nascent civil rituals in his study 
of 1920s revolutionary experimentation, see Stites, Revolutionary Dreams, especially 109–114. 
8 Christel Lane, The Rites of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society—the Soviet Case (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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had prepared the way for the creation of new type of person and a new way of life, informed by 
communist ideology and state atheism. As part of this, the early state embraced a new 
revolutionary calendar, both literally—by abandoning the Julian calendar for the Gregorian 
calendar used across Western Europe—and figuratively—by developing new holidays and rituals 
that grounded everyday life in practices that would release society from religion’s grip. 
 The new “Red Calendar” served three primary purposes. First, the emphasis on secular 
rather than religious holidays proselytized the state’s atheist, anti-religious agenda, aiming to 
reduce religion’s influence on everyday life. This projected a message about the incompatibility 
of religious and civic identities. New holidays, secondly, buttressed the Bolsheviks’ claim to 
legitimate rule over the fledgling state. Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, holidays 
and rituals—particularly in the late 1920s and ‘30s—formed a cornerstone of a distinctly Soviet 
way of life. By the 1930s, public celebrations of holidays and careful management of older forms 
of festivity solidified an emergent sense of collective identity that dovetailed with articulations of 
the Soviet people, as citizens collectively marked important dates in the history of their country 
and the revolutionary movement. In subsequent decades, forms of holiday celebrations remained 
highly stable, though small changes reflected subtle renegotiations in the understanding and 
practice of Soviet identity after Stalin. 
 
A Break from Religion: Replacement and Experimentation in the 1920s 
 Early Soviet rule was marked by wild experimentation as political elites and citizens 
defined and negotiated the parameters of life under communist party rule. Atheism featured 
centrally in this agenda, reflecting Marxist suspicion of all religious practices. In the first decade, 
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the precise shape and form that public and social life should take was not yet settled. This 
provided ample space for leaders, cultural activists, and others committed to the Bolshevik 
agenda to introduce a wide range of initiatives to counteract religion’s hold on society. A 
common strategy in these first years was simply replacing religious celebrations and symbols 
with analogous non-religious alternatives. Although many of these experimental forms failed to 
take hold, they laid an early blueprint for a socialist society that set the tone for a specifically 
secular civic identity. 
 After the revolution, changing the calendar was one of the first orders of business. On 
January 25, 1918, just months after assuming power, the fledgling state renounced the Julian 
calendar in favor of the Gregorian one used in Western Europe. Because the old calendar had 
been tightly associated with Orthodoxy, the calendar offered evidence of a new, secular order 
and symbolically suggested a fresh start to the most basic building blocks of public life. Cultural 
activists also experimented with creative ways to limit religion’s influence. Alongside arrests of 
priests, anti-religious and atheist propaganda, and prohibiting religious activity, there were 
nascent attempts to offer secular variants of religious holidays, including alternative Komsomol 
Christmas and Easter celebrations in the early 1920s.10 Young activists organized various 
celebrations to coincide with Orthodox Christmas first in 1923. As described by Richard Stites, 
the event was a veritable “antireligious carnival,” complete with clowns mocking God, fake 
rabbis and priests, parodies of liturgical music, and a bonfire where gods were burned in effigy.11 
In the face of public outrage, celebrations at Easter time were comparatively muted, though they 
                                                            
10 On antireligious activity and atheism in general, see Peris, Storming the Heavens; Smolkin, A Sacred Space Is 
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still involved biting mockeries of religious practice and other festivities.12 
 When these nascent attempts to offer secular surrogates for religious holidays largely 
failed to take hold, the state turned to more heavy-handed measures. In 1928, the state banned 
the sale and use of Christmas trees and activists “revealed” Grandfather Frost (the Russian 
equivalent of Santa Claus) to be in cahoots with priests and kulaks, moves that were 
accompanied by a short-lived revival of anti-religious holidays.13 Although religious practice 
largely continued, most noticeably in villages, the state left little doubt about religion’s perceived 
incompatibility with Soviet life.14 Meanwhile, the state’s attempts to strictly control all forms of 
celebration also signaled its desire to harness public festivity as a tool for building its own 
legitimacy and for promoting an affective, civic identity on its own strictly articulated terms. 
  
Remembering October: Celebration, Revolutionary Calendar, and State Legitimacy 
 While restrictions on religious practice set limits for what could be considered acceptable 
behavior, the cultivation and “invention” of revolutionary holidays offered a more constructive 
vision of socialist life, a different approach to legitimizing Bolshevik rule.15 In the 1920s, 
experimentation with celebrating revolutionary holidays—May 1 (Labor Day) and November 7 
(Day of the Great October Socialist Revolution)—contributed to ongoing conversations about 
the nature of identity in the fledgling state. Over the first decade of Soviet rule, holiday 
celebrations became ever more elaborate, as the state progressively embraced the revolution as a 
point of origin for a new society. As celebrations expanded, citizens took part in festivities in 
growing numbers, laying a cornerstone of patriotic, participatory citizenship. 
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 Leaders were initially unsure of how best to celebrate and commemorate revolution, not 
least because the country plunged almost immediately into a disastrous civil war. The first major 
holiday, May 1 (officially “Day of International Solidarity of Workers”), took place as the Civil 
War was only just beginning. In 1918, the event lacked a central purpose and had little in 
common with its future incarnations, but the holiday combined solemnity and merrymaking, a 
formula that largely continued in subsequent years. A lively parade along revolutionary sites, 
speeches, music, fireworks, and dancing contributed to the atmosphere of festivity in Leningrad. 
The more solemn requiem for revolutionary martyrs inside the Winter Palace reminded observers 
of the sacrifices made in the name of revolution.16 Each of these aspects sought to increase the 
emotional impact of the holidays, deepening citizens’ affective ties to the fledgling state. During 
the first year of rule, new symbols, flags, statues, and language offered visual evidence of the 
Bolsheviks’ strengthening hold over state and society, and by the first anniversary of the 
revolution, the scope of celebration grew dramatically, now centered in Moscow. As the civil 
war waged on, the party carefully managed commemorations to mark its first year of rule.17 
 Revolutionary holidays, foremost the anniversary of the October Revolution, became 
increasingly theatricalized over the next decade, contributing to state legitimacy and forming a 
cornerstone of a revolutionary Soviet identity that was couched in public participation. Mass 
spectacles and large-scale open-air theatrical productions cemented official interpretations of 
revolutionary events and performed them for a relatively undereducated population.18 Millions of 
citizens took part in the massive festivities to celebrate a decade of Bolshevik rule in November 
                                                            
16 Stites, Revolutionary Dreams, 84–85; von Geldern, Bolshevik Festivals, 86–93. Von Geldern interprets May Day 
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of celebrations and how to transmit specific meanings to citizens. 
17 Stites, Revolutionary Dreams, 91–93; von Geldern, Bolshevik Festivals, 93–97; Rolf, Soviet Mass Festivals, 
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1927, a watershed moment for participatory citizenship. The anniversary marked the pinnacle of 
a decade-long experimentation to establish the significance of October, centering the revolution 
as the state’s founding moment. The holiday grounded and expanded public memory, 
transforming the storming of the Winter Palace from what was essentially a fait accompli into a 
dramatic, violent, and popular takeover of the transitional government.19 The party carefully 
managed all aspects of the festivities, even issuing detailed instructions to local party 
administrations to ensure celebrations and speeches across the country would meet Moscow’s 
exacting standards.20 The mass scale of celebrations also increased the participatory mechanisms 
embedded in holiday festivities, calling citizens to take part in civic life. 
 This first decade of holiday experimentation reflected two primary goals: establishing the 
legitimacy of the Bolshevik party and projecting its atheist and ideological messages to the 
populace. This was part of a larger conversation among leaders about how best to enact, monitor, 
and demonstrate power across a large geographic and cultural expanse, and to cultivate mass 
participation in state rituals. With the 1927 decennial celebrations, it was clear that the party and 
state were there to stay, and the question of legitimacy was largely resolved. From then onward, 
celebratory mechanisms, particularly on major holidays, became more routinized and managed, 
as the connection between celebration and Soviet identity became more recognized. 
 
Holidays and the Soviet People: The 1930s 
 If the 1920s had been a quest to legitimate Bolshevik rule, the 1930s saw a crystallization 
                                                            
19 Corney, Telling October, 175–200. In point of this fact, Sergei Eisenstein’s October (Ten Days that Shook the 
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visual record of the revolution, heightening the drama and scale of the original Bolshevik takeover. Images of the 
dramatized film were frequently mistaken for documentary footage. On Eisenstein’s film and its impact, see Corney, 
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of the form and practice of celebration that reflected a greater sense of confidence among 
political elites. This coincided with new articulations of Soviet identity and the concept of the 
Soviet people, described in Chapter 1. Holidays, parades, elections, and other celebrations 
provided leaders with occasions to hail the emergence and existence of a distinct, united Soviet 
people and to encourage (or demand) popular participation in the rituals of state. In comparison 
to the experimental celebrations of the 1920s, the 1930s saw centralized control over the form 
and content of holidays, which coincided with new mechanisms of state repression and 
coercion.21 By the 1930s, formal holiday celebrations coalesced into a tightly managed script that 
was carefully choreographed by the party and its partner organizations, including the Komsomol. 
The party’s strict control over holidays established a certain degree of repetitiveness, which itself 
served a pedagogical function and emphasized a distinctly Soviet way of life.22 The forms that 
developed in the 1930s would remain largely unchanged for the remainder of Soviet rule. 
 Major celebrations took place in three phases, each of which heavily leaned on and 
encouraged mass public participation. First came the preparatory stage, wherein local authorities 
erected platforms, raised flags, and informed citizens about upcoming events. By broadcasting 
the message of upcoming festivities, the state sought near complete participation in holiday 
rituals. Formal programs followed, including (generally military) parades and speeches from 
local, republic, and all-union elites. The formal programming ensured that state messages were 
consistent and disseminated the appropriate pedagogical messages. Last came the celebratory 
phase, where ideology was set aside for merrymaking and fun. The final phase encouraged 
popular participation, transforming holidays into moments of public festivity in an explicitly 
                                                            
21 On the coexistence of violence and celebration, see especially Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades. 
22 Rolf, Soviet Mass Festivals, 1917–1991, 58. On the pedagogical function of holidays, see also Rosalinde Sartorti, 
“Stalinism and Carnival: Organization and Aesthetics of Political Holidays,” in The Culture of the Stalin Period, ed. 






civic mode.23 Each phase emphasized citizens’ involvement in the design and implementation of 
holidays and promoted the participatory nature of citizenship that evolved in the 1930s. 
 Festivities advanced ongoing ideological projects, including the new emphasis on the 
Soviet people in the 1930s. Holidays enacted two aspects of the discourses surrounding Soviet 
identity discussed in Chapter 1: the emphasis on and celebration of distinctly Soviet heroes and 
the simultaneous unity and diversity of the populace. Celebrations of heroes—from polar 
explorers to Stakhanovite industrial and agricultural workers—projected the unique 
accomplishments of the state vis-à-vis the population. Mass demonstrations and public parades 
symbolized and showcased popular participation in heroic feats, signaling the unity of the Soviet 
people.24 This unity was further displayed through military parades, which increased in 
prominence in the 1930s and projected order, discipline, and hierarchical unity. 
 Celebrations reflected state initiatives while cultivating popular participation in civic life. 
Physical culture parades, the first of which took place in 1936, highlighted the official 
prioritization of military readiness, as citizens marched to showcase their own physical fitness. 
The inclusion of ethnic minorities and women highlighted the Soviet Union’s multiethnic 
composition and asserted its message of liberation, not least among women of Central Asia and 
the Caucasus.25 Suggesting the link between these celebrations and the idea of the Soviet people, 
the 1938 physical culture parade became one of the earliest invocations of the phrase in visual 
propaganda. Georgii Kibardin’s 1938 poster (Figure 8) visually represented the diverse, 
hierarchically structured populace.26 In the poster, parade participants included various 
                                                            
23 Rolf, Soviet Mass Festivals, 1917–1991, 65–72. 
24 The celebrations are discussed in Chapter 1. See also Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades, 46–84. 
25 Petrone, 23–45. As Petrone notes, the inclusion of both minorities and women distinguished Soviet politics of the 
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minorities, including Ukrainians, recognizable by the embroidery of their dresses and suits and 
the flowers in women’s hair, and Central Asians and Caucasians, identifiable by their traditional 
hats, fabrics, and the cuts of their clothing. Dominating the foreground of the poster, modern, 
ethnically ambiguous citizens—presumably Russians—led fellow citizens under a banner 
greeting “dear Stalin.” The caption conveyed the main message: “The physical-culture parade: a 
powerful demonstration of the power and the invincibility of the Soviet people.” The poster 
encapsulated the Stalinist approach to diversity management: minorities were welcome and 
visibly present, but always guided by ethnically neutral Russians. This symbolism dominated the 
1939 manifestation, which prominently featured Uzbeks, Georgians, and other minorities in 
national costume, led by Russians who carried a banner declaring themselves the “first among 
equals.”27 
 As in the 1920s, holidays centered on major urban centers, foremost in Moscow and 
Leningrad, the Soviet Union’s premiere cities. Union and autonomous republics, oblasts, and 
local administrations, both urban and rural, took cues from Moscow, as the state projected 
celebratory practices outwards through party instructions. At the same time, holiday celebrations 
reflected regional specificities, as localized and ethnic traditions were shaped and adapted for a 
modern Soviet context with varying degree of sanction. In Central Asia, this often revolved 
around food prepared specifically for festivities, including plov (a rice pilaf typically prepared by 
men) and samsa (meat-filled pastries) in the south, and bauyrsaq (fried bread) in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan.28 In rural areas, parades and celebrations might include tractors, folk festivities, and 
collective farm outings.29 
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Figure 8: “The Physical-Culture Parade: the powerful demonstration of the power and the invincibility of 






 These adaptations brought all-union celebratory forms and practices to the periphery. 
They were complemented by national dekady (sing. dekada), ten-day festivals of the art, music, 
and literature of union and autonomous republics, which displayed the culture of the peripheries 
at the center. Like the multiethnic physical-culture parades, dekady offered a formalized, visual 
reminder of the friendship of the peoples, a centerpiece of ideology in the late-1930s. The first, 
held in Moscow in March 1936 to celebrate and display Ukrainian culture, featured folk music 
and dancing. Following on its success, subsequent dekady showcased Kazakh (May 1936), 
Georgian (January 1937), Uzbek (May 1937), Azerbaijani (April 1938), Kyrgyz (June 1939), 
Armenian (October 1939), and Belarusian (June 1940) arts and culture. The central party-state 
apparatus publicly feted the official delegations and received them at the Kremlin. The press 
covered performances and meetings with party-state leaders in detail.30 To complement public 
performances, which had a more limited audience, newspapers ran selections of recent literature 
and poetry in translation and elaborate reviews of performances, offering a nationwide platform 
for the most talented and recognized writers and performers of each republic.31 
 Through dekady, the central state and republics showcased both Soviet progress and 
traditional national cultures. A side-by-side photograph of two participants in Kazakhstan’s 1936 
dekada, singer-poet (aqin) Jambyl Jabaev, clad in a traditional, fur-lined hat and long white 
beard, and writer and education activist Sáken Seıfullin in a modern suit, suggested contrasting 
modes of participation in Soviet life (Figure 9).32 Dekady were not merely wholesale celebrations 
                                                            
30 The list of dekady is not exhaustive. On national dekady, see Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, 439–40; 
İğmen, Speaking Soviet with an Accent, 133–34; Isabelle Ruth Kaplan, “The Art of Nation-Building: National 
Culture and Soviet Politics in Stalin-Era Azerbaijan and Other Minority Republics” (Georgetown University, 2017). 
Jeff Sahadeo also addresses dekady as visual representations of Soviet multiethnic friendship in Red or Black? 
31 For example, Izvestiia published a full page of selections from Kazakh writers, including work by Sáken Seıfullin, 
Jirshi Ahmetbekov, and T. Jurgenev, together with a piece on Kazakh history and a description of the exhibition on 
Kazakh art, see Izvestiia, 17 May 1936, 3.  
32 Demonstrating the coexistence of celebration and persecution and shifting priorities of the state, Seıfullin was 






of ethnic kitsch but rather opportunities to demonstrate cultural achievements. The press 
commended these festivals for making the cultures of Soviet peoples accessible to the broader 
public and praised the state for cultivating and modernizing national cultures.33 Through 
showcasing art and culture, festivals raised the visibility of ethnic minorities and demonstrated 
their important albeit performative role within the body politic. These celebrations would 
continue in subsequent decades as a demonstration of the state’s ongoing public commitment to 
the flourishing of all peoples, even as the space for expressing ethnic identities was strictly 
                                                            
33 For examples of typical coverage, see “Prazdnik narodnogo iskusstva,” Izvestiia, 23 March 1936, 1; “Iskusstvo 
pobedivshego naroda,” Pravda, 27 May 1936, 1; “Talanty sotsialisticheskoi Gruzii,” 14 January 1937, 1; 
“Torzhestvo uzbekskogo iskusstva,” Pravda, 26, May 1937, 1. 
Figure 9: Kazakh singer-poet (aqin) Jambyl Jabaev, left, and writer Sáken Seıfullin right, printed in Literaturnaia 






circumscribed, tightly controlled, and subject to repression.34 
 Holiday celebrations also reflected a new emphasis on rising living standards and the end 
of revolutionary asceticism, first signaled in Stalin’s famous 1935 dictum that life had become 
more joyous.35 As evidence of this new, happier life, Christmas trees returned, now to celebrate 
the more secular New Year. Ramped up New Year’s celebrations, inspired and led by Ukrainian 
party leader Pavel Postyshev (better known for his role in the Ukrainian famine of 1932–33), 
were seen as tools for inspiring more emotional love for the country, particularly among 
children. Bourgeois elements were refashioned as quintessentially Soviet merrymaking, as New 
Year’s became synonymous not with religious practice but with secular, civic belonging.36  
 While New Year’s celebrations offered one of the least ideologically oriented aspects of 
civic life, celebrations and rituals surrounding the 1936 Constitution and for elections in 
subsequent years served a more overtly political purpose. As described in Chapter 1, Bolshevik 
leaders cultivated a distinctly celebratory atmosphere, transforming these events from official 
formalities to explicitly patriotic holidays. The extensive “all-union” discussion that took place 
ahead of the final passage of the constitution offered citizens expansive opportunities to 
participate in civic life and offer comments and criticisms on the structure and function of the 
Soviet government. Following the final approval on December 5, 1936, the day was declared an 
annual public holiday, signifying the importance of the constitution itself.37 
                                                            
34 In the 1930s, dekady took place most frequently in Moscow. Over time, the sites of these festivals expanded, first 
to Leningrad and then to other major cities, serving as a means to broadcast lateral ties connecting citizens to one 
another, including across peripheries. Many of the feted participants in the dekady of the 1930s fell victim to 
Stalinist terror, including Seıfullin. As Yekelchyk has demonstrated, there was also controversy surrounding dekady 
in Stalin’s final years: the Ukrainian dekada of 1951 was followed by a campaign of ideological purification 
concerning acceptable forms of national expression, see Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Empire of Memory, 129–30. 
35 “Rech’ tovarishcha Stalina na pervom vsesoiuznom soveshchanii stakhanovtsev,” Pravda, 22 November 1935, 1. 
36 On the reintroduction of holiday trees and the navigation of their specific meaning, see Petrone, Life Has Become 
More Joyous, Comrades, 85–109. 
37 Getty, “State and Society Under Stalin”; Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades, 175–202; Lomb, 






 Elections functioned similarly. Focusing on postwar elections in Kyiv (which differed 
little from their prewar variants), Serhy Yekelchyk describes the riotous, joyous celebrations that 
ensured high turnout and participation. Elections, of course, were not competitive, so citizens 
lined up for the polls to signify approval for the government. As such, elections became “a 
festive moment for confirming [voters’] Soviet identities, rather than a political choice.” Polling 
stations became sites for citizens to express their love for the state and Stalin. From orchestras 
and brass bands to festivities after the polls were closed, elections were a celebration of 
participatory, communal citizenship.38 Newspapers hailed elections and near unanimous approval 
of the party’s chosen candidates as evidence of unity.39 As Jan Gross shows, elections functioned 
as a tool of Sovietization during the occupation of new territories after the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact, signifying their tight association with Soviet citizenship.40 
 In both newly occupied territories and across the country, elections were strictly 
controlled and tightly managed, a reminder of the darker side of civic celebration under Stalin 
and the careful state management of the forms, content, and practices of citizenship. Alongside 
the festive atmosphere existed a sharp undercurrent of surveillance, repression, and state control. 
After all, participation was never voluntary or optional, and the state enforced strict limits on the 
forms and interpretations of celebrations. Restrictions and exclusions were omnipresent. In some 
cases, repression and celebration unfolded concurrently, reflecting the simultaneity of terror and 
ordinary, everyday life.41 Large-scale celebrations of the 20th anniversary of the revolution in 
November 1937 on Red Square, for example, took place at the height of the Great Purges, a short 
                                                            
38 Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Citizens, 179–217, quotation on 216. 
39 E.g. “Triumf sotsialisticheskoi demokratii,” Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 12 (December 1937), 12–15; “Edinstvo 
partii i naroda,” Izvestiia, 28 June 1938, 1; B. Volin, “Velikaia pobeda sovetskogo naroda,” Istoricheskii zhurnal, 
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40 Gross, Revolution from Abroad, 71–113. 
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walk away from the NKVD headquarters and Lubianka prison, where arrestees awaited trial and 
execution. Sometimes, terror and celebration were more concretely linked. As the state 
celebrated mass participation in the 1937 elections—the first with universal suffrage—
campaigns were accompanied by a crackdown on anti-Soviet behavior.42 Religious life, too, 
remained strictly controlled, especially after the 1937 census revealed high levels of religiosity, 
leading to reinvigorated atheist propaganda drives.43 These repressive measures suggested the 
limits of both acceptable behavior and Soviet identity. 
 
From War to Victory: Holidays and Celebrations in Late Stalinism 
 World War II and its aftermath saw subtle renegotiations of holiday rituals, as war itself 
became a quintessential experience for forging a deeper sense of community and unity. Wartime 
shortages and ongoing worries reduced the scope of all celebrations. Holidays, including annual 
celebrations on May 1 and November 7, assumed a more subdued tone, but they nevertheless 
marked collective moments of celebration. At the same time, a more liberal attitude towards 
religion opened the doors for limited observance of religious holidays, a possibility that remained 
largely open until Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaigns in the 1950s. With war’s end, holidays 
returned by and large to prewar formats, with one innovation: Victory Day gradually entered the 
pantheon of Soviet holidays, becoming, like the revolution, another point of origin for a united 
Soviet people. The tentative embrace of Victory Day under Stalin laid the groundwork for its 
later prominence beginning in the mid-1960s. 
 Following the Nazi invasion, war’s hardships limited the scope of celebrations and 
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altered the atmosphere and mood across the country. So as not to interfere with wartime 
production, holiday observance was shifted to Sundays, and celebrations were scaled back to 
reflect the more somber atmosphere of war. Despite their more limited scope, holidays presented 
important opportunities to raise morale and express confidence in inevitable victory.44 Perhaps no 
event was more symbolically significant than the 24th anniversary of the revolution, celebrated 
during the bleak autumn of 1941, as German soldiers were at the very gates of the Soviet capital. 
A giant military parade in Red Square projected to the world (and to Nazi Germany specifically) 
the Soviet Union’s commitment to celebrating the revolution, even under the trying conditions of 
wartime occupation. Stalin’s address, only his second communication of the war, projected 
confidence in ultimate victory and rallied citizens to make all necessary sacrifices.45 After the 
war, as Rolf notes, the “defiant Red Square performance on the major Soviet holiday in 1941 
was declared a heroic act, and it was viewed as a harbinger of the fall of Hitler’s regime.”46 
Indeed, the event was so significant that the current Russian state, generally ambivalent about 
Soviet holidays but eager to embrace World War II mythologies, celebrates November 7 not as 
the anniversary of the revolution but as the anniversary of the 1941 parade in Red Square.47 
 With the announcement of the German surrender on May 9, 1945, impromptu festivities 
broke out across the country, as people rushed out onto the streets to celebrate the end of a long, 
brutal war. In Chapter 2, we saw how Makhsuda M. described raucous street celebrations in 
Tashkent that extended into the night, and the preparation of celebratory, meat-laden plov, a 
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departure from wartime deprivations.48 Newspapers similarly described the atmosphere of 
widespread festivity across the country.49 These spontaneous celebrations marked a departure 
from the carefully managed events of prior holidays. This, however, was exceptional. The 
official celebration of victory, celebrated on Red Square on June 24, 1945, returned to the tightly 
choreographed performances typical of the Stalin era.50 The first anniversary was similarly 
observed. In the final decade of Stalin’s rule, celebrations continued to center around May 1 and 
November 7, which returned to their prewar splendor as part of a broader push, in Yekelchyk’s 
words, to restore and maintain “symbolic order.”51 Even Victory Day was demoted to an 
ordinary working day in late 1946, to be revived as a public holiday only in 1965.52 
 Religious accommodations made during war also affected the celebration and observance 
of holidays. The limited re-legalization of religious practice opened the door for the return of 
religious holidays among the faithful. These effects, however, should not be overstated. The state 
only permitted registered religious activity, which excluded many groups deemed too dangerous 
to recognize, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Ukrainian Greek Catholics, and others. Across the 
country and particularly in newly incorporated territories of the far west, surveillance remained 
tight on secular and religious holidays, as the KGB and party watched for signs of anti-Soviet 
activity.53 In new territories, the state also worked hard to ensure state holidays were celebrated 
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appropriately, since holidays themselves helped cultivate a Soviet way of life.54 
 
After Stalin: Public Festivity under Khrushchev and Brezhnev 
 After Stalin’s death, holiday festivities continued largely in the patterns set out under 
Stalin.55 As before, holidays served, in the words of one 1977 book, as “an important means of 
educating the masses” (vazhnoe sredstvo vospitaniia mass), particularly for young citizens.56 
Specialists in new rituals—a growing community in the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s—praised the 
emotional power of holidays, seeing celebrations as means of deepening affective attachment to 
the state and as evidence of the spiritual strength of the Soviet people.57 Aside from continuing 
Stalinist-style festivities, three post-Stalin developments are worthy of comment. First, a series 
of anti-religious campaigns under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev cracked down on unsanctioned 
religious activity, suggesting the perceived incompatibility of religious and Soviet identities. 
Second, Brezhnev led a reinvigoration of the cult of World War II, as Victory Day became one 
of the landmarks of the Soviet calendar. Finally, the state demonstrated more comfort with ethnic 
and local holidays beginning in the 1960s. Each of these developments suggested subtle 
renegotiations of the boundaries of Soviet identity that dovetailed with the introduction of the 
new civil rituals, discussed in the following section. 
 While public holiday celebrations remained relatively unchanged under Khrushchev, 
state and party attitudes towards religion became increasingly confrontational, somewhat belying 
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the liberalism with which the Khrushchev era is often associated.58 A brief suppression of 
religious activity in 1954 was followed by a more extensive campaign that began in 1958 and 
continued until Khrushchev’s 1964 removal. The earlier “Hundred Day” campaign, an intense 
religious crackdown that began in July 1954, returned serious attention to atheism for the first 
time since the late 1930s.59 As Victoria Smolkin observes, the campaign used “an arsenal of old 
and new tactics” to eliminate religion, including the closure of churches and other religious 
buildings, prohibitions on religious practices, and renewed efforts at disseminating atheist 
propaganda, especially through lectures. Party organs criticized the press and various state and 
party organizations for insufficient attentiveness to atheist propaganda, and the state redoubled 
their efforts towards eliminating religion’s pernicious hold on society.60 After backlash and 
criticism, the campaign ended abruptly on November 10, and leaders took stock and reassessed 
their methods of measuring religiosity.61 Party leaders turned renewed attention to religious 
activities beginning in late 1958, when leaders unleashed a more sustained and tailored campaign 
to limit and control religious observance. 
 The longer 1958–64 anti-religious campaign sought to limit religious practice across the 
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country, particularly around major religious holidays.62 As Eren Tasar notes, unregistered 
activity bore the brunt of the state’s attention, reflecting a desire to categorize and control all 
aspects of religious life. This had its most significant impact on unregistered groups—like 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, some Baptists, and others—and on folk religious practices 
just outside the margins of legal religious practice.63 As before, the KGB carefully monitored the 
population for all signs of unsanctioned activity.64 Unregistered mass celebrations, including 
pilgrimages to sites of local religious significance, were seen as subversive and in need of strict 
control and ongoing surveillance. New atheist propaganda initiatives targeted specific behaviors, 
seeking to unmask false religious beliefs and superstitions among citizens at a local level. 
Although the campaign was reversed after Khrushchev’s 1964 removal, similar campaigns again 
dominated the political and social landscape throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, ending 
only with liberalization and religious accommodations under Gorbachev.65 Harsh crackdowns 
sent renewed signals about the incompatibility of religious and civic identification. 
 While crackdowns narrowed the scope of holiday celebrations and observance, the 
reinvigorated cult of World War II offered a more constructive vision of Soviet identity 
beginning in the mid-1960s. In 1965, Victory Day was once again elevated to a public, non-
working holiday, paving the way for the massive celebrations and military parades commonly 
associated with Soviet World War II commemoration. The Brezhnev era was a veritable heyday 
of new commemorative initiatives that left their mark on urban landscapes across the country. 
Beginning with the 1967 opening of the giant Mamaev-Kurgan memorial at the site of the Battle 
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of Stalingrad, memorials proliferated from Kyiv to Vladivostok and Murmansk to Almaty.66 
 New monuments and memorial complexes spoke both to the collective experience of the 
war—for example, through tributes to officially designated Hero Cities—as well as to more local 
aspects. The main war memorial in Almaty, opened in 1975, specifically commemorated the 28 
Guardsmen of the (Kazakhstani) Panfilov Division, while the Murmansk complex, opened on a 
hill overlooking the city in 1974, memorialized “defenders of the Arctic.” Many sites also 
incorporated smaller tributes to locals who served in World War II, including both those killed 
and those who returned. These complexes became central sites for Victory Day celebrations, 
which grew in scale and importance in the Soviet Union’s final decades.67 With the introduction 
of new civic rites, discussed below, memorials also featured in more personal rituals. Memorials 
came to be seen as meaningful sites for presenting passports and inductions into the military, and 
newlyweds often laid wreaths and flowers as part of their wedding-day tour (Figure 10).68 In this 
way, World War II became a public aspect of collective identity, as citizens gathered to 
commemorate the lost and celebrate hard-won victory. 
Beginning in the 1960s, party and state leaders also demonstrated more comfort with localized 
celebrations of holidays of ethnic and regional significance, particularly those closely tied with 
pre-Islamic and pre-Christian traditions. This included Ivan Kupala (a summer holiday 
celebrated across the Western Soviet Union, associated with John the Baptist but with roots in 
pagan rituals) and Nauruz (the “Persian” New Year celebrated across most of Central Asia and 
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Azerbaijan, with roots in pre-Islamic celebrations), as well as seasonal folk holidays of diverse 
ethnic and geographic origins. Under Stalin, New Year’s was the only major holiday that derived 
primarily from folk tradition, and its celebration, as we have already seen, was contested 
throughout the 1920s and ‘30s. Although observance of folk holidays never fully disappeared, it 
always flirted with the boundaries of acceptability and legal practice. 
 By the 1960s, the state was more comfortable with promoting and celebrating folk 
holidays, seeing them as an inseparable part of ethnic and regional identity. As a 1977 book 
 noted, these traditions were now instilled with new meaning: “Folk holidays and rituals… 
Figure 10: War memorials in use: a passport ceremony (left) and a wedding visit (right). Undated photographs from 






express the masses’ relationship to nature, their life experience, and their worldview… 
Nowadays in our country, traditional folk holidays are enjoying resurgence; they are cleansed of 
religious features and imbued with new theoretical content. Through them, the ethnic color and 
cultural distinctiveness of peoples of the USSR are carefully preserved.”69 Throughout the 1960s, 
‘70s, and ‘80s, specialists discussed these holidays extensively, emphasizing their older origins 
and recovering them from alleged religious cooptation. Many believed that selectively developed 
aspects of folk culture could demonstrate the progressive aspects of ethnic identities, which 
complemented civic, Soviet identities.70 Formalized celebrations, though sanctioned by Moscow, 
resulted largely from local initiative, not least because many of the observed holidays lacked 
countrywide significance. This reflected a comfort with regional variation and local autonomy 
that had been largely absent under Stalin, when ethnic forms and culture were strictly controlled 
at the center (for example, through carefully choreographed dekady). 
 The general continuation of Stalin-era participatory forms of celebration combined with 
religious crackdowns, a renewed emphasis on World War II, and greater comfort with folk 
holidays exemplified the subtle negotiations over the nature of Soviet identity and the limits of 
appropriate behavior. On one hand, the state continued to be the locus for public celebrations, 
indicated both by ritualized World War II commemorations and strict limitations on unregistered 
religious activity. At the same time, the embrace of folk traditions and holidays was one area in 
which the state was willing to decentralize the planning and implementation of celebrations, 
reminding citizens that ethnic identities—once cleansed of religious elements—could and did 
inform Soviet identities. 
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 Even without complete freedom in how and when ethnic identities could be expressed, 
the incorporation of folk traditions and holidays belied Brezhnev’s assertions about the 
“monolithic” nature of the Soviet people. If atheist propaganda and intensified commemorations 
of World War II in theory mobilized more universal aspects of Soviet identity, then other holiday 
celebrations reflected specific regional and ethnic particularities. This suggested a diversity of 
possible ways to express civic and ethnic identity. These more subtle negotiations under 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev coincided with and complemented the cultivation of new rituals for 
weddings, births, funerals, and other personal milestones. 
 
Rituals and Civic Rites in Late Socialism 
 While holidays and public celebrations brought private citizens into public space to 
celebrate the country’s accomplishments and losses, the state also focused on new rituals for 
citizens’ private lives. As with public holidays, the revolution ushered in a period of upheaval in 
ritual form, including experimentation with “red” weddings, baptisms, and funerals. These 
secular alternatives to religious rites, however, never really took off and faded relative to the 
more monolithic Stalinist forms. Beginning in the late 1950s and with new intensity under 
Brezhnev and his successors, the state renewed its interest in the creation, establishment, and 
implementation of new civil rituals. This brought the state into the more private realm of family 
life. The cultivation of new rituals for birth, marriage, death, and other life moments dovetailed 
with anti-religious campaigns and thus functioned as one specific aspect of atheist propaganda. 
New rituals, however, were also part of a larger cultivation of Soviet identity, one that sought to 
deepen affective attachment to the state. In light of the state’s fears of religiosity, activists 






“spiritual culture” of Soviet people, also expressed the unity and diversity of the body politic.71  
 Although there was certainly some central state initiative, most of the work for creating 
and implementing new rituals was decentralized, reflecting the belief that new rituals should 
express local traditions and customs. Accordingly, republics had broad latitude to develop forms 
and practices that would be most meaningful locally. This decentralization reflected the state’s 
general understanding that ‘Soviet’ and ‘ethnic’ identities were mutually constitutive, as old 
traditions found new life as part of Soviet rituals. The incorporation and adaptation of older 
customs was seen to deepen the emotional content and attraction of rituals. 
 
Red Weddings, Baptisms, and Funerals: Early Experimentation with Soviet Rituals 
 In the first decade after the October Revolution, many aspects of everyday life underwent 
profound changes, as citizens and the state together elaborated the acceptable behaviors and 
practices suitable within an explicitly communist society. As already seen, state and party leaders 
and cultural activists viewed religious practices with deep suspicion, particularly in relation to 
raising the next generation. To reduce the widespread practice of religious rites, some early 
activists developed non-religious alternatives for birth, marriage, and death. In contrast to later 
variants from the 1960s, early experimentation with rites and rituals resulted not from official 
policies and priorities but rather emerged of more spontaneous movements from below, 
primarily among activists committed to the nascent state and its atheist ideology. 
 Almost immediately, the state declared the separation of church and state in a January 
1918 decree that dissolved church property, abolished all clergy, and gave citizens no religious 
exemption from fulfilling civic duties and obligations. Atheist propaganda proliferated. As one 
part of the process of secularization, the registration of civic acts—birth, marriage, divorce, and 
                                                            






death—were shifted from church registries and metric books to state institutions, leading to the 
founding of civil registry offices across the country, typically known by their Russian acronym 
ZAGS (Organy zapisi aktov grazhdanskogo sostaianiia—Organs of registering acts of civil 
status). A December 1917 decree on marriage, children, and family recognized only civil 
registrations; church weddings would have legal standing only if the parties signed a 
corresponding civil registration.72 These changes embedded the state in rituals of personal life, 
transforming weddings from private events to civic acts. 
 The registry office, however, did little to impart the appropriate celebratory atmosphere 
that some citizens apparently wanted. Church weddings largely continued, now supplemented 
with the additional trip to ZAGS.73 Others took a more creative approach. Among certain, mostly 
urban segments of the population, the emergence of red baptisms (or ‘Octoberings’—oktiabriny, 
a portmanteau of October and baptism), red weddings, and, less commonly, red funerals, 
borrowed from religious rites and competed directly and self-consciously with religious practice. 
In contrast to religious rituals, a red wedding or Octobering demonstrated citizens’ connection 
and dedication to the state.74 As Richard Stites noted, they served the dual purpose of offering a 
formal celebration of marriage while simultaneously demonstrating the couple’s commitment to 
new social norms, including the equality of spouses.75 In the mid-1920s, newspapers occasionally 
reported these rituals across the country, often interpreting them as evidence of progress in 
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establishing a Soviet way of life.76 
 Some contemporaries believed these civil alternatives could popularize a Soviet way of 
life and reduce the influence of bourgeois and religious elements. As economist and Bolshevik 
Iurii Larin noted in a front-page Pravda article in 1924, “To arrange an Octobering is to give an 
oath to raise not slaves for the bourgeoisie but fighters against it. Octoberings denote a solemn 
(torzhestvennyi), practical initiation into social solidarity with their class. In contrast, christening 
is running from one’s class to the Lord God, to a personal communication through him with 
enemies of the proletariat.”77 Writer Vikentii Veresaev similarly praised the potential of new 
rituals. Though present versions bordered on banal, he believed artists could create better ones, 
“a grandiose task, on which it is worth expending our energies.” “The main significance of the 
ritual,” he continued, “is, on one hand, that it gives people ready-made, artistically strengthened 
channels for the emergence of feelings crowded into the soul, and on the other hand, organizes 
these very feelings, and directs, enlightens, and deepens them.”78 
 Others were less convinced, indicating the degree of public debate and contention. One 
1924 Pravda article questioned their suitability and called for their elimination.79 Film director 
Vitalii Zhemchuzhnyi criticized existing practices as merely an excuse for new parents to be 
showered with gifts.80 Satirical writers Il’ia Il’f and Evgenii Petrov, too, poked fun at the 
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“nightmare musical and trade-union mystery” of Octobering rituals and relayed an apocryphal 
story of one that, at the revenge of the local chairman, morphed into a “two-hour report on the 
international situation,” delivered over the newborn’s cradle as “adults smoked mournfully and 
an orchestra played on. All for the sake of positive statistical reporting on the number of 
successful political conversions!”81 Not surprisingly, given the lack of official prioritization, they 
never really caught on. After a brief heyday in the 1920s, red weddings and Octoberings tapered 
off.82 Less elaborate civil registrations of weddings, births, and deaths, however, became 
standard, even if they were not always perfectly observed or implemented.83 
 
World War II and Its Aftermath: A Religious Crisis 
 As seen in Chapter 2, World War II dramatically altered relations between church and 
state, as leaders made formal concessions to the Russian Orthodox Church, Islam, and other 
religions, in part to foster civic loyalty in conditions of total war. This expanded notions of 
Soviet identity. The Councils for Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (CAROC) and for 
Religious Cults (CARC, which dealt with all non-Orthodox faiths) were founded in 1943 and 
1944, respectively, to oversee church-state relations, effectively legalizing some religious life. 
Republic documents encouraged propagandists to reduce divisive atheist and anti-religious 
propaganda as part of the total war effort and focus instead on more unifying, anti-fascist 
propaganda.84 Suggesting the degree of newfound religious tolerance, a May 1942 letter 
addressed to all oblast soviets of the League of the Militant Godless in Kazakhstan urged 
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propagandists to avoid offending believers’ sentiments as they sought “to prove to every believer 
that the outcome of the war with fascism will be decided not by the Holy Spirit, but by the power 
of weapons, the fortress of the home front, and the moral-political unity of the Soviet people.”85 
 Within the party, activists worried about the potential impact of revived religiosity. In a 
series of urgent letters to Stalin and Malenkov in 1943 and 1944, party member and candidate of 
architectural sciences A.K. Chaldymov urged party leaders to take the threat of religion seriously 
and proposed founding a “Cult of the Holy Motherland,” complete with ministers, temples, and 
quasi-religious services. Chaldymov expressed dismay about the paucity of Soviet rituals relative 
to religious alternatives: “Up until now, we have not sufficiently used the weapons that directly 
act upon human feelings, which have been used by religion at different times and eras. To this 
day, such powerful weapons for acting on the human psyche have been exclusively in the realm 
of religion.”86 His concern, self-evidently, was the lack of emotional appeal of secular rituals. He 
proposed that a patriotic cult might be entrusted with carrying out holidays, revolutionary 
celebrations, and events in personal and civic life. Even through it appears nothing came of his 
seemingly outlandish suggestions, both his writing of meetings to which he had been called and 
the marginalia scribbled by leaders on archival records indicate he had attention at the highest 
echelons of power.87 
 After World War II, it became clear that religious life would not recede from the social 
sphere without additional action. Directives from the party’s Ideological Division emphasized 
the urgency of anti-religious propaganda and warned against complacency in church-state 
relations. Party documents repeatedly expressed concern about the decline of atheist propaganda 
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and the mistaken belief that religious adherence would decline on its own.88 There was some fear 
that Ivan Polianskii, CARC chairman from 1944 until his death in 1956, did not take religious 
activity sufficiently seriously. Fellow activists criticized Polianskii’s assertions in a July 1947 
report that religion was not of serious political significance. Mikhail Suslov and other top 
ideological leaders worried that his underestimation of religious cults could fuel an inadvertent 
religious revival.89 These concerns expressed a postwar consensus that religion, in fact, was 
irreconcilable with Soviet life. 
 Complicating the relationship between religious and civic identities, religious activity 
tended to be the highest in the western regions occupied during the war, including Western 
Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic Republics, regions that were considered to be far less integrated 
into Soviet society.90 Combating the perceived increase in religious fervor went hand in hand 
with (re)integration of these communities into society. Propagandists responded to religious 
activity primarily through atheist propaganda, with the strongest attention to the observance of 
religious holidays. Much of this propaganda work was conducted by the newly formed Society 
for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge (later: Knowledge Society), founded 
in 1947, which took up a lot of the work of the now-disbanded League of the Militant Godless.91 
 Success in conducting anti-religious and atheist propaganda was typically measured 
through declining numbers of baptisms, rising numbers of church closures, and a decrease in 
religious activity. In the same way, frequent religious rituals and activity were interpreted as 
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failures of agitation and propaganda work. Most concerning were reports of party members and 
Komsomol activists taking part in religious weddings and other rites, suggesting the limits of the 
state’s religious accommodations.92 This presented the need for more extensive rituals that could 
compete with religious practice. Leaders began by addressing several administrative problems 
concerning the governance of civic acts themselves. 
 
Administrative Changes and Improvements to Civil Registries 
 Even before the advent of new civil rituals, party leaders criticized serious shortcomings 
in registering civil acts that many feared had led to a greater inclination to turn to religious 
institutions for a more celebratory environment to mark major life moments, even among party 
and Komsomol members. Until 1956, the work of civil registry offices fell under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the organization in charge of both the ordinary and secret 
police. This often detracted from the celebratory atmosphere many newlyweds desired. As a 
December 1958 Komsomol report for the Central Committee admitted, “The premises of many 
district and city civil registry offices are in a neglected condition. In many cases, the registry 
offices are located in police stations, sometimes next to pre-trial detention cells, and the 
necessary furniture and equipment are lacking.”93 Given the circumstances, the report seemed to 
suggest, it was hardly surprising that many young people were reluctant to make ZAGS the 
centerpiece of their wedding celebrations. 
 New attention to the work of registry offices reemphasized the state’s role in private life. 
A 1946 decree addressed the dismal state of affairs at civic registry offices in the RSFSR, tasking 
local organs with renovating their premises and offering a better environment for registering civil 
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acts. The decree ordered registry offices to provide comfortable reception rooms, including a 
separate waiting room and a hall for the actual marriage registration. It also decreed that 
weddings should be officiated at predetermined times, so as not to coincide with the registration 
of other civil acts. Simultaneous divorce proceedings or funerals were not considered optimal; as 
one report dryly noted, “the registration of marriage and death should be separated.”94 The decree 
also sought to regulate weddings rituals themselves, with specific procedures for applying to 
marry, signing marriage documents, and receiving the subsequent paperwork. By direction of the 
Soviet of People’s Commissars, other republics were asked to issue analogous decrees that 
would account for “local particularities.”95 
 Despite these improvements, problems continued. One report complained that much of 
the furniture in registry offices had not been renovated or replaced for decades and had simply 
become junk.96 A 1954 report noted that many localities had ignored the instructions from the 
decree entirely: “Despite the governmental decree, in many cases ZAGS organs are still housed 
together with other institutions, their premises are often tight, not adequately furnished, lack the 
necessary equipment, and are kept in an unsatisfactory condition.” The authors of the report, A. 
Gorkin, K. Gorshenin, V. Starovskii, and A. Puzanov, recommended careful oversight to ensure 
local offices made the necessary improvements, and they advocated a significant increase in the 
number of officials hired to staff these institutions.97 
 Further improvements came with a major administrative change in 1956, which shifted 
the jurisdiction of civil registry offices from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the police) to the 
executive committees of local soviets. This shift, the 1958 Komsomol report noted, “contributed 
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to the revitalization of registry offices,” as public organizations, including the Komsomol, began 
tentatively to participate and assist with their work. The Ministry of Trade also circulated a 1958 
letter that ordered republic, regional, and oblast trade administrations to ensure wide availability 
of all goods and services needed for weddings, from dresses and suits to candy and champagne. 
The letter encouraged republics and local offices to consider opening special stores for wedding 
attire, developing systems for ordering and delivering food for receptions, and selling flowers, 
candy, fruit and champagne at registry offices themselves.98 Local initiatives sought to move 
weddings away from civil registry offices to workers’ clubs and houses of culture, which offered 
a more genial atmosphere for wedding celebrations.99 
 Despite significant improvements, shortcomings remained. At least one report, prepared 
by Z. Sinitsyn in Latvia, blamed high divorce rates on insufficient attention towards wedding 
festivities. Greater attention to the importance of marriage, as might be suggested by better 
wedding procedures, Sinitsyn argued, could potentially lower divorce rates and contribute to a 
stronger, more stable Soviet family.100 Participants at a regional meeting in Sverdlovsk, including 
local officials, Komsomol leaders, and trade union representatives, complained of insufficient 
involvement from public organizations. Furthermore, activists worried that marriage rituals were 
too underdeveloped to “create a solemn/celebratory (torzhestvennyi) atmosphere.”101 
 Despite promising local initiatives—the report singled out for praise the Irkutsk, 
Stalingrad, and Kalinin oblasts—the general situation remained unsatisfactory and in many 
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cases, quite “formal,” a situation blamed for the high rates of church weddings among youth. The 
Komsomol offered a long list of suggestions for improving the state of wedding rituals, which 
included continued monitoring of the condition of registry offices, improving the availability of 
goods and services from wedding dresses to taxis, and improving the wedding ceremony itself.102 
It was in this context that the February 1958 Komsomol wedding in Kalinin (present-day Tver’), 
described in the chapter’s introduction, became an example for a new approach to civil rituals, 
which set the stage for new articulations of Soviet identity. 
 
The Komsomol Wedding (1958) and the Rise of New, Celebratory Weddings 
 By the late 1950s, substantial consensus had emerged about the unsuitability of existing 
marriage rituals, and a number of institutions and organizations set out to find better answers for 
how to meet the needs of the population. In doing so, cultural activists and government officials 
sought to address two primary problems: the elevated numbers of church weddings, baptisms, 
and funerals and high levels of divorce. To create better rituals and offer greater support to 
Soviet families, political and cultural activists turned to older traditions as a way to boost the 
significance and emotional appeal for citizens, which would in turn foster a deeper sense of 
affective attachment to the state. 
 Regional ethnographic expeditions sought to identify historical and ongoing traditions 
associated with specific communities and ethnic groups. A report on the “modern peasant 
wedding,” based on materials from expeditions in the Kalinin oblast between 1956–58, observed 
that the general basis for weddings had changed dramatically under Soviet rule. The older idea 
that parents would arrange a wedding based on economic considerations was roundly rejected by 
young citizens, who now chose partners based on personal qualities and relationships. Parents, 
                                                            






the report, concluded, still offered advice, and sometimes even successfully intervened, but 
young people determined their own fate. Since the revolution, many older traditions had carried 
over in altered forms. Although dowries had fallen out of custom, the bride’s family still often 
gave a substantial gift to the groom—a fur coat, boots, or another expensive object—that was 
generally not returned if the engagement was broken off. A matchmaking ceremony (svatovstvo) 
had generally evolved into little more than an announcement of an engagement, while religious 
aspects and the bride’s ritualized mourning of her own maidenhood had disappeared. Fun 
elements—games and other merrymaking--in contrast, largely continued, though celebrations 
were much abridged relative to the multi-day celebrations of the past.103 
 Some of these traditional elements could be seen in the 1958 Komsomol wedding 
discussed in the introduction, a description of which was prepared by the Executive Committee 
of the Kalinin oblast soviet as a model for a new kind of wedding. Although this wedding self-
consciously and primarily derived its legitimacy from its novelty, the ceremony borrowed 
extensively from traditional elements: the use of elaborately painted horse-drawn sleighs, the 
singing of ‘Russian’ songs, the ceremonial role of ‘matchmakers,’ traditional clothing, and the 
parental reception of the newlyweds with bread and salt. These old-style touches added to the 
wedding’s emotional impact. Although this was not the first so-called “Komsomol Wedding”—
the term had occasionally surfaced in previous decades—it was part of broader attention to civil 
rituals that began in the late 1950s.104 
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 Improvements to wedding ceremonies concentrated on several shortcomings in existing 
practice. The location of weddings continued to be a primary focus. The opening of halls and 
institutions specifically designed for weddings began in the late 1950s. The first wedding palace, 
a retrofitted two-story imperial edifice, opened along the banks of the Neva River in Leningrad 
in November 1959. The first floor had special rooms for submitting and receiving paperwork and 
separate waiting rooms for the bride and groom and their friends. A carpeted white marble 
staircase, flanked with statues representing the four seasons, led to the second floor, where there 
were large halls for the ceremony and reception. The second floor also included a shop for 
flowers and gifts, where newlyweds could buy rings and guests could purchase presents. A 
photographer was always on hand, ready to document the ceremony according to the couple’s 
desires. Music rang throughout the palace, with a program designed specifically for weddings.105 
 According to a 1964 report, the first palace attracted widespread approval and admiration. 
The report praised new Soviet weddings as a bulwark of atheism, particularly when conducted in 
grand and opulent settings: 
The opening of the Weddings Palace in Leningrad has great political significance. It is a 
stronghold of atheist propaganda and it has become easier to fight the influence of 
religion and religious rituals among youth. It would not be superfluous to mention a 
conversation between the head of the Palace of Marriage with an elderly man, the 
grandfather of one of the brides, who said, “I am a deeply religious man and in my time, I 
got married in the church, but I wanted to see the wedding of my granddaughter in the 
new Palace, because in the church, they still teach ‘Let the wife be afraid of her husband.’ 
This is not suitable for our youth, but here, it is bright, festive, and the words are 
simple…in a word, it is completely modern.”106 
 
Within just a few months, demand for the Leningrad wedding palace was high enough that it 
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worked nonstop from 10 am to 10 pm daily. In the first five years of its existence, some 50,000 
weddings took place in its premises, and the palace attracted visits from fellow citizens and 
foreigners. Even East German First Secretary Walter Ulbricht and his wife stopped in to admire 
the palace and extend their good wishes for its continued operation.107 
 New wedding rituals became features not only of social calendars but also of the 
geographical landscape of Soviet life. In subsequent years, similar palaces and special buildings 
specifically for weddings opened up across the country, first in Moscow, Kyiv, and other large 
cities, and eventually in smaller communities.108 Cities and oblasts commissioned new houses 
and palaces for conducting the ceremonies, often combining elements of local culture with 
communist symbols. For instance, Almaty’s short, cylindrical Wedding Palace (1971) 
incorporated design elements that were intentionally reminiscent of a yurt but simultaneously 
featured the standard Lenin portrait and other Soviet symbols.  
 Throughout the late 1960s and ‘70s, houses and palaces for weddings proliferated across 
the country, often in prominent locations in city centers. As one book noted, the first House of 
Happiness opened in Tashkent in 1964, with another seven opening shortly thereafter across the 
republic. By 1977, Uzbekistan had 365 of these specialized institutions, a tribute to their 
importance to late Soviet urban planning.109 To add to their attraction, buildings were outfitted 
with all the conveniences deemed necessary for modern Soviet weddings, including shops to buy 
flowers, wedding clothes, and other necessities. These buildings were built to impart some of the 
drama and significance that might have been captured by churches, mosques, synagogues, and 
other religious buildings, often with stained glass, carpeted hallways, and portraits of Lenin and 
other key figures. One oblast report from Kazakhstan proudly mentioned that a hall had been 
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specially appointed and furnished for the weddings in the local Palace of Culture, complete with 
a prominent bust of Lenin and visible state emblem—truly every couple’s dream!110 
 Alongside improving buildings and halls used for weddings, considerable thought went to 
the ceremonies themselves. Activists ensured that the wedding rites would be reasonably 
straightforward but imbued with sufficient meaning and beauty so as to make them attractive to 
young people.111 In a Komsomol meeting at the division on working youth, participants 
highlighted the need for attracting talented artists, dance groups, and choral collectives to ensure 
the quality of the rites. Some proposed assembling published collections based on research and 
ethnography for couples to select from. Others emphasized the importance of ensuring 
photographers were always on hand. Traditional food was also thought to be important, with 
specific reference to the korovai, a decorative bread prepared for weddings. Some recommended 
commissioning new wedding songs, since more traditional versions were no longer handed down 
from generation to generation. With the help of the Institute of Ethnography, special brochures 
were compiled to advise couples on how to organize the wedding. All agreed that weddings 
should be happy, celebratory occasions, and there was much urgent work to be done.112 
 
From Birth to Death: Family Life in Soviet Rituals 
 New wedding rituals were not the only traditions to be updated for late Soviet conditions. 
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In the 1960s, the party and state combatted religious practice not only by propagandizing against 
it but also by offering richer civil alternatives. Two others, the celebratory registration of the 
birth of a child (and/or a complementary name-giving ritual) and the more somber civil funerals, 
offered secular alternatives to events that might otherwise have had religious overtones. Officials 
feared civil registration alone was too bureaucratic and devoid of emotion to compete with 
religious alternatives. New ceremonies for birth registration and funerals were not nearly as 
successful as new wedding rituals, in part because many citizens found simple civil registration 
to be sufficient. As with weddings, other new “civil rituals” (grazhdanskie obriady) were 
primarily developed at the republic level, where officials created and promoted ceremonies that 
incorporated regional and ethnic particularities. 
 Sustained attention to rituals around birth dated to the 1960s. Like weddings, new birth 
rituals were tied to concerns about religious activity, especially the high number of baptisms.113 
In 1965, Leningrad, ever ahead of the game (or at least with an ample supply of underutilized 
grandiose buildings), opened the first “Palace of the Infant” (Dvorets Maliutka), a two-storied 
villa with specially appointed space for filling out documents, a shop for selling toys and gifts, 
rooms for mothers and children (with pediatricians and nurses on hand), and ceremonial and 
banquet halls.114 Faced with requests for similar institutions, cities quickly followed suit, or else 
reserved specific space within existing institutions for registering births.115 Some palaces offered 
parenting advice, in the form of both consultation evenings and brochures that new parents could 
take home.116 The plethora of services was designed to entice new parents to make birth 
                                                            
113 On baptisms as the impetus for new rituals, see Vladimir Aleksandrovich Rudnev, Sovetskie prazdniki, obriady, 
ritualy (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1979), 119. 
114 The palace is described in Belov, Nashi prazdniki, 133. 
115 Rudnev, Sovetskie prazdniki, obriady, ritualy, 125. 
116 Rudnev, 130. As Rudnev notes, these instructional materials included directions about how to raise healthy 






registration a celebratory event. 
 Rituals surrounding the birth of a child were simultaneously private family moments and 
public civil events. Ceremonies were infused with the language of citizenship, as the birth of a 
child was also the birth of a new citizen. Literature on birth registration procedures emphasized 
their social function, as well as the importance of the love, care, and help for a child and new 
parents from a community of family, friends, and co-workers. At the Leningrad Palace, the 
presiding official read the following text upon the official signing of paperwork, “Today, the 
son/daughter, born into the family of (parents’ names), is registered. According to the parents’ 
wish, he/she is given the name (child’s name). In honor of new citizen (child’s first and last 
name), the state anthem of the Soviet Union will be sung.” To the tune of the anthem, local 
officials congratulated the parents and gave them the birth certificate, a medallion, and a 
congratulatory letter from the city administration.117 
 Like marriage rituals, birth rituals reflected ethnic and local traditions, with some 
variation across the country. As Lane notes, Latvian rituals were less severe and more emotional 
than the Leningrad variant. As part of the ritual, young children in national dress presented new 
parents with the birth certificate with candles that would be lit during the ceremony. A local 
official emphasized the importance of raising the child in the spirit of love for one’s native place, 
a stepping stone for love of the Soviet Union, reflecting the nested forms of patriotism discussed 
in Chapter 2.118 In Ukraine, local elders added a traditional touch, while Karelia employed folk 
choirs.119 In Lithuania, there was more focus on the actual function of naming the child, and 
ceremonies often incorporated a traditional family feast. Grandmothers played a uniquely 
important role in Belarus. In Uzbekistan, reworked “cradle celebrations” (beshik to’y) were also 
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adapted and included in new civil rituals.120 Across the country, new parents planted trees in 
honor of newborn children, often in special parks where entire promenades were lined with trees 
for new citizens.121 
 Along with offering secular alternatives to baptism, circumcision, and other religious 
rites, new rituals promoted proper birth registration with the state. Avoiding or circumventing 
parental reliance on religious ceremony was certainly one benefit of offering more celebratory 
rituals. Officials, however, were often less concerned about whether the birth was registered in 
this new, celebratory manner, as long as the birth was registered with local authorities, an 
important bureaucratic procedure that rendered new citizens legible to state authorities. Although 
this was less of a problem in urban centers and across the western Soviet Union, officials 
expressed concerns about unregistered births in Central Asia and in rural communities. 
Alongside promoting new registration rituals, city and regional authorities conducted extensive 
work at birthing homes and hospitals to streamline and simplify the registration process, ensuring 
that the country’s newest citizens were known and accounted for.122 
 Concerns about religious practices also undergirded a new focus on civil funerals, easily 
the least successful of the new life-cycle rituals developed by state, party, and cultural activists in 
the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s. Civil funerals, at least where they were implemented, offered a 
somber, reflective service for family members, friends, and coworkers to remember deceased 
loved ones. A ceremony, overseen by a trained official in uniform, focused on the life of the 
deceased, before the family accompanied the coffin for burial. Music and poetry, like Dmitrii 
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Shostakovich’s Requiem and Robert Rozhdestvenskii’s poem “Requiem,” contributed to the 
reflective, somber atmosphere. Speeches reminded loved ones that the work and memory of the 
departed lived on.123  
 As with weddings and birth registration, some attention went towards ensuring that cities 
and rural centers had suitable infrastructure for carrying out civic funerals appropriately. In the 
1960s and ‘70s, there were efforts to improve the quality and administration of cemeteries, many 
of which were in a disastrous state, thanks to chronic neglect.124 There was also some attention to 
constructing new pavilions within the territory of cemeteries themselves and adding shops for 
selling wreaths, flowers, and other funereal items. These provided a convenient and appropriate 
space to conduct civil funerals.125 
 Unlike more laudatory descriptions of birth and wedding rituals, state, party, and cultural 
activists spoke extensively about shortcomings in funeral rites.126 Some worried that existing 
civil funeral ceremonies, while modestly successfully in cities, were poorly adapted for rural 
environments.127 Despite improvements to the quality and care of cemeteries and the 
commissioning of new music and rites, secular funerals remained by and large unpopular, 
especially in the countryside. Authorities may have spoken of the need to improve these rituals, 
but many seemed unconcerned by the lack of success in this arena, particularly in contrast to 
concerns about birth registration and weddings. In part, difficulties in introducing and 
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popularizing secular funerals stemmed from problems inherent in atheist cosmology. Although a 
belief in life after death was certainly not a precondition for meaningful funerals, death rituals 
were precisely the arena in which ideology and new rituals offered the least meaningful 
alternative to religion. As a result, attitudes, beliefs, and practices surrounding death continued to 
be influenced by religious belief, even as actual belief evolved and declined.128 The state clearly 
had far more success with rituals for happier occasions. 
 
The Proliferation of Rituals: Socializing Citizens  
 Rituals celebrating more private milestones in family life—marriage, birth, death—were 
complemented by new celebrations for other key life events that marked social milestones, 
including the first day of school, the presentation of the first internal passport, recruitment into 
the military, and various job-related milestones (the first paycheck, promotions, retirement). 
Unlike weddings, birth registrations, and funerals, these civic milestones were often celebrated 
collectively, as groups rather than individuals marked milestones together. Across the Soviet 
Union, at both republic and local levels, commissions under the authority of the Soviet of 
Workers’ Deputies prepared formal rituals for these new celebratory occasions. Celebrations of 
these moments rooted (especially young) citizens’ private lives and personal development into 
the life of their communities and celebrated their progressive inclusion in society. The rituals 
represented state attempts to foster a more universal civic identity. 
 In general, these rituals celebrated citizens’ socialization through their inclusion in the 
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main institutions of Soviet life, including schools, the military, and the workplace.129 Of these 
rituals, the presentation of the internal passport most obviously expressed state aims of 
cultivating civic identity and a sense of citizenship among young citizens. By the mid-1970s, the 
passport system underwent a major change, as use of the internal passport expanded to include 
previously excluded rural inhabitants. With the universalization of the passport system in 1976, 
all citizens over 16 years of age were required to carry the internal passport as their primary 
identity document, one that testified to citizens’ nested ethnic and civic identities.130 The creation 
of special festivities for ceremonial presentations of citizens’ first passport, a process that began 
in the 1960s, would add an air of formality and solemnity to this civil ritual. According to a 1977 
book, “The presentation of the passport of a citizen of the USSR, the official recognition of 
young men and women as full-fledged (polnopravnye) citizens of the Country of the Soviets, is a 
significant and thrilling event in the life of young people. This event signifies for them the start 
of adulthood and independence.”131 
 Like other ceremonies, the passport ceremony did not have a single form, allowing for 
regional and local variation. Ceremonies often borrowed from a shared set of rites, including 
speeches on the responsibilities and duties of citizenship, a formal statement or oath from 
participants acknowledging their status as citizens of the Soviet Union, a rendition of the national 
anthem, and recitations of various poems and texts, often including Vladimir Mayakovsky’s 
Lines about a Soviet Passport.132 The 1929 poem, quoted in the epigraph of the dissertation, 
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concluded with the poet defiantly and proudly showing his passport at the border: “Read it, envy 
me, I am a citizen of the Soviet Union.”133 To add to the solemnity and as a symbol of 
generational turnover, local elites often participated in the ceremonies, including officials, old 
Bolsheviks, war veterans, and decorated workers. The older generation served as an example to 
their sixteen-year-old compatriots of how to live and contribute to society.134 Passport rituals 
were often held at war memorials in the summer or in conjunction with local Constitution Day 
celebrations (December 5 until 1977, October 7 thereafter).135 
 Together with new rituals for family milestones, rituals celebrating citizens’ progressive 
socialization were seen to be part of a distinctly “Soviet way of life” (sovetskii obraz zhizni) 
emerging among citizens, as described by N. Andrianov and A. Belov, candidates of 
philosophical sciences, in a 1976 Pravda article: 
Here dozens of new civil rituals have been quickly approved. They have become an 
inseparable part of the Soviet way of life… In its symbolic, vividly emotional form, this 
new socialist ritualism (obriadnost’) collectively expresses events that are significant for 
people. It fulfills important social, worldview, and ideological functions. Having become 
an element of spiritual culture, it serves as one of the means for transmitting leading ideas 
and impressions from generation to generation, and enables the confirmation of 
communist ideals, revolutionary and patriotic traditions, and moral education.136 
 
As Andrianov and Belov made clear, rituals helped to forge an affective community, unified in 
its spiritual values, revolutionary history, and pursuit of communism. This distinct way of life, 
they suggested, was at the core of a shared identity that united citizens across a vast geographic 
space. At the same time, the rituals themselves were not monolithic. The “dozens” of emerging 
ritual forms reflected the richness of the country's diverse, multiethnic population. 
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Blending the Soviet and the Ethnic 
 In the eyes of many experts, a primary concern was how to imbue new rituals with 
meaningful emotional content. According to specialists, the path towards emotional impact was 
paved directly by elements of ethnic and traditional cultures and by instilling older, more 
traditional rites with new, specifically Soviet interpretations. Determining which traditions to 
include remained, in the words of one expert, “one of the most difficult questions in the 
development of new rituality.”137 In their syncretic blend of old and new, Soviet rituals were 
“invented traditions” that borrowed from the past for their emotional legitimacy, yet were 
carefully and self-consciously developed and adapted for the modern era.138 The ethnically 
informed shape of new rituals echoed the underlying goal of the nationalities policy of another 
era, which had sought to mitigate ethnic opposition by encouraging the development of national 
forms within strict boundaries. Although the purpose was no longer to avoid ethnic unrest, rituals 
broadcasted official views on the limits of acceptable ethnic expression. 
 Activists focused on how to cleanse traditional rites of antiquated content and symbolism. 
Most prominently, this meant eliminating or reinterpreting their religious significance. As 
Dmitrii Ugrinovich noted, “The use of old, folk ritual forms is expedient in those situations when 
they are not organically connected to an ideology and psychology that is antagonistic to us.”139 
Many expressed concern that older religious and ethnic rituals implied certain understandings of 
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social relations that were unacceptable in modern Soviet times. In a 1977 book, for example, 
Aleksandr Evstifeev warned against Orthodox and Islamic attitudes towards women, which 
tended to see women as property and deprived them of civil rights. He believed newer Soviet 
rituals offered an opportunity to create a “family of a new type,” which needed to be celebrated 
in a public, emotional way that would be memorable to all involved.140 
 Among specialists, there was considerable confidence about citizens’ ability to reinterpret 
and appropriate older traditions. As Ugrinovich noted, when determining the suitability of older 
traditions, “it is important to consider whether one or another traditional ritual form expresses 
new conceptual content, or, at the very least, does not contradict [that content].” As examples of 
good reinterpretation, he noted that engagement rituals no longer symbolized economic relations 
between families but the couple’s intent to enter into marriage. Similarly, wedding rings had 
shed their ecclesiastical origins to become symbols of spousal fidelity, which served civil 
weddings well.141 Evstifeev suggested that young couples had reinterpreted the traditional 
practice of showering newlyweds with grain—historically to protect them from evil spirits and 
poverty—as a symbol of peace and harmony.142 
 Scholars, activists, and theorists wrote extensively on the idea that new rituals could 
combine elements of both the “ethnic” and the Soviet. The “inclusion of ethno-progressive 
elements in the shared traditions of people of our country,” the Ivano-Frankivisk oblast 
committee secretary P.D. Sardachuk wrote in 1983, “strengthens their international content. 
Even the deepest feelings of love for one’s Motherland is formed by the means of fostering in 
young men and women love for their native land, the paternal home.” Citing one example, he 
noted that Carpathian mothers in one district in his oblast sent off their sons for military service 
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with forest flowers and hand-sewn embroidered cloths.143 Another observer, citing recent 
ethnographic research, noted that many Kyrgyz marriage traditions continued to the present, and 
he reflected on his belief that the most successful new traditions were ones with analogues in 
traditional culture.144 
  Rituals themselves often differed from place to place in overt and subtle ways, reflecting 
the specific regional and ethnic traditions of various communities. Ugrinovich argued that the 
suitability of older traditional rituals depended on the couple themselves and their way of life, 
suggesting the need for a certain degree of flexibility. What worked in cities, he argued, was not 
always ideal in the countryside.145 In general, experts saw rituals as a connection to the past and 
encouraged the use of ethnic, local, and traditional rituals whenever they could be deemed 
appropriate.146 As Vladimir Brudnyi argued in a 1968 book, incorporating traditional elements 
ensured that weddings continued to express the “people’s soul” (dusha narodnaia). As a result, 
traditions—dress, food, music, rites—differed according to local customs.147 
 Regional difference was further encouraged by a significant decentralization in the 
development and implementation of rituals, which was generally left up to union and 
autonomous republics. Brudnyi specifically drew from differences between Russia and Ukraine 
(and within Ukraine itself).148 In Ukraine and Moldova, proposed uniforms for the personnel who 
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would carry out civil rituals incorporated traditional embroidery.149 Songs were also considered 
to be an important expression of national identity, foremost in the Western Soviet Union.150 In 
the Baltic republics, greater emphasis was also put on coming-of-age rituals, in part to compete 
with the Catholic and Protestant confirmation ceremonies typically completed by teenagers.151 
Reflecting official emphasis on local and ethnic traditions, books and materials on civil rituals 
and rites were prepared and published all across the country, often in non-Russian languages.152 
 Although cultural activists sought to blend local practice with Soviet rituals, this was not 
always successful. A. Aliev, the author of a 1968 book published in Makhachkala, Dagestan, 
complained that, while new forms of weddings eliminated many dangerous elements from the 
past and were now preferred by young people, there had been too little attention to national 
traditions: “In new weddings, the parents of the bride and groom and their relatives are often 
pushed away from making plans, which damages the family character of the ritual; the good 
elements that can be saved from folk rituals of matchmaking and marriage are not being used.” 
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Aliev blamed both central and local initiatives for a tendency to transplant forms and rituals from 
Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic Republics into the North Caucasus, often to poor effect. Rather, 
the most effective modern form of weddings, he argued, would blend the best elements of old 
rituals specific to the North Caucasus with new, progressive rituals. Some of the tensions also 
came in balancing the newer, more modern ceremonies that many young people preferred with 
older traditions favored by their parents and grandparents.153 More generally, suggestions for 
how to incorporate local rituals were often vague, suggesting that appeals to ethnic and local 
traditions were often superficial formalities rather than deep commitments. 
 Alongside more traditional elements, new rituals also reflected aspects of Soviet life. 
State symbols, like Lenin busts, flags, and state seals, featured prominently in the decor of 
wedding and infant palaces and registry offices. The use of the Soviet anthem in infant 
registration, passport ceremonies, and other rituals tied rituals to the practice of citizenship, as 
did the use of World War II memorial sites for private rituals. After wedding ceremonies, 
newlyweds embraced the tradition of taking photos at various local sites, many of which were 
imbued with specific meaning. As Evstifeev described in 1977, “On the day of the wedding, 
according to a new tradition, newlyweds visit monuments to fallen heroes, lay wreaths of living 
flowers, reminding them once again at the festive moment of those who protected this happy 
holiday.”154 To this day, this tradition can be seen across the former Soviet Union, as any 
Saturday walk in a city park will almost certainly reveal. Even with their varying ethnically 
derived content, rituals across the country confirmed citizens’ belonging to a single Soviet state. 
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Measuring Success: Rituals on the Frontlines of Soviet Atheism and Civic Identity 
 By the mid-1960s, activists were already noting the fruits of their labor. In qualitative 
terms, specialists hailed new rituals for hastening the decline of religious practice. Ritual expert 
Vladimir Brudnyi noted in 1968 that new rituals had quickly become enmeshed in Soviet life, 
even new republics like Estonia and Latvia, and they had contributed to a notable decline in 
religious practice.155 Andrianov and Belov’s Pravda article from 1976 similarly credited new 
rituals for a serious decline in religiosity. New research from Leningrad, they noted, suggested 
more than 80 percent of people who had “recently” broken with religion had been influenced by 
new rituals.156 Although church weddings and baptisms continued among some parts of the 
population and in some locales, many believed there was evidence of decline.157 More generally, 
books, pamphlets, and other published materials praised new rituals for their power to engage 
citizens emotionally without relying on religious practices and provided atheist alternatives that 
spoke to citizens’ minds and feelings all at once.158 
 Alongside more qualitative successes, party and state leaders also demonstrated the 
effectiveness of new rituals in quantitative terms, which highlighted their function as an 
instrument of late Soviet atheist propaganda. Because statistics tended to be reported at local and 
republic levels, countrywide statistics are difficult to approximate, but local state and party 
organizations noted improvements. The Leningrad division of the Komsomol reported a 
precipitous decline in church weddings in 1964, a triumph that was attributed to the runaway 
success and popularity of its Wedding Palace. It was so successful, in fact, that a second palace 
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was opened in February 1963. “Now,” the 1964 report proudly declared, “almost all marriages in 
Leningrad are registered in Palaces in a stately, celebratory manner,” citing a decline in church 
weddings from 25 percent of new marriages in 1959 to 0.24 percent in 1964. This success, the 
report more generally observed, had contributed to stronger marriages and families.159 
 Most republics and locales reported mixed success but marked improvement, according 
to a series of reports made in the early 1970s. Belarus reported a republic-wide increase in 
celebratory civic weddings from just 7.3 percent in 1964 to 67.3 percent in 1971. Their report 
complained, however, of serious understaffing at the Minsk Wedding House, suggesting major 
limitations to their work.160 By 1971, Uzbekistan also reported on the widespread availability of 
“Houses of Happiness” (the name frequently given to smaller wedding institutions, typically in 
rural areas) across the republic. The report further noted various improvements in their work, 
though overall the number of new-style weddings remained low, below 50 percent even in 
Tashkent.161 Turkmenistan, though mum on overall statistics, reported improvements across 
some rural regions and great enthusiasm for improving the work of registry offices among 
employees, a large number of whom were women.162 Other republics reported various 
shortcomings while acknowledging the importance of continued attention.163 
 That the development of new Soviet rituals was at the forefront of atheism under both 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev is also evident in the statistical reports on their implementation that 
emanated from oblasts, cities, and towns across the country. Local reports identified successes 
                                                            
159 RGASPI, f. M-1, o. 32, d. 1151, ll. 40–44. Statistics on page 44. 
160 GARF, f. 9492, o. 8, d. 52, l. 8.  
161 GARF, f. 9492, o. 8, d. 52, ll. 12–14. This only reported on weddings held in the new, “celebratory” manner and 
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noted that registry office employees often made mistakes in filling out paperwork, suggesting the urgent need for 






through statistical reporting on the numbers of celebratory birth registrations, weddings, funerals, 
and other rituals, as well as the number of religious rituals had taken place. Reflecting official 
understanding and measurement of religiosity, success in implementing Soviet rituals was 
measured through higher numbers of new rites and declining numbers of religious ones.164 In 
Kazakhstan, local oblast and regional committees reported on the numbers of births, weddings, 
and sometimes funerals that had been carried out in the new, celebratory matter. These numbers 
were contrasted to statistics on continuing (though declining) baptisms and religious weddings 
and funerals in the same period.165 Similar practices were at work in Ukraine and elsewhere. 
 Atheism, however, was always only one aspect of the potential of these new rituals. 
Indeed, as one scholar noted, it was precisely their “polyfunctional character” that rendered them 
indispensible to efforts to educate, socialize, and prepare people, particularly youth, for Soviet 
citizenship.166 The built-in flexibility, which permitted different practices based on participants’ 
ethnicity, geographical location, socio-economic background, and/or personal preferences, 
enabled rituals, at least in theory, to play a dynamic, adaptable role in civic life.167 As one author 
noted, “The versatility of content and function of every ritual or ritualistic cycle is already 
embedded in their genesis, since the creators and bearers of rituals subordinate ritual art to life 
circumstances and their own needs.” Speaking of the “syncretic combination (synkretychne 
poiednannia) of the various origins into a ritual,” she emphasized that rituals played a primarily 
social function that reflected the circumstances of the present but which also connected people to 
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the past.168 Rituals, experts agreed, were fundamental to the institution and practice of Soviet 
citizenship, instilling in people the morality, worldview, and principles expected of citizens. 
 
Conclusion: Holidays, Rituals, and Identity between Center and Periphery 
 From the October Revolution to the collapse, celebration and commemoration featured 
centrally in the development, articulation, and practice of Soviet identity. In the first decade of 
rule, experimentation both in the forms and symbols of holiday celebrations and civil rituals to 
mark birth, marriage, and death reflected nascent and ongoing conversations about the nature of 
Soviet identity and the role of the state and religion in the formation of new citizens. As Stalin 
strengthened his grip over state and society in the late 1920s and early 1930s, these more open 
conversations were suppressed in favor of hierarchical and orchestrated forms that dominated 
public life for the duration of his rule. Forms of celebration mirrored conversations about the 
nature of civic identity, as leaders and cultural elites emphasized the simultaneous unity and 
diversity of the Soviet people. Expressions of this unity and diversity remained strictly monitored 
and controlled by the state under Stalin, as the party-state claimed to be the primary (and often 
only) source of legitimacy. Carefully choreographed demonstrations of unity, from ritualized 
cultural performances by ethnic minorities in the dekady that proliferated in the 1930s to parades 
that showcased the country’s diversity, both evidenced and deepened rigid hierarchical relations. 
These celebrations broadcast the ways in which the state had liberated and uplifted its formerly 
oppressed peoples, a feat for which all citizens were expected to constantly express their deep, 
enduring gratitude. 
 Echoing the fact that patriotic discourse under Khrushchev and Brezhnev remained 
largely unchanged from its Stalinist antecedents, ritualized holiday celebrations under Stalin’s 
                                                            






successors retained most of the features that had crystalized under Stalin. The celebration of 
major holidays, including annual commemorations of Victory Day beginning in 1965, kept an air 
of rigid formality that emanated from Moscow. These celebrations, however, were also 
accompanied by an expansion of celebratory practices that included not only more formal 
recognition of traditional ethnic and regional holidays but also a rise in lifecycle rituals. Far from 
the hegemonic, centralized, and ritualized practices of formal holidays, new rituals to celebrate 
weddings, births, the first day of school, the presentation of the first passport, and other life 
events were developed primarily outside Moscow. This reflected an attempt to incorporate a 
wide variety of regional and ethnic practices to instill greater emotional content, offering a 
meaningful way for citizens to celebrate life milestones in a civic space. 
 Soviet celebratory practices both reflected and challenged the hierarchical organization of 
the Soviet Union. The celebration of major holidays remained highly centralized and ritualized 
from shortly after the revolution until the Soviet Union’s demise, reflecting the “rigidity of form” 
that Alexei Yurchak has identified as definitional to late Soviet society.169 Forms of celebration 
emanated from and centered on Moscow, as the party maintained strict control and surveillance 
across the country. The development of civil rituals under Stalin’s successors, in contrast, told a 
more complicated story. As with holidays, some of the impetus for introducing and developing 
new rituals came from Moscow. From administrative changes concerning registry offices to 
issuing instructions for republics to improve and develop new rituals, much of the initial energy 
(and indeed, a certain degree of permission) came from the center. Reflecting this relationship, 
the first all-union scientific-practical conference on new rituals took place in Moscow in 1964 on 
                                                            






the party’s initiative.170 Leading academics, many based in Moscow, also wrote extensively 
about new rituals and their significance in Soviet society. Iulian Bromlei, the ethnographer 
discussed in Chapter 3 and a key theorist on Soviet identity, even offered a contribution to a 
1981 book of methodological recommendations. His article, “New rituality: an important 
component of the Soviet way of life,” reflected on how rituals contributed to modern civic life.171 
 At the same time, the state’s insistence that civil rituals should incorporate and build on 
ethnic and local traditions decentralized the processes of developing and implementing rituals. 
This devolution granted greater authority to republics, as well as academics and scholars who 
researched, studied, and developed these rituals. Not surprisingly, this process yielded mixed 
results. Some republics, for example Armenia and Turkmenistan, seemed to devote little energy 
or attention to the development of new rituals, and their occasional reports suggested ongoing 
difficulties in the implementation and practice of new rituals.172 By the same token, in the 1970s 
and especially the 1980s, Ukraine had become the leading authority on new rituals. It was likely 
for this reason that Kyiv hosted the second all-union scientific-practical conference in 1978, with 
participation from all republics and many scholars and other specialists, including a major speech 
by Bromlei. The infrastructure for studying, developing, and implementing new rituals in 
Ukraine was widely considered to be the best in the Soviet Union, and Ukrainian experts were 
recognized as leaders in this field.173 A 1981 book closed with recommended ritual forms that 
republics could adapt according to local circumstances, and prominently featured specific 
                                                            
170 I have been unable to track down records of this conference, though M.A. Orlyk, Deputy Director of the Soviet of 
Ministers of Ukraine and head of the Ukrainian Commission on Soviet Traditions, Holidays, and Rituals, mentioned 
the earlier conference at the second conference held in Kyiv in 1978: TsDAVOU, f. 2, o. 14, d. 2655, l. 80. 
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Traditsionnye i novye obriady v bytu narodov SSSR. 
172 See reports in GARF, f. 9492 o. 8, d. 52. 






ceremonies and costumes that had been developed in Ukraine.174 This was one palpable 
disruption of the center-to-periphery power structure that often dominated Soviet politics. 
 Furthermore, by encouraging the development of rituals that were informed and colored 
by local and ethnic traditions and practices, the state demonstrated an ongoing commitment to 
the cultivation of ethnic minorities. Of course, the space for expressing these identities remained 
closely monitored and tightly circumscribed, not least because of strict restrictions on religious 
life. Nevertheless, the use and incorporation of traditions from across the country offered a 
symbolic reminder that these identities informed and contributed to civic identity. The 
widespread belief that ethnically derived rituals could inspire a deeper, more emotional 
attachment to the state suggested that elites continued to see ethnicity as a powerful tool for 
making Soviet citizens.
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2, o. 13, dd. 9745, 9747, 9748, and 9748a. One example ritual for initiating people into agricultural work had been 








Russian Language, Soviet People: 
Language Policy from Revolution to Brezhnev  
 
 
After dozens of Ukrainian intellectuals were arrested in the fall of 1965, the literary 
scholar Ivan Dziuba sent a critique of nationalities policy in Ukraine to Petro Shelest and 
Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, heads of the Ukrainian party and state apparatuses, respectively. 
Dziuba, then a committed Marxist and member of the Writers’ Union of Ukraine, argued that 
policies in Ukraine had veered dangerously away from Marxist ideology. Under Stalin and since 
his death, Dziuba wrote, the state had abandoned its prior commitment to national languages and 
cultures, instead pushing an agenda of linguistic and cultural Russification, thinly veiled under 
the rubric of internationalism. Ukrainian had become a second-class language as a new 
generation grew up with a strong preference for Russian. The only acceptable Marxist solution 
would be a return to the Leninist policies of the 1920s.1 
Not surprisingly, the authorities were unimpressed. Dziuba’s book was officially banned 
and circulated only illegally.2 Dziuba himself was accused of “anti-Soviet activities.” He was 
expelled from the Writers Union, removed from his job, and sentenced to five years 
imprisonment and five additional years in exile, though he was released after just 18 months. His 
personal trajectory hints at the seriousness with which the state treated questions of language and 
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culture. In truth, the place of Russian was far more complicated than the simple dichotomy that 
Dziuba proposed. Aspects of both “internationalism” and “Russification” were certainly present 
(if not always officially acknowledged) in the way the state handled Russian, but neither concept, 
nor some hybrid between the two, accurately conveys the complexity of its role. 
The Russian language stood squarely at the heart of nationalities policy from the Soviet 
Union’s very establishment, first through vigorous refusals to acknowledge the language’s 
obvious centrality, and later through formal acknowledgement of its importance. Analysis of the 
discourses about Russian, language education, alphabet changes, and pedagogical questions 
across the country between Lenin and Brezhnev suggests that the state did not see Russian 
exclusively—or even primarily—as the language of the Russian people. Instead, the state 
stressed that the language represented an important tool of interethnic communication that 
belonged equally to all citizens. Rather than a hegemonic project that privileged Russian and 
Russians, policies and discourses concerning Russian’s status were intended, if not entirely 
successfully, to make the language more ethnically unmarked and neutral. Leaders and cultural 
figures sought to incentivize the use of Russian through indexing it as the language of state, 
culture, progress, and interethnic communication.3 As such, Russian represented a tool of both 
hierarchical and lateral integration. 
Most obviously, Russian functioned as the language of upward mobility and the language 
of state, connecting people in a hierarchical relationship with the Soviet center. In this function, 
Russian occupied an imperial position, much like the role English, French, Spanish, and German 
played in the British, French, Spanish, and Habsburg Empires, respectively. More uniquely, 
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Russian also enabled interethnic communication, connecting not only center to periphery but 
also periphery to periphery. Although this function has played a de facto role in all empires—for 
example, in interactions between South Asian migrants and local South Africans and other 
imperial subjects or between conscripts in imperial militaries—the Soviet Union uniquely and 
formally cultivated this function.4 Indeed, that learning Russian could enable all citizens, 
particularly non-Russians, to communicate with one another was central to official justifications 
for why all citizens should master the language. This reflected Soviet claims of radical equality 
and the elimination of ethno-linguistic hierarchies and difference. 
At the same time, these attempts to ensure greater equality were routinely contradicted by 
inequalities implicit in the regime’s use of Russian. Despite attempts to highlight Russian as an 
ethnically neutral marker of all-union identity, its connection to the Russian people could not be 
denied. Its more formal prominence beginning in the late 1930s coincided with new articulations 
of Soviet identity that emerged in the 1930s. The language’s symbolic role as a lingua franca 
and its close association with Soviet identity echoed frequent slippages between the “Soviet” and 
“Russian” peoples. Since knowledge of Russian increasingly became a prerequisite for 
participation in society, the burdens of integration nearly always fell unequally upon the 
shoulders of non-Russian citizens. 
Leaders and citizens, informed by changing, competing, and often contradictory goals, 
perpetually debated, criticized, and negotiated the role of Russian. Its general trajectory between 
Lenin and Brezhnev hinged around two pivotal moments: the 1938 law that mandated Russian-
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language education for all pupils and the 1958–59 school reform that ostensibly allowed parents 
to choose the language of their children’s school instruction. These moments suggested three 
general phases in Russian’s development in the Soviet Union. First, from before the revolution 
until 1938, leaders promoted the development and use of non-Russian languages while 
simultaneously recognizing Russian as the language of state, culture, and revolution. Following 
the 1938 law, Russian’s importance was publicly and systematically emphasized. Educational 
changes dovetailed with the language’s more prominent function as a language of integration and 
of all-union and international activity, as Russian transformed into a world language during and 
after World War II, at least in the growing sphere of Soviet influence. The removal of formal 
language requirements in 1958–59 signified something of a return to pre-1938 policies, as the 
state relied on informal modes of cultural imperialism to ensure Russian’s prominence. 
This chapter explores the role of the Russian language with a shifting lens between 
Moscow and union republics. The main foci of language policy were determined in Moscow 
within party circles and among educational elites, who determined and set the general policies. 
Also in Moscow, central newspapers discussed the theoretical role of the language and its 
growing use across the country. At the same time, the practical processes that determined the 
importance and significance of the language took place primarily at the periphery and among 
non-Russians, who bore the burden of learning a new language to ensure the possibility of 
“interethnic communication.” As a result, this chapter leans heavily on archival sources from 
republic-level Ministries of Education and party documents, which are supplemented with party 
and state documents from the Soviet center. These parallel lenses illuminate how, even as the 
Russian language’s position ebbed and flowed from decade to decade, it remained persistently 






Lenin’s Language: Russian Between Revolution and Korenizatsiia 
 The first two decades of Soviet rule set the terms of Russian’s role in the Soviet Union 
both in theory and practice. During these early years, Bolshevik leaders simultaneously pursued 
two contradictory policies. On one hand, they explicitly positioned themselves in opposition to 
tsarist political agendas with policies of korenizatsiia (indigenization), which undermined the 
historic dominance of the Russian language. On the other hand, these same elites developed 
theoretical ideas of Russian as the appropriate language of Soviet state, culture, and revolution. 
As a result, despite meaningful attempts to decenter the language, Russian remained broadly 
taught and universally important. 
 
Russian as a State Language: Bolshevik Thinking in Theory and Practice 
The deep association between Russian and the state predated the revolution, even though, 
as Michael Gordin notes, the language’s development “was not quite linear.”5 Until the 17th 
century, Russian state formations used versions of Church Slavonic that differed markedly from 
vernacular Russian. Peter the Great’s 1708 orthographic reform modernized the state language, 
bringing it more in line with spoken forms. Still, Russian was eclipsed by other languages: Old 
Church Slavonic in the medieval period, and foreign languages—Latin, German, and French—
well into the 19th century. With the flourishing of literary Russian—Pushkin, Gogol, and 
others—and continued territorial expansion in the 19th century, Russian indubitably became the 
language of empire. Linguistic (and often cultural) Russification became a prerequisite for social 
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advancement, though few subjects had access to education. Mastery of Russian, however, rarely 
guaranteed full integration: although many citizens advanced through civil and military service, 
non-Russian and non-Orthodox subjects often found their upward mobility limited. Russification 
in schools and military service furthermore often came with the loss of previously guaranteed 
autonomy.6 Non-Russian languages suffered to varying degrees, ranging from active 
repression—with prohibitions and limits on Ukrainian, Polish, and Romanian—to negligence.7 
Outside official circles, the regime’s liberal critics advocated Russian as a state language 
at the turn of the century, and Bolsheviks, too, recognized Russian’s significance, even as they 
criticized oppressive tsarist policies towards the empire’s peripheries. In an oft-quoted 1914 
article published in Proletarskaia Pravda, Lenin staked out a position that, like the liberals he 
opposed, highlighted Russian’s importance: “Even more so than you, we know that the language 
of Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dobroliubov, Chernyshevskii is great and powerful. Even more so than 
you, we want the possibility of closer communication and brotherly unity among the oppressed 
classes of all nations inhabiting Russia without any differentiation.”8 In contrast to liberals, 
however, Lenin opposed the mandatory study of Russian, although he did believe citizens should 
be guaranteed opportunities to study the language on a voluntary basis.  
Lenin’s 1914 article suggested two fundamental understandings about the role of Russian 
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in the future Bolshevik state. First, he viewed Russian as the language of culture and progress, 
highlighting the work of writers who observed changes in Russian society and wrote influentially 
about the country’s future. Second, he presumed that Russian would be the language of “closer 
communication and brotherly unity” among all peoples of the empire, even under conditions of 
greater equality. Lenin developed his ideas as follows: “Hundreds of thousands of people are 
moving about from one corner of Russia to another, the ethnic composition of the population is 
intermixing, isolation and ethnic backwardness (zaskoruzlost’) should fall away. Those who by 
the circumstances of their own lives and work need knowledge of Russian will study it without 
the stick.”9 In his view, participation in society—through both interaction with fellow citizens 
and inclusion in the workforce—would incentivize learning Russian without a state mandate. 
The presumption of preference for Russian confirmed its de facto status as the language of state 
and society and as a key tool for advancement for non-Russian peoples. 
Following the 1917 revolution, politicians, cultural activists, and journalists frequently 
invoked Lenin’s words to demonstrate the importance of Russian and the need for a gradual 
approach to enforcing Russian-language use. At a 1924 Komintern meeting just months after 
Lenin’s death, head of state Mikhail Kalinin quoted the 1914 article as evidence of Lenin’s 
confidence in the tenets of Bolshevism and his faith that the working masses would ultimately be 
converted. Lenin’s thinking on the nationalities question, Kalinin proclaimed, “made him the 
leader of both the Russian (russkii) revolution and the international revolution.”10 The following 
year, a full-page spread celebrating the particularity of the USSR and its constitution prominently 
quoted the same 1914 essay to demonstrate the state’s commitment to voluntary study of Russian 
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while reinforcing the language’s inherent draw.11 
The 1920s and ‘30s saw a growing association between the Russian language and 
revolution. In a 1921 Krasnaia Gazeta article, former Kadet leader Grodeskul highlighted 
Russian’s revolutionary significance: “In the era of the great French Revolution, French was 
called the language of freedom, and today, Russian is called the language of the worldwide 
revolution. Soviet Russia has a role like never before, and if Soviet Russia manages to put its 
ideals into practice, the Russian people will be described in history as the liberator-people of 
humanity.”12 In a 1927 Pravda essay on education, Mansurov, a Tatar representative to the 
Central Soviet for National Minorities of the RSFSR, advocated teaching Russian in national 
schools from the earliest grades: “Russian is the language of the majority, it is the language 
spoken by the progressive proletariat of Russia, who carried out the great proletariat revolution 
and raised up the flag of liberation of workers of the entire world out from under the yoke of 
imperialism, it is the language of the richest culture, and the language in which all socio-political 
and economic life of our federation is carried out.” Echoing Lenin, Mansurov highlighted 
Russian’s growing “pull” and emphasized the importance of access to both Russian and native-
language instruction.13  
Linguists and scholars discussed the impact of the revolution, exemplified in Afanasii 
Selishchev’s Language of the Revolutionary Epoch (1928).14 This was part of a growing trend 
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that saw the “language of Lenin” as the international language of the revolution, as poet Alexei 
Kruchenykh wrote in a 1923 pamphlet, Methods of Lenin’s Rhetoric: For the Study of the 
Language of Lenin. The introduction highlighted Soviet Russian’s international status: 
At the present moment, Russian, in consequence of the particular role of our October 
revolution, is the language of the international revolution. Knowing just two or three 
words: “Lenin,” “Bolshevik,” “Soviets”—it is possible to cross the entire world; they are 
a particular subject, a password by which workers of all countries recognize one another. 
From this, [we see] the importance of studying Russian revolutionary rhetoric (rech’) is 
not just for us but on an international scale. Additionally, the broadest and most 
comprehensive literature on the socialist revolution has been published in Russian. For 
anyone studying the revolutionary movement, especially of the last decade, it will be 
absolutely obligatory to be familiar with the broad Russian literature on this matter.15 
 
Poet Vladimir Mayakovsky explored Russian’s connection Lenin in his 1927 poem, To Our 
Youth: 
 Comrade-youth, 
  look to Moscow, 
 in Russian sharpen your ears! 
 Even if I were 
  a Negro of declining years, 
 even then, 
without despondency or laziness, 
 I would learn Russian 
  simply because 
in it 
 spoke Lenin.16 
 
As suggested elsewhere in the poem, Mayakovsky’s own birth in Georgia and his Cossack 
heritage connected him with an “all-union” identity that, like Kruchenykh, saw Russian as the 
common inheritance and future of all progressive peoples, one that drew them towards Moscow. 
In dedicating the poem “to our youth,” Mayakovsky indexed Russian as the language of 
the future. He was not alone. Izvestiia correspondent G. Rylkin highlighted the growing use of 
Russian among Crimea’s Jewish community in a 1926 article, “In a new place.” Rylkin subtly 
                                                            
15 Aleksei Kruchenykh, Priemy leninskoi rechi: K izucheniiu iazyka Lenina (1925), 3rd ed. (Izd. Vserossiiskogo 
Soiuza Poetov, 1928), 3. 






contrasted old-fashioned lifestyles with new tropes of tractors and Komsomol members. He 
described an elderly Jew harnessing his horse at the water pump with a “long, wedge-shaped 
beard,” assisted by his young grandson. Subtly suggesting incongruity, Rylkin noted that the 
elderly man spoke Russian, which was not unusual: “Russian has become deeply embedded in 
life in the colony. We heard how old men and women speak Russian between themselves. As 
concerns youth, they speak exclusively in Russian. The Pioneers do not know Yiddish at all.”17 
This young generation, he implied, had abandoned old-fashioned ways in favor of new 
technologies, ideology, and language. Another elderly informant concluded resignedly, “There is 
no return to the past.”18 
 
Korenizatsiia: A Decentering of Russian? 
 To some extent, policies of korenizatsiia (indigenization) contradicted the widespread 
rhetorical centering of Russian. To counter tsarist oppression in keeping with Lenin’s 
prerevolutionary writings, leaders enacted a far-reaching agenda of “affirmative action” to 
promote non-Russians. Native-language schooling became a central focus in the first decade of 
rule, often at the expense of Russian. Terry Martin has highlighted how policies of linguistic 
Ukrainization, the Latinization of non-Slavic languages, and the favorable treatment of ethnic 
minorities through quota systems in higher education and government explicitly disadvantaged 
both Russian and Russians.19 
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Although the state certainly prioritized the promotion of ethnic minorities in new and 
innovative ways during the first two decades of rule, korenizatsiia was not simply an agenda of 
derussification or anti-Russian sentiment. Widespread Latinization campaigns in the 1920s and 
‘30s, for example, were far more complex. While elements of derussification were implicit in the 
decision not to embrace Cyrillic, alphabets shifted from Arabic to Latin in almost every case 
(Kalmyk being a notable exception). Activists across Eurasia justified Latinization as a tool for 
reducing the influence of religious leaders, promoting literacy, and adopting a more universal 
“international alphabet.”20 Indeed, there were even abortive attempts to introduce a Latin 
alphabet for Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian, a reminder that even the place of the Cyrillic 
script was as-yet undetermined as Latinization campaigns progressed.21 
Affirmative action policies were also heavily contested, suggesting that the relative roles 
of languages continued to be debated. At the 1926 meeting of the Central Executive Committee 
(TsIK), economist Iurii Larin controversially expressed concern about perceived discrimination 
against Russians, despite critical attention to Ukraine’s non-Russian, non-Ukrainian minorities. 
He decried alleged repression of Russian in favor of Ukrainian, citing evidence from complaints 
to newspaper boards about the dearth of educational opportunities for Russian-speaking children 
and the unresponsiveness of local governments to complaints voiced in Russian.22 Most of the 
subsequent speakers objected to his diagnosis and advocated continued Ukrainization, but the 
controversy suggested a view that pro-Russian language constituency existed as well. As 
Matthew Pauly argues, resistance to affirmative action policies was often evident at the local 
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level. Many resisted Ukrainian-language education, most actively in Russophone cities, 
suggesting widespread use and popularity of Russian in some localities.23  
Although the state did not mandate Russian-language education until 1938, this was not a 
prohibition. In fact, because there was no all-union Ministry of Education until 1966, educational 
policy was substantially decentralized, offering leeway for republics to develop their own 
policies.24 Many republics mandated the study of Russian beginning shortly after the revolution. 
In the Ukrainian and Belarusian SSRs, all students studied Russian regardless of ethnicity.25 At a 
1929 party meeting in the Kazakh krai, party leaders pushed for improved Russian-language 
education, fearing that Kazakh students’ lack of Russian proficiency would limit educational 
opportunities and prevent upward mobility, since higher education was often in Russian.26 By 
1938, leaders declared Russian in Kazakh schools to be of “especially urgent concern” 
(aktualnoe znachenie), citing its political significance “as the state language of the Great Soviet 
Union” and its practical significance in academic disciplines and higher education.27 The 
Ministry of Education of the Kazakh SSR increased the number of Russian instructional hours in 
Kazakh schools from 24 to 31 hours per week for the 1937–38 school year, though crippling 
shortages of both teachers and materials mitigated the impact.28 On the eve of the 1938 law, 
considerable consensus had emerged across the country about Russian’s importance.29 
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The formal de-emphasis on Russian should thus not be conflated with active repression 
of the language. Indeed, Russian never disappeared from the central workings of the state, even 
at the republic and local levels. After all, Lenin’s conviction that there was no need to mandate 
the study of Russian was rooted in a firm belief that forcing Russian would be ineffective: 
coercion, he wrote, “makes it harder for the great and powerful Russian language to reach other 
national groups, and more importantly, it exacerbates hostility, creates a million new tensions, 
intensifies irritation and mutual misunderstanding, etc.”30 In Lenin’s view, the fastest way to 
promote proficiency would be to let non-Russians recognize its importance of their own accord 
while providing resources for them to study the language voluntarily.  
No one could deny that Russian was the language of advancement beyond the republic 
level, and for all the proclaimed equality of languages, non-Russian languages were often 
disadvantaged in high politics at the all-union and republic scale. Stenographs of party meetings 
frequently suggested deep preference for Russian: although representatives could theoretically 
speak in any language, stenographers summarized or omitted remarks delivered in non-Russian 
languages. This was sometimes even the case in republics, where titular languages were often 
theoretically prioritized but nevertheless disadvantaged in practice. At party meetings in 
Kazakhstan, those presenting in Kazakh were encouraged to offer brief remarks in Russian in 
written or oral form, “since we do not have stenographers who speak Kazakh.”31 
The lack of priority afforded to provisioning meetings with qualified stenographers 
contributed to an erasure of non-Russian languages and demonstrated de facto preferences for 
Russian. Government ministries and the party frequently conducted their work in Russian, both 
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in Kazakhstan and elsewhere, and sometimes even responded to non-Russian language petitions 
in Russian.32 Ali F. İğmen notes that cultural activists administering local clubs in Kyrgyzstan 
routinely corresponded in Russian, ironically even when discussing the need to expand the use of 
Kyrgyz.33 This preference for Russian filtered down to the population as well. In letters to the 
central state, non-Russian citizens often wrote in awkward, broken Russian rather than native 
languages, suggesting many felt requests and petitions would be considered more seriously if 
delivered in Russian.34 
Even without an official mandate, leaders, cultural activists, and even ordinary citizens 
routinely acknowledged and identified Russian as a language of unique importance in the first 
two decades of Soviet rule. Although in theory knowledge of Russian was not an absolute 
prerequisite for participation in civic life, there was little doubt that knowing Russian enabled 
more active citizenship in practice. This was most true for the upwardly mobile and for any non-
Russian who routinely interacted with fellow citizens across ethnic lines. Russian thus enjoyed a 
position of implicit centrality, paving the way for a more formal role on the eve of World War II. 
 
A Second Native Language: The Centering of Russian after 1938 
If the 1920s and early 1930s saw an implicit centering of Russian, the push towards 
mandatory Russian-language education represented just one policy of a broad agenda that more 
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unapologetically embraced Russian beginning in the late 1930s. Pedagogical trends, alphabet 
Cyrillization, and postwar promotion of Russian in Eastern Europe evinced a more explicitly 
articulated place for Russian in the Soviet Union and the world. In official parlance, Russian, a 
language of learning and culture, enabled citizens to communicate with both one another and the 
state, deepening the connection between Russian and Soviet culture. This coincided with the 
greater institutionalization of the concept of the Soviet people, as discussed in Chapter 1. 
Underlying the state’s promotion of Russian was a fundamental understanding that a 
Russian-inflected civic identity could exist alongside other ethnic affiliations, a fact that scholars 
of Soviet nationalities policy have often mischaracterized.35 Far from an overt agenda of 
Russification, a term implying one-way cultural assimilation, the re-centering of Russian that 
began in the late 1930s was part of a new discourse on Soviet identity that saw ethnic and civic 
(i.e. Soviet) identities as inherently compatible and even mutually constitutive. This non-binary 
understanding enabled the state to promote native and Russian languages simultaneously. 
Cultural and educational policies may have sought to change cultures and lifestyles, but these 
practices were not simply attempts to turn the various Soviet peoples into something vaguely 
resembling Russians. Rather, state policy mandated that the overwhelming majority of students 
be educated in native languages, to which Russian was considered a vital supplement. 
Leaders and educators in Moscow and republics adopted two rhetorical strategies to 
lessen the apparent contradiction in the dual promotion of ethnic and civic identities. First, 
leaders relied on inclusive, affective language to describe Russian. This discourse encouraged 
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non-Russians to see Russian not as a foreign language with little connection to their lives but 
instead as a “second native language,” near and dear to their hearts. Secondly, policies promoting 
Russian were often described as practical measures of all-union and cross-cultural integration 
and tied the language to the goal of promoting interethnic understanding. By deemphasizing the 
historic connection to the Russian people, this rhetoric of integration favored its function in state 
institutions and society and deepened its association with Soviet identity. For non-Russians, 
access to this identity increasingly demanded proficiency in Russian. This simultaneously reified 
existing inequalities while offering a tool for integration and upward mobility. 
Although the state would not formally abandon its commitment to native-language 
education until the 1958–59 school reform, the implantation of mandatory Russian-language 
education contributed to a slow, at first almost imperceptible, decline in native languages. The 
requirement that all schools teach Russian burdened an already severely taxed system, straining 
the limited availability of textbooks, teachers, and even hours in the day. Given the pervasive 
implication of Russian’s singular importance, the years that followed the 1938 mandate saw a 
steady decline in emphasis on non-Russian languages, foremost those of non-titular minorities, 
who frequently found themselves integrated into either titular-minority or Russian-language 
schools. Although citizens theoretically shared an equal claim to Russian as either a first or 
second language, non-Russians persistently bore the burden of language acquisition, sometimes 
at the cost of their own language. 
 
The 1938 Mandate at the Center and Periphery 






1938.36 Much like Soviet identity more broadly, the push for standardized Russian-language 
education was intertwined with the looming threat of war. As Blitstein observes, leaders 
expressed concerns that the lack of Russian proficiency among recruits threatened military 
efficacy. These concerns were articulated at the highest level of political leadership: Stalin 
himself pushed Russian-language education during the October 1937 plenum of the Central 
Committee, citing the need for a common language among conscripts.37 
Following Stalin’s demand for universal Russian instruction, the NKP RSFSR prepared a 
centralized mandate, ultimately passed as the March 13, 1938 decree, “On the mandatory study 
of Russian in schools of the national republics and oblasts.” The decree offered a three-fold 
justification for requiring the study of Russian: 
First, in the condition of a multiethnic state like the USSR, the knowledge of Russian 
should be a powerful means of connection and communication between peoples of the 
USSR, enabling their long-term economic and cultural growth. Secondly, mastery of 
Russian enables the long-term improvement (usovershenstvovanie) of national cadres in 
the areas of scientific and technical knowledge. Thirdly, knowledge of Russian facilitates 
the necessary conditions for successful military duty by all citizens in the ranks of the 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and Navy.38 
 
The law primarily emphasized the need for integration and connection. Knowledge of Russian 
was seen to be a prerequisite for cultural integration, participation in science and the party, and 
serving in the military, thereby justifying mandatory study. The direct association between 
Russian and both military duty and science also connected Russian with all-union pursuits. 
 The legal rhetoric concerning the implementation of the law dovetailed with several 
emergent trends discussed in Chapter 1. The focus on all-union institutions, most importantly the 
Red Army, reflected the growing focus on unity. At the same time, references to the Russian 
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people, though not always prominent, hinted at an implicit hierarchy that privileged Russians. 
Finally, echoing the tenor of the Great Purges, discussions about Russian frequently blamed 
lagging proficiency on internal enemies. The text of the law held counter-revolutionary 
Trotskyist-Bukharinite and bourgeois-nationalist elements responsible for the dangerous state of 
affairs that left many students without access to Russian-language education.39 
This anti-nationalist refrain permeated coverage of Russian in non-Russian schools. One 
Pravda article highlighted worrying problems in Tajikistan: “Bourgeois nationalists—enemies of 
the Tajik people, who spent many years in Tajikistan’s organs of education—have done 
everything possible to prevent the exposure of Tajik children to the Russian language and 
culture,” resulting in not only students but even teachers having low proficiency.40 Citing this 
very article, a 1938 report concluded that everything said about Tajik schools “as a whole and 
completely applies to the teaching of Russian in Kazakh schools.” The report blamed “national-
fascists” for the low number of hours (24 per week in the 1936–37 school year) of language 
instruction and the exclusion of Russian literature from curricula.41 Ukrainian Party Secretary 
Nikita Khrushchev similarly blamed bourgeois nationalists for scaling back Russian in Ukraine, 
and analogous accusations circulated regarding teaching in Karelia, Crimea, and elsewhere.42 
Attempts to reduce or deemphasize Russian in schools were interpreted as the work of enemies 
of the people who did not give Russian the proper respect or emphasis. 
From the press to internal party meetings, leaders, educators, and cultural activists 
emphasized Russian as the language of the entire populace. A 1938 Pravda headline declared 
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Russian to be the property or achievement (dostoianie) of all Soviet peoples (narody). The article 
noted that Russian had historically been the sphere of only privileged non-Russians, studied by 
the offspring of economic and religious elites. Now, interest in and knowledge of Russian had 
been democratized and spread to all ethnic minorities: “They do not juxtapose their native 
language to Russian. They know and love their language, study it, develop it. But at the same 
time, they want to know Russian as the language of the great people who created the richest 
socialist culture in the world, with Leninism as its highest achievement. They use Russian as a 
shared Soviet achievement (dostoianie).”43 Although Russian was directly linked with the 
Russian people, the article’s author foregrounded its connection to socialist culture. Selected 
individuals—revolutionary heroes, scientists, and writers—were praised as examples of the 
language’s rich heritage and associated Russian with culture, science, and revolution.  
The article promoted Russian as a tool of interethnic communication, which it saw as 
perhaps its most important historical and contemporary function. As proof, the editorialist cited 
non-Russians’ use of the language. Taras Shevchenko, the 19th century Ukrainian poet, writer, 
and artist (here, a “poet-revolutionary”), had been educated and wrote in Russian. Russian 
literature had also influenced Alexander Chavchavadze, a 19th century Georgian nobleman, 
writer, and translator. Figures like Shevchenko and Chavchavadze demonstrated Russian’s 
historic function in cross-cultural communication. In the present era, the editorialist declared, 
“Russian is becoming the international language of socialist culture,” an international status akin 
to Latin in the Middle Ages and French in the 18th and 19th centuries. Decrying nationalists and 
Trotskyists for keeping Russian out of national schools and bemoaning the lack of preparation 
for the upcoming school year, the article concluded: “Workers of our country want to know 
                                                            






Russian language in all its richness. As the powerful instrument (orudie) of socialist culture, 
Russian should become the property (dostoianie) of every Soviet citizen!”44 
Recognition of Russian’s importance also came from republics. At a March 1939 Central 
Committee in Kazakhstan, Sársen Amanjolov, who drafted the new Cyrillized Kazakh alphabet, 
explicitly saw Russian as the most powerful “instrument” (orudie) for boosting the military and 
improving culture: “This great Russian language has now become the great international 
language of the peoples of the Soviet Union in matters of mutual understanding and mutual 
connection. In this language, our peoples can communicate and understand one another and at 
the same time, strengthen the friendship of the peoples and the power of our country, both in the 
Red Army and also in everyday life…”45 The Kazakh language, he further noted, owed much of 
its post-revolutionary development to Russian’s influence, since it enabled Kazakh workers to 
access the riches of Russian literature and culture. 
 Party and educational activists frequently highlighted the leading role of the Russian 
people as a primary reason that all citizens should study Russian. At the 14th Congress of the 
Communist Party of Ukraine in June 1938, Secretary Nikita Khrushchev proclaimed, 
“Comrades, now all peoples will study Russian, because Russian workers, foremost the workers 
of Petersburg and Moscow, raised the banner of revolt in October 1917.”46 At a meeting about 
the new Tajik script, Tair Pulatov, head of the alphabet commission, similarly declared: 
The Tajik people has always remembered, remembers, and will remember the enormous 
significance and influence on the development of its [own Tajik] culture that has been 
and continues to be shown by the great Russian culture and the great Russian language, 
the culture and language of the titan people (narod-ispolin) that has given humanity such 
luminaries of science and art like Lenin and Stalin, Pushkin and Tolstoy, Gorky and 
Mayakovsky, Mechnikov and Pavlov, Tsiolkovsky and Michurin… The Tajik people 
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sees in them a clear example of all that is cutting-edge, progressive, and luminous, which 
enables its [the Tajik people’s] growth and progress on the path to communism. It sees in 
this the only correct path to its real, bright, and radiant future.47 
 
Pulatov emphasized Russian’s importance in culture and science and called all to study and 
master “the very language in which the great works of Lenin and Stalin were written.”48 Russian 
was not only important in the past and present, Pulatov insisted: it was the language of the future. 
 Educational specialists expressed considerable doubt that rank and file teachers properly 
valued Russian. At an April 1939 meeting of the Division of Schools and Science at the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, one attendee, Vasilenko, discussed serious 
problems that had been uncovered in newspapers, teacher conferences, and school inspections: 
“If you ask a teacher what revolutionary significance is contained in the decision of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party [to mandate Russian language education], they don’t know. 
They say it is a progressive language, the language of Lenin and Stalin, but what dictates its 
necessity, they do not know.”49 This, he went on, was true of teachers at all types of schools. 
Many had little concept of what students were expected to know, despite clear expectations in 
the text of the decision. Rural teachers, he pointed out, lacked both knowledge and training, 
suggesting significant gaps between the law and implementation. 
 Outside elite party circles, many echoed the new emphasis on Russian. One 1940 letter to 
Pravda from a Kazakh village commented, “The political and cultural significance of the 
Russian language for the USSR is enormous. It is not only the language of the most numerous 
nation in our country, but also the second native language of all its inhabitants and a connecting 
element of all 160 and more nationalities that settle our Union.” The letter writer concluded that 
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the “mastery of Russian by the entire population of the country is a political task of first-order 
importance.”50 The Scientific-Research Institute of Schools at the NKP of the Kazakh SSR called 
a meeting to discuss the letter’s content. The report indicated widespread approval of his 
description of Russian as a “second native language.” Russian was not a foreign language for 
non-Russian speakers and should be treated and taught differently.51 
 On one hand, the idea of Russian as a second native language reinforced the belief that 
everyone had equal claim to it. At the same time, the concept betrayed continuing inequalities 
faced by ethnic minorities, who were expected to gain near-native proficiency in Russian despite 
fewer resources. Because national schools taught native and Russian languages and literatures 
where Russian schools taught only Russian, non-Russians received far fewer hours of Russian 
instruction relative to Russian peers, even in the best of circumstances.52 More often than not, 
schools failed to live up to the standards, creating nearly insurmountable hurdles. In many 
schools, Russian was either taught incompetently or not at all.53 Although Russian teachers were 
theoretically supposed to speak students’ native language, especially in lower grades, sufficient 
teachers with the requisite skills often did not exist, least of all in rural communities. Sometimes 
native Russian speakers with little to no grasp of students’ native language taught in non-Russian 
schools.54 In more unfortunate but exceedingly common cases, teachers who spoke students’ 
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native language could barely speak Russian.55 Despite limited instruction hours, unqualified 
teachers, and no Russian in the home, non-Russians were still expected to master Russian 
roughly on par with native speakers. 
 The inequality of these expectations can be read across reports decrying the state of 
Russian proficiency. School inspectors and education policy experts frequently condemned 
unacceptable spelling and orthographic mistakes among non-Russian pupils. Most reports 
offered only statistical representations, but when inspectors spoke of specific mistakes, many 
would be familiar to any language learner. In some cases, mistakes reflected differences between 
spellings and pronunciations, whereby students would spell Russian phonetically or pronounce 
words according to spelling.56 Students also struggled with unfamiliar sounds and grammatical 
concepts, and many learned incorrect pronunciation from incompetent teachers.57 Other reports 
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proficiency was the biggest problem facing schools, TsGARK, f. 1692, o. 1, d. 221, ll. 61–63; an undated statement 
similarly highlighted teachers’ spelling and grammatical mistakes, see ll. 79–85. 
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Russian), specific grammatical forms, or regional dialects. One report criticized pronunciation even among native 
speakers, decrying the influence of a Muscovite accent, which further departed from written Russian in the 
pronunciation of specific words: GARF, f. 10049, o. 1, d. 126, ll. 2–3. The difference between written and spoken 
Russian could be difficult for language learners. A 1938 report on the state of Russian in Kazakh schools 
complained that students often omitted spaces between words that are slurred together, added spaces in other cases, 
and mixed hard and soft vowels (u instead of iu), TsGARK, f. 1692, o. 1, d. 133, ll. 18–19. A 1940 report on 
Russian education in Dagestan also highlighted small spelling errors of one of the best students: L. Brontman, 
“Russkii iazyk v raionakh Dagestana,” Pravda, 25 September 1940, 3. On similarly mistakes in Tatarstan, see Gr. 
Kaminskii, “Russkii iazyk v tatarskoi shkole,” Izvestiia, 21 March 1941, 2. In postwar western Ukraine, one report 
noted that pupils often confused Russian and Ukrainian orthography and pronunciation or spoke Russian with a 
Ukrainian accent, see State Archive of Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (hereafter DAIFO), f. R-3, o. 2, d. 60, ll. 73–77. 
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highlighted orthographic confusion, whereby language-learners confused Cyrillic letters with 
similar-looking Latin ones.58 
 At least one letter writer, in a letter to Pravda in 1940, took pity on language learners, 
since Russian was “one of the most difficult languages.” Although the grammar and vocabulary 
were somewhat familiar for Slavs, Russian presented difficulties for non-Slavic minorities: 
But for the rest of the ethnicities of our Union it is sometimes more difficult than their 
native language… The Russian verb with its perfective and imperfective aspects, past 
participles, and gerunds, three forms of imperatives—it’s a tough pill [literally: hard 
bone] for non-Slavs. Declension with an endless array of exceptions. The mutation of 
sounds. And—the most difficult of all—Russian stress. Just 50 or 60 years ago, scholars 
in the West believed that Russian stress had no rules whatsoever. Now we know there are 
rules, and how! In nouns alone there are nine types of stress, but there is no rule for 
determining to which group one or another noun belongs.59 
 
These problems, the author declared, were compounded by the fact that textbooks did not take 
into account the specificity of non-Russian schools and presumed native proficiency. Such 
textbooks failed to explain finer points of grammar and vocabulary to non-native learners. 
 The letter writer implicitly hinted at the significant pedagogical impact of Russian’s 
status as a second native language. Most practically, students were expected to transition into 
near-native Russian-language proficiency quickly, with relatively little clarified in their mother 
tongue. Celebrated teachers often suggested that once students had amassed sufficient 
vocabulary, native language should only be used in the most extreme cases.60 Although this 
might have been pedagogically sound advice for efficient language acquisition, most reports 
emphasized the sorry state of the average pupil’s grasp of Russian grammar, often blaming poor 
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instruction at the earliest level.61 Because proficiency was often measured by the lack of spelling 
and grammatical errors, oral fluency was only one goal of language training. Furthermore, given 
the extreme under-resourcing of schools with pedagogical materials and textbooks, non-Russian 
schools sometimes relied on textbooks prepared for Russian schools, presuming students to be 
able to access materials for Russian students of a similar age, clearly an unrealistic expectation.62 
 Inequalities between languages became apparent when students transitioned into Russian-
language schools alongside native speakers. Although the state devoted significant resources 
towards native-language schools, most extensively at the primary school level (grades 1–4), non-
Russian children encountered Russian-language education in a number of circumstances. Non-
Russian populations deemed insufficiently concentrated geographically to justify the expense of 
native-language education often found only Russian-language schools available, a trend that 
dramatically increased in subsequent decades.63 Transitioning to Russian-language schools was 
common after fourth grade, when many non-Russians entered Russian schools due to insufficient 
demand for native language schools and/or shortages of suitably trained teachers. The most 
upwardly mobile of non-Russian students entered Russian-language higher education, often 
exposing their poor preparation, particularly in Russian. Insufficient Russian proficiency could 
prevent non-Russians from continuing their education.64 The discourse of the “second native 
language” thus subtly implied an expectation of near-native fluency, despite the fact that most 
non-Russians had considerably fewer resources at their disposal for learning Russian. 
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Alphabet Soup: Cyrillization and Orthographic Change 
For many non-Slavic students, learning Russian entailed not only acquiring a new 
language with unfamiliar sounds and grammar but also a new alphabet, since most non-Slavic 
languages were written in Latin-derived scripts. Across Eurasia, Latinization increasingly came 
under attack with the introduction of mandatory Russian-language study, culminating in the 
adoption of Cyrillic-based scripts for most languages between 1936 and the early 1940s.65 The 
transition to modified Cyrillic alphabets highlighted the growing prominence of Russian, as 
activists emphasized the need for and timeliness of new scripts. As Tair Pulatov, the head of the 
alphabet commission in Tajikistan, noted, under current conditions of “brotherhood and Stalinist 
friendship between people of the Soviet Union,” the Latin script stood in “clear conflict with the 
tendencies of development of the modern Tajik language.”66 Political leaders, scholars, and 
cultural activists argued that the transition to Cyrillic scripts would offer numerous advantages 
on both individual and communal levels. 
On an individual scale, new scripts promised to reduce confusion and educational 
burdens, since non-Russians students would no longer need to learn two alphabets.67 This 
discourse rhetorically couched the introduction of new scripts in discourses of liberation and 
attention to non-Russians’ needs while simultaneously privileging the place of Russian. 
Orthographic choices underscored the Russian language’s privileged position. The near-universal 
decision to include all Russian letters in new Cyrillized scripts, including for sounds without 
local equivalents, enabled borrowed Russian words to be properly rendered and promoted proper 
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pronunciation.68 Similarly, sounds unique to non-Russian languages were generally rendered 
with modified versions of the closest Cyrillic variant (for example, ғ, ў, қ in Uzbek were deemed 
roughly similar to г, у, and к). These choices rendered alphabets for all Cyrillic-based languages 
approximately mutually intelligible, as mediated through Russian orthography. 
At the same time, the vision of communication and common connection was oriented 
around and through the Russian language. After all, the modified Cyrillic alphabets, which 
differed from language to language, were far more dissimilar than the more unified Latin scripts 
that were being replaced. In the 1920s, and 30s, there were concrete efforts to ensure greater 
mutual intelligibility between non-Russian languages. Because the adopted Cyrillic scripts 
rendered languages more different, the shift to Cyrillic privileged communication between non-
Russian peoples that was mediated through Russian. This switch was thought, above all, to help 
non-Russians learn Russian more easily and effectively. Although activists occasionally 
referenced the potential benefits to Russians learning non-Russian languages, the primary focus 
was typically on improving Russian proficiency among non-Russians.69 Improved proficiency, 
leaders and cultural activists noted, would make it easier in turn for non-Russians to grasp the 
fundamentals of science, technology, and Marxism-Leninism.70 It would also allow non-Russians 
to receive higher education in elite institutions. 
Activists also argued that Cyrillized scripts offered numerous communal advantages. In 
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economic terms, new scripts obviated the need for separate typewriters and presses for Russian 
and non-Russian languages and enabled access to cutting-edge printing technology available for 
Cyrillic.71 More importantly, new scripts would promote unity and communication and serve as 
an important tool of all-union integration. This mechanism of integration, aided by the Cyrillic 
script and the use of the Russian language, exposed the hierarchical relationship between Russian 
and non-Russian peoples. As two Kazakh research scholars noted, the Soviet Union was a 
“unified system of socialist economy and a community of economic and political interests” and 
home to a common culture that was “national in form and socialist in content.” Russians’ leading 
place in society, they argued, justified a common Cyrillic alphabet.72 Pulatov similarly saw the 
adoption of a Russian script as necessary to Tajikistan’s integration, emphasizing cultural unity.73 
Concerns about fostering better communication reflected larger ideological projects to 
forge a more unified society. If, as suggested by two anthropologists, “orthographic choice is 
really about ‘imagining’ the past and the future of a community,” new Cyrillic scripts visually 
placed non-Russian republics firmly within Moscow’s orbit and separated them from the outside 
world.74 In 1939, this had specific ramifications in Moldova, which transitioned into a Cyrillic 
script immediately after Soviet annexation. The new script not only promoted closer interaction 
with Russians and Ukrainians, it also delineated Moldovan from Romanian as written across the 
border. Secretary V. Tsyganko of the Moldovan regional committee of the Communist Party 
argued that the new script “enriches the Moldovan language, strengthens the linguistic 
connection with the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, makes the study of the Russian language 
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easier,” enabling Moldovans to study the works of Stalin and Lenin.75 Cyrillized scripts offered a 
visual, linguistic reminder that non-Russians belonged to a unified Soviet society. New 
alphabets, alongside newly mandated Russian-language instruction, were tools for promoting 
civic participation and interethnic communication. 
Despite the emphasis on communication, new Cyrillized scripts came with costs borne 
primarily by non-Russians, revealing hidden inequalities between citizens. On one level, the 
transition to new alphabets contributed to material shortages across Eurasia. Since students were 
no longer trained to read materials in outdated scripts, books needed to be reissued and textbooks 
needed to be rewritten. Although the state allocated financial and material resources to the 
transition, the process went slowly, thanks in part to widespread shortages during and after 
World War II. A 1947 report highlighted long-term costs in Kyrgyzstan: “Many necessary books 
are not being republished. The works of Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, Gorky, and also several 
books by Kyrgyz writers published in the Latin alphabet are not accessible to students now. 
Pupils who read books in the Russian alphabet do not understand the Latin typeface.”76 
There were also human costs, since the adoption of new alphabets rendered entire 
populations effectively illiterate, at least as far as newly published materials and newspapers 
were concerned. Implementing new alphabets required retraining teachers, massive literacy 
campaigns, new textbooks and educational materials, and republishing of all literature that was 
to be preserved, all processes that happened twice in less than two decades. Even though new 
scripts would ultimately decrease burdens for pupils formerly required to master two alphabets 
from an early age, a certain number of citizens never fully transitioned. In a published oral 
history, one Uzbek woman recalled that her parents remained “barely literate” (malogramotnyi) 
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as a result. Her father learned to read prayers and the Quran in Arabic script; her mother “spent 
four years studying in what was already a Soviet school, but then, study was in Latin, and then 
she never managed to master Cyrillic, and in practice, she did not know how to read or write.”77 
In this sense, script changes in non-Russian languages could be both tools of and obstacles to 
upward mobility. 
 
World War II: Russian on the Front and Home Front 
If the 1938 decree provided a legal and theoretical framework for mandated study of 
Russian, subsequent decades saw a dramatic increase in the language’s practical significance. 
During World War II and the waning years of Stalin’s rule, Russian served as a tool of 
integration, both within the Soviet Union and in its growing sphere of influence in Eastern 
Europe. Pedagogical changes underscored Russian’s practical significance, as proficiency in 
Russian became expected from all citizens, as well as a growing number of non-citizens in 
Eastern Europe and the world. As before the war, the focus on Russian created difficulties for 
non-Russians, on whom the demands of integration were almost always the greatest. 
The Soviet occupation of large swaths of Eastern Europe in the wake of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact created a climate that privileged Russian. As the state made inroads into 
Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, and the Baltic states, the integration of new territories 
entailed an overhaul of school curricula, including the introduction of Russian-language study. 
Reflecting deep suspicion of Polish-language institutions in Western Ukraine and Belarus, the 
state favored Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian schools over Polish ones and imported a variety 
                                                            






of elites and institutions as part of a broad-based effort to Sovietize formerly Polish territories.78 
Those able to communicate in Russian and/or the language of given republics had access to 
upward mobility due to the benefits of higher quality educational materials and the ability to 
communicate with newly arrived personnel. The presence of Red Army soldiers, party members, 
teachers, and other officials recruited from elsewhere in the Soviet Union increased the 
prominence of Russian and strongly associated the language with Soviet rule.79 In Moldova, the 
transition to a new Cyrillic script in 1939 further underscored Russian’s new prominence.80 Less 
trusted minorities, like Poles, Germans, and borderland inhabitants, were subjected to 
deportation and targeted for agitation campaigns that emphasized Russian proficiency.81 
Both within the military and on the home front, World War II exposed inequalities 
inherent in language policy. As seen in the original 1938 decree, military concerns factored 
prominently in the shift to mandatory Russian language study. The introduction of a universal 
male draft and the elimination of territorial units in the 1930s created a need for communication 
within the ranks. Despite innovative cultivation of native-language propaganda with non-Russian 
recruits, detailed in Chapter 2, service in the military promoted a Russian-speaking milieu. 
Though this did not constitute blatant Russification (soldiers ethnic identities continued to be 
promoted), it reinforced Russian-inflected Soviet identities within the military.82 
The battlefield heightened the stakes of Russian proficiency for soldiers and “peaceful 
Soviet citizens” living behind enemy lines. Following the German invasion, Pravda and Izvestiia 
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provided no shortage of stories of German soldiers whose attempts to infiltrate the countryside 
had been thwarted by citizens’ recognition of their “broken” (lomanyi) Russian, often conveyed 
with renderings of poor pronunciation and grammatical mistakes.83 One report highlighted a 
fascist bandit (razboinik) who “screeched, breaking all rules of the Russian language.”84 Another 
reporter, D. Zaslavskii, drew an even subtler distinction in an article about a German radio 
broadcast that had tried to garner peasant support: “They presented on that day on the radio some 
woman who was falsely advertised to listeners as a ‘collective farmer’… This ‘collective farmer’ 
hoarsely screamed as if in Russian, but it was not our Soviet Russian language. It was a spoiled, 
Russo-German jargon, a vile idiom that combined the fragrance of the feudal lordly manor, the 
old city bazaar, and the German barracks.” Soviet women, Zaslavskii concluded, could easily 
recognize her as a “German production.”85 This and similar reports tightened the association 
between properly articulated, “Soviet Russian” and true patriots, which was only heightened by 
suspicion of native-language use in occupied territories and Nazi collaboration with anti-Soviet 
nationalist groups.86 Real patriots, such reports implied, spoke proper Russian, suggesting high 
expectations for the mastery of the language by non-Russians.  
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Deep in the rear, citizens lived in ever-closer contact with one another, and Russian often 
served as a de facto means of communication. Wartime policies further promoted Russian in the 
education of non-Russians both by design and default. In some cases, native languages were 
tightly controlled and even prohibited. This was especially true for Soviet Germans and other 
“punished peoples,” deported en masse to sites across Central Asia and western Siberia in the 
1930s and ‘40s.87 In other cases, the shift to Russian-language education happened by default. 
Party documents from 1942 noted the limited availability of teachers qualified to teach in 
Ukrainian for evacuated children in Central Asia.88 Insufficient textbooks, teachers, and 
classrooms often meant that Russian became the default language of instruction, since it was 
perceived to be more universally accessible. These conditions impacted host communities and 
resettled peoples alike, as the Soviet Union became more unified, connected, and nation-like, 
mediated through Russian as a language of “interethnic communication.” 
Wartime propaganda also emphasized Russian proficiency, even as some agitation was 
specifically targeted towards minorities in their native languages. At a meeting of the 
Administration of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee in March 1944, the 
Russian literary critic Aleksandr Egolin noted with dismay that two recipients of honors from the 
Uzbek Union of Writers did not even know Russian. Specifically citing the possibility that the 
unnamed writers in question were more influenced by the culture of “Iranian and other eastern 
peoples” than by Russian culture, Egolin interpreted this as a severe shortcoming. Wartime 
conditions necessitated bringing all citizens closer to Russian culture, and in Egolin’s view, that 
especially applied to honored writers. Soviet unity was thus mediated through Russian.After 
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Victory: An Expanded World for Russian 
 Following the German defeat, Russian expanded both geographically and in significance, 
dovetailing with the celebration of the Russian people. In geographic terms, the expansion of 
Soviet influence westward to East Germany meant that Russian functioned as a language not 
only of interethnic but also of international communication, as highlighted by D. Zaslavskii in a 
1949 Literaturnaia Gazeta article. Zaslavskii opened with a description of a Budapest girls’ 
school, where pupils learned Russian as part of newly adopted curriculum: 
Hungarian girls study Russian. So do Hungarian boys. As it is in Budapest, so it is in 
other cities of Hungary. And also in Romania, in Czechoslovakia, in other countries of 
new democracy. By and large, the current generation in these countries does not know 
Russian. But already many adults are studying it. And the adolescent generation will 
know Russian and will read the works of Russian artistic and scientific literature in the 
original. The interest in Russian is very great. It corresponds to the great interest in the 
Soviet Union. This is not just a matter of compliance. The interest in our country is borne 
of high feelings of friendship, consciousness of the historical role that the Soviet people 
has played in liberating countries of new democracy from oppressors, foreigners and their 
own. With love, the names of Lenin and Stalin have been accepted into the national 
lexicons of all nations. With a feeling of devotion, friendship and love, they instill 
interest in Russian. 
 
Zaslavskii contrasted the proficiency of Hungarian schoolgirls, who supposedly learned Russian 
“without grammatical mistakes” with the broken, old-fashioned Russian spoken on foreign radio 
stations like Voice of America: “This is not the Russian language of our time. Democratic 
peoples (narody) learn genuine Russian, Soviet Russian.” 89 
Zaslavskii saw the increased use of Russian outside Soviet borders, including the study of 
Russian by “our enemies,” as proof of the Soviet Union’s status as a world power in politics and 
culture. Knowledge of Russian, he went on, would be a precondition of being an educated 
person, much like Latin, French, and English: “Now no one can consider himself a scholar in the 
full and actual sense of the word if he does not know Russian, if he does not read the works of 
                                                            






Russian thought in the original… Without Russian, it is already impossible to be an authentically 
educated person.”90 Published on New Year’s Day, the article closed with a hopeful vision for 
the future: “with great power we recognize the great responsibility that Russian literature and 
Russian science has taken upon itself before all peoples of the world” as the Soviet Union led the 
world towards communism.91 In 1953, S. Soltanov expressed similar optimism in Izvestiia about 
the growing number of Chinese students learning Russian in order to read Soviet books and 
textbooks.92 Newspapers routinely reported on the study of Russian in Eastern Europe.93 
Within the Soviet Union, the state continued to emphasize the study of Russian, often 
seen as essential for developing patriotism and for binding the various Soviet peoples together. 
Knowledge of Russian, educators and cultural figure repeated frequently, brought non-Russians 
closer to both “the brotherly Russian people” and citizens of other ethnicities, thereby promoting 
and deepening the “friendship of the peoples” that unified all citizens.94 This had particular 
manifestations in the newly acquired territories of Western Ukraine and Belarus and the Baltic 
republics, where the state used Russian as a tool of cultural and political integration. 
Multidirectional population transfers, including the influx of political and cultural elites, 
deportations of unwanted or untrusted minorities and activists, and the brutal suppression of 
purported nationalists, connected the region with the rest of the country. In western republics, the 
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Holocaust, emigration, and expulsions had left many cities severely underpopulated, which 
enabled a greater influx of citizens from elsewhere in the Soviet Union. In Western Ukraine, 
expulsions of Poles and Polish Jews contributed to this phenomenon, as local and non-local 
Ukrainians and transplants from elsewhere in the Soviet Union resettled the region.95 Suspicion 
of nationalism and the nationalist underground in the Baltic republics and Western Ukraine 
drove policies that favored local Russophone elites, who collaborated with cadres sent to the 
region. As William Risch demonstrates, incoming Russian-speaking personnel, including 
military officials, railroad employees, teachers, and political elites, together with their families, 
ensured Russian’s newfound prominence (alongside Ukrainian) in formerly Polish-speaking 
Lviv. The opening of Russian-language schools, theatres, and cultural institutions demonstrated 
Russian’s ascendency. Russian speakers often viewed their language as superior, begrudging 
mandatory local-language schooling and Ukrainian’s prevalence on the street.96  
Schools in newly annexed territories taught Russian as part of a broad program to 
inculcate pupils with Soviet values and principles, which included curricula on the constitution, 
Soviet history, and other subjects.97 Teachers were treated with suspicion and were required to 
attend various retraining courses to demonstrate their ideological reliability.98 As schools were 
Sovietized, command of Russian became an essential aspect of citizenship, and school 
administrations closely monitored the state of Russian-language education. One report 
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documented how Western Ukrainian students confused Russian and Ukrainian pronunciation and 
grammar, continuing the expectations of near-native proficiency.99 A 1948 report from Estonia 
complained that teachers and school officials undervalued Russian’s political significance and 
noted that many students finishing secondary school had insufficient proficiency.100 
 
Russian in School Curricula and Pedagogy 
Pedagogical debates set the tone for Russian’s ascendancy, as pedagogues advocated the 
expanded use of Russian in the educational process, including encouraging students to speak and 
practice Russian in their spare time. Administrators in both Moscow and republics also debated 
curricular changes to offer enhanced opportunities to learn Russian from an early age. These 
initiatives were not symmetrical: although Russian pupils theoretically studied titular languages 
in union and autonomous republics, teachers rarely if ever prioritized creating similar 
opportunities for Russians to practice titular languages with non-Russian peers, implying that 
ethnic Russians’ study of non-Russian languages represented a mere formality. 
Reflecting the idea that Russian should be a second native language for all students, 
Kubeev, a teacher in Kazakhstan, urged his fellow teachers encourage students to use Russian 
outside of class: “Here, some colleagues might ask, why not in their native language, why not in 
Kazakh? Because the native language will never be forgotten, and it is necessary to learn to 
speak Russian well. Outside class, teachers should also speak with pupils in Russian and pupils 
should speak Russian amongst themselves.” Emphasizing the importance of Russian as an 
instrument of social interaction, he also proposed joint programming for Russian and Kazakh 
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schools to create opportunities for Kazakh pupils to practice.101 Another teacher similarly 
expressed his belief that teachers should encourage Kazakhs to speak in Russian in their free 
time. He drew positively from his tsarist-era education, where a sign instructed pupils to “Speak 
in Russian, not in Kyrgyz.”102 Such suggestions relegated pupils’ mother tongue to a secondary 
position in education, even in native-language schools. 
Education officials in some union and autonomous republics also explored the possibility 
of adding an additional “preparatory” year for non-Russian students. Educators envisioned this 
as a chance to begin learning Russian, and it was temporarily implemented in some autonomous 
republics and oblasts in the RSFSR in the 1947–48 school year.103 The extra year was seen to be 
most beneficial to minority students who might later attend Russian schools, usually due to the 
lack of teachers, resources, and students to justify native-language education beyond elementary 
school.104 Russian thus played a critical role in educational advancement and was key to upward 
mobility. Despite some petitioning for improvements to national schools, including opening 
dormitories, improving pedagogical training, and preparing instructional materials, many saw 
small, dispersed populations as a justification for greater emphasis on Russian. 
As a result of methodological and practical difficulties, local officials often sought to 
increase hours of Russian-language instruction to prepare students for continued study, either 
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through curricular adjustments or additional schooling.105 This was seen to be both in pupils’ best 
interests and in line with popular demand. In a 1945 report to Georgii Malenkov, a politburo 
member and the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the North Ossetian party 
secretary K. Kulov remarked, “It must be noted that pupils of our secondary schools and their 
parents show a persistent desire to fully master the Russian language. At the same time, our 
intelligentsia expresses a legitimate dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Russian-language 
education for children of non-Russian nationalities.” Many, Kulov continued, fairly believed that 
students had learned Russian more effectively in tsarist schools than at present, and the RSFSR 
Ministry of Education responded to these concerns by proposing increased instructional hours.106 
 Pedagogues also frequently floated the possibility of teaching additional subjects in 
Russian. In 1939, Atamberdin, a teacher in Qostanaı, Kazakhstan, for example, argued that some 
subjects, notably math and physics, would be more effectively taught in Russian, since many 
secondary school teachers of technical subjects had better command of Russian than of 
Kazakh.107 Similar suggestions were made in the North Caucasus after World War II to prepare 
non-Russians for Russian schools, though these proposals were scrapped because of insufficient 
proficiency.108 Higher education, too, was often conducted in Russian. At the Kazakh Institute 
for Marxism-Leninism, for example, some coursework was taught in Russian, since many major 
works had yet to be translated into Kazakh.109 Although Russian-language instruction for 
subjects other than Russian language and literature was rarely implemented before the 1958–59 
school reform, even talking about the possibility deepened the association between Russian, 
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science, and progress. 
Educational specialists continued to debate using Russian as a teaching language for 
selected subjects in native-language schools, usually floated as a means to improve the quality 
and breadth of Russian-language education. In a 1947 letter to Mikhail Suslov, Andrei Zhdanov, 
and others, Mikhail Yakovlev, who worked in the Central Committee, expressed concern about 
the state of teaching Russian across the country. He highlighted shortages of qualified teachers in 
Central Asia and students’ poor command of Russian in many non-Russian schools, which he 
blamed on insufficient instructional hours relative to Russian peers. Non-Russians, Yakovlev 
observed, had just 1420 hours devoted to Russian, whereas Russian schools had more than 2400. 
He proposed an overall increase of more than 400 hours and greater standardization for Russian 
instruction, which he believed should start in the second half of first grade.110 
Proposed increases came at the expense of non-Russian languages, in part because there 
were only so many hours to work with. This manifested itself in several proposals. Yakovlev 
advocated limiting pupils to studying a maximum of three languages: their native language, 
Russian, and one foreign language. This proposal especially affected non-titular minorities, who, 
in addition to native, Russian, and foreign languages, often studied the titular language of their 
union or autonomous republic. He also suggested scaling back hours for native language 
literature whenever literature was deemed insufficiently developed to justify 2–3 hours per week. 
He cited the limitations of literary canons of Dagestan, North Ossetia, Udmurtia, and the Komi 
Republic and advocated for more study of Russian literature, deemed vastly more important. He 
also proposed the instruction of some subjects—history of the USSR, geography, and others—be 
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shifted into Russian in grades 8–10, giving students more active exposure to Russian.111 
Yakovlev believed problems in teaching Russian were symptomatic of system-wide 
shortcomings, most urgently in teacher training for non-Russian schools. Many teachers, he 
noted, were insufficiently qualified to teach at all and specifically ill equipped to teach 
Russian.112 In addition to increasing Russian contact hours in schools, he proposed additional 
instruction in teachers’ colleges and pedagogical institutions to ensure teachers themselves were 
prepared. Improving Russian in non-Russian schools, he argued, was in the interests of ethnic 
minorities: better knowledge would help to develop a non-Russian intelligentsia and promote 
non-Russian representation in technical and scientific fields, for which knowledge of Russian 
was essential. Indeed, he saw the overemphasis on native language as a hindrance for non-
Russian students: “at present,” he concluded, “the matter of korenizatsiia in autonomous 
republics is sufficiently streamlined so as to negatively affect students’ mastering of the 
foundations of science, including Russian.”113 
 
Marxism and the Problem of Linguistics (1950) 
 Stalin’s essays on “Marxism and the Problem of Linguistics,” first published as a series 
of Pravda articles in 1950, furthered the emphasis on the practical application of Russian. The 
essays themselves were the culmination of a dramatic revision of linguistic science that rejected 
the previously dominant Marrist school led by Nikolai Marr, who had argued for the historical 
connections between language groups that are today considered to be unrelated.114 Stalin’s 
essays, in the estimation of one scholar, “completely altered the field of Soviet linguistics” and 
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“brought about a monumental, but ambiguous, shift in Soviet efforts to understand the 
relationship between Party ideology and knowledge.”115 
The essays, formulated as a question-and-answer discussion with young scholars, argued 
that language was inherently functional and served as a means of communication across class 
lines and over time. “Language exists, it has been created,” Stalin declared, “for the purpose of 
serving society as a whole, as a means of communication between people, to be common to the 
members of society and to be unified for society, equally serving members of society irrespective 
of their class status.” This was true not only of Russian but also of languages of other Soviet 
peoples. To the extent that Stalin discussed Russian specifically, he argued that the language had 
remained relatively consistent across time, despite new vocabularies specific to the socialist era. 
Soviet citizens, he noted, could easily read Pushkin, suggesting that language was not specific to 
the given stage of economic development.116 The essays also implied that Russian would 
continue to be the lingua franca until the advent of worldwide socialism, rather than an eventual 
merging of languages, as Marr had implied.117  
 Stalin’s writings on linguistics had a two-fold impact on Russian’s place in the Soviet 
Union. The first concerned the scientific apparatus, as the scientific community embraced an 
expanded role for Russian and emphasized a comparative-historical approach to linguistics.118 
Within linguistics, previously marginalized scholars of Russian language and history rose to new 
prominence following a purge of the now-rejected Marrist school. Most prominent was Viktor 
Vinogradov, who was appointed as the Director of the Linguistics Institute. Graduate dissertation 
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themes, too, were to be revisited and reoriented towards this new direction.119 As Ethan Pollock 
notes, “forging a new direction in linguistics meant emphasizing the history of the Russian 
language, its grammar, syntax, and relationship to other Slavic languages. This national 
emphasis, as opposed to Marr’s transnational linguistic theory, fit with the patriotic fervor of the 
era.”120 This carried over to other fields. In literature, there was a new emphasis on representing 
the language of the people: literature, like language itself, was supposed to serve the people.121 
 The second impact concerned Soviet pedagogy. In practice, the primary result seems to 
have been an endless series of meetings to discuss the essays’ everyday importance for both 
teachers and students.122 At August and January conferences and at special training sessions, 
teachers attended lectures and participated in discussions to ensure everyone understood the 
significance of Stalin’s work and its implications for the teaching of all languages.123 Despite 
assertions that Stalin’s essays had triggered a restructuring (perestroika) in language education, 
reports on the supposedly significant changes tended to be very vague, and the practical changes 
seem to have been fairly modest. There was, however, a greater emphasis on communication and 
proper expression, as one article noted: “Instructions have been sent to localities concerning the 
restructuring of all work in Russian language, so that it will be oriented towards students’ 
mastery of firm, deliberate knowledge of grammar, and expertise in literate writing.”124 
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Teachers in Ukraine offered various interpretations of Stalin’s essays. Some highlighted 
the need to purify Russian and Ukrainian from obsolete words and to avoid local jargon. One 
interpreted Stalin’s words as an instruction for citizens “even more to love their Soviet 
Motherland, people, Ukrainian language, the language of the brotherly Russian people, and the 
languages of the peoples of the Soviet Union.” Another interpreted Stalin’s essays as an 
instruction for citizens to “mercilessly hate the enemies of the people, bourgeois nationalists.” 
Others complained that instructions on how to overhaul education lacked “concrete directives” to 
help them make appropriate changes.125 Still, one report concluded, Stalin’s essays had raised the 
quality of instruction in general: “This academic year, teachers-linguists have significantly raised 
demands towards themselves and their students. They have started to pay closer attention to the 
literacy and culture of speech both during lessons and also out of class, to the correct articulation 
of thought by students, and to the ideological content of students’ answers.”126 
  Stalin’s essays on linguistics and the resulting emphasis on language’s role in 
communication reflected more comfort with Russian’s prominent role in society and prefigured 
reforms under Stalin’s successors. This explicit acknowledgement of Russian’s importance was 
complemented by two policies of Stalin’s twilight years: ongoing nationalist repression and the 
continuing prominence of the Russian people. First, nationalism continued to be deeply suspect, 
a fact on display in brutal campaigns against nationalists in Western Ukraine and the Baltic 
republics, as well as in the late Stalinist purges.127 The so-called Mingrelian affair, a strategy to 
undermine Lavrentii Beria’s extensive patronage network, instigated a major purge of the 
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Georgian party apparatus in 1951–52, ostensibly to eliminate a traitorous nationalist cell.128 The 
Doctors’ Plot, a final purge halted only by Stalin’s death, similarly conveyed official suspicion of 
supposed “Jewish bourgeois nationalism.”129 Although historians have dismissed the anti-
nationalist content as the motivating factor of these purges, public rhetoric nevertheless signaled 
ongoing suspicion of non-Russians to the public.130 
The Russian people also continued to feature prominently in ideological writing. In 
keeping with common practice since the late 1930s, the central press regularly reminded readers 
of Russians’ role in guiding their fellow citizens towards communism and portrayed non-
Russians as grateful to their Russian older brothers for help and support.131 Because Russian was 
self-evidently connected to the Russian people (regardless of whether the connection was 
formally acknowledged or emphasized), the growing expectation that non-Russians master 
Russian in order to communicate with fellow citizens hinted at Russians’ privileged position. 
The choice of Russian as a language of communication could never be fully neutral or entirely 
equal, since proficiency came with highly differentiated costs borne unevenly by Russians and 
non-Russians (particularly non-Slavs), reifying and deepening inequalities. 
Still, the place of Russian was never strictly hierarchical. Family and friendship 
metaphors implied a certain degree of mutual equality and common belonging, wherein Russian 
served as a means of communication. Russian, importantly, not only opened the door for non-
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Russians to appreciate the celebrated richness of Russian culture and literature but also could 
make non-Russian culture and literature legible to fellow citizens. Newspapers highlighted the 
publication of various collections of translated folk stories, prose, and poetry from non-Russian 
peoples.132 Russian’s function as a means to connect citizens was reciprocal: it made Russian-
language sources available to non-Russians and translated non-Russian sources accessible to all 
citizens. This emphasis on mutual connections and enrichment complicated imperial hierarchies 
implicit in the use of Russian and contributed to its function as the language of state and society. 
 
After Stalin: An Interlude 
 Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953 precipitated considerable political change. Yoram 
Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk posit that Stalin’s death offered an opening for major policy 
changes to address long-standing problems and inefficiencies that his subordinates had been 
unwilling to tackle while he was alive.133 Nationalities policy, specifically the place of Russian 
vis-à-vis non-Russian languages, emerged as a key battleground in the ensuing power struggle. 
Lavrentii Beria, who was re-appointed Minister of Internal Affairs after Stalin’s death, sought to 
capitalize on dissatisfaction with the state of nationalities policy in the Caucasus, Ukraine and 
the Baltic states as he vied for political supremacy. 
 Alongside an agenda of promoting state over party institutions, particularly in the 
security apparatus, Beria overturned several aspects of late-Stalinist nationalities policy. He 
swiftly reversed the effects of the Mingrelian Affair, rehabilitating those who had been purged 
from the party and turning the tables on those who had been locally responsible for carrying it 
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out. This, Amy Knight has suggested, sought not only to reconstitute his patronage network in 
Georgia, but also “to curb ‘Great Russian chauvinism’ and assert the right of indigenous 
nationalities” as part of a broader criticism of Stalinist policies.134 As Minister of Internal Affairs, 
Beria recommended replacing Russians with Ukrainians at both the central and oblast levels of 
the Ukrainian security apparatus (KGB).135 A series of draft resolutions prepared for the Central 
Committee in Moscow highlighted serious violations of Leninist nationalities policy across the 
western republics. One draft-resolution complained of a serious undervaluing of Ukrainian and 
widespread use of Russian in higher education, party organs, and state institutions.136 Similar 
claims were made in Latvia, Belarus, and Lithuania.137 Each draft expressed concerns that 
resurgent nationalists might exploit errors in nationalities policy to their advantage. 
National activists, particularly those in local communist parties, and some citizens 
reacted to these measures positively. William Prigge has argued that Beria “propos[ed] radical, 
concrete and far-reaching reforms for Latvia and other republics,” citing the possible 
implementation of a Latvian language requirement. Beria successfully found allies among 
Latvian party leaders.138 KGB reports from Lithuania, too, indicated widespread excitement. The 
assistant director at an institute of experimental medicine reportedly told his acquaintances, 
“These are very important questions. Now there will only be national cadres. And in the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs almost all have been replaced with Lithuanians. This is being done very well. 
It has been necessary to deal with this question for a long time. In truth, it is being done very 
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cunningly so as to gradually send all the Russians out of here.”139 Another noted that the release 
of political prisoners had contributed to an atmosphere of greater freedom and expressed 
excitement about changing language politics: “They are removing people who do not know 
Lithuanian from their posts and in their place Lithuanians are being appointed. Everyone who 
doesn’t know the Lithuanian language is supposed to leave our region.”140 Lithuanians across the 
republic expressed hope that a revised nationalities policy would lead to a Lithuanian resurgence 
at the expense of Russians and Russian. The impact was severe enough to precipitate a reaction: 
Russians in western republics complained of discrimination in letters to the Central Committee. 
Some complained of unfair hiring preferences; one went so far as to declare there to be a 
“pogrom of Russian workers” in Belarus. Others worried that Russians had nowhere to go.141 
Beria’s attempt to consolidate his political base by overhauling nationalities policy 
ultimately failed. Following a trip to East Germany to handle the June 1953 uprisings, Beria was 
arrested, denounced, and eventually tried and executed in December 1953. His successors largely 
reversed his reforms. Some have concluded that his bid for power, however short-lived, left a 
significant legacy. “Beria’s radical approach to nationalities policy,” Knight argues, “marked a 
sharp departure from the Stalinist line. The implications for center-periphery relations were far 
reaching, to say the least. For the first time since the creation of the Soviet Union non-Russian 
nationalities were encouraged to assert their own cultural and political identities and the 
traditional policy of Russification was thrown into question.”142 More recently, Jeremy Smith has 
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noted that Khrushchev briefly continued some of Beria’s reforms in his first years.143 There can 
be little doubt that Beria raised important challenges to Stalinist policies, but most of his reforms 
were either yet to be implemented upon his arrest or swiftly reversed. 
Beria’s agenda nevertheless highlights two critical aspects of nationalities policy, both of 
which were true throughout Soviet rule: Russian’s position was never a foregone conclusion, and 
there was always popular resistance to language policies. First, leaders and citizens continued to 
debate and negotiate Russian’s position. Beria’s attempts to solidify a political base by 
questioning Russian’s (and Russians’) dominance in non-Russian republics reflected an enduring 
strain of Soviet thinking on nationalities that had roots in korenizatsiia of the 1920s and, looking 
ahead, would resurface in the 1980s. Second, that Beria could claim a plausible (albeit ultimately 
unsuccessful) support base by opportunistically endorsing an agenda of national revival reveals 
considerable resistance to policies that had promoted Russian’s expanded role. These voices 
were often silenced and invisible in the tide of pro-Russian policies and sentiments, but they 
nevertheless reflected long-standing resentments and criticisms that often bubbled beneath the 
surface. Beria’s power bid opened a brief window of opportunity for party and state apparatuses 
and private citizens to express dissatisfaction about the status of native and Russian languages. 
Though the window quickly closed, these complaints did not simply disappear. 
 
Mandating Choice, Displacing Native Language: The 1958–59 School Reform 
 Under Stalin’s successors, Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, discourses around 
the role of Russian continued largely in the patterns set out under Stalin. Russian, still the 
“second native language” of all citizens, continued to function officially as the “language of 
                                                            






interethnic communication” that connected citizens to one another and to the larger world, a 
discourse that continued to deemphasize the language’s connection to ethnic Russians.144 
Translation into Russian, too, continued to be hailed as a tool for making the works of non-
Russian writers accessible to fellow citizens and to a worldwide audience.145 Newspapers 
celebrated the growing prominence of Russian not only within Soviet borders but also outside 
them—even beyond the communist world.146 This only grew as Khrushchev and Brezhnev 
sought opportunities to expand Soviet influence into the developing world in the wake of 
decolonization.147 At the same time, changes in educational policies—principally the 1958–59 
school reform that removed formal language requirements in all schools—contributed to subtle 
changes in the relative role of Russian and native languages. 
 
The 1958–59 Reform 
The school reform of 1958–59, the most significant post-Stalin policy change concerning 
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the teaching and use of Russian, set into motion a major restructuring of Soviet education. As 
part of a curricular overhaul that added an eighth year of mandatory schooling and sought to 
make education more practical, the reform ended the long-standing mandate of native language 
education, giving parents and students more opportunity to study in Russian-language schools as 
desired. This paved the way for long-term changes in educational priorities, language use, and 
popular perceptions over the next several decades. In effect, these changes extended and 
intensified trends that had begun under Stalin, including the indexing of Russian as a language of 
science and culture and the celebration of Russian as the language of interethnic communication. 
At the same time, the state shifted responsibility for increased Russian-language use onto the 
shoulders of citizens themselves, suggesting more subtle practices of cultural imperialism. 
 As we saw in Chapter 3, the reform, officially the “Law on the Strengthening of the 
Relationship of the School with Life and on the Further Development of the System of Public 
Schools in the USSR,” primarily focused on the establishment of polytechnic education and 
practical training. The reform, however, also hastened significant changes to the structure of 
language education in the Soviet Union. The question of language first appeared in Thesis 19 of 
the joint theses approved by the Central Committee and the Soviet of Ministers in November 
1958, which outlined the main principles of the reform. Native-language education, the thesis 
noted, had been a key feature of Leninist nationalities policy. Students in national schools “also 
seriously study the Russian language, which is a powerful means of interethnic communication, 
strengthening the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, and exposing them to the riches of 
Russian and world culture.”148 The thesis proposed the following to remedy the overburdening of 
non-Russians required to study three languages (native, Russian, and one foreign): 
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It follows to study the question about whether the right should be granted to parents to 
decide to what school with which language of study to send their children. If a child will 
study in a school where instruction is conducted in a language of one of the union or 
autonomous republics, then he can also study Russian according to his desire. And vice-
versa, if a child will study in a Russian school, he can study the language of a union or 
autonomous republic according to his desire. It stands to reason that this should be done 
if there are the necessary contingents of children for the staffing of classes with one or 
another language of instruction.149 
 
Allowing parents to choose the language of children’s education, the thesis concluded, was a 
democratic solution that would alleviate overburdening of students while avoiding “any 
administering (administrirovanie) in this important matter.”150 
Discussion of the prepared theses unfolded over the following six weeks. A report 
prepared by the teachers’ newspaper of Kazakhstan indicated considerable support for the new 
initiative among teachers, many of whom expressed concerns about educational burdens. Many, 
however, were resistant to the idea of making Russian optional. S. Kenesbaev, an academic at 
the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan, expressed his concerns:  
In schools with instruction in a national language, it is reasonable to study Russian, which 
is the language of progress, civilization, the language of interethnic communication of 
peoples and of strengthening the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union. The study 
of native and Russian languages is of vital importance, without which it would be 
difficult, and even impossible, to speak of a broadly educated Soviet person. Because of 
the overloading of the educational plans of national schools, the study of a foreign 
language, I dare say, needs to be done through organizing [extracurricular] circles, in 
which students enroll voluntarily.151 
 
Pravda and Izvestiia also routinely published responses to the proposed changes from republic 
leaders, administrators, teachers, parents, and readers.152 Those that commented on language 
specifically indicated a plethora of opinions on how to balance educational needs and limitations. 
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Some emphasized the overarching importance of Russian with little or no reference to native 
languages, suggesting perhaps tacit approval of the new measures that would implicitly scale 
back native language education. “Now,” declared Lithuanian Party secretary Vladas Niunka, “it 
is impossible to consider yourself an educated person in our country without knowing or only 
weakly knowing Russian.”153 To prioritize Russian proficiency, Tajik Minister of Education Tair 
Pulatov proposed smaller class sizes.154 Others recommended a ninth year for non-Russian 
schools to ensure dual proficiency in native and Russian languages.155 Yet others implored that 
the state continue to mandate native languages, particularly for titular minorities.156 Some also 
advocated the continued study of republic languages in Russian schools and among non-titular 
minorities as a tool of “international education (vospitanie).”157 
Similar discussions played out at the meetings of the Supreme Soviet in December 1958, 
as lawmakers came together to approve the final version of the law. In his address to the general 
assembly, Ivan Kairov, president of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences (APN) of the RSFSR, 
the USSR’s premier pedagogical body, noted that the topic of language had generated 
considerable countrywide debate. Reiterating the commitment to parental choice, he noted near-
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universal acknowledgement of Russian’s importance and concern about overburdening non-
Russians. An extra year of instruction, he stated unequivocally, raised too many practical 
questions and complications. Otherwise, Kairov advocated a policy with flexibility to local 
conditions: “This issue [of educational burdens] should be taken up by Union republics, each 
with their own conditions, to find a reserve of the necessary time, for example, by removing 
secondary materials from programs and textbooks among the subjects in the academic plan or by 
more persistent searches for rational teaching methods.”158  
Delegates reiterated the concerns that had appeared in newspapers. Kh. Pirn, of the 
Estonian SSR, emphasized the dual importance of native and Russian languages in national 
schools.159 Piotr M. Masheroŭ (Masherov) of the Belarusian SSR argued that native language 
education should be mandated as either a primary or a secondary subject for children of the 
titular nationality, but that parents should be able to choose main language of instruction. Isidor 
Dolidze, Mečislovas Gedvilas, and Arvīds Pelše, of South Ossetia (Georgian SSR) and the 
Lithuanian and Latvian SSRs respectively, argued that both Russian and the republic language 
should be taught in all republic schools, regardless of the language of instruction.160 Others said 
little about native-language education and instead focused on the importance of Russian.161 The 
Supreme Soviet ultimately decided against a firm statement: the final law, passed on December 
24, 1958, only mentioned the historical importance of native language education. Harkening 
back to pre-1938 policies, republics were ostensibly left to determine specific mandates.162 
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The following spring, each republic put forward their own version of the law on schools. 
Most enshrined the right of parents to choose the language of their children’s education. Several 
republics, including the Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, and Kyrgyz republics, also noted the importance 
of improving the teaching of Russian. In Ukraine, the law clarified that the teaching of either 
Russian or Ukrainian would only happen with the demonstration of sufficient demand. While 
most republics complied with the regime’s informal push towards parental choice, Azerbaijan 
and Latvia initially resisted. Instead, the republics continued existing policy, mandating both 
Russian and the titular language of the republic (and, in the case of Latvia, a foreign language as 
well).163 The state responded to this and other “nationalist” initiatives with leadership purges in 
both republics.164 Dissent on this matter, clearly, would not be tolerated. 
The 1958–59 laws demonstrated reluctance to push exclusively Russian-language 
education while informally enshrining Russian’s premier position. By allowing parents to choose 
the language of school instruction, the state avoided the appearance of requiring primary 
proficiency in Russian. Indeed, the law even ostensibly allowed parents to opt out of Russian 
entirely. Of course, parental choice was colored by institutional inequalities: Russian schools 
were often perceived to be better institutions with more students, better textbooks, and more 
qualified teachers.165 Parents, too, frequently saw Russian as a gateway to upward mobility, since 
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elite higher educational institutions usually operated in Russian.166 As Russian’s position grew, 
the state could maintain a modicum of deniability for its role in this trend. The closing of non-
Russian schools due to insufficient demand, what scholars have called the “efficiency principle,” 
could thus be justified as a rational response to market-like forces.167 Increased use of Russian 
among non-Russians, rather than emanating from above, could be portrayed as a popular 
movement, the natural result of Russian’s importance. 
 
The Long-Term Impact of the Reform 
The reform’s impact extended in several directions. On one level, party and state leaders, 
education administrators, and cultural figures publicly emphasized the ongoing importance of 
native languages. Indeed, many remarked upon the mutual enrichment of the side-by-side use of 
native and Russian languages, echoing academics’ descriptions of the sblizhenie (coming 
together) of Soviet peoples. As Georgian poet Grigol Abashidze remarked in 1971, “The use of 
our so warmly beloved ‘language of communication,’ Russian, far from excludes but rather 
develops and improves national languages.” As evidence, he noted that Russian translations had 
rendered work by Georgian writers accessible to Russia and the broader world.168 Kyrgyz writer 
Chingiz Aitmatov similarly remarked, “Speaking of Russian’s importance, we do not deny…the 
role and importance of other national languages, particularly in places of their ethnic distribution. 
On the contrary, speaking of Russian, we imply alongside it the all-round development of all 
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national languages as one of the main features, one of the immutable conditions of Soviet 
internationalism, the internationalism of a single Soviet culture.”169 
Still, there could be little doubt that the reform contributed to the long-term devaluation 
of native languages in both practical and symbolic terms. Over the following decades, the 
number of national schools in many republics dropped precipitously. At the same time, Russian 
and so-called “mixed schools,” which included class groupings in two or more languages, rose 
dramatically.170 Mixed schools were widely celebrated for promoting interethnic friendship 
between pupils, a key source of “international education (vospitanie).”171 These interactions 
usually favored Russian. The emphasis on “rational” and “economic” approaches—that certain 
languages would be offered only with sufficient demand (and teachers)—exacerbated declines in 
native-language schools, hitting higher education and non-titular minorities hardest. Many faced 
the choice of sending children to either Russian or titular schools thanks to limited local 
offerings.172 The reform also essentially gave a green light for republics to shift higher education, 
most prominently in technical fields, into Russian. The removal of language requirements thus 
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catalyzed a significant scaling back of native-language education in favor of Russian.  
As a result, an increasing number of citizens spoke Russian, including a growing number 
of non-Russians who spoke Russian as their primary language.173 Participation in all-union 
institutions, most notably the military, aided this trend, contributing to higher proficiency among 
non-Russian men than women.174 Interethnic families, too, often favored Russian.175 Harder to 
quantify is the effect on native language proficiency, not least because many felt pressured to 
claim the language of their ethnicity as native regardless of actual practice. Nevertheless, Brian 
Silver notes that among the Central Asians who claimed Russian as their primary language, “a 
large majority… apparently fail to retain fluency in their national languages,” citing that in the 
1970 census, two-thirds of Russian-speaking Kazakhs and four-fifths of Russian-speaking Tajiks 
did not claim proficiency in a second Soviet language. “Switching the mother tongue to 
Russian,” he concluded, “is therefore accompanied ordinarily by declining ability to 
communicate with nationals who are fluent in the national tongue but not in Russian.”176 Citizens 
were aware of a trend of non-Russians who had “forgotten” their native language, which some 
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took as proof of the consolidation of diverse, multiethnic citizens into a single Soviet people.177 
Whatever the reasons, higher levels of Russian proficiency promoted the language’s 
status as the de facto language of society, suggesting one aspect of the symbolic significance of 
the 1958–59 reform. The 1961 party program further enshrined Russian’s central importance “as 
the language of interethnic communication and cooperation of all peoples of the USSR.” The 
section on ethnic relations charged the party with two contradictory tasks. On one hand, the party 
guaranteed “the long-term free development of languages of the peoples of the USSR, the 
complete freedom for every citizen of the USSR to speak, educate (vospityvat’), and teach their 
children in any language without allowing any privileges, limitations, or coercion in the use of 
any [particular] language.” At the same time, the program explicitly afforded Russian a 
privileged position: “The ongoing process of voluntary study…of Russian has positive 
significance, as it promotes the mutual exchange of experience and the exposure of every nation 
and people to the cultural achievements of all other peoples of the USSR and to world 
culture.”178 This simultaneous emphasis on equality and the de facto privileging of Russian 
illustrated the state’s cautious but effective preference for Russian. 
Citizens, too, routinely highlighted proficiency in Russian (and often, non-proficiency in 
supposedly “native” languages) as a key aspect of Soviet identity in letters written in the 1960s 
and ‘70s in connection with the new constitution. As V. Pokrovsky, a Leningrad party member 
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noted in a 1968 letter that proposed the enshrining Russian as the country’s official language: 
In the Soviet Union, all national languages are considered to be equal, but for the 
convenience of communication between people of different ethnicities, Russian is an all-
union language, and, at the same time, a republic language in multiethnic union Soviet 
republics. Russian merits such great respect. It is an all union and republic language in 
multinational republics for the following reasons: Russian is the native language of V.I. 
Lenin; Russian is the native language of people of the Russian ethnicity, as the 
recognized older brother in the multiethnic brotherly family of the Soviet Union; Russian 
has already become, in fact, an all-union language; not only Russians but also peoples of 
all ethnicities of the Soviet Union actively participated in the creation of Russian.179 
 
Others more simply acknowledged Russian’s growing social importance. E. Sinner, of Tula 
(RSFSR), noted in 1964, “the consolidation of peoples of the USSR into a single nation will 
happen on the basis of the Russian language as the most widespread, and the richest among the 
languages of the Soviet Union.”180 
 That the end of mandated native-language education for all citizens coincided with a 
reform that emphasized technical and practical education further underscored deep associations 
between Russian and science, another aspect of the reform’s symbolic importance. The reform 
sought to modernize schools and make them more practical, to connect education more closely 
with “life.” As part of this overhaul, school programs emphasized polytechnic education and 
practical training, combining theoretical learning with on-site training.181 Many higher 
educational institutions in union and autonomous republics, which previously operated in local 
languages, shifted instruction into Russian. In this sense, under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, 
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Russian was viewed as a language of education, culture, science, and technology, an 
understanding that diverted attention from the language’s connection with the Russian people.182 
 Reflecting the growing identification of Russian with science, there was also a newfound 
emphasis on the professionalization of teaching Russian, manifested through the founding of 
new teachers’ newspapers and journals, the holding of regular conferences for Russian teachers, 
and greater control over the quality of instruction. These efforts were oriented both internally, 
towards teachers and students of Russian within the Soviet Union, and externally, towards 
language students and teachers worldwide. The pedagogical journal Russian Language in the 
National School began publication in 1957, just ahead of the school reform.183 The journal 
provided a more deeply focused study of specific methodologies for teaching Russian to non-
Russian speakers than was offered in the long-existing Russian Language in School, which only 
sometimes featured articles on teaching in national schools. Republic journals on teaching 
Russian were also founded and expanded in subsequent years, offering teachers insight into the 
particularities of teaching Russian in specific national contexts.184 
Alongside promoting Russian in non-Russian schools, pedagogical journals emphasized 
the importance of Russian in ways that presented more subtle challenges to non-Russian readers. 
Most professional journals, the Uzbek Minister of Education Anvar Kucharov noted at an 
inaugural meeting of the Ministry of Education of the USSR in 1967, were published almost 
exclusively in Russian.185 Moreover, as Vladimir Khvostov, president of the Academy of 
Pedagogical Sciences, noted at the same meeting, most teaching materials were designed and 
                                                            
182 On Russian as an international scientific language, see Gordin, Scientific Babel, 6 and 241–66. 
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organized with Russian schools in mind, suggesting a certain one-size-fits-all approach that took 
Russian schools as the assumed starting point.186 Although the APN vowed to rectify this 
situation, it suggested the state saw Russian schools as the default for the entire country, 
paralleling ethnic Russians’ prominence in visual propaganda, as seen in Chapter 1.  
 Teachers’ conferences also raised the degree of professionalism in teaching Russian. 
Although conferences for Russian-language teachers had taken place under Stalin, the level of 
organization and their all-union significance increased under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. In both 
1960 and 1962, large inter-republic conferences were held in Uzbekistan, the Baltic Republics, 
and the South Caucasus. Participants reportedly found discussions useful for improving teaching 
quality and bringing together the expertise of linguists, teachers, and policy makers. As a report 
on a potential all-union conference noted in 1967, “in modern conditions, when the function of 
Russian as the language of interethnic communication expands ever larger, the long-term 
improvement of its teaching is necessary.”187 Perhaps the largest such conference took place in 
Tashkent in 1979, with opening remarks delivered by Brezhnev. The conference, “Russian: The 
Language of Friendship and Cooperation of the Peoples of the USSR,” covered all aspects of 
Russian-language education.188 The state also sponsored and participated in international 
conferences for Russian teachers abroad as part of efforts to promote Russian worldwide.189 
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Given the recognition of Russian’s civic importance, considerable attention was turned 
towards teaching quality. New institutions, faculties, and groups within existing universities that 
specialized in teaching Russian to non-Russians increased teacher competency.190 The state also 
worked to improve rural instruction. At the Ministry of Education’s inaugural 1967 meeting 
Azerbaijani Minister of Education Mehdi Mehdizadə highlighted the difficulties of provisioning 
rural areas with qualified teachers. He observed that urban students assigned to teach three years 
in rural schools often found ways to leave early or avoid service in villages. To alleviate these 
problems, he proposed extending initial teaching assignments to five years and focusing on 
training local students—who were more accustomed to village life—as teachers.191 The Tajik 
SSR proposed a more innovative solution to the lack of qualified teachers for staffing Russian 
schools and Russian-language curriculum by inviting young teachers from Ukraine, Russia, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan to work in the republic for several years during the 1960s and ‘70s.192 
 
Russification and its Discontents 
 Although many citizens embraced Russian as a means of lateral integration and upward 
mobility, others criticized Russian’s growing prominence as out of step with Leninist principles, 
a critique articulated by Ivan Dziuba in 1965. Resistance to what many saw as de facto rather 
than de jure linguistic Russification emanated from both titular and non-titular minorities across 
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the country. In a 1966 letter to the Central Committee, Soviet Germans in the Kyrgyz SSR 
complained of discrimination experienced by their children. They specifically decried the lack of 
national schools, which they claimed had resulted in linguistic Russification.193 As Krista Goff 
has noted, non-titular activists in the Caucasus also expressed dismay about the lack of native 
language schools and resources, as only Russian and Azerbaijani schools became available.194 
Constitutional letters occasionally emphasized the need to strengthen titular languages in 
non-Russian republics. Three school teachers in Kyiv complained in a 1965 letter about the 
scaling back of native languages as a result of the 1958–59 reform: “Many parents approach the 
question too ‘practically,’ and they deny children the native language.” They compared the 
current preference for Russian over Ukrainian to the elite preference for French over Russian in 
previous centuries. Rather than the “liberal” position that language choice should be left to 
parents, they argued, “the study of the language of the people of a given republic should be 
turned from a right to an important duty of both parents and their children.”195 Although such 
views were relatively rare and, as in Dziuba’s case, often swiftly suppressed, public 
dissatisfaction with linguistic Russification would grow in the 1980s. This movement ultimately 
contributed to political and social destabilization in the final years of Soviet rule. 
 
Conclusion: Russian for Communication, Imperialism by Default 
 In 1968, V. Kagosian, an Armenian in Sochi (RSFSR), addressed the constitutional 
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commission with an unusual request: 
As is known, today there are more than eight million speakers of Esperanto (the 
international language of the future). Wouldn’t it be expedient to put together initiatives 
and create conditions for the broad implementation of study of this language in schools 
and in special courses in the USSR? With the introduction of Esperanto on our planet, 
humanity can escape the cruel diseases of chauvinism and nationalism. “Native language 
and Esperanto—on a global scale, for more than three billion people”! The only proper 
way out: no violation of the principle of absolute equality, and, most importantly, the 
resolution of the most serious problems of our entire planet. All peoples of our earth will 
go for this. Two languages on a global scale are easier to learn than thousands. “Study 
our native language and the language of interethnic communication—Esperanto!!”196 
 
Kagosian and other Esperanto enthusiasts proposed an unorthodox solution to the very problem 
that stood at the heart of the Soviet language policy: how to both support native language 
education while guaranteeing at least a minimal degree of communication. The proposal to use 
Esperanto rather than Russian, Kagosian believed, would provide the fairest solution for 
everyone, promoting communication not only within the country but across the entire globe.197 
 The difficulty of the widespread introduction of Esperanto, of course, ruled out any 
practical implementation of this wild request, not least because many Soviet Esperanto activists 
had fallen victim to Stalinist purges.198 The sheer practicalities of teaching a country of hundreds 
of millions a language spoken by so few suggest the most important reason why Russian became 
and remained central, despite palpable discomfort with the language’s imperial past. There 
simply was no better alternative if a common language of communication was considered 
necessary to the functioning of the state. As much as Lenin and other leaders tried to avoid the 
appearances of empire, Russian was the most expedient language of communication, spoken by 
the country’s largest ethnic group and a growing number of non-Russians.  
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 Soviet leaders and citizens alike adopted wide-ranging discourses that described Russian 
in terms that attempted to mitigate its imperial overtones. Even before the revolution, Lenin 
identified Russian as a language of literary and revolutionary culture, and he advocated voluntary 
study of the language. In the decades after the revolution and with increased intensity after the 
1938 law, leaders repeatedly emphasized that Russian was not exclusively or primarily the 
language of the Russian people; instead, it was the language of revolution and of Lenin, as well 
as the language of culture and science. Most importantly, it was the language that connected 
citizens not only with the state, but also with fellow citizens. After the mandate to learn Russian 
was officially removed in 1958–59, leaders fell back on the idea that citizens themselves chose to 
learn Russian voluntarily, allowing its usage, both as a primary and secondary language, to be 
portrayed—often sincerely—as a popular movement. 
 Of course, the use of Russian was never entirely fair or equal, despite repeated insistence 
from leaders, the press, and citizens themselves. Russian’s preeminent position exposed some of 
the deepest inequalities that differentiated citizens. Unsurprisingly, non-Russians consistently 
bore the burden of communication, which was almost always conducted in Russian. It was non-
Russians who spent additional hours of the school day learning Russian to ensure they could 
communicate with neighbors and fellow citizens. The expectation, often explicit, that students 
master Russian to a degree that put them roughly on par with native speakers only furthered the 
sense that non-Russian citizens would always be behind fellow citizens to some degree. 
Attending Russian-language schools, made possible after the 1958–59 school reform, could 
reduce the educational burdens of learning Russian. This, however, came at a significant cost, as 
native-language education and institutions took a back seat to Russian-language ones. 






mobility and lateral integration, two features often seen as important for promoting non-Russian 
minorities and enabling them to participate as equal citizens. Although implicit inequalities 
continued, the state did offer unparalleled opportunities for its non-Russian citizens to participate 
fully in civic life. Russian featured centrally in the state’s efforts to forge a connected and unified 
citizenry. As people lived, worked, and traveled side-by-side, Russian served as a powerful 
adhesive that enabled citizens to engage both with one another and with the state, ensuring its 








Whither the Soviet People? 
 
 
 On July 2, 1990, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev approached the podium to give 
the introductory speech at the 28th (and, as it happened, final) Congress of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s speech surveyed the current domestic and international 
situation and outlined the major goals of the party and state over the next five to ten years. In 
contrast to the more optimistic, celebratory tone of prior congresses, Gorbachev talked more 
about problems than triumphs. Citing the need to be “objective and principled,” he launched 
almost immediately into a sober assessment of the country’s biggest challenges, from ecological 
disasters in the Aral Sea and Lake Baikal to ongoing complications stemming from the 
Chernobyl crisis and the aftermath of the Afghan war.1 Even his concluding words suggested 
more resignation than confidence: “Before us, comrades, lie the most difficult tasks, and the 
party sees their resolution, the way out of the crisis to be only forward, only along the path of 
further democratization and deepening perestroika.”2 
 In another significant departure from past practice, and even contrasting his own speech 
at the 27th Congress in 1986, the Soviet people was curiously absent from Gorbachev’s remarks. 
In his address, he used the phrase only once, when he briefly mentioned the “heroic role of 
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communists in the Soviet people’s military feat in the era of the Great Patriotic War.”3 His words 
hinted at a change in tone that could be seen across the political and ideological spectrum. This 
coincided with a growing recognition among both political elites and ordinary citizens of rising 
interethnic tensions. Although these factors should not be seen in isolation as an explanation for 
the Soviet Union’s impending collapse, they hint at an increasing awareness of social rifts in the 
late 1980s that suggested a marked departure from prior decades and offer an excellent vantage 
point to reflect on the long-term fate of the Soviet people. 
 
The Fate of the Soviet People: Newspapers, Ideology, and Social Indicators in the 1980s 
 In Chapter 1, we observed the meteoric rise of the concept of the Soviet people beginning 
in the mid-1930s. The 1980s, by contrast, told a different story. Almost as quickly as the term 
had surged into popular usage just a few decades previously, use of the term plummeted in the 
central press in the final years of Soviet rule (Figure 11).4 In newspapers, the term remained 
largely confined to empty patriotic formulations that had become standard under Stalin. Outside 
of narrow academic discussions of the Soviet people, which to some extent continued, public 
discussion of the concept among party leaders and in the press noticeably declined. 
 As already suggested in the analysis of Gorbachev’s remarks in 1990, this change was 
both quantitative and qualitative. Whereas past leaders—Khrushchev and Brezhnev most 
significantly—had talked at length about the Soviet people at prior congresses, the final party 
congresses devoted far less attention to the term. At first, the change was subtle. In the 1986 
Congress, Gorbachev used the term several times, including twice near the beginning of his 
remarks. Then, his tone remained fairly optimistic. He expressed confidence that necessary 
                                                            
3 KPSS, 1:88. 






improvements to the political, economic, and social structure would yield positive results and 
would raise “the material and spiritual life of the Soviet people onto a qualitatively new level.” 
This would demonstrate to the world the ongoing relevance of socialist construction.5 He closed 
his remarks with familiar tropes: “The Soviet people can be confident that the party deeply 
recognizes its responsibility for the future of the country and for lasting peace on earth, for the 
correctness of the planned course. The main thing that is necessary for its practical realization is 
hard work, unity of the party and the people, and the united actions of all workers.”6 Other 
speeches similarly invoked the term, suggesting continuity with past practices. 
 Just four years later, as we have already seen, the difference was stark. Gorbachev’s 
altered tone and emphasis presented the most glaring illustration of how much things had 
changed, and he was not alone. The decline of the term “Soviet people” was palpable across the 
thirteen days of meetings, mirroring the steady decline of the term in the central press. This 
rhetorical shift reflected a growing acknowledgement that there were problems in the general 
state of interethnic relations. At both the 19th Party Conference, held for the first time since 
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1941, and the September 1989 Plenum, “interethnic relations in modern conditions” featured as a 
major subject of discussion.7 In preparation for the September Plenum, the party solicited letters 
from citizens about the state of interethnic relations across the country, suggesting a new 
willingness to hear and discuss the urgent problems facing society. For the plenum, the 
Communist Party of Ukraine prepared reports on interethnic relations in other countries, 
including the U.S., Canada, France, and elsewhere, a clear sign that some party leaders were 
looking elsewhere for new approaches.8 
Other indicators further suggested the troubling state of affairs, particularly on matters of 
interethnic relations and international (internatsional’nyi, alternatively multicultural) education. 
A 1987 report on sociological research about the values of students in Kyiv betrayed serious 
weaknesses in ideological work. In surveys, students were asked to comment on various 
situations related to interethnic relations. The report concluded that 31 percent of respondents 
preferred monoethnic educational groups, and 31–37 percent did not approve of interethnic 
marriages. Further, many students reported first-hand experience of interethnic tensions, most 
frequently of a minor sort, “rudeness in communication, conversation.”9 These numbers 
concerned the party. The conclusion—that higher educational institutions needed to improve 
work in “international” training of students—suggests that party leaders saw the current state of 
affairs among students as unacceptable and in need of continued attention. At the same time, it 
was also clear that they were relying on old tricks to address new problems.  
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“People are Breaking Apart, Like Sheep without a Shepherd”: Letters on the Eve of Collapse10 
 As leaders and newspapers paid decreasing lip service to the concept of the Soviet 
people, the party actively collected thousands of letters from citizens, many of which offer 
insight into how citizens responded to the conditions of the late 1980s. In some cases, as with the 
preparations for the 1989 plenum, these letters were explicitly solicited as evidence. More often, 
citizens wrote on their own accord to detail their particular experiences and concerns, much as 
they had in past decades. In the late 1980s, in the new conditions of glasnost’, thousands of 
letters poured in, which the party regularly reviewed and used to compile reports on their 
contents. The reports, full of extended excerpts from the letters that had been received and 
statistical analysis of their general content, make it possible to speak of the letters both generally 
and specifically. Even with all the obvious caveats about the institutional origins of this source 
material, the letters shed light on citizens’ growing concerns about the state of affairs around the 
country, particularly on matters of interethnic relations. The reports, too, offer a glimpse into the 
real anxieties of the party members tasked with compiling them.11 
 Judging by the thousands of letters received, matters of interethnic relations were a 
pressing concern for citizens in the late 1980s. The vast majority of letters concerned recent 
events and escalating conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Baltic States, Moldova, and elsewhere, 
either by witnesses to events or by concerned citizens living elsewhere.12 A 1989 report, 
compiled based on letters addressing interethnic relations in 1988 and 1989, made several 
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generalizations: “The majority of letters contains facts that give evidence about the radicalization 
(obostrenie) of mutual relations between nations (natsiia); the impingement of the rights of non-
titular nationalities in a number of union and autonomous republics and oblasts; requests to 
implement the necessary measures for suppressing oppressions and injustices, for ensuring 
[minority] representation in elected bodies, [and] for providing the possibility of study in native 
languages.” The report further indicated the “polarization of opinions” of authors from regions 
with multiethnic populations, suggesting that increased tension was particularly visible in places 
where citizens of different ethnicities lived side by side.13  
Among the most constant refrains in letters, particularly those from Russian speakers in 
non-Russian communities, was the sense that new policies promoting non-Russian languages in 
republics and native-language education discriminated against Russian speakers.14 A report on 
letters from Russian speakers in Uzbekistan received between 1988–89 suggested that many 
believed that conditions had recently worsened. One woman from Samarkand wrote: 
For seventy years, our peoples (narody) have lived in peace and friendship, all language 
barriers have practically disappeared, and there has been an increase in mixed 
marriages—everything was leading towards equality and good neighborly relations. 
However, recently the ethnic relations in our republic have elicited considerable concern 
for parts of the population. Nationalism in the last two years has reached greater scopes. 
Even in public transport people are discussing the possibility of declarations similar to 
those made in Georgia, Moldova, the Baltic Republics. And confidence is expressed that 
the police will support such declarations… It is not surprising that the Russophone parts 
of the population have a skeptical attitude to the local police.15 
 
Another woman similarly noted that, though she had been born and raised in Uzbekistan and felt 
it to be her home, she heard increased antagonism and open threats from her Uzbek neighbors, 
who were increasingly united in their mahallas [Uzbek: neighborhoods]. Another woman 
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reported that she had been told to return to her “own Russia” if she did not agree with current 
conditions.16 One Tashkent resident complained that the official status of Uzbek now made it 
especially difficult for non-Uzbek speakers to participate in local society: “I have lived in 
Tashkent for 36 years already, and it is not my fault that I have a weak knowledge of Uzbek. 
Many would like to know Uzbek and other languages. But that is the way things have gone, and 
it is important to take that into account. Unfortunately, the Uzbek segment of the population does 
not want to consider this.”17 
 Russian speakers across the Soviet Union expressed similar concerns. One report noted 
that many letters contained “complaints from Russians who live in union and autonomous 
republics about the difficulty of life in another ethnic (inonatsional’nyi) environment.” The 
report also noted an uptick in requests for help in moving to the RSFSR from other republics, 
particularly from the Baltic republics, Azerbaijan, ASSRs in the RSFSR, and all the republics of 
Central Asia and Kazakhstan.18 Many Russophone letter writers complained of growing tensions 
from the increased presence of nationalist groups. “Tell me, Mikhail Sergeevich [Gorbachev],” 
wrote one woman in Moldova, “why do they so furiously dislike Russians in the republics? What 
bad did we do to them, what did we do to earn this antipathy? Perhaps Russians have committed 
a great sin for which they must be held in contempt.”19 
Although the registered complaints speak more to the loss of privilege than to growing 
inequality (indeed, these policies generally promoted greater equality for non-Russians), their 
words suggest increased polarization and antipathy between various segments of society, 
foremost along ethnic lines. This is cast into even sharper relief when considered alongside 
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letters from nationalist activists, who complained that the historic emphasis on Russian had 
caused a precipitous decline in native language use. These concerns were expressed most 
frequently in letters from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, as well as several Volga republics, 
Yakutia, and Buriatia.20 The same report observed that complaints from ethnic minorities often 
had elements of anti-Russian sentiment.21 Although anecdotal, the few oral history interviews I 
conducted in Kazakhstan, too, indicated a growing sense of animosity between ethnic Kazakhs 
and non-Kazakhs, particularly after the Jeltoqsan riots in December 1986 that broke out after 
popular First Secretary Dinmuhamed Qonaev (Kunaev), an ethnic Kazakh, was unceremoniously 
replaced by ethnic Russian Gennadii Kolbin.22 
Above all, letter writers expressed deep concern about the growing factionalism and 
radicalization of society at large. As one letter writer, a female Russian economist in Chișinău, 
noted: “People are breaking apart, like sheep without a shepherd, into groups, factions, and 
camps. Some call public gatherings, revolts, and dream of their own sort of government, dream 
about ridding themselves of occupants. Others are splitting their heads, how to live, where to 
live? We don’t have time for this perestroika! [Do perestroiki li zdes’?]”23 Ethnic tensions, of 
course, were not unique to the late 1980s, but people wrote with a new sense of urgency and 
alarm, particularly as glasnost’ encouraged citizens to discuss difficult issues more openly.24 
 Although these tensions in no way catalyzed the collapse, they created and exposed 
                                                            
20 RGANI, f. 100, o. 1, d. 300, l. 15. 
21 RGANI, f. 100, o. 1, d. 300, l. 15. 
22 This sense was expressed both by Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs, although the oral history record, conducted more 
than thirty years later and only after the events in December 1986 had become a significant part of Kazakhstan’s 
post-Soviet historical narrative, is certainly not sufficient evidence. In one case, one interviewee, a Kazakh woman 
who was a philology student who specialized in the German language, talked generally about Russians and Kazakhs 
avoiding each other on the street, but also more specifically about the tension that ensued when she was asked to 
defend her thesis in Russian, having expected to do so in Kazakh. 
23 RGANI, f. 100, o. 1, d. 308, l. 12. Many thanks to Tamara Polyakova for clarifying the final sentence.  
24 On earlier uprisings and ethnic tensions, see especially V. A Kozlov, Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and 






weaknesses that made the state less equipped to handle the growing economic crisis. At the very 
moment that leaders spoke less of a united Soviet people and local policies created more 
variation in governance (particularly in questions of language), individuals felt increasingly 
alienated from their neighbors and fellow citizens. In many cases, citizens wrote abstractly about 
problems elsewhere, particularly in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Baltic Republics, Moldova, and 
Uzbekistan. Many worried that similar tensions were emerging in less dramatic but pervasive 
ways in their own communities, in sharp contrast to the perceived greater harmony of the past. 
Many feared the situation could easily escalate into crisis, suggesting a growing sense of disunity 
that was felt both on the all-union level and locally, suggesting greater problems for the Soviet 
Union as a whole. 
 
The Soviet People in Theory and Practice: A Look Back 
 The tone of official speeches, the central press, and citizens’ letters in the 1980s differed 
markedly from prior decades. As we saw in the first chapter, the concept of the Soviet people 
was first coherently formulated in the mid-1930s as a centerpiece of a new focus on Soviet 
identity. In 1935, Nikolai Bukharin’s explication of a united and “heroic Soviet people” began a 
decades-long conversation about the nature and existence of the Soviet people. Articulations of 
Soviet identity in the 1930s borrowed heavily from past discourses, especially the idea of the 
new Soviet person, even as leaders emphasized the uniqueness of the Soviet epoch. In the first 
post-revolutionary decades, the communist party was seen to be forging a new community of 
citizens, diverse in its composition but united in its commitment to the party-state and to Stalin 
himself. This affective attachment called upon citizens to contribute their energies in pursuit of 






and discussions of the constitution, or identifying and eliminating the enemies deemed outside 
the body politic. In letters, citizens articulated their identities with reference to their membership 
in the Soviet body politic, suggesting early success in cultivating an affective Soviet identity. 
 Citizens’ first-hand experience with the Soviet Union as a unified country increased 
dramatically during World War II, when the stresses and strains of war demanded complete 
mobilization and participation from all parts of society. As we saw in Chapter 2, the ideology of 
the Soviet people, as expressed in the central press and in speeches from Stalin and other leaders, 
reflected expanded visions of the body politic, as the population was called to bridge geographic, 
gender, generational, religious, and ethno-linguistic divides to support the war effort. Throughout 
the war, the state appealed to citizens through forms of nested patriotism, which harnessed sub-
state identities, whether ethnic, gender, generational, or civic, to a broader Soviet identity. 
Through evacuations, military service, labor recruitment, and deportations, citizens crossed the 
geographic and ethno-linguistic worlds to which they had been previously more confined, 
offering countless and more personal illustrations of the Soviet Union as a united homeland. 
These efforts to unite citizens broadly continued after war’s end, as the war itself joined the 
October Revolution as a cornerstone of a shared Soviet experience. 
 After Stalin, political elites broadly continued the Stalin-era focus on patriotism but with 
much greater conviction about the existence and importance of the Soviet people, the subject of 
Chapter 3. Notions of Soviet identity were shaped by changing understandings of the role of the 
state, particularly in the newfound emphasis that the state should provide for its people. Political 
elites and scholars wrote extensively on the development of the Soviet people, finding evidence 
for its existence in the common historical past, interethnic marriages, and growing Russian 






Soviet identity, not least through letters in which many proclaimed their primary identification to 
be their civic identities as citizens of the Soviet Union.  
 A wide range of institutions and practices complemented and supported state discourses 
about Soviet identity. Holiday festivities and the formation of new rituals for marking life 
milestones from the cradle to the grave, the focus of Chapter 4, cemented distinctly Soviet ways 
of celebration that reflected and shaped broader discussions about Soviet identity. Under Stalin, 
celebrations had remained strictly controlled and carefully orchestrated by the center. Holidays 
and other festivities showcased the unity and diversity of citizens, as well as the rigid 
hierarchies—particularly ethnic—that were central to the organization of state and society. While 
largely continuing established celebratory practices, Stalin’s successors devoted energy towards 
new forms of civic rituals that rooted citizens’ personal lives to the state within a sanctioned 
framework. In contrast to the rigid hierarchies of Stalin-era holiday celebrations, rituals 
borrowed heavily from ethnic practices and offered citizens leeway for choosing ceremonies that 
were meaningful to them. Although this had definite limits, perhaps clearest in the tight control 
over religious activity throughout the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, it offered citizens some 
space to navigate Soviet identity in ways that reflected their own ethnic, local, and civic 
identities and experiences. 
 The Russian language, too, served as a powerful indicator and driver of Soviet identity, 
as we saw in the final chapter. Across the Soviet period, Russian served as a means of 
hierarchical and lateral integration, connecting citizens not only to the state but also to one 
another. Russian’s legal status often reflected larger state priorities. In the 1920s, the language 
was explicitly deemphasized, as the state promoted ethnic minorities in government, party, 






remained the de facto language of state and was widely considered to be a prerequisite for 
upward mobility. With the introduction of mandatory Russian education in 1938, its role became 
more formally recognized and rigidly enforced. The school reform of 1958–59, in contrast, 
which eliminated mandatory language requirements, reflected greater confidence in the inherent 
pull of Russian and suggested a reliance on cultural imperialism rather than coercion to ensure its 
position. Throughout the Soviet period, knowledge of Russian remained a powerful equalizing 
force between citizens that enabled participation and advancement in civic life. At the same time, 
the use of Russian reflected and deepened existing inequalities, as the burdens of integration 
were almost always borne by non-Russians. 
 Together, these discourses, practices, and institutions shaped a vision of Soviet identity 
that was predicated on citizens’ own involvement in and contribution to the state. From its very 
inception, the concept of the Soviet people encouraged active patriotism, as citizens contributed 
to and participated in public life. Over the decades, leaders offered evolving perspectives on the 
importance of the Soviet people. Yet this process was not unidirectional. By participating in civic 
life, citizens actively contributed to the process of forging Soviet identity. From letter writing to 
gathering in public squares for holidays, from economically productive labor to voting in 
elections, participation—and not rights claims—was the main hallmark of citizenship and 
belonging in the Soviet Union. In their words and deeds, citizens reflected on and challenged 
state-sponsored discourses of Soviet identity, as they considered and articulated their own 
experiences and beliefs of what it meant to be citizens. 
 The Soviet identity that emerged stood at the heart of several important negotiations, 
themes that have run throughout each chapter. First, the state and citizens negotiated the 






people were largely theoretical. When Bukharin proclaimed the existence of a united Soviet 
people, few citizens had extensive first-hand experience with the country as a unified whole. 
Citizens nevertheless negotiated the meaning of identity through participatory rituals, from 
writing letters about the 1936 Constitution to voting dutifully in elections and celebrating 
holidays. World War II deepened the experience of the Soviet people as the country took on 
more nation-like qualities and operated as a coherent whole. Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, 
the practice of Soviet identity also informed the theory: ideologists, scholars, and academics 
pointed to increasing interethnic marriage and growing Russian proficiency as evidence that the 
Soviet people was being forged in practice, as a coherent community. As such, the theory and 
practice of Soviet identity were constantly negotiated and fine-tuned in conversation. 
 Also at the core of Soviet identity was the ongoing negotiation of both equality and 
inequality. This manifested itself in many ways. On a most basic level, the initial promotion of 
the concept of the Soviet people dovetailed with a newfound emphasis on the formal equality of 
all citizens, as guaranteed in the 1936 constitution. Despite this official emphasis on equality, 
citizens encountered inequalities in myriad ways in their everyday lives, the result of both 
explicitly discriminatory policies and more subtle grades of privilege that distinguished citizens 
from one another along gender, ethnic, linguistic, and class lines. The experience of inequality, 
in turn, drove some citizens to embrace a Soviet identity, often exchanging non-Russian ethno-
linguistic identities for a Russian-inflected, all-union identity. The state, however, offered little 
room for citizens to reject ethno-linguistic identities entirely: the ongoing mandate of passport 
ethnicity ensured that this category remained a key criterion by which the state sorted and 
understood its citizens. 






identities. As already stated, the state officially emphasized the compatibility of ethnic and civic 
modes of identification, as the internal passport powerfully testified. This compatibility could be 
seen in other areas as well, including ongoing native-language education, the promotion of non-
Russian minorities in state and party institutions, the use of nested patriotism during and after 
World War II, and the adaptation of ethnic traditions into new Soviet ones. The relationship 
between ethnic and civic identities, however, was often fraught in practice. Beginning in 1958–
59, the notion that parents could choose the language of their children’s education placed native 
and Russian languages in direct competition for scarce resources in education. Many citizens 
recognized the social privileges and upward mobility that came with Russian proficiency, 
leading many to seek Russian-language education for their children. Others, particularly those of 
multiethnic heritage like Anatolii L., whose letter was cited at the beginning of the dissertation, 
understood their historic ethnic affiliations to be incompatible with their sense of Soviet identity, 
leading them to embrace their status as Soviet citizens. Such declarations challenged official 
ideology while simultaneously demonstrating the affective pull of civic identity. 
Soviet identity emerged as the result of initiatives that took place at both the center and 
periphery and among citizens, in ways that reflected and shaped the evolving power dynamics 
embedded in the organization of the entire state. Across Soviet history, power dynamics to some 
extent epitomized the strict hierarchies typically associated with empires.25 Especially under 
Stalin, the state remained organized in a centralized way. Power emanated primarily from the 
center, which projected its vision for society onto the peripheries. The very notion of the Soviet 
people emerged as the result of state-sponsored and state-centered initiatives to forge a more 
unified society. Under Stalin and his successors, the discourses of identity were directed 
                                                            







primarily from the center to the country’s physical and cultural peripheries. Holiday celebrations 
epitomized this relationship, as the state developed, controlled, and monitored forms of 
celebration across the country. The expression of ethnic identity, too, was strictly subordinated to 
central state control, as exemplified in the formal celebration of national cultures via dekady and 
in center-directed purges of republic-level party-state apparatuses. Crackdowns on ethnic and 
religious expression further indicated the center’s unrestricted hold over civic life. 
Relations both between the state and its citizens and among citizens also reflected formal 
and informal hierarchies. In Stalin’s lifetime, the leader himself stood at the pinnacle of society, 
dominating political, economic, cultural, and social life, as citizens expressed their gratitude, 
love, and admiration for their leader, teacher, and father. A hierarchical logic also dominated 
interethnic relations, foremost through the explicit and implicit privileging of ethnic Russians, 
often celebrated as the first among equals and the older brother to their compatriots. Ethnic 
minorities, foremost non-Slavic ones, were eclipsed by their Russian counterparts, especially in 
matters of representation in the central press. In the most extreme cases, repressive measures 
stigmatized and excluded certain ethnic, religious, and social groups, betraying their relative 
position on the margins of society. The reliance on the Russian language and expectations of 
near-native fluency from ethnic minorities also placed the burdens of linguistic integration firmly 
on the shoulders of non-Russians. All these factors contributed to institutionalized and informal 
inequalities that exemplified the state’s imperial and hierarchical organization.  
At the same time, the discourses and practices that surrounded Soviet identity challenged 
and disrupted rigid hierarchies in new and innovative ways. The notion of the Soviet people itself 
imagined a diverse populace that was bound by a sense of kinship, shared values, and common 






War II, unprecedented interactions between citizens altered relations between the center and the 
periphery. The hinterlands made essential contributions to the central war effort while becoming 
key sites for forging a deep sense of affective identity. Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, 
discourses about providing for citizens and raising living standards articulated a sense of the 
state’s obligations towards citizens, rhetorically upending established power relations. In the 
1960s and ‘70s, republic-level actors shaped and promoted new civic rituals that drew on ethnic 
traditions and regional practices, which similarly disrupted rigid center-periphery hierarchies. 
Discourses surrounding the Russian language, too, encouraged not only hierarchical integration 
into the state but also lateral connections between citizens, which enabled them to interact 
directly with one another across peripheries. Although use of Russian exposed inherent 
inequalities between citizens, the language simultaneously provided a vehicle for ethnic 
minorities to participate fully in civic life and to move freely across Soviet space. 
Finally, the emphasis on—indeed, demand of—participation from all citizens promoted 
an inclusive model of citizenship that drew on ethnic affiliations and civic patriotism to foster an 
affective civic belonging that bridged ethnic, linguistic, gender, and geographic divisions. The 
emphasis on participation centered citizens’ own role in and contributions to society, while 
endowing them with opportunities to articulate and practice their identities on their own terms. 
Although their ability to participate and exert their own agency was circumscribed by state-
imposed strictures, citizens nevertheless played an active role in articulating and practicing their 
own identities. In doing so, they reflected and challenged state discourses of civic identity. Even 
without real guarantees of rights, people across the country actively engaged with ideology and 
took part in civic life in ways that confirmed their status as citizens. 






citizens were constantly in flux, as power and identity were negotiated by political, academic, 
and cultural elites and citizens. From the revolution to the collapse, ideas of Soviet identity and 
the nature of citizenship in the Soviet Union were in a state of perpetual evolution and change. 
This identity, then, is perhaps best seen as a set of available discourses and practices developed 
and performed by the state, the party, and citizens together and negotiated within specific 
geographic, temporal, and personal contexts. Together and across a diverse geographic and 
cultural expanse, the state and its citizens participated in a decades-long conversation about the 
nature and significance of Soviet identity and citizenship. This conversation varied across time 
and space and at the center and periphery, as citizens negotiated the meaning and limits of Soviet 
identity. But, as decades of state discourse and citizens’ own words poignantly suggest, it was a 
real, existing identity, one that many citizens passionately claimed.  
 
“What will become of the motherland and of us?”26 
 On December 8, 1991, Boris Yeltsin (Russia), Leonid Kravchuk (Ukraine), and Stanislav 
Shushkevich (Belarus) gathered secretly in the Białowieża Forest, in western Belarus. Together 
they signed the Belavezh Accords, which pronounced the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
formation of a new Commonwealth of Independent States with dubious legal authority.27 “The 
Soviet Union,” the accords stated starkly, “as a subject of international law and geopolitical 
reality, has ceased to exist.”28 Within weeks, the remaining republics—the three Baltic Republics 
had already seceded—gathered to sign more binding agreements, and the fate of the country 
could no longer be in doubt. On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev announced his resignation in a 
                                                            
26 Quotation from Soviet/Russian rock band D.D.T.’s “Chto takoe osen’,” written by Yuri Shevchuk in September 
1991. The song appeared on D.D.T.’s 1992 album Aktrisa vesna. 
27 Perhaps the best treatment of the Soviet Union’s final months is Serhii Plokhy, The Last Empire: The Final Days 
of the Soviet Union (New York: Basic Books, 2014). 






televised address. After he left his office that evening, the Soviet flag was lowered over the 
Kremlin for the last time.29 
 By December 1991, the Soviet collapse was essentially a fait accompli. Decades of 
reliance on oil prices had crippled the economy when falling prices could no longer support the 
state’s needs.30 Within the party and state apparatuses, the lack of control and discipline over 
bureaucrats and party members had led to veritable looting and (illegal) privatization of state 
assets, further depriving the country of the resources it so desperately needed.31 Ecological and 
environmental disasters, from the ongoing desiccation of the Aral Sea to the explosion of the 
nuclear reactor at Chernobyl and the catastrophic Spitak earthquake in 1988 revealed just how 
ill-equipped the late-Soviet state had become to handle escalating crises.32 Meanwhile, the 
conversations enabled by Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost’ (“openness”) unleashed a tidal wave 
of conversations about the crimes of the past. This raised questions about not only Stalin but also 
about the communist ideology on which the entire country was based.33 Revolutions across 
Eastern Europe in 1989 and the quiet withdrawal of Soviet troops from its former satellites 
                                                            
29 For general discussions of the many factors that led to Soviet collapse, see Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: 
The Soviet Collapse, 1970–2000, Updated Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Jeremy Smith, The Fall 
of Soviet Communism, 1985–1991 (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). As Smith notes (p. 5), “it was the 
unique combination of a number of these factors, both long-term and short-term, which led to the demise of Soviet 
communism in the manner and at the time that it did.” 
30 Kotkin, Armageddon Averted. As Chris Miller has noted, there were substantial last-ditch efforts to reform the 
economy, in part inspired by examples from China. These proved insufficient, see The Struggle to Save the Soviet 
Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2016). 
31 Steven Lee Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1998). 
32 On late Soviet environmental problems through the lens of environmental activism, see Weiner, A Little Corner of 
Freedom, 402–39. See also Edward Geist, “Political Fallout: The Failure of Emergency Management at 
Chernobyl’,” Slavic Review 74, no. 1 (2015): 104–26; Serhii Plokhy, Chernobyl: The History of a Nuclear 
Catastrophe (New York: Basic Books, 2018); Nigel Raab, All Shook Up: The Shifting Soviet Response to 
Catastrophes, 1917–1991 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017), 143–205. 
33 Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, 67–73. For (near) contemporary scholarly views on the meaning of perestroika and 
glasnost’ on Soviet society and politics, see Ed A. Hewett and Victor H. Winston, eds., Milestones in Glasnost and 
Perestroyka: Politics and People (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1991). As Denis Kozlov shows, this 
was not unprecedented in the 1980s: the 1960s had seen some degree of similar openness about the crimes of the 
past, see The Readers of Novyi Mir. By the 1980s, these discussions extended to Lenin, who had previously been off 






illustrated to the world the Soviet Union’s declining international influence.34 The August Coup 
in 1991 rendered Gorbachev entirely powerless at home, culminating in the dissolution of the 
communist party and its uncontested grip over the Soviet state. 
 Economic and political crises also opened the doors for previously marginal national and 
local movements to exert unprecedented influence.35 Uprisings, protests, and outbreaks of 
violence across the Soviet Union revealed deeper problems facing the country. Clashes between 
protesters and Soviet troops in Almaty, Kazakhstan (1986); Yerevan, Armenia (1988); Tbilisi, 
Georgia (1989); Vilnius, Lithuania (1990); and elsewhere signaled declining trust between the 
people and their state. Ethnic violence, worst in Nagorno-Karabakh (starting in 1988); Fergana, 
Uzbekistan (1989); and Osh, Kyrgyzstan (1990), exposed rising tensions among citizens.36 By 
the time leaders gathered in western Belarus in December 1991, the secession of three 
republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—was already internationally recognized, and most of 
the remaining republics had declared independence. Perhaps most damningly, Ukraine’s 
referendum on December 1, 1991, in which 92 percent of voters approved of Ukrainian 
independence, signaled a complete loss of popular support for preserving the Soviet Union at 
all.37 In this sense, the final lowering of the Soviet flag on December 25, 1991, represented a 
symbolic end to a process that had been years in the making. 
 The dissolution of the Soviet Union also signaled the end of the Soviet people, at least as 
                                                            
34 See especially Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the 
Soviet Union (Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies 5, no. 4 (2003): 178–256; Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East 
European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 2),” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 
4 (2004): 3–64; Mark Kramer, “The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the 
Soviet Union (Part 3),” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 1 (2005): 3–96; Mark Kramer, “The Demise of the 
Soviet Bloc,” The Journal of Modern History 83, no. 4 (2011): 788–854; Stephen Kotkin, Uncivil Society: 1989 and 
the Implosion of the Communist Establishment (New York: Modern Library, 2009). 
35 For explicit statements of the argument that economic and political collapse was a precondition for the nationalist 
mobilizations, see Suny, Revenge of the Past, 154–60; Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 324.  
36 On growing nationalist movements across the former Soviet Union in both general and specific manifestations, 
see Lieven, The Baltic Revolution; Bohdan Nahaylo, The Ukrainian Resurgence (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1999); Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization; Derluguian, Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus.  






a formally upheld state goal. Much like the Soviet Union itself, the Soviet people’s demise was 
the culmination of a long process. Declining faith among citizens about the unity of their own 
communities together with the state and party’s near-total abandonment of a concept that had 
previously undergirded official thinking testified to cracks that threatened the once-celebrated 
ethnic harmony. Violent ethnic clashes offered the most palpable evidence of worsening 
relations, but these were complemented by countless smaller disagreements and minor clashes. 
In opening the door to more open and honest conversations, glasnost’ shone a light on 
disagreements and rifts that separated citizens from another, particularly as evidence of deep-
rooted inequalities became harder to deny. And thus, with the final lowering of the Soviet flag at 
the end of 1991, the once united Soviet population was now divided by ever-hardening borders, 
protracted conflicts, different languages, and previously suppressed antipathies. Without its state, 
the Soviet people could no longer exist. How could it? The story thus ends. 
 And yet. 
 Any trip to the former Soviet Union still reveals how its legacies continue to shape both 
people and places. In many respects, the Soviet identity that was created and the Soviet people 
(liudi, individuals) that were formed during these decades have outlived the state that created 
them. As Svetlana Alexievich intimated in the introduction of Secondhand Time (2013), a 
collection of oral histories collected over two decades of travel across the former Soviet Union, 
“Communism had an insane plan: to remake the ‘old breed of man,’ ancient Adam. And it really 
worked… Perhaps it was communism’s only achievement. Seventy-plus years in the Marxist-
Leninist laboratory gave rise to a new man: Homo sovieticus.”38  
                                                            
38 Svetlana Alexievich, Secondhand Time: The Last of the Soviets, trans. Bela Shayevich, Reprint edition, 2016, 3. 
The concept of Homo soveticus was popularized by exiled dissident and sociologist Aleksandr Zinov’ev, whose 






 Continuing, she notes the omnipresence of the Soviet person across former Soviet space 
and her own intimate familiarity with the identity: 
Some see him as a tragic figure, others call him a sovok. I feel like I know this person; 
we’re very familiar, we’ve lived side by side for a long time. I am this person. And so are 
my acquaintances, my closest friends, my parents. For a number of years, I traveled 
throughout the former Soviet Union—Homo soveticus isn’t just Russian, he’s Belarusian, 
Turkmen, Ukrainian, Kazakh. Although we now live in separate countries and speak 
different languages, you couldn’t mistake us for anyone else. We’re easy to spot! People 
who’ve come out of socialism are both like and unlike the rest of humanity—we have our 
own lexicon, our own conceptions of good and evil, our heroes, our martyrs.39 
 
Reflecting on the common experiences and shared vocabulary that connected former citizens, 
Alexievich notes her own familiarity with the life stories and trajectories of her informants and 
“reminisced alongside” them: “We share a collective memory. We’re neighbors in memory.”40 
Of course, as memories become more distant and a new generation grows up in a post-Soviet 
world, the presence and prominence of Soviet people retreat more gradually, almost 
imperceptibly, holdouts and echoes from a country that no longer exists.
                                                                                                                                                                                               
published abroad in 1981, see Aleksandr Zinov’ev, Gomo sovetikus (Lausanne: L’Âge d’homme, 1982). An English 
translation appeared in 1985 as Aleksandr Zinoviev, Homo Sovieticus (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1985). 
39 Alexievich, Secondhand Time, 3. “Sovok,” a shortening for the Soviet person (sovetskii chelovek), is also the 
Russian word for dustpan, giving it an explicitly derisive air. 
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